From: Chas Williams <3chas3@gmail.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>,
Chas Williams <3chas3@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.14.y 5/5] udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers
Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2016 10:06:22 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1464789982-4244-5-git-send-email-3chas3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1464789982-4244-1-git-send-email-3chas3@gmail.com>
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit 197c949e7798fbf28cfadc69d9ca0c2abbf93191 upstream.
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
(cherry picked from commit f7f4fb819a8dc620ce43a435ef91327274e2a875)
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <3chas3@gmail.com>
---
net/ipv4/udp.c | 6 ++++--
net/ipv6/udp.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index b0fe135..f305c4b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -1233,6 +1233,7 @@ int udp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
+ bool checksum_valid = false;
bool slow;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
@@ -1258,11 +1259,12 @@ try_again:
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
- if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
+ checksum_valid = !udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb);
+ if (!checksum_valid)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
- if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
+ if (checksum_valid || skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov, copied);
else {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index d2013c7..639401c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int udpv6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
+ bool checksum_valid = false;
int is_udp4;
bool slow;
@@ -420,11 +421,12 @@ try_again:
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
- if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
+ checksum_valid = !udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb);
+ if (!checksum_valid)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
- if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
+ if (checksum_valid || skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov, copied);
else {
--
2.5.5
prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-01 14:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-01 14:06 [PATCH 3.14.y 1/5] sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event Chas Williams
2016-06-01 14:06 ` [PATCH 3.14.y 2/5] USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate() Chas Williams
2016-06-01 14:06 ` [PATCH 3.14.y 3/5] x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization Chas Williams
2016-06-01 14:06 ` [PATCH 3.14.y 4/5] x86/mm: Improve switch_mm() barrier comments Chas Williams
2016-06-01 14:06 ` Chas Williams [this message]
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