Patch "Revert "ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler"" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

Patch "Revert "ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler"" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

[gregkh]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    Revert "ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler"

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     revert-ecryptfs-forbid-opening-files-without-mmap-handler.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 78c4e172412de5d0456dc00d2b34050aa0b683b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 17:32:29 -0400
Subject: Revert "ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler"

From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>

commit 78c4e172412de5d0456dc00d2b34050aa0b683b5 upstream.

This reverts commit 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87.

It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on
the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file,
which is a bit of a heavy hammer.  The right fix is to have mmap depend
on the existence of the mmap handler instead.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c |   13 ++-----------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/file.h>
 #include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
 
 struct ecryptfs_open_req {
@@ -148,7 +147,7 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file
 	flags |= IS_RDONLY(d_inode(lower_dentry)) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR;
 	(*lower_file) = dentry_open(&req.path, flags, cred);
 	if (!IS_ERR(*lower_file))
-		goto have_file;
+		goto out;
 	if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR((*lower_file));
 		goto out;
@@ -166,16 +165,8 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file
 	mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux);
 	wake_up(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.wait);
 	wait_for_completion(&req.done);
-	if (IS_ERR(*lower_file)) {
+	if (IS_ERR(*lower_file))
 		rc = PTR_ERR(*lower_file);
-		goto out;
-	}
-have_file:
-	if ((*lower_file)->f_op->mmap == NULL) {
-		fput(*lower_file);
-		*lower_file = NULL;
-		rc = -EMEDIUMTYPE;
-	}
 out:
 	return rc;
 }


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jeffm@suse.com are

queue-4.4/ecryptfs-don-t-allow-mmap-when-the-lower-fs-doesn-t-support-it.patch
queue-4.4/revert-ecryptfs-forbid-opening-files-without-mmap-handler.patch