From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:57489 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753816AbcHRJik (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2016 05:38:40 -0400 Subject: Patch "random: properly align get_random_int_hash" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree To: ebiggers3@gmail.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tytso@mit.edu Cc: , From: Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2016 11:37:19 +0200 Message-ID: <147151303910981@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled random: properly align get_random_int_hash to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: random-properly-align-get_random_int_hash.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let know about it. >>From b1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 21:08:39 -0400 Subject: random: properly align get_random_int_hash From: Eric Biggers commit b1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 upstream. get_random_long() reads from the get_random_int_hash array using an unsigned long pointer. For this code to be guaranteed correct on all architectures, the array must be aligned to an unsigned long boundary. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1793,13 +1793,15 @@ int random_int_secret_init(void) return 0; } +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash) + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)); + /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of * depleting entropy is too high */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash); unsigned int get_random_int(void) { __u32 *hash; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers3@gmail.com are queue-4.4/random-properly-align-get_random_int_hash.patch