Patch "module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

[<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     module-invalidate-signatures-on-force-loaded-modules.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2016 09:24:01 +0930
Subject: module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules

From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd upstream.

Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else.  Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/module.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2606,13 +2606,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	int err = -ENOKEY;
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
-	if (info->len > markerlen &&
+	/*
+	 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+	 * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+	 */
+	if (flags == 0 &&
+	    info->len > markerlen &&
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2631,7 +2636,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_
 	return err;
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3444,7 +3449,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info
 	long err;
 	char *after_dashes;
 
-	err = module_sig_check(info);
+	err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_copy;
 


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ben@decadent.org.uk are

queue-4.4/module-invalidate-signatures-on-force-loaded-modules.patch
queue-4.4/documentation-module-signing.txt-note-need-for-version-info-if-reusing-a-key.patch