stable.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: vegard.nossum@oracle.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	davej@codemonkey.org.uk, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "fs/seq_file: fix out-of-bounds read" has been added to the 4.7-stable tree
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2016 15:55:19 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1473083719195100@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    fs/seq_file: fix out-of-bounds read

to the 4.7-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     fs-seq_file-fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.7 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 088bf2ff5d12e2e32ee52a4024fec26e582f44d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 15:17:11 -0700
Subject: fs/seq_file: fix out-of-bounds read

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit 088bf2ff5d12e2e32ee52a4024fec26e582f44d3 upstream.

seq_read() is a nasty piece of work, not to mention buggy.

It has (I think) an old bug which allows unprivileged userspace to read
beyond the end of m->buf.

I was getting these:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 at addr ffff880116889880
    Read of size 2713 by task trinity-c2/1329
    CPU: 2 PID: 1329 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #96
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
      kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x80
      kasan_report_error+0x2cb/0x7e0
      kasan_report+0x4e/0x80
      check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0
      kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
      seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480
      proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260
      do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0
      do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860
      vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0
      do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0
      SyS_readv+0xb/0x10
      do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
      entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Object at ffff880116889100, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096
    Allocated:
    PID = 1329
      save_stack_trace+0x26/0x80
      save_stack+0x46/0xd0
      kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
      __kmalloc+0x1aa/0x4a0
      seq_buf_alloc+0x35/0x40
      seq_read+0x7d8/0x1480
      proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260
      do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0
      do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860
      vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0
      do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0
      SyS_readv+0xb/0x10
      do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
      return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    Freed:
    PID = 0
    (stack is not available)
    Memory state around the buggy address:
     ffff88011688a000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     ffff88011688a080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    >ffff88011688a100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
		       ^
     ffff88011688a180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
     ffff88011688a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
    ==================================================================
    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

This seems to be the same thing that Dave Jones was seeing here:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/12/334

There are multiple issues here:

  1) If we enter the function with a non-empty buffer, there is an attempt
     to flush it. But it was not clearing m->from after doing so, which
     means that if we try to do this flush twice in a row without any call
     to traverse() in between, we are going to be reading from the wrong
     place -- the splat above, fixed by this patch.

  2) If there's a short write to userspace because of page faults, the
     buffer may already contain multiple lines (i.e. pos has advanced by
     more than 1), but we don't save the progress that was made so the
     next call will output what we've already returned previously. Since
     that is a much less serious issue (and I have a headache after
     staring at seq_read() for the past 8 hours), I'll leave that for now.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471447270-32093-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/seq_file.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/seq_file.c
+++ b/fs/seq_file.c
@@ -223,8 +223,10 @@ ssize_t seq_read(struct file *file, char
 		size -= n;
 		buf += n;
 		copied += n;
-		if (!m->count)
+		if (!m->count) {
+			m->from = 0;
 			m->index++;
+		}
 		if (!size)
 			goto Done;
 	}


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from vegard.nossum@oracle.com are

queue-4.7/fs-seq_file-fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2016-09-05 13:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1473083719195100@kroah.com \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=davej@codemonkey.org.uk \
    --cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=vegard.nossum@oracle.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).