* [PATCH 01/12] ima: use file_dentry()
[not found] <1474028371-21288-1-git-send-email-mszeredi@redhat.com>
@ 2016-09-16 12:19 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-09-16 12:19 ` [PATCH 02/12] vfs: move permission checking into notify_change() for utimes(NULL) Miklos Szeredi
1 sibling, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Miklos Szeredi @ 2016-09-16 12:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-fsdevel; +Cc: linux-kernel, Al Viro, stable, Mimi Zohar
Ima tries to call ->setxattr() on overlayfs dentry after having locked
underlying inode, which results in a deadlock.
Reported-by: Krisztian Litkey <kli@iki.fi>
Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 4b9b4a4e1b89..ef1e4e701780 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
{
static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
char *cause = "unknown";
- struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ out:
*/
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
{
- struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
int rc = 0;
/* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 596ef616ac21..423d111b3b94 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
/* read 'security.ima' */
- xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_path.dentry, &xattr_value);
+ xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
--
2.5.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 02/12] vfs: move permission checking into notify_change() for utimes(NULL)
[not found] <1474028371-21288-1-git-send-email-mszeredi@redhat.com>
2016-09-16 12:19 ` [PATCH 01/12] ima: use file_dentry() Miklos Szeredi
@ 2016-09-16 12:19 ` Miklos Szeredi
1 sibling, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Miklos Szeredi @ 2016-09-16 12:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-fsdevel; +Cc: linux-kernel, Al Viro, stable
This fixes a bug where the permission was not properly checked in
overlayfs. The testcase is ltp/utimensat01.
It is also cleaner and safer to do the permission checking in the vfs
helper instead of the caller.
This patch introduces an additional ia_valid flag ATTR_TOUCH (since
touch(1) is the most obvious user of utimes(NULL)) that is passed into
notify_change whenever the conditions for this special permission checking
mode are met.
Reported-by: Aihua Zhang <zhangaihua1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Aihua Zhang <zhangaihua1@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18+
---
fs/attr.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
fs/utimes.c | 17 +----------------
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 42bb42bb3c72..3c42cab06b5d 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -202,6 +202,21 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **de
return -EPERM;
}
+ /*
+ * If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both
+ * times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission
+ */
+ if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) {
+ if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) {
+ error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+ }
+
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
umode_t amode = attr->ia_mode;
/* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */
diff --git a/fs/utimes.c b/fs/utimes.c
index 794f5f5b1fb5..ba54b9e648c9 100644
--- a/fs/utimes.c
+++ b/fs/utimes.c
@@ -87,21 +87,7 @@ static int utimes_common(struct path *path, struct timespec *times)
*/
newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_TIMES_SET;
} else {
- /*
- * If times is NULL (or both times are UTIME_NOW),
- * then we need to check permissions, because
- * inode_change_ok() won't do it.
- */
- error = -EPERM;
- if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
- goto mnt_drop_write_and_out;
-
- error = -EACCES;
- if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) {
- error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
- if (error)
- goto mnt_drop_write_and_out;
- }
+ newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_TOUCH;
}
retry_deleg:
inode_lock(inode);
@@ -113,7 +99,6 @@ retry_deleg:
goto retry_deleg;
}
-mnt_drop_write_and_out:
mnt_drop_write(path->mnt);
out:
return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 901e25d495cc..7c391366fb43 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ typedef int (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
#define ATTR_KILL_PRIV (1 << 14)
#define ATTR_OPEN (1 << 15) /* Truncating from open(O_TRUNC) */
#define ATTR_TIMES_SET (1 << 16)
+#define ATTR_TOUCH (1 << 17)
/*
* Whiteout is represented by a char device. The following constants define the
--
2.5.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread