* Patch "f2fs: check entire encrypted bigname when finding a dentry" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
@ 2017-05-23 10:22 gregkh
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From: gregkh @ 2017-05-23 10:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jaegeuk, ebiggers, gregkh, stable, tytso; +Cc: stable, stable-commits
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
f2fs: check entire encrypted bigname when finding a dentry
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
f2fs-check-entire-encrypted-bigname-when-finding-a-dentry.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 6332cd32c8290a80e929fc044dc5bdba77396e33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2017 10:00:08 -0700
Subject: f2fs: check entire encrypted bigname when finding a dentry
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit 6332cd32c8290a80e929fc044dc5bdba77396e33 upstream.
If user has no key under an encrypted dir, fscrypt gives digested dentries.
Previously, when looking up a dentry, f2fs only checks its hash value with
first 4 bytes of the digested dentry, which didn't handle hash collisions fully.
This patch enhances to check entire dentry bytes likewise ext4.
Eric reported how to reproduce this issue by:
# seq -f "edir/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345%.0f" 100000 | xargs touch
# find edir -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
100000
# sync
# echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
# keyctl new_session
# find edir -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
99999
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
(fixed f2fs_dentry_hash() to work even when the hash is 0)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/dir.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 3 ++-
fs/f2fs/hash.c | 7 ++++++-
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
@@ -124,19 +124,29 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_target_dentr
de = &d->dentry[bit_pos];
- /* encrypted case */
+ if (de->hash_code != namehash)
+ goto not_match;
+
de_name.name = d->filename[bit_pos];
de_name.len = le16_to_cpu(de->name_len);
- /* show encrypted name */
- if (fname->hash) {
- if (de->hash_code == fname->hash)
- goto found;
- } else if (de_name.len == name->len &&
- de->hash_code == namehash &&
- !memcmp(de_name.name, name->name, name->len))
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION
+ if (unlikely(!name->name)) {
+ if (fname->usr_fname->name[0] == '_') {
+ if (de_name.len >= 16 &&
+ !memcmp(de_name.name + de_name.len - 16,
+ fname->crypto_buf.name + 8, 16))
+ goto found;
+ goto not_match;
+ }
+ name->name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
+ name->len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (de_name.len == name->len &&
+ !memcmp(de_name.name, name->name, name->len))
goto found;
-
+not_match:
if (max_slots && max_len > *max_slots)
*max_slots = max_len;
max_len = 0;
@@ -170,7 +180,7 @@ static struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_in_le
int max_slots;
f2fs_hash_t namehash;
- namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name);
+ namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name, fname);
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(dir), level > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH);
@@ -547,7 +557,7 @@ int __f2fs_add_link(struct inode *dir, c
level = 0;
slots = GET_DENTRY_SLOTS(new_name.len);
- dentry_hash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&new_name);
+ dentry_hash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&new_name, NULL);
current_depth = F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth;
if (F2FS_I(dir)->chash == dentry_hash) {
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1722,7 +1722,8 @@ void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *, cons
/*
* hash.c
*/
-f2fs_hash_t f2fs_dentry_hash(const struct qstr *);
+f2fs_hash_t f2fs_dentry_hash(const struct qstr *name_info,
+ struct f2fs_filename *fname);
/*
* node.c
--- a/fs/f2fs/hash.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/hash.c
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static void str2hashbuf(const unsigned c
*buf++ = pad;
}
-f2fs_hash_t f2fs_dentry_hash(const struct qstr *name_info)
+f2fs_hash_t f2fs_dentry_hash(const struct qstr *name_info,
+ struct f2fs_filename *fname)
{
__u32 hash;
f2fs_hash_t f2fs_hash;
@@ -79,6 +80,10 @@ f2fs_hash_t f2fs_dentry_hash(const struc
const unsigned char *name = name_info->name;
size_t len = name_info->len;
+ /* encrypted bigname case */
+ if (fname && !fname->disk_name.name)
+ return cpu_to_le32(fname->hash);
+
if (is_dot_dotdot(name_info))
return 0;
--- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_in_inline_di
if (IS_ERR(ipage))
return NULL;
- namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name);
+ namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name, fname);
inline_dentry = inline_data_addr(ipage);
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ int f2fs_add_inline_entry(struct inode *
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(ipage, NODE);
- name_hash = f2fs_dentry_hash(name);
+ name_hash = f2fs_dentry_hash(name, NULL);
make_dentry_ptr(NULL, &d, (void *)dentry_blk, 2);
f2fs_update_dentry(ino, mode, &d, name, name_hash, bit_pos);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jaegeuk@kernel.org are
queue-4.4/f2fs-check-entire-encrypted-bigname-when-finding-a-dentry.patch
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2017-05-23 10:22 Patch "f2fs: check entire encrypted bigname when finding a dentry" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
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