From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:56424 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751779AbdFLHz2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Jun 2017 03:55:28 -0400 Subject: Patch "KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree To: ebiggers@google.com, dhowells@redhat.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com Cc: , From: Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 09:55:10 +0200 Message-ID: <149725411024138@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: keys-fix-dereferencing-null-payload-with-nonzero-length.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let know about it. >>From 5649645d725c73df4302428ee4e02c869248b4c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:48:40 +0100 Subject: KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length From: Eric Biggers commit 5649645d725c73df4302428ee4e02c869248b4c5 upstream. sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's ->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/keys/keyctl.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __us /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ payload = NULL; - if (_payload) { + if (plen) { ret = -ENOMEM; payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!payload) { @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ payload = NULL; - if (_payload) { + if (plen) { ret = -ENOMEM; payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!payload) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@google.com are queue-4.9/keys-encrypted-avoid-encrypting-decrypting-stack-buffers.patch queue-4.9/keys-fix-freeing-uninitialized-memory-in-key_update.patch queue-4.9/keys-fix-dereferencing-null-payload-with-nonzero-length.patch