From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from out1-smtp.messagingengine.com ([66.111.4.25]:42887 "EHLO out1-smtp.messagingengine.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752398AbdIRHKb (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Sep 2017 03:10:31 -0400 Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning" failed to apply to 4.12-stable tree To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, dan.carpenter@oracle.com, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: From: Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 09:10:43 +0200 Message-ID: <150571864382145@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: The patch below does not apply to the 4.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >>From 58738c495e15badd2015e19ff41f1f1ed55200bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 15:41:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning Dan reports: The patch 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices" from Jun 8, 2015, leads to the following static checker warning: drivers/nvdimm/bus.c:1018 __nd_ioctl() warn: integer overflows 'buf_len' From a casual review, this seems like it might be a real bug. On the first iteration we load some data into in_env[]. On the second iteration we read a use controlled "in_size" from nd_cmd_in_size(). It can go up to UINT_MAX - 1. A high number means we will fill the whole in_env[] buffer. But we potentially keep looping and adding more to in_len so now it can be any value. It simple enough to change, but it feels weird that we keep looping even though in_env is totally full. Shouldn't we just return an error if we don't have space for desc->in_num. We keep looping because the size of the total input is allowed to be bigger than the 'envelope' which is a subset of the payload that tells us how much data to expect. For safety explicitly check that buf_len does not overflow which is what the checker flagged. Cc: Fixes: 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus..." Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Dan Williams diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index a18c2914f4b6..66586ce23f1b 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -911,19 +911,20 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, int read_only, unsigned int ioctl_cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc = nvdimm_bus->nd_desc; - size_t buf_len = 0, in_len = 0, out_len = 0; static char out_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE]; static char in_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE]; const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL; unsigned int cmd = _IOC_NR(ioctl_cmd); - unsigned int func = cmd; - void __user *p = (void __user *) arg; struct device *dev = &nvdimm_bus->dev; - struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg; + void __user *p = (void __user *) arg; const char *cmd_name, *dimm_name; + u32 in_len = 0, out_len = 0; + unsigned int func = cmd; unsigned long cmd_mask; - void *buf; + struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg; int rc, i, cmd_rc; + u64 buf_len = 0; + void *buf; if (nvdimm) { desc = nd_cmd_dimm_desc(cmd); @@ -983,7 +984,7 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) { func = pkg.nd_command; - dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %zu, out: %zu, len %zu\n", + dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %u, out: %u, len %llu\n", __func__, dimm_name, pkg.nd_command, in_len, out_len, buf_len); @@ -1013,9 +1014,9 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, out_len += out_size; } - buf_len = out_len + in_len; + buf_len = (u64) out_len + (u64) in_len; if (buf_len > ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN) { - dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %zu > %d\n", __func__, + dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %llu > %d\n", __func__, dimm_name, cmd_name, buf_len, ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN); return -EINVAL;