From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ebiggers@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, tudor.ambarus@microchip.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Date: Sun, 19 Nov 2017 12:51:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1511092279242165@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
crypto-dh-don-t-permit-key-or-g-size-longer-than-p.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From ccd9888f14a8019c0bbdeeae758aba1f58693712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 18:30:46 -0800
Subject: crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit ccd9888f14a8019c0bbdeeae758aba1f58693712 upstream.
The "qat-dh" DH implementation assumes that 'key' and 'g' can be copied
into a buffer with size 'p_size'. However it was never checked that
that was actually the case, which most likely allowed users to cause a
buffer underflow via KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE.
Fix this by updating crypto_dh_decode_key() to verify this precondition
for all DH implementations.
Fixes: c9839143ebbf ("crypto: qat - Add DH support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
crypto/dh_helper.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/crypto/dh_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/dh_helper.c
@@ -83,6 +83,14 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf
if (secret.len != crypto_dh_key_len(params))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Don't permit the buffer for 'key' or 'g' to be larger than 'p', since
+ * some drivers assume otherwise.
+ */
+ if (params->key_size > params->p_size ||
+ params->g_size > params->p_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Don't allocate memory. Set pointers to data within
* the given buffer
*/
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@google.com are
queue-4.9/crypto-dh-don-t-permit-key-or-g-size-longer-than-p.patch
queue-4.9/arm-crypto-reduce-priority-of-bit-sliced-aes-cipher.patch
queue-4.9/crypto-dh-don-t-permit-p-to-be-0.patch
reply other threads:[~2017-11-19 11:51 UTC|newest]
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