* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
@ 2017-12-11 21:19 gregkh
2017-12-11 21:43 ` Don Dutile
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2017-12-11 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: danielj, bharat, ddutile, jgg, leon, parav, paul; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 315d160c5a4e034a576a13aa21e7235d5c9ec609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 20:10:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand
For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.
This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 23278ed5be45..a337386652b0 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
{
+ u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);
+ bool is_ib = false;
int ret;
+ while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)
+ is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
+
+ /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */
+ if (!is_ib)
+ return 0;
+
qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!qp->qp_sec)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security);
void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
{
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);
/* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to
@@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
int ret;
int i;
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
/* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
* QP security could be marked for an error state
* transition. Wait for this to complete.
@@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
{
int i;
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
/* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
* wait until this QP security structure is processed
* in the QP to error flow before destroying it because
@@ -557,7 +578,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
{
int ret = 0;
struct ib_ports_pkeys *tmp_pps;
- struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps;
+ struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps = NULL;
struct ib_qp *real_qp = qp->real_qp;
bool special_qp = (real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI ||
real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_GSI ||
@@ -565,18 +586,27 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) ||
(qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));
+ WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&
+ rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
+ !real_qp->qp_sec),
+ "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
+ __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
+
/* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
* handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
* enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
* checked as well.
*/
- if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+ if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
qp_attr,
qp_attr_mask);
-
+ if (!new_pps) {
+ mutex_unlock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
/* Add this QP to the lists for the new port
* and pkey settings before checking for permission
* in case there is a concurrent cache update
@@ -600,7 +630,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
qp_attr_mask,
udata);
- if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+ if (new_pps) {
/* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
* ports_pkeys structure.
*/
@@ -631,6 +661,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
u16 pkey;
int ret;
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))
+ return 0;
+
ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -665,6 +698,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
{
int ret;
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+ return 0;
+
ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -690,6 +726,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
{
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+ return;
+
security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
@@ -697,6 +736,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
{
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
+ return 0;
+
if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
return -EACCES;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
2017-12-11 21:19 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree gregkh
@ 2017-12-11 21:43 ` Don Dutile
2017-12-11 21:50 ` Greg KH
2017-12-11 21:51 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Don Dutile @ 2017-12-11 21:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh, danielj, bharat, jgg, leon, parav, paul; +Cc: stable
On 12/11/2017 04:19 PM, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
>
> The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
> If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
> tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
> id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
That's b/c this patch needs to be applied (tagged for stable) first:
commit 2e4c85c6edc80fa532b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
Author: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Date: Thu Nov 2 15:22:27 2017 +0200
IB/core: Avoid unnecessary return value check
Since there is nothing done with non zero return value, such check is
avoided.
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
2b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
All applied cleanly to RHEL when done in that order.
--dd
> ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>
> From 315d160c5a4e034a576a13aa21e7235d5c9ec609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 20:10:39 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand
>
> For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
> specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.
>
> This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
> querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.
>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
> Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
> Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> index 23278ed5be45..a337386652b0 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> @@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
>
> int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
> {
> + u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);
> + bool is_ib = false;
> int ret;
>
> + while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)
> + is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
> +
> + /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */
> + if (!is_ib)
> + return 0;
> +
> qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!qp->qp_sec)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security);
>
> void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
> {
> + /* Return if not IB */
> + if (!sec)
> + return;
> +
> mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);
>
> /* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to
> @@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
> int ret;
> int i;
>
> + /* Return if not IB */
> + if (!sec)
> + return;
> +
> /* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
> * QP security could be marked for an error state
> * transition. Wait for this to complete.
> @@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
> {
> int i;
>
> + /* Return if not IB */
> + if (!sec)
> + return;
> +
> /* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
> * wait until this QP security structure is processed
> * in the QP to error flow before destroying it because
> @@ -557,7 +578,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
> {
> int ret = 0;
> struct ib_ports_pkeys *tmp_pps;
> - struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps;
> + struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps = NULL;
> struct ib_qp *real_qp = qp->real_qp;
> bool special_qp = (real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI ||
> real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_GSI ||
> @@ -565,18 +586,27 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
> bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) ||
> (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));
>
> + WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&
> + rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
> + !real_qp->qp_sec),
> + "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
> + __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
> +
> /* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
> * handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
> * enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
> * checked as well.
> */
>
> - if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
> + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
> mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
> new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
> qp_attr,
> qp_attr_mask);
> -
> + if (!new_pps) {
> + mutex_unlock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> /* Add this QP to the lists for the new port
> * and pkey settings before checking for permission
> * in case there is a concurrent cache update
> @@ -600,7 +630,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
> qp_attr_mask,
> udata);
>
> - if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
> + if (new_pps) {
> /* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
> * ports_pkeys structure.
> */
> @@ -631,6 +661,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
> u16 pkey;
> int ret;
>
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))
> + return 0;
> +
> ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> @@ -665,6 +698,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
> {
> int ret;
>
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
> + return 0;
> +
> ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> @@ -690,6 +726,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>
> void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
> {
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
> + return;
> +
> security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
> if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
> unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
> @@ -697,6 +736,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
>
> int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
> {
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
> + return 0;
> +
> if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
> return -EACCES;
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
2017-12-11 21:43 ` Don Dutile
@ 2017-12-11 21:50 ` Greg KH
2017-12-11 21:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-12-11 21:51 ` Greg KH
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2017-12-11 21:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Don Dutile; +Cc: danielj, bharat, jgg, leon, parav, paul, stable
On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 04:43:44PM -0500, Don Dutile wrote:
> On 12/11/2017 04:19 PM, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> >
> > The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
> > If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
> > tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
> > id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> >
> That's b/c this patch needs to be applied (tagged for stable) first:
>
> commit 2e4c85c6edc80fa532b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
> Author: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> Date: Thu Nov 2 15:22:27 2017 +0200
>
> IB/core: Avoid unnecessary return value check
> Since there is nothing done with non zero return value, such check is
> avoided.
> Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
> 2b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
That patch was not tagged for stable at all :(
What went wrong with the process here?
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
2017-12-11 21:43 ` Don Dutile
2017-12-11 21:50 ` Greg KH
@ 2017-12-11 21:51 ` Greg KH
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2017-12-11 21:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Don Dutile; +Cc: danielj, bharat, jgg, leon, parav, paul, stable
On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 04:43:44PM -0500, Don Dutile wrote:
> On 12/11/2017 04:19 PM, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> >
> > The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
> > If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
> > tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
> > id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> >
> That's b/c this patch needs to be applied (tagged for stable) first:
>
> commit 2e4c85c6edc80fa532b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
> Author: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> Date: Thu Nov 2 15:22:27 2017 +0200
>
> IB/core: Avoid unnecessary return value check
> Since there is nothing done with non zero return value, such check is
> avoided.
> Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
> 2b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
>
> All applied cleanly to RHEL when done in that order.
That worked, thanks.
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
2017-12-11 21:50 ` Greg KH
@ 2017-12-11 21:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-12-11 22:21 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2017-12-11 21:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg KH; +Cc: Don Dutile, danielj, bharat, leon, parav, paul, stable
On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 10:50:31PM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 04:43:44PM -0500, Don Dutile wrote:
> > On 12/11/2017 04:19 PM, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > >
> > > The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
> > > If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
> > > tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
> > > id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
> > >
> > > thanks,
> > >
> > > greg k-h
> > >
> > That's b/c this patch needs to be applied (tagged for stable) first:
> >
> > commit 2e4c85c6edc80fa532b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
> > Author: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> > Date: Thu Nov 2 15:22:27 2017 +0200
> >
> > IB/core: Avoid unnecessary return value check
> > Since there is nothing done with non zero return value, such check is
> > avoided.
> > Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
> > 2b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
>
> That patch was not tagged for stable at all :(
It doesn't look like something that should go to -stable to me..
I think we will need to make you a proper 4.14 backport for the 'Only
enforce security for InfiniBand' patch.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
2017-12-11 21:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
@ 2017-12-11 22:21 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2017-12-11 22:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason Gunthorpe; +Cc: Don Dutile, danielj, bharat, leon, parav, paul, stable
On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 02:53:58PM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 10:50:31PM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 04:43:44PM -0500, Don Dutile wrote:
> > > On 12/11/2017 04:19 PM, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
> > > > If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
> > > > tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
> > > > id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
> > > >
> > > > thanks,
> > > >
> > > > greg k-h
> > > >
> > > That's b/c this patch needs to be applied (tagged for stable) first:
> > >
> > > commit 2e4c85c6edc80fa532b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
> > > Author: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> > > Date: Thu Nov 2 15:22:27 2017 +0200
> > >
> > > IB/core: Avoid unnecessary return value check
> > > Since there is nothing done with non zero return value, such check is
> > > avoided.
> > > Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> > > Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
> > > 2b2c7e1eb3597ef4d4bbb8f
> >
> > That patch was not tagged for stable at all :(
>
> It doesn't look like something that should go to -stable to me..
>
> I think we will need to make you a proper 4.14 backport for the 'Only
> enforce security for InfiniBand' patch.
No, I almost always want the same exact patches that are in Linus's
tree. Otherwise the patch you make will be wrong 90% of the time.
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-12-11 22:21 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-12-11 21:19 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-11 21:43 ` Don Dutile
2017-12-11 21:50 ` Greg KH
2017-12-11 21:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-12-11 22:21 ` Greg KH
2017-12-11 21:51 ` Greg KH
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).