From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: marc.dionne@auristor.com, alexander.levin@verizon.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "afs: Adjust mode bits processing" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 14:53:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15136051859065@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
afs: Adjust mode bits processing
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
afs-adjust-mode-bits-processing.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Mon Dec 18 14:47:43 CET 2017
From: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 16:27:44 +0000
Subject: afs: Adjust mode bits processing
From: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
[ Upstream commit 627f46943ff90bcc32ddeb675d881c043c6fa2ae ]
Mode bits for an afs file should not be enforced in the usual
way.
For files, the absence of user bits can restrict file access
with respect to what is granted by the server.
These bits apply regardless of the owner or the current uid; the
rest of the mode bits (group, other) are ignored.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/afs/security.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/afs/security.c
+++ b/fs/afs/security.c
@@ -340,17 +340,22 @@ int afs_permission(struct inode *inode,
} else {
if (!(access & AFS_ACE_LOOKUP))
goto permission_denied;
+ if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && !(inode->i_mode & S_IXUSR))
+ goto permission_denied;
if (mask & (MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ)) {
if (!(access & AFS_ACE_READ))
goto permission_denied;
+ if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IRUSR))
+ goto permission_denied;
} else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) {
if (!(access & AFS_ACE_WRITE))
goto permission_denied;
+ if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IWUSR))
+ goto permission_denied;
}
}
key_put(key);
- ret = generic_permission(inode, mask);
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from marc.dionne@auristor.com are
queue-4.4/afs-populate-group-id-from-vnode-status.patch
queue-4.4/afs-adjust-mode-bits-processing.patch
queue-4.4/afs-populate-and-use-client-modification-time.patch
reply other threads:[~2017-12-18 13:53 UTC|newest]
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