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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@fb.com, ast@kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 01/14] bpf: fix branch pruning logic" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 16:47:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1513957658116166@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171222152312.2945-2-daniel@iogearbox.net>


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    [PATCH stable/4.14 01/14] bpf: fix branch pruning logic

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     bpf-fix-branch-pruning-logic.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From foo@baz Fri Dec 22 16:47:02 CET 2017
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 16:22:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH stable/4.14 01/14] bpf: fix branch pruning logic
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, jannh@google.com, stable@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Message-ID: <20171222152312.2945-2-daniel@iogearbox.net>

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>


From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>

[ Upstream commit c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467 ]

when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |    2 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
 		struct bpf_map *map_ptr;	/* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
 	};
 	int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
-	int converted_op_size; /* the valid value width after perceived conversion */
+	bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
 };
 
 #define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3665,6 +3665,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
+		env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true;
 		if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
 			err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
 			if (err)
@@ -3855,6 +3856,7 @@ process_bpf_exit:
 					return err;
 
 				insn_idx++;
+				env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true;
 			} else {
 				verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -4035,6 +4037,7 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct b
 				u32 off, u32 cnt)
 {
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
+	int i;
 
 	if (cnt == 1)
 		return 0;
@@ -4044,6 +4047,8 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct b
 	memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
 	memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
 	       sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
+	for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++)
+		new_data[i].seen = true;
 	env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
 	vfree(old_data);
 	return 0;
@@ -4062,6 +4067,25 @@ static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_d
 	return new_prog;
 }
 
+/* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not explore
+ * branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can have dead code
+ * too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code with nops.
+ */
+static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
+	struct bpf_insn nop = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0);
+	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
+	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
+		if (aux_data[i].seen)
+			continue;
+		memcpy(insn + i, &nop, sizeof(nop));
+	}
+}
+
 /* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
  * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
  */
@@ -4379,6 +4403,9 @@ skip_full_check:
 	free_states(env);
 
 	if (ret == 0)
+		sanitize_dead_code(env);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
 		/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
 		ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
 


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel@iogearbox.net are

queue-4.14/bpf-fix-integer-overflows.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-fix-branch-pruning-logic.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-s390x-do-not-reload-skb-pointers-in-non-skb-context.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-sparc-fix-usage-of-wrong-reg-for-load_skb_regs-after-call.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-fix-incorrect-tracking-of-register-size-truncation.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-don-t-prune-branches-when-a-scalar-is-replaced-with-a-pointer.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-verifier-fix-bounds-calculation-on-bpf_rsh.patch
queue-4.14/selftests-bpf-add-tests-for-recent-bugfixes.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-fix-corruption-on-concurrent-perf_event_output-calls.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-fix-incorrect-sign-extension-in-check_alu_op.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-ppc64-do-not-reload-skb-pointers-in-non-skb-context.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-fix-missing-error-return-in-check_stack_boundary.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-force-strict-alignment-checks-for-stack-pointers.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-fix-32-bit-alu-op-verification.patch
queue-4.14/bpf-fix-build-issues-on-um-due-to-mising-bpf_perf_event.h.patch

  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-22 15:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-22 15:22 [PATCH stable/4.14 00/14] BPF stable patches for 4.14 Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:22 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 01/14] bpf: fix branch pruning logic Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` gregkh [this message]
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 02/14] bpf: fix corruption on concurrent perf_event_output calls Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 02/14] bpf: fix corruption on concurrent perf_event_output calls" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 03/14] bpf, s390x: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 03/14] bpf, s390x: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 04/14] bpf, ppc64: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 04/14] bpf, ppc64: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 05/14] bpf, sparc: fix usage of wrong reg for load_skb_regs after call Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 05/14] bpf, sparc: fix usage of wrong reg for load_skb_regs after call" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 06/14] bpf/verifier: fix bounds calculation on BPF_RSH Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 06/14] bpf/verifier: fix bounds calculation on BPF_RSH" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 07/14] bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op() Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 07/14] bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 08/14] bpf: fix incorrect tracking of register size truncation Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 08/14] bpf: fix incorrect tracking of register size truncation" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 09/14] bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 09/14] bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 10/14] bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary() Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 10/14] bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 11/14] bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 11/14] bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 12/14] bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 12/14] bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 13/14] bpf: fix integer overflows Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 13/14] bpf: fix integer overflows" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:23 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 14/14] selftests/bpf: add tests for recent bugfixes Daniel Borkmann
2017-12-22 15:47   ` Patch "[PATCH stable/4.14 14/14] selftests/bpf: add tests for recent bugfixes" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2017-12-22 15:45 ` [PATCH stable/4.14 00/14] BPF stable patches for 4.14 Greg KH
2017-12-22 15:48   ` Greg KH
2017-12-22 15:51 ` Greg KH

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