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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: jslaby@suse.cz, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 16:39:53 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515857993211157@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180112165805.10791-1-jslaby@suse.cz>


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From jslaby@suse.cz  Sat Jan 13 16:20:05 2018
From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 17:58:05 +0100
Subject: bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20180112165805.10791-1-jslaby@suse.cz>

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.

syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.

However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.

Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.

This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.

Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c |   17 +++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
 	u32 elem_size, array_size, index_mask, max_entries;
 	bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	struct bpf_array *array;
+	u64 mask64;
 
 	/* check sanity of attributes */
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -38,13 +39,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
 	elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
 
 	max_entries = attr->max_entries;
-	index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
 
-	if (unpriv)
+	/* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has
+	 * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to
+	 * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space.
+	 */
+	mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1);
+	mask64 = 1ULL << mask64;
+	mask64 -= 1;
+
+	index_mask = mask64;
+	if (unpriv) {
 		/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
 		 * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
 		 */
 		max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+		/* Check for overflows. */
+		if (max_entries < attr->max_entries)
+			return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+	}
 
 	/* check round_up into zero and u32 overflow */
 	if (elem_size == 0 ||


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jslaby@suse.cz are

queue-4.4/bpf-adjust-insn_aux_data-when-patching-insns.patch
queue-4.4/hwrng-core-sleep-interruptible-in-read.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-refactor-fixup_bpf_calls.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-array-fix-overflow-in-max_entries-and-undefined-behavior-in-index_mask.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-don-t-ab-use-instructions-to-store-state.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-prevent-out-of-bounds-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-add-bpf_patch_insn_single-helper.patch
queue-4.4/bpf-move-fixup_bpf_calls-function.patch

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-13 15:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12 16:17 [PATCH 4.4-stable 0/6] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation Jiri Slaby
2018-01-12 16:17 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 1/6] bpf: add bpf_patch_insn_single helper Jiri Slaby
2018-01-12 16:17 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 2/6] bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Jiri Slaby
2018-01-12 16:17 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 3/6] bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function Jiri Slaby
2018-01-12 16:17 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 4/6] bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() Jiri Slaby
2018-01-12 16:17 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 5/6] bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns Jiri Slaby
2018-01-12 16:17 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 6/6] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation Jiri Slaby
2018-01-12 16:52   ` Eric Dumazet
2018-01-12 16:28 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 0/6] " Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-12 16:58 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 7/7] bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask Jiri Slaby
2018-01-13 15:39   ` gregkh [this message]
2018-01-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 4.4-stable 0/6] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation Greg KH

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