stable.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	dwmw@amazon.co.uk, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	torvalds@linuxfoundation.org, will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 09:18:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516004318178159@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 22:48:01 +0100
Subject: x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4 upstream.

Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and
spectre_v2.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ config X86
 	select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST
 	select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
 	select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
+	select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
 	select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
 	select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT
 	select GENERIC_IOMAP
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -60,3 +61,31 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 		set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
 #endif
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+			  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+#endif


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx@linutronix.de are

queue-4.14/x86-pti-unbreak-efi-old_memmap.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch
queue-4.14/x86-microcode-intel-extend-bdw-late-loading-with-a-revision-check.patch
queue-4.14/membarrier-disable-preemption-when-calling-smp_call_function_many.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-remove-dead-logic-in-pti_user_pagetable_walk.patch
queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch
queue-4.14/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch
queue-4.14/x86-acpi-handle-sci-interrupts-above-legacy-space-gracefully.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch
queue-4.14/x86-tboot-unbreak-tboot-with-pti-enabled.patch
queue-4.14/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch
queue-4.14/x86-acpi-reduce-code-duplication-in-mp_override_legacy_irq.patch
queue-4.14/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch
queue-4.14/kdump-write-correct-address-of-mem_section-into-vmcoreinfo.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2018-01-15  8:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1516004318178159@kroah.com \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=torvalds@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).