Patch "x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

[<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors

to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-cpu-x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-amd-processors.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 694d99d40972f12e59a3696effee8a376b79d7c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2017 23:43:54 -0600
Subject: x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

commit 694d99d40972f12e59a3696effee8a376b79d7c8 upstream.

AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel
page table isolation feature protects against.  The AMD microarchitecture
does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that
access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode
when that access would result in a page fault.

Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting
the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI
is set.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Cc: Nick Lowe <nick.lowe@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -883,8 +883,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
 
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
 
-	/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
-	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from thomas.lendacky@amd.com are

queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-rsb-on-context-switch-for-affected-cpus.patch
queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-lfence-to-the-retpoline-rsb-filling-rsb-macros.patch
queue-4.9/x86-cpu-x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-amd-processors.patch