From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, dwmw@amazon.co.uk,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, peterz@infradead.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 08:47:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <151660723520054@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-mce-make-machine-check-speculation-protected.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 6f41c34d69eb005e7848716bbcafc979b35037d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 16:28:26 +0100
Subject: x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 6f41c34d69eb005e7848716bbcafc979b35037d5 upstream.
The machine check idtentry uses an indirect branch directly from the low
level code. This evades the speculation protection.
Replace it by a direct call into C code and issue the indirect call there
so the compiler can apply the proper speculation protection.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by:Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Niced-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801181626290.1847@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ idtentry async_page_fault do_async_page_
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
-idtentry machine_check has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 do_sym=*machine_check_vector(%rip)
+idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1
#endif
/*
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_simd_coprocessor_e
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
dotraplinkage void do_iret_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
#endif
+dotraplinkage void do_mce(struct pt_regs *, long);
static inline int get_si_code(unsigned long condition)
{
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -1754,6 +1754,11 @@ static void unexpected_machine_check(str
void (*machine_check_vector)(struct pt_regs *, long error_code) =
unexpected_machine_check;
+dotraplinkage void do_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+ machine_check_vector(regs, error_code);
+}
+
/*
* Called for each booted CPU to set up machine checks.
* Must be called with preempt off:
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tglx@linutronix.de are
queue-4.9/futex-prevent-overflow-by-strengthen-input-validation.patch
queue-4.9/x86-mce-make-machine-check-speculation-protected.patch
queue-4.9/x86-pti-document-fix-wrong-index.patch
queue-4.9/timers-unconditionally-check-deferrable-base.patch
queue-4.9/x86-apic-vector-fix-off-by-one-in-error-path.patch
queue-4.9/objtool-improve-error-message-for-bad-file-argument.patch
queue-4.9/kprobes-x86-disable-optimizing-on-the-function-jumps-to-indirect-thunk.patch
queue-4.9/x86-mm-pkeys-fix-fill_sig_info_pkey.patch
queue-4.9/x86-tsc-fix-erroneous-tsc-rate-on-skylake-xeon.patch
queue-4.9/sched-deadline-zero-out-positive-runtime-after-throttling-constrained-tasks.patch
queue-4.9/module-add-retpoline-tag-to-vermagic.patch
queue-4.9/kprobes-x86-blacklist-indirect-thunk-functions-for-kprobes.patch
queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-rsb-on-context-switch-for-affected-cpus.patch
queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-lfence-to-the-retpoline-rsb-filling-rsb-macros.patch
queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-optimize-inline-assembler-for-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch
queue-4.9/retpoline-introduce-start-end-markers-of-indirect-thunk.patch
queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-move-processor-tracing-out-of-scattered-features.patch
queue-4.9/x86-cpu-x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-amd-processors.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-01-22 7:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=151660723520054@kroah.com \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).