From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
davem@davemloft.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@fb.com,
"stable@vger.kernel.org" <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 bpf] bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 10:07:11 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516788431.13558.109.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <606bf504-a39f-288d-11cd-56888ecbc165@iogearbox.net>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2253 bytes --]
On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 22:39 +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 01/09/2018 07:04 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> >
> > The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.
> >
> > A quote from goolge project zero blog:
> > "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
> > the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
> > from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
> > appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
> > attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
> > and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
> > So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
> > the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
> > a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
> > to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."
> >
> > To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
> > option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
> > So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
> > x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64
> >
> > The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
> > In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden
> >
> > v2->v3:
> > - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)
> >
> > v1->v2:
> > - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
> > - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
> > - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func
> > - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
> > It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next
> >
> > Considered doing:
> > int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
> > but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
> > bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
> > and remove this jit_init() function.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
>
> Applied to bpf tree, thanks Alexei!
For stable too?
[-- Attachment #2: smime.p7s --]
[-- Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature, Size: 5213 bytes --]
next parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-24 10:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20180109180429.1115005-1-ast@kernel.org>
[not found] ` <606bf504-a39f-288d-11cd-56888ecbc165@iogearbox.net>
2018-01-24 10:07 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-24 10:10 ` [PATCH v3 bpf] bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-28 14:45 ` Greg KH
2018-01-28 23:40 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-29 12:31 ` Greg KH
2018-01-29 15:36 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-29 17:36 ` Greg KH
2018-01-29 20:25 ` Daniel Borkmann
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1516788431.13558.109.camel@infradead.org \
--to=dwmw2@infradead.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=kernel-team@fb.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).