Patch "x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

[<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86cpubugs_Make_retpoline_module_warning_conditional.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


Subject: x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de
Date: Sat Jan 27 15:45:14 2018 +0100

From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de

commit e383095c7fe8d218e00ec0f83e4b95ed4e627b02

If sysfs is disabled and RETPOLINE not defined:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:97:13: warning: ‘spectre_v2_bad_module’ defined but not used
[-Wunused-variable]
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;

Hide it.

Fixes: caf7501a1b4e ("module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module")
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -94,9 +94,10 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 
 #ifdef RETPOLINE
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
 bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
@@ -106,6 +107,13 @@ bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpol
 	spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
 	return false;
 }
+
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
+}
+#else
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
 #endif
 
 static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
@@ -300,7 +308,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
-		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "",
-		       spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "");
+		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+		       spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
 #endif


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp@alien8.de are

queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch
queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch
queue-4.14/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpubugs_Make_retpoline_module_warning_conditional.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch
queue-4.14/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch
queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch
queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch
queue-4.14/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch
queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch
queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch