From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 03:38:21 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15180575013116@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:28 -0800
Subject: x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859)
array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array
indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask
otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the
carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software.
The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is
handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the
control flow.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414808.33451.1873237130672785331.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -23,6 +23,30 @@
#define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory")
#endif
+/**
+ * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the
+ * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise
+ * @index: array element index
+ * @size: number of elements in array
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 - (index < size)
+ */
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ unsigned long mask;
+
+ asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;"
+ :"=r" (mask)
+ :"r"(size),"r" (index)
+ :"cc");
+ return mask;
+}
+
+/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
#define dma_rmb() rmb()
#else
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams@intel.com are
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch
queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch
queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch
queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch
queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch
queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch
queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch
queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-02-08 2:43 UTC|newest]
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