Patch "x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

Patch "x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

[gregkh]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From foo@baz Thu Feb  8 03:33:09 CET 2018
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 19:12:20 +0000
Subject: x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>


(cherry picked from commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881)

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from darren.kenny@oracle.com are

queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch
queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch