From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, davem@davemloft.net,
ebiederm@xmission.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "mpls, nospec: Sanitize array index in mpls_label_ok()" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 12:10:14 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1519125014149149@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
mpls, nospec: Sanitize array index in mpls_label_ok()
to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
mpls-nospec-sanitize-array-index-in-mpls_label_ok.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 3968523f855050b8195134da951b87c20bd66130 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 22:34:24 -0800
Subject: mpls, nospec: Sanitize array index in mpls_label_ok()
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
commit 3968523f855050b8195134da951b87c20bd66130 upstream.
mpls_label_ok() validates that the 'platform_label' array index from a
userspace netlink message payload is valid. Under speculation the
mpls_label_ok() result may not resolve in the CPU pipeline until after
the index is used to access an array element. Sanitize the index to zero
to prevent userspace-controlled arbitrary out-of-bounds speculation, a
precursor for a speculative execution side channel vulnerability.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c
+++ b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/mpls.h>
#include <linux/netconf.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -935,24 +936,27 @@ errout:
return err;
}
-static bool mpls_label_ok(struct net *net, unsigned int index,
+static bool mpls_label_ok(struct net *net, unsigned int *index,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
+ bool is_ok = true;
+
/* Reserved labels may not be set */
- if (index < MPLS_LABEL_FIRST_UNRESERVED) {
+ if (*index < MPLS_LABEL_FIRST_UNRESERVED) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
"Invalid label - must be MPLS_LABEL_FIRST_UNRESERVED or higher");
- return false;
+ is_ok = false;
}
/* The full 20 bit range may not be supported. */
- if (index >= net->mpls.platform_labels) {
+ if (is_ok && *index >= net->mpls.platform_labels) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
"Label >= configured maximum in platform_labels");
- return false;
+ is_ok = false;
}
- return true;
+ *index = array_index_nospec(*index, net->mpls.platform_labels);
+ return is_ok;
}
static int mpls_route_add(struct mpls_route_config *cfg,
@@ -975,7 +979,7 @@ static int mpls_route_add(struct mpls_ro
index = find_free_label(net);
}
- if (!mpls_label_ok(net, index, extack))
+ if (!mpls_label_ok(net, &index, extack))
goto errout;
/* Append makes no sense with mpls */
@@ -1052,7 +1056,7 @@ static int mpls_route_del(struct mpls_ro
index = cfg->rc_label;
- if (!mpls_label_ok(net, index, extack))
+ if (!mpls_label_ok(net, &index, extack))
goto errout;
mpls_route_update(net, index, NULL, &cfg->rc_nlinfo);
@@ -1810,7 +1814,7 @@ static int rtm_to_route_config(struct sk
goto errout;
if (!mpls_label_ok(cfg->rc_nlinfo.nl_net,
- cfg->rc_label, extack))
+ &cfg->rc_label, extack))
goto errout;
break;
}
@@ -2137,7 +2141,7 @@ static int mpls_getroute(struct sk_buff
goto errout;
}
- if (!mpls_label_ok(net, in_label, extack)) {
+ if (!mpls_label_ok(net, &in_label, extack)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto errout;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams@intel.com are
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-interleave-xor-register-clearing-with-push-instructions.patch
queue-4.15/nospec-move-array_index_nospec-parameter-checking-into-separate-macro.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-merge-the-pop_c_regs-and-pop_extra_regs-macros-into-a-single-pop_regs-macro.patch
queue-4.15/kvm-nvmx-set-the-cpu_based_use_msr_bitmaps-if-we-have-a-valid-l02-msr-bitmap.patch
queue-4.15/x86-nvmx-properly-set-spec_ctrl-and-pred_cmd-before-merging-msrs.patch
queue-4.15/x86-speculation-add-asm-msr-index.h-dependency.patch
queue-4.15/mm-fix-memory-size-alignment-in-devm_memremap_pages_release.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-push_and_clean_regs-in-more-cases.patch
queue-4.15/x86-speculation-update-speculation-control-microcode-blacklist.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-clear-registers-for-exceptions-interrupts-to-reduce-speculation-attack-surface.patch
queue-4.15/x86-speculation-correct-speculation-control-microcode-blacklist-again.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-merge-save_c_regs-and-save_extra_regs-remove-unused-extensions.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-indent-push_and_clear_regs-and-pop_regs-properly.patch
queue-4.15/x86-speculation-fix-up-array_index_nospec_mask-asm-constraint.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-clear-extra-registers-beyond-syscall-arguments-to-reduce-speculation-attack-surface.patch
queue-4.15/kvm-x86-reduce-retpoline-performance-impact-in-slot_handle_level_range-by-always-inlining-iterator-helper-methods.patch
queue-4.15/x86-mm-pti-fix-pti-comment-in-entry_syscall_64.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-get-rid-of-the-alloc_pt_gpregs_on_stack-and-save_and_clear_regs-macros.patch
queue-4.15/mpls-nospec-sanitize-array-index-in-mpls_label_ok.patch
queue-4.15/x86-speculation-clean-up-various-spectre-related-details.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-introduce-the-push_and_clean_regs-macro.patch
queue-4.15/revert-x86-speculation-simplify-indirect_branch_prediction_barrier.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-compat-clear-registers-for-compat-syscalls-to-reduce-speculation-attack-surface.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-fix-cr3-restore-in-paranoid_exit.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-02-20 11:11 UTC|newest]
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