From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de,
brgerst@gmail.com, dvlasenk@redhat.com,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, hpa@zytor.com, jpoimboe@redhat.com,
luto@kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 20:58:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15196751045257@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151942358116.21775.14209781084277174517.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-entry-64-clear-extra-registers-beyond-syscall-arguments-to-reduce-speculation-attack-surface.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Mon Feb 26 20:55:53 CET 2018
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 14:06:21 -0800
Subject: x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <151942358116.21775.14209781084277174517.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
commit 8e1eb3fa009aa7c0b944b3c8b26b07de0efb3200 upstream.
At entry userspace may have (maliciously) populated the extra registers
outside the syscall calling convention with arbitrary values that could
be useful in a speculative execution (Spectre style) attack.
Clear these registers to minimize the kernel's attack surface.
Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused
registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments, since those registers are
likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use
under speculation.
Note, Linus found that the XOR instructions can be executed with
minimized cost if interleaved with the PUSH instructions, and Ingo's
analysis found that R10 and R11 should be included in the register
clearing beyond the typical 'extra' syscall calling convention
registers.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787988577.7847.16733592218894189003.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -176,13 +176,26 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs)
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
+ /*
+ * Clear extra registers that a speculation attack might
+ * otherwise want to exploit. Interleave XOR with PUSH
+ * for better uop scheduling:
+ */
+ xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
+ xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
+ xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
+ xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
+ xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
+ xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
+ xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
/* IRQs are off. */
movq %rsp, %rdi
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams@intel.com are
queue-4.9/mm-fix-devm_memremap_pages-collision-handling.patch
queue-4.9/ib-core-disable-memory-registration-of-filesystem-dax-vmas.patch
queue-4.9/mm-avoid-spurious-bad-pmd-warning-messages.patch
queue-4.9/mm-introduce-get_user_pages_longterm.patch
queue-4.9/mm-fail-get_vaddr_frames-for-filesystem-dax-mappings.patch
queue-4.9/fs-dax.c-fix-inefficiency-in-dax_writeback_mapping_range.patch
queue-4.9/device-dax-implement-split-to-catch-invalid-munmap-attempts.patch
queue-4.9/v4l2-disable-filesystem-dax-mapping-support.patch
queue-4.9/libnvdimm-dax-fix-1gb-aligned-namespaces-vs-physical-misalignment.patch
queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-clear-extra-registers-beyond-syscall-arguments-to-reduce-speculation-attack-surface.patch
queue-4.9/libnvdimm-fix-integer-overflow-static-analysis-warning.patch
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-26 19:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <151942352167.21775.16852023419062929165.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-02-23 22:05 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 01/11] mm: avoid spurious 'bad pmd' warning messages Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "mm: avoid spurious 'bad pmd' warning messages" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:05 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 02/11] fs/dax.c: fix inefficiency in dax_writeback_mapping_range() Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "fs/dax.c: fix inefficiency in dax_writeback_mapping_range()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:05 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 03/11] libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:05 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 04/11] device-dax: implement ->split() to catch invalid munmap attempts Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "device-dax: implement ->split() to catch invalid munmap attempts" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:05 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 05/11] mm: introduce get_user_pages_longterm Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "mm: introduce get_user_pages_longterm" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:05 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 06/11] v4l2: disable filesystem-dax mapping support Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "v4l2: disable filesystem-dax mapping support" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:06 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 07/11] IB/core: disable memory registration of filesystem-dax vmas Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "IB/core: disable memory registration of filesystem-dax vmas" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:06 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 08/11] libnvdimm, dax: fix 1GB-aligned namespaces vs physical misalignment Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "libnvdimm, dax: fix 1GB-aligned namespaces vs physical misalignment" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:06 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 10/11] mm: fail get_vaddr_frames() for filesystem-dax mappings Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` Patch "mm: fail get_vaddr_frames() for filesystem-dax mappings" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 22:06 ` [4.9-stable PATCH 11/11] x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface Dan Williams
2018-02-26 19:58 ` gregkh [this message]
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