FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

[gregkh]

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2020 05:44:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for
 indirect branches.

Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.

Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
with -EPERM as described in the documentation.

Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 8d57562b1d2c..56f573aa764f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1175,11 +1175,14 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 			return 0;
 		/*
 		 * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
-		 * mode.
+		 * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
+		 * by a  previous prctl call.
+
 		 */
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+		    task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
 		task_update_spec_tif(task);

Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

[Sasha Levin]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 03:33:55PM +0200, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
>
>The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
>If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
>tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
>id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
>
>thanks,
>
>greg k-h
>
>------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>
>From 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
>Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2020 05:44:19 -0700
>Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for
> indirect branches.
>
>Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
>it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
>PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
>(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
>vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
>PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
>
>Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
>speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
>with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
>
>Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
>Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
>Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

This patch now applies fine to all branches after we resolved the issues
with the other IPBP patch.

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha