From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: asteinhauser@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 15:33:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15922280366520@kroah.com> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2020 05:44:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for
indirect branches.
Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 8d57562b1d2c..56f573aa764f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1175,11 +1175,14 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
return 0;
/*
* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
- * mode.
+ * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
+ * by a previous prctl call.
+
*/
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+ task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
task_update_spec_tif(task);
reply other threads:[~2020-06-15 13:34 UTC|newest]
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