From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: luto@kernel.org, bp@suse.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
riel@surriel.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2021 12:51:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <162427270623162@kroah.com> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:36:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a
user buffer
Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to
fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual
conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems
plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page
and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing
XRSTOR on the page in question.
__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers
are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
modify the registers.
If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig()
could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without
reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU
state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the
victim task's user-visible state.
Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
situation from corrupting any state.
[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
microarchitectural conditions".
Fixes: 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.758116583@linutronix.de
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
index d5bc96a536c2..4ab9aeb9a963 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -369,6 +369,25 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
fpregs_unlock();
return 0;
}
+
+ /*
+ * The above did an FPU restore operation, restricted to
+ * the user portion of the registers, and failed, but the
+ * microcode might have modified the FPU registers
+ * nevertheless.
+ *
+ * If the FPU registers do not belong to current, then
+ * invalidate the FPU register state otherwise the task might
+ * preempt current and return to user space with corrupted
+ * FPU registers.
+ *
+ * In case current owns the FPU registers then no further
+ * action is required. The fixup below will handle it
+ * correctly.
+ */
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+ __cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state();
+
fpregs_unlock();
} else {
/*
next reply other threads:[~2021-06-21 10:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-21 10:51 gregkh [this message]
2021-06-21 14:29 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree Borislav Petkov
2021-06-21 18:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-21 19:34 ` Borislav Petkov
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