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* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: SVM: Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree
@ 2022-01-29 12:53 gregkh
  0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: gregkh @ 2022-01-29 12:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: seanjc, brijesh.singh, liam.merwick, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky; +Cc: stable


The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 0b0be065b7563ac708aaa9f69dd4941c80b3446d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 01:07:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests

Never intercept #GP for SEV guests as reading SEV guest private memory
will return cyphertext, i.e. emulating on #GP can't work as intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 37eb3168e0ea..defc91a8c04c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -312,7 +312,11 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
 				return ret;
 			}
 
-			if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept)
+			/*
+			 * Never intercept #GP for SEV guests, KVM can't
+			 * decrypt guest memory to workaround the erratum.
+			 */
+			if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
 				set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 		}
 	}
@@ -1010,9 +1014,10 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
 	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
 	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
-	 * as VMware does.
+	 * as VMware does.  Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
+	 * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
 	 */
-	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
 		set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 
 	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);


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2022-01-29 12:53 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: SVM: Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree gregkh

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