From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: jroedel@suse.de, bp@suse.de, stable@vger.kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Unroll string mmio with" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree
Date: Mon, 04 Apr 2022 09:42:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <164905816816067@kroah.com> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4009a4ac82dd95b8cd2b62bd30019476983f0aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 10:33:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Unroll string mmio with
CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO
The io-specific memcpy/memset functions use string mmio accesses to do
their work. Under SEV, the hypervisor can't emulate these instructions
because they read/write directly from/to encrypted memory.
KVM will inject a page fault exception into the guest when it is asked
to emulate string mmio instructions for an SEV guest:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000065068
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 8000100000067 P4D 8000100000067 PUD 80001000fb067 PMD 80001000fc067 PTE 80000000fed40173
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7 #3
As string mmio for an SEV guest can not be supported by the
hypervisor, unroll the instructions for CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO
enabled kernels.
This issue appears when kernels are launched in recent libvirt-managed
SEV virtual machines, because virt-install started to add a tpm-crb
device to the guest by default and proactively because, raisins:
https://github.com/virt-manager/virt-manager/commit/eb58c09f488b0633ed1eea012cd311e48864401e
and as that commit says, the default adding of a TPM can be disabled
with "virt-install ... --tpm none".
The kernel driver for tpm-crb uses memcpy_to/from_io() functions to
access MMIO memory, resulting in a page-fault injected by KVM and
crashing the kernel at boot.
[ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ]
Fixes: d8aa7eea78a1 ('x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support')
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321093351.23976-1-joro@8bytes.org
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/iomem.c b/arch/x86/lib/iomem.c
index df50451d94ef..3e2f33fc33de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/iomem.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/iomem.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static __always_inline void rep_movs(void *to, const void *from, size_t n)
: "memory");
}
-void memcpy_fromio(void *to, const volatile void __iomem *from, size_t n)
+static void string_memcpy_fromio(void *to, const volatile void __iomem *from, size_t n)
{
if (unlikely(!n))
return;
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ void memcpy_fromio(void *to, const volatile void __iomem *from, size_t n)
}
rep_movs(to, (const void *)from, n);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_fromio);
-void memcpy_toio(volatile void __iomem *to, const void *from, size_t n)
+static void string_memcpy_toio(volatile void __iomem *to, const void *from, size_t n)
{
if (unlikely(!n))
return;
@@ -56,14 +55,64 @@ void memcpy_toio(volatile void __iomem *to, const void *from, size_t n)
}
rep_movs((void *)to, (const void *) from, n);
}
+
+static void unrolled_memcpy_fromio(void *to, const volatile void __iomem *from, size_t n)
+{
+ const volatile char __iomem *in = from;
+ char *out = to;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
+ out[i] = readb(&in[i]);
+}
+
+static void unrolled_memcpy_toio(volatile void __iomem *to, const void *from, size_t n)
+{
+ volatile char __iomem *out = to;
+ const char *in = from;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
+ writeb(in[i], &out[i]);
+}
+
+static void unrolled_memset_io(volatile void __iomem *a, int b, size_t c)
+{
+ volatile char __iomem *mem = a;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < c; ++i)
+ writeb(b, &mem[i]);
+}
+
+void memcpy_fromio(void *to, const volatile void __iomem *from, size_t n)
+{
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO))
+ unrolled_memcpy_fromio(to, from, n);
+ else
+ string_memcpy_fromio(to, from, n);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_fromio);
+
+void memcpy_toio(volatile void __iomem *to, const void *from, size_t n)
+{
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO))
+ unrolled_memcpy_toio(to, from, n);
+ else
+ string_memcpy_toio(to, from, n);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_toio);
void memset_io(volatile void __iomem *a, int b, size_t c)
{
- /*
- * TODO: memset can mangle the IO patterns quite a bit.
- * perhaps it would be better to use a dumb one:
- */
- memset((void *)a, b, c);
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO)) {
+ unrolled_memset_io(a, b, c);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * TODO: memset can mangle the IO patterns quite a bit.
+ * perhaps it would be better to use a dumb one:
+ */
+ memset((void *)a, b, c);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset_io);
reply other threads:[~2022-04-04 7:42 UTC|newest]
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