FAILED: patch "[PATCH] random: account for arch randomness in bits" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

[<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 77fc95f8c0dc9e1f8e620ec14d2fb65028fb7adc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 17:04:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] random: account for arch randomness in bits

Rather than accounting in bytes and multiplying (shifting), we can just
account in bits and avoid the shift. The main motivation for this is
there are other patches in flux that expand this code a bit, and
avoiding the duplication of "* 8" everywhere makes things a bit clearer.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 12e45a2a6308 ("random: credit architectural init the exact amount")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 0d6fb3eaf609..60d701a2516b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = { .notifier_call = random_pm_notifica
 int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
 {
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
-	unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
+	unsigned int i, arch_bits;
 	unsigned long entropy;
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
@@ -784,12 +784,12 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
 	_mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
 #endif
 
-	for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
 	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
 			entropy = random_get_entropy();
-			arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
+			arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8;
 		}
 		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
 	}
@@ -801,8 +801,8 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
 	if (crng_ready())
 		crng_reseed();
 	else if (trust_cpu)
-		_credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
-	used_arch_random = arch_bytes * 8 >= POOL_READY_BITS;
+		_credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
+	used_arch_random = arch_bits >= POOL_READY_BITS;
 
 	WARN_ON(register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier));