From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BC311273F9; Tue, 21 Apr 2026 08:31:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776760306; cv=none; b=tCnOuLqDlXNGwV/90gXiPrV+mIFN1wwIA4NoHGUPR8ba9Y74tU8kF0v/4nLGcUwNemCrLeWnZ/8DNyqCrrzfk9TMWlPR3tWkQiN4GpgT1PPL0gWA7rn6bkXSQnL7Oe1Z+47cS3rEHzGnWY4VtgObUL4dQtf7S8ln2HuWdBVESOU= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776760306; c=relaxed/simple; bh=z9hoGsaXqKuWu/+mcsB/sTmS2Aq3KjYQ8GuAfdQxXiA=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Cc:Subject:To:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=hHFyNUh12ra6k0HHrQD0ceOCkxh8kLoMtNN1IEJ4S5gfon/rdjjB6Tnuyo7lb6madALA8Dy19aOMRGC9DWrnWFrP6ap1VTuCtvFoglUipNlYSjMJ5Bb+1t2OpKsgkVA62KdBHWka09WLyDc/DuIxFT6DEtIW9mQqEsm3fJnq0s4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=baLMRGq4; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="baLMRGq4" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 76FDAC2BCB5; Tue, 21 Apr 2026 08:31:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1776760306; bh=z9hoGsaXqKuWu/+mcsB/sTmS2Aq3KjYQ8GuAfdQxXiA=; h=Date:Cc:Subject:To:References:From:In-Reply-To:From; b=baLMRGq402k5jNcIDeL0Pn8W0w/vULYkexfpKJ7Q6pZ4jtCQ1qZaPUJYTzao8a2qj s5HYWQj2+aw6n0dMt7cH5GadoVenDq+CxQVg4HGlLqAkAutFXewvjEPlKT1LUqvfDv IJbN5TeUU634hQSFuoDJ5a9J1joW1J+tEc1bEZkjj6WZhkobEGRFSX9aBn3VgC5X8V uzjLVc0DUuArEQvcqoNqNOWPledGlLHxRZXrezbJc94UCsYLD+CtTmIeSRGEgv+wnP MGWCm1lixZoDQ7MXrj82g2Ro1L8H1tdYZPHCCY4o7DomI+XXg86aomNLOLpJ2bsmCA EpO2nYtD4zi/A== Message-ID: <16fa1bbb-639d-44b6-82d0-374c56b4371f@kernel.org> Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 16:31:44 +0800 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Cc: chao@kernel.org, LKML , Yuhao Jiang , Junrui Luo , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents To: Gao Xiang , linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org References: <20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> <20260416094408.3466613-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Chao Yu In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 4/21/2026 3:38 PM, Gao Xiang wrote: > > > On 2026/4/21 15:26, Chao Yu wrote: >> On 4/16/2026 5:44 PM, Gao Xiang wrote: >>> Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing >>> dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() >>> with unchecked nameoffs. >>> >>> If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, >>> maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the >>> directory block. >>> >>> nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of >>> `sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` as well [1]. >>> >>> [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com >>> Fixes: 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations") >>> Fixes: 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()") >>> Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang >>> Reported-by: Junrui Luo >>> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/A0FD7E0F-7558-49B0-8BC8-EB1ECDB2479A@outlook.com >>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >>> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang >>> --- >>> v3: >>>   - Disallow unaligned nameoff0 to avoid petential oob reads as well. >>> >>>   fs/erofs/dir.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- >>>   1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/fs/erofs/dir.c b/fs/erofs/dir.c >>> index e5132575b9d3..d074fded1577 100644 >>> --- a/fs/erofs/dir.c >>> +++ b/fs/erofs/dir.c >>> @@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, >>>           const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff; >>>           unsigned int de_namelen; >>> -        /* the last dirent in the block? */ >>> -        if (de + 1 >= end) >>> -            de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); >>> -        else >>> +        /* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ >>> +        if (de + 1 < end) >>>               de_namelen = le16_to_cpu(de[1].nameoff) - nameoff; >>> +        else if (maxsize <= nameoff) >>> +            goto err_bogus; >>> +        else >>> +            de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); >>> -        /* a corrupted entry is found */ >>> -        if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || >>> -            de_namelen > EROFS_NAME_LEN) { >>> -            erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", >>> -                  EROFS_I(dir)->nid); >>> -            DBG_BUGON(1); >>> -            return -EFSCORRUPTED; >>> -        } >>> +        /* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ >>> +        if (!in_range32(de_namelen, 1, EROFS_NAME_LEN) || >>> +            nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) >>> +            goto err_bogus; >>>           if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, >>>                     erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb), >>> @@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx, >>>           ctx->pos += sizeof(struct erofs_dirent); >>>       } >>>       return 0; >>> +err_bogus: >>> +    erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", EROFS_I(dir)->nid); >>> +    DBG_BUGON(1); >>> +    return -EFSCORRUPTED; >>>   } >>>   static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) >>> @@ -88,7 +90,8 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) >>>           } >>>           nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de->nameoff); >>> -        if (nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) || nameoff >= bsz) { >> >> You mean? >> >> if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || nameoff % sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)) > > The explanation can be seen as: > https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com > > But I think `nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` is also fine? Yes, it's fine to use "nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)", it's a minor cleanup to use "!nameof". Thanks, > I could also switch to your suggested version. > > Thanks, > Gao Xiang >