Re: [PATCH net] netconsole: avoid out-of-bounds access on empty string in trim_newline()

[patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org]

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>:

On Mon, 20 Apr 2026 03:18:36 -0700 you wrote:
> trim_newline() unconditionally dereferences s[len - 1] after computing
> len = strnlen(s, maxlen). When the string is empty, len is 0 and the
> expression underflows to s[(size_t)-1], reading (and potentially
> writing) one byte before the buffer.
> 
> The two callers feed trim_newline() with the result of strscpy() from
> configfs store callbacks (dev_name_store, userdatum_value_store).
> configfs guarantees count >= 1 reaches the callback, but the byte
> itself can be NUL: a userspace write(fd, "\0", 1) leaves the
> destination empty after strscpy() and triggers the underflow. The OOB
> write only fires if the adjacent byte happens to be '\n', so this is
> not a security issue, but the access is undefined behaviour either way.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net] netconsole: avoid out-of-bounds access on empty string in trim_newline()
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/7079c8c13f2d

You are awesome, thank you!
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