From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
To: David Long <dave.long@linaro.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 14:23:08 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <18dd1b76-910c-6873-bde5-4e96fa66b87a@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181031135713.2873-1-dave.long@linaro.org>
Hi David,
On 10/31/18 6:56 AM, David Long wrote:
> From: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
>
> V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
> Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.
Thanks for submitting those patches!
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot tested on a Brahma-B15 based platform and did not see any
regressions or issues, seeing about the same hackbench performance
before and after.
Test:
#!/bin/sh
for i in $(seq 0 9)
do
hackbench 13 process 10000
done
before:
min: 140.800
max: 142.571
avg: 141.7233
after:
min: 140.004
max: 141.600
avg: 141.0242
>
> Marc Zyngier (2):
> ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17
> ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15
>
> Russell King (22):
> ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs
> ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure
> ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths
> ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking
> ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre
> ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches
> ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit
> ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space
> ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening
> ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions
> ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15
> ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling
> ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
> ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros
> ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation
> ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry
> ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user()
> ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state
> ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user()
> ARM: use __inttype() in get_user()
> ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()
> ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses
>
> arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 12 ++
> arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h | 32 ++++++
> arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 6 +-
> arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h | 3 +
> arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h | 8 ++
> arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 2 -
> arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 ++-
> arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 23 +++-
> arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h | 4 +
> arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h | 15 +++
> arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +-
> arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 26 +++--
> arch/arm/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c | 18 +++
> arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 18 ++-
> arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S | 25 +++++
> arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 55 ++++-----
> arch/arm/kernel/smp.c | 4 +
> arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c | 2 +
> arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c | 8 +-
> arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 110 +++++++++++++++++-
> arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S | 9 ++
> arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 23 ++++
> arch/arm/mm/Makefile | 2 +-
> arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 3 +
> arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S | 3 +-
> arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S | 6 -
> arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S | 154 +++++++++++++++++++------
> arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c | 17 ++-
> 30 files changed, 674 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
> create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
>
--
Florian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-01 6:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-31 13:56 [PATCH 4.9 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/24] ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/24] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/24] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/24] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/24] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening David Long
2018-11-06 10:40 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-06 10:55 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-06 16:19 ` Mark Brown
2018-11-06 16:30 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-06 16:53 ` Mark Brown
2018-11-06 16:20 ` David Long
2018-11-06 16:23 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/24] ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17 David Long
2018-11-05 9:13 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-07 2:22 ` David Long
2018-11-07 2:23 ` David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/24] ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/24] ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/24] ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/24] ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/24] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/24] ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/24] ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/24] ARM: use __inttype() in get_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/24] ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/24] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses David Long
2018-10-31 21:23 ` Florian Fainelli [this message]
2018-11-02 1:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches David Long
2018-11-02 8:54 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-02 17:22 ` David Long
2018-11-02 11:28 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
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