From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Message-Id: <20111102221454.052669506@clark.kroah.org> Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 15:14:09 -0700 From: Greg KH To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Jouni Malinen , "John W. Linville" Subject: [043/107] cfg80211: Fix validation of AKM suites In-Reply-To: <20111102221600.GA26650@kroah.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know. ------------------ From: Jouni Malinen commit 1b9ca0272ffae212e726380f66777b30a56ed7a5 upstream. Incorrect variable was used in validating the akm_suites array from NL80211_ATTR_AKM_SUITES. In addition, there was no explicit validation of the array length (we only have room for NL80211_MAX_NR_AKM_SUITES). This can result in a buffer write overflow for stack variables with arbitrary data from user space. The nl80211 commands using the affected functionality require GENL_ADMIN_PERM, so this is only exposed to admin users. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Signed-off-by: John W. Linville Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -3364,9 +3364,12 @@ static int nl80211_crypto_settings(struc if (len % sizeof(u32)) return -EINVAL; + if (settings->n_akm_suites > NL80211_MAX_NR_AKM_SUITES) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(settings->akm_suites, data, len); - for (i = 0; i < settings->n_ciphers_pairwise; i++) + for (i = 0; i < settings->n_akm_suites; i++) if (!nl80211_valid_akm_suite(settings->akm_suites[i])) return -EINVAL; }