From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann , Vlad Yasevich , "David S. Miller" Subject: [ 16/22] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 12:36:59 -0800 Message-Id: <20130212203416.600791519@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20130212203413.459836020@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20130212203413.459836020@linuxfoundation.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 3.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Daniel Borkmann [ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ] On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endp /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -270,6 +272,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);