From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , "Eric W. Biederman" Subject: [ 047/124] scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids. Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2013 15:10:29 -0700 Message-Id: <20130402221109.647773164@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20130402221104.163133110@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20130402221104.163133110@linuxfoundation.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: "Eric W. Biederman" commit 92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349 upstream. Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet created a pid namespace. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/scm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/core/scm.c +++ b/net/core/scm.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -52,7 +53,8 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(st if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid)) return -EINVAL; - if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && + if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || + ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && ((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) && ((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||