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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [ 33/34] net: fix incorrect credentials passing
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2013 12:02:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130429184704.642438507@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130429184700.845644077@linuxfoundation.org>

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------


From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 83f1b4ba917db5dc5a061a44b3403ddb6e783494 ]

Commit 257b5358b32f ("scm: Capture the full credentials of the scm
sender") changed the credentials passing code to pass in the effective
uid/gid instead of the real uid/gid.

Obviously this doesn't matter most of the time (since normally they are
the same), but it results in differences for suid binaries when the wrong
uid/gid ends up being used.

This just undoes that (presumably unintentional) part of the commit.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/socket.h |    3 ++-
 include/net/scm.h      |    2 +-
 net/core/sock.c        |   14 ++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/socket.h
+++ b/include/linux/socket.h
@@ -316,7 +316,8 @@ struct ucred {
 /* IPX options */
 #define IPX_TYPE	1
 
-extern void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred, struct ucred *ucred);
+extern void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred, struct ucred *ucred,
+			  bool use_effective);
 
 extern int memcpy_fromiovec(unsigned char *kdata, struct iovec *iov, int len);
 extern int memcpy_fromiovecend(unsigned char *kdata, const struct iovec *iov,
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(stru
 {
 	scm->pid  = get_pid(pid);
 	scm->cred = cred ? get_cred(cred) : NULL;
-	cred_to_ucred(pid, cred, &scm->creds);
+	cred_to_ucred(pid, cred, &scm->creds, false);
 }
 
 static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -815,15 +815,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_setsockopt);
 
 
 void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred,
-		   struct ucred *ucred)
+		   struct ucred *ucred, bool use_effective)
 {
 	ucred->pid = pid_vnr(pid);
 	ucred->uid = ucred->gid = -1;
 	if (cred) {
 		struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
 
-		ucred->uid = user_ns_map_uid(current_ns, cred, cred->euid);
-		ucred->gid = user_ns_map_gid(current_ns, cred, cred->egid);
+		if (use_effective) {
+			ucred->uid = user_ns_map_uid(current_ns, cred, cred->euid);
+			ucred->gid = user_ns_map_gid(current_ns, cred, cred->egid);
+		} else {
+			ucred->uid = user_ns_map_uid(current_ns, cred, cred->uid);
+			ucred->gid = user_ns_map_gid(current_ns, cred, cred->gid);
+		}
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cred_to_ucred);
@@ -984,7 +989,8 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 		struct ucred peercred;
 		if (len > sizeof(peercred))
 			len = sizeof(peercred);
-		cred_to_ucred(sk->sk_peer_pid, sk->sk_peer_cred, &peercred);
+		cred_to_ucred(sk->sk_peer_pid, sk->sk_peer_cred,
+			      &peercred, true);
 		if (copy_to_user(optval, &peercred, len))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		goto lenout;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-04-29 19:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-04-29 19:02 [ 00/34] 3.4.43-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 01/34] aio: fix possible invalid memory access when DEBUG is enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 02/34] TTY: do not update atime/mtime on read/write Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 03/34] TTY: fix atime/mtime regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 04/34] sparc64: Fix race in TLB batch processing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 05/34] atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 06/34] ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 07/34] Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 08/34] Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 09/34] caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 10/34] irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 11/34] iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 12/34] llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 13/34] netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 14/34] NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 15/34] rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 16/34] tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 17/34] netrom: fix invalid use of sizeof in nr_recvmsg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 18/34] cbq: incorrect processing of high limits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 19/34] net IPv6 : Fix broken IPv6 routing table after loopback down-up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 20/34] net: count hw_addr syncs so that unsync works properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 21/34] atl1e: limit gso segment size to prevent generation of wrong ip length fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 22/34] bonding: fix bonding_masters race condition in bond unloading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 23/34] bonding: IFF_BONDING is not stripped on enslave failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 24/34] af_unix: If we dont care about credentials coallesce all messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 25/34] netfilter: dont reset nf_trace in nf_reset() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 26/34] rtnetlink: Call nlmsg_parse() with correct header length Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 27/34] tcp: incoming connections might use wrong route under synflood Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 28/34] tcp: Reallocate headroom if it would overflow csum_start Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 29/34] esp4: fix error return code in esp_output() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 30/34] net: sctp: sctp_auth_key_put: use kzfree instead of kfree Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 31/34] tcp: call tcp_replace_ts_recent() from tcp_ack() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 32/34] net: rate-limit warn-bad-offload splats Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-29 19:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2013-04-29 19:02 ` [ 34/34] net: drop dst before queueing fragments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-04-30  1:54 ` [ 00/34] 3.4.43-stable review Shuah Khan

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