* [PATCH] KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession
@ 2013-06-18 16:47 David Howells
2013-06-18 16:55 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2013-06-18 16:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-security-module; +Cc: linux-kernel, stable
Skip key state checks (invalidation, revocation and expiration) when checking
for possession. Without this, keys that have been marked invalid, revoked
keys and expired keys are not given a possession attribute - which means the
possessor is not granted any possession permits and cannot do anything with
them unless they also have one a user, group or other permit.
This causes failures in the keyutils test suite's revocation and expiration
tests now that commit 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 reduced the
initial permissions granted to a key.
The failures are due to accesses to revoked and expired keys being given
EACCES instead of EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
security/keys/internal.h | 1 +
security/keys/process_keys.c | 8 +++++---
security/keys/request_key.c | 6 ++++--
security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index d4f1468..df971fe 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred);
extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 42defae..a3410d6 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ found:
key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -448,7 +449,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
might_sleep();
key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
- false, cred);
+ no_state_check, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
err = key_ref;
@@ -468,7 +469,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
- match, rka->cred);
+ match, no_state_check,
+ rka->cred);
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
@@ -675,7 +677,7 @@ try_again:
/* check to see if we possess the key */
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
- cred);
+ true, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index c411f9b..172115b 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
* waited for locks */
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
- key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
+ key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
+ false, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto key_already_present;
@@ -539,7 +540,8 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
dest_keyring, flags);
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
- key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
+ key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
+ false, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 85730d5..92077de 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
&key_type_request_key_auth,
(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
- cred);
+ false, cred);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession
2013-06-18 16:47 [PATCH] KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession David Howells
@ 2013-06-18 16:55 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2013-06-18 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells; +Cc: keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable
On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 05:47:22PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Skip key state checks (invalidation, revocation and expiration) when checking
> for possession. Without this, keys that have been marked invalid, revoked
> keys and expired keys are not given a possession attribute - which means the
> possessor is not granted any possession permits and cannot do anything with
> them unless they also have one a user, group or other permit.
>
> This causes failures in the keyutils test suite's revocation and expiration
> tests now that commit 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 reduced the
> initial permissions granted to a key.
>
> The failures are due to accesses to revoked and expired keys being given
> EACCES instead of EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> security/keys/internal.h | 1 +
> security/keys/process_keys.c | 8 +++++---
> security/keys/request_key.c | 6 ++++--
> security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
<formletter>
This is not the correct way to submit patches for inclusion in the
stable kernel tree. Please read Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt
for how to do this properly.
</formletter>
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