From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2013 11:10:48 -0400 From: Dave Jones To: Steven Rostedt Cc: Jochen Striepe , "Theodore Ts'o" , Guenter Roeck , Linus Torvalds , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Andrew Morton , stable Subject: Re: [ 00/19] 3.10.1-stable review Message-ID: <20130713151048.GB31035@redhat.com> References: <20130712173150.GA5534@roeck-us.net> <20130712181103.GA6689@roeck-us.net> <20130712193557.GB342@thunk.org> <1373658551.17876.117.camel@gandalf.local.home> <20130712201939.GB15261@redhat.com> <1373660900.17876.124.camel@gandalf.local.home> <20130713004707.GF7609@pompeji.miese-zwerge.org> <1373713889.17876.135.camel@gandalf.local.home> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1373713889.17876.135.camel@gandalf.local.home> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 07:11:29AM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote: > > Users expect vanilla .0 releases usable as production systems, to > > be updated (meaning, no new features, just stabilizing) with the > > corresponding -stable series. > > This really is a case by case basis. An unprivileged user exploit > requires a box that lets other users than the owner of the box to log > in. Most users of .0 releases do not do this. local exploits aren't just a problem for multi-user machines. An attacker who can own your firefox process, can now potentially escalate to root. (Ok, most exploits are just crashing the box, but how many times have we been proven wrong in the past when we thought something was just a DoS, and someone smarter has found a way to turn it into a root-hole?) Dave