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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Subject: [ 11/11] mm: do not grow the stack vma just because of an overrun on preceding vma
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 12:53:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131018195049.836387681@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131018195049.069623827@linuxfoundation.org>

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 09884964335e85e897876d17783c2ad33cf8a2e0 upstream.

The stack vma is designed to grow automatically (marked with VM_GROWSUP
or VM_GROWSDOWN depending on architecture) when an access is made beyond
the existing boundary.  However, particularly if you have not limited
your stack at all ("ulimit -s unlimited"), this can cause the stack to
grow even if the access was really just one past *another* segment.

And that's wrong, especially since we first grow the segment, but then
immediately later enforce the stack guard page on the last page of the
segment.  So _despite_ first growing the stack segment as a result of
the access, the kernel will then make the access cause a SIGSEGV anyway!

So do the same logic as the guard page check does, and consider an
access to within one page of the next segment to be a bad access, rather
than growing the stack to abut the next segment.

Reported-and-tested-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/mmap.c |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)

--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1875,9 +1875,28 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_stru
 	return error;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Note how expand_stack() refuses to expand the stack all the way to
+ * abut the next virtual mapping, *unless* that mapping itself is also
+ * a stack mapping. We want to leave room for a guard page, after all
+ * (the guard page itself is not added here, that is done by the
+ * actual page faulting logic)
+ *
+ * This matches the behavior of the guard page logic (see mm/memory.c:
+ * check_stack_guard_page()), which only allows the guard page to be
+ * removed under these circumstances.
+ */
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
 int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
 {
+	struct vm_area_struct *next;
+
+	address &= PAGE_MASK;
+	next = vma->vm_next;
+	if (next && next->vm_start == address + PAGE_SIZE) {
+		if (!(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 	return expand_upwards(vma, address);
 }
 
@@ -1900,6 +1919,14 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, un
 #else
 int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
 {
+	struct vm_area_struct *prev;
+
+	address &= PAGE_MASK;
+	prev = vma->vm_prev;
+	if (prev && prev->vm_end == address) {
+		if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 	return expand_downwards(vma, address);
 }
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-10-18 19:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-10-18 19:53 [ 00/11] 3.4.67-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 01/11] ALSA: snd-usb-usx2y: remove bogus frame checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 02/11] ALSA: hda - Add fixup for ASUS N56VZ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 03/11] random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 04/11] vfs: allow O_PATH file descriptors for fstatfs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 05/11] ext4: fix memory leak in xattr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-21 16:37   ` Dave Jones
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 06/11] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix typo in saving DSCR Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 07/11] parisc: fix interruption handler to respect pagefault_disable() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 08/11] watchdog: ts72xx_wdt: locking bug in ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 09/11] drm/radeon: fix hw contexts for SUMO2 asics Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` [ 10/11] mm/mmap: check for RLIMIT_AS before unmapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-18 19:53 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2013-10-18 20:49 ` [ 00/11] 3.4.67-stable review Guenter Roeck
2013-10-18 21:25   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-10-19  3:41 ` Shuah Khan
2013-10-19  4:49   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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