[PATCH 3.4 00/27] 3.4.88-stable review

[PATCH 3.4 00/27] 3.4.88-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.88 release.
There are 27 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat Apr 26 21:55:41 UTC 2014.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.88-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 3.4.88-rc1

Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
    wait: fix reparent_leader() vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race

Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
    jffs2: remove from wait queue after schedule()

Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
    jffs2: avoid soft-lockup in jffs2_reserve_space_gc()

Ajesh Kunhipurayil Vijayan <ajesh@broadcom.com>
    jffs2: Fix crash due to truncation of csize

Kamlakant Patel <kamlakant.patel@broadcom.com>
    jffs2: Fix segmentation fault found in stress test

Claudio Takahasi <claudio.takahasi@openbossa.org>
    Bluetooth: Fix removing Long Term Key

Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
    Char: ipmi_bt_sm, fix infinite loop

Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
    sparc64: don't treat 64-bit syscall return codes as 32-bit

Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
    sparc32: fix build failure for arch_jump_label_transform

Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
    Revert "sparc64: Fix __copy_{to,from}_user_inatomic defines."

oftedal <oftedal@gmail.com>
    sparc: PCI: Fix incorrect address calculation of PCI Bridge windows on Simba-bridges

Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
    rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device in rds_iw_laddr_check

Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
    isdnloop: several buffer overflows

YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
    isdnloop: Validate NUL-terminated strings from user.

Pablo Neira <pablo@netfilter.org>
    netlink: don't compare the nul-termination in nla_strcmp

Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
    ipv6: some ipv6 statistic counters failed to disable bh

Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
    xen-netback: remove pointless clause from if statement

Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
    vhost: validate vhost_get_vq_desc return value

Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
    vhost: fix total length when packets are too short

lucien <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
    ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu do not handle the mtu of the second fragment properly

Heiner Kallweit <heiner.kallweit@web.de>
    ipv6: Avoid unnecessary temporary addresses being generated

Matthew Leach <matthew.leach@arm.com>
    net: socket: error on a negative msg_namelen

Peter Boström <peter.bostrom@netrounds.com>
    vlan: Set correct source MAC address with TX VLAN offload enabled

Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
    ipv6: don't set DST_NOCOUNT for remotely added routes

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net: unix: non blocking recvmsg() should not return -EINTR

Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
    bridge: multicast: add sanity check for query source addresses

Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
    net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                            |  4 ++--
 arch/sparc/Kconfig                  |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  4 ++--
 arch/sparc/kernel/pci.c             |  4 ++--
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls.S        |  4 ++--
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_bt_sm.c      |  2 +-
 drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c    | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c   |  4 ++--
 drivers/vhost/net.c                 | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/jffs2/compr_rtime.c              |  4 ++--
 fs/jffs2/nodelist.h                 |  2 +-
 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c                 | 14 ++++++++++----
 kernel/exit.c                       | 15 +++++++++++----
 lib/nlattr.c                        | 10 ++++++++--
 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c                |  3 +++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c           |  8 +++++++-
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c           |  6 ++++++
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                 |  5 ++++-
 net/ipv6/icmp.c                     |  2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c               | 18 ++++++++----------
 net/ipv6/mcast.c                    | 11 ++++++-----
 net/ipv6/route.c                    |  2 +-
 net/rds/iw.c                        |  3 ++-
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c            |  4 ++--
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c             |  5 -----
 net/socket.c                        |  4 ++++
 net/unix/af_unix.c                  | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 27 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)

[PATCH 3.4 01/27] net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit c485658bae87faccd7aed540fd2ca3ab37992310 ]

While working on ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
memory leakage in the error path.

Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48a9 and by unconditionally
jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:

Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..u^..X.........
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
    [<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
    [<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
    [<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
    [<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
    [<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
    [<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
    [<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
    [<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
    [<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
    [<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380

What happens is that commit bbd0d59809f9 clones the skb containing
the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
freeing it.

The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.

While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
sctp_chunk_destroy() though.

Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c |    4 ++--
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c  |    5 -----
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1366,8 +1366,8 @@ static void sctp_chunk_destroy(struct sc
 	BUG_ON(!list_empty(&chunk->list));
 	list_del_init(&chunk->transmitted_list);
 
-	/* Free the chunk skb data and the SCTP_chunk stub itself. */
-	dev_kfree_skb(chunk->skb);
+	consume_skb(chunk->skb);
+	consume_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
 
 	SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(chunk);
 	kmem_cache_free(sctp_chunk_cachep, chunk);
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -749,7 +749,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(co
 
 		/* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
 		if (!sctp_auth_enable || !new_asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
-			kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
 			sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
 			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 		}
@@ -764,10 +763,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(co
 		auth.transport = chunk->transport;
 
 		ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
-
-		/* We can now safely free the auth_chunk clone */
-		kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
-
 		if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
 			sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
 			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

[PATCH 3.4 03/27] net: unix: non blocking recvmsg() should not return -EINTR

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit de1443916791d75fdd26becb116898277bb0273f ]

Some applications didn't expect recvmsg() on a non blocking socket
could return -EINTR. This possibility was added as a side effect
of commit b3ca9b02b00704 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in
unix recv routines").

To hit this bug, you need to be a bit unlucky, as the u->readlock
mutex is usually held for very small periods.

Fixes: b3ca9b02b00704 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1787,8 +1787,11 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kio
 		goto out;
 
 	err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
-	if (err) {
-		err = sock_intr_errno(sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock));
+	if (unlikely(err)) {
+		/* recvmsg() in non blocking mode is supposed to return -EAGAIN
+		 * sk_rcvtimeo is not honored by mutex_lock_interruptible()
+		 */
+		err = noblock ? -EAGAIN : -ERESTARTSYS;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1910,6 +1913,7 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct ki
 	struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
 	struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
 	int copied = 0;
+	int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
 	int check_creds = 0;
 	int target;
 	int err = 0;
@@ -1925,7 +1929,7 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct ki
 		goto out;
 
 	target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags&MSG_WAITALL, size);
-	timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock);
 
 	/* Lock the socket to prevent queue disordering
 	 * while sleeps in memcpy_tomsg
@@ -1937,8 +1941,11 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct ki
 	}
 
 	err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
-	if (err) {
-		err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+	if (unlikely(err)) {
+		/* recvmsg() in non blocking mode is supposed to return -EAGAIN
+		 * sk_rcvtimeo is not honored by mutex_lock_interruptible()
+		 */
+		err = noblock ? -EAGAIN : -ERESTARTSYS;
 		goto out;
 	}
 

[PATCH 3.4 04/27] ipv6: dont set DST_NOCOUNT for remotely added routes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>

[ Upstream commit c88507fbad8055297c1d1e21e599f46960cbee39 ]

DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes
locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router
advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited
number of routes getting added remotely.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/route.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ int ip6_route_add(struct fib6_config *cf
 	if (!table)
 		goto out;
 
-	rt = ip6_dst_alloc(&net->ipv6.ip6_dst_ops, NULL, DST_NOCOUNT);
+	rt = ip6_dst_alloc(&net->ipv6.ip6_dst_ops, NULL, (cfg->fc_flags & RTF_ADDRCONF) ? 0 : DST_NOCOUNT);
 
 	if (!rt) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;

[PATCH 3.4 06/27] net: socket: error on a negative msg_namelen

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matthew Leach <matthew.leach@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit dbb490b96584d4e958533fb637f08b557f505657 ]

When copying in a struct msghdr from the user, if the user has set the
msg_namelen parameter to a negative value it gets clamped to a valid
size due to a comparison between signed and unsigned values.

Ensure the syscall errors when the user passes in a negative value.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Leach <matthew.leach@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/socket.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1907,6 +1907,10 @@ static int copy_msghdr_from_user(struct
 {
 	if (copy_from_user(kmsg, umsg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
 		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (kmsg->msg_namelen < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
 		kmsg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
 	return 0;

[PATCH 3.4 07/27] ipv6: Avoid unnecessary temporary addresses being generated

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiner Kallweit <heiner.kallweit@web.de>

[ Upstream commit ecab67015ef6e3f3635551dcc9971cf363cc1cd5 ]

tmp_prefered_lft is an offset to ifp->tstamp, not now. Therefore
age needs to be added to the condition.

Age calculation in ipv6_create_tempaddr is different from the one
in addrconf_verify and doesn't consider ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS.
This can cause age in ipv6_create_tempaddr to be less than the one
in addrconf_verify and therefore unnecessary temporary address to
be generated.
Use age calculation as in addrconf_modify to avoid this.

Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <heiner.kallweit@web.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -897,8 +897,11 @@ retry:
 	 * Lifetime is greater than REGEN_ADVANCE time units.  In particular,
 	 * an implementation must not create a temporary address with a zero
 	 * Preferred Lifetime.
+	 * Use age calculation as in addrconf_verify to avoid unnecessary
+	 * temporary addresses being generated.
 	 */
-	if (tmp_prefered_lft <= regen_advance) {
+	age = (now - tmp_tstamp + ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS) / HZ;
+	if (tmp_prefered_lft <= regen_advance + age) {
 		in6_ifa_put(ifp);
 		in6_dev_put(idev);
 		ret = -1;

[PATCH 3.4 08/27] ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu do not handle the mtu of the second fragment properly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: lucien <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit e367c2d03dba4c9bcafad24688fadb79dd95b218 ]

In ip6_append_data_mtu(), when the xfrm mode is not tunnel(such as
transport),the ipsec header need to be added in the first fragment, so the mtu
will decrease to reserve space for it, then the second fragment come, the mtu
should be turn back, as the commit 0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74
said.  however, in the commit a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be, it use
*mtu = min(*mtu, ...) to change the mtu, which lead to the new mtu is alway
equal with the first fragment's. and cannot turn back.

when I test through  ping6 -c1 -s5000 $ip (mtu=1280):
...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00002000,seq=0xb), length 1232
...frag (1232|1216)
...frag (2448|1216)
...frag (3664|1216)
...frag (4880|164)

which should be:
...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00001000,seq=0x1), length 1232
...frag (1232|1232)
...frag (2464|1232)
...frag (3696|1232)
...frag (4928|116)

so delete the min() when change back the mtu.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Fixes: 75a493e60ac4bb ("ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size")
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |   14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1194,21 +1194,19 @@ static void ip6_append_data_mtu(unsigned
 				unsigned int fragheaderlen,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct rt6_info *rt,
-				bool pmtuprobe)
+				unsigned int orig_mtu)
 {
 	if (!(rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)) {
 		if (skb == NULL) {
 			/* first fragment, reserve header_len */
-			*mtu = *mtu - rt->dst.header_len;
+			*mtu = orig_mtu - rt->dst.header_len;
 
 		} else {
 			/*
 			 * this fragment is not first, the headers
 			 * space is regarded as data space.
 			 */
-			*mtu = min(*mtu, pmtuprobe ?
-				   rt->dst.dev->mtu :
-				   dst_mtu(rt->dst.path));
+			*mtu = orig_mtu;
 		}
 		*maxfraglen = ((*mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7)
 			      + fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
@@ -1225,7 +1223,7 @@ int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int
 	struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
 	struct inet_cork *cork;
 	struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
-	unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen, mtu;
+	unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen, mtu, orig_mtu;
 	int exthdrlen;
 	int dst_exthdrlen;
 	int hh_len;
@@ -1310,6 +1308,7 @@ int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int
 		dst_exthdrlen = 0;
 		mtu = cork->fragsize;
 	}
+	orig_mtu = mtu;
 
 	hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
 
@@ -1392,8 +1391,7 @@ alloc_new_skb:
 			if (skb == NULL || skb_prev == NULL)
 				ip6_append_data_mtu(&mtu, &maxfraglen,
 						    fragheaderlen, skb, rt,
-						    np->pmtudisc ==
-						    IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE);
+						    orig_mtu);
 
 			skb_prev = skb;
 

[PATCH 3.4 09/27] vhost: fix total length when packets are too short

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit d8316f3991d207fe32881a9ac20241be8fa2bad0 ]

When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.

This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.

Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.

Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.

CVE-2014-0077

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/vhost/net.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
@@ -351,6 +351,12 @@ static int get_rx_bufs(struct vhost_virt
 	*iovcount = seg;
 	if (unlikely(log))
 		*log_num = nlogs;
+
+	/* Detect overrun */
+	if (unlikely(datalen > 0)) {
+		r = UIO_MAXIOV + 1;
+		goto err;
+	}
 	return headcount;
 err:
 	vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
@@ -405,6 +411,14 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *
 		/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
 		if (unlikely(headcount < 0))
 			break;
+		/* On overrun, truncate and discard */
+		if (unlikely(headcount > UIO_MAXIOV)) {
+			msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+			err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
+						 1, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
+			pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: len %zd\n", sock_len);
+			continue;
+		}
 		/* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
 		if (!headcount) {
 			if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {

[PATCH 3.4 10/27] vhost: validate vhost_get_vq_desc return value

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit a39ee449f96a2cd44ce056d8a0a112211a9b1a1f ]

vhost fails to validate negative error code
from vhost_get_vq_desc causing
a crash: we are using -EFAULT which is 0xfffffff2
as vector size, which exceeds the allocated size.

The code in question was introduced in commit
8dd014adfea6f173c1ef6378f7e5e7924866c923
    vhost-net: mergeable buffers support

CVE-2014-0055

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/vhost/net.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
@@ -324,9 +324,13 @@ static int get_rx_bufs(struct vhost_virt
 			r = -ENOBUFS;
 			goto err;
 		}
-		d = vhost_get_vq_desc(vq->dev, vq, vq->iov + seg,
+		r = vhost_get_vq_desc(vq->dev, vq, vq->iov + seg,
 				      ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov) - seg, &out,
 				      &in, log, log_num);
+		if (unlikely(r < 0))
+			goto err;
+
+		d = r;
 		if (d == vq->num) {
 			r = 0;
 			goto err;

[PATCH 3.4 11/27] xen-netback: remove pointless clause from if statement

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>

[ Upstream commit 0576eddf24df716d8570ef8ca11452a9f98eaab2 ]

This patch removes a test in start_new_rx_buffer() that checks whether
a copy operation is less than MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET in length, since
MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET is defined to be PAGE_SIZE and the only caller of
start_new_rx_buffer() already limits copy operations to PAGE_SIZE or less.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Reported-By: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Tested-By: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -338,8 +338,8 @@ static bool start_new_rx_buffer(int offs
 	 * into multiple copies tend to give large frags their
 	 * own buffers as before.
 	 */
-	if ((offset + size > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) &&
-	    (size <= MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) && offset && !head)
+	BUG_ON(size > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET);
+	if ((offset + size > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) && offset && !head)
 		return true;
 
 	return false;

[PATCH 3.4 12/27] ipv6: some ipv6 statistic counters failed to disable bh

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>

[ Upstream commit 43a43b6040165f7b40b5b489fe61a4cb7f8c4980 ]

After commit c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify
processing to workqueue") some counters are now updated in process context
and thus need to disable bh before doing so, otherwise deadlocks can
happen on 32-bit archs. Fabio Estevam noticed this while while mounting
a NFS volume on an ARM board.

As a compensation for missing this I looked after the other *_STATS_BH
and found three other calls which need updating:

1) icmp6_send: ip6_fragment -> icmpv6_send -> icmp6_send (error handling)
2) ip6_push_pending_frames: rawv6_sendmsg -> rawv6_push_pending_frames -> ...
   (only in case of icmp protocol with raw sockets in error handling)
3) ping6_v6_sendmsg (error handling)

Fixes: c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify processing to workqueue")
Reported-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/icmp.c       |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |    4 ++--
 net/ipv6/mcast.c      |   11 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8
 			      np->tclass, NULL, &fl6, (struct rt6_info*)dst,
 			      MSG_DONTWAIT, np->dontfrag);
 	if (err) {
-		ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
+		ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
 		ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
 	} else {
 		err = icmpv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6, &tmp_hdr,
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1661,8 +1661,8 @@ int ip6_push_pending_frames(struct sock
 	if (proto == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) {
 		struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
 
-		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type);
-		ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
+		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type);
+		ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
 	}
 
 	err = ip6_local_out(skb);
--- a/net/ipv6/mcast.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
@@ -1430,11 +1430,12 @@ static void mld_sendpack(struct sk_buff
 		      dst_output);
 out:
 	if (!err) {
-		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
-		ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
-		IP6_UPD_PO_STATS_BH(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
-	} else
-		IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
+		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
+		ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
+		IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
+	} else {
+		IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
+	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return;

[PATCH 3.4 13/27] netlink: dont compare the nul-termination in nla_strcmp

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pablo Neira <pablo@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit 8b7b932434f5eee495b91a2804f5b64ebb2bc835 ]

nla_strcmp compares the string length plus one, so it's implicitly
including the nul-termination in the comparison.

 int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str)
 {
        int len = strlen(str) + 1;
        ...
                d = memcmp(nla_data(nla), str, len);

However, if NLA_STRING is used, userspace can send us a string without
the nul-termination. This is a problem since the string
comparison will not match as the last byte may be not the
nul-termination.

Fix this by skipping the comparison of the nul-termination if the
attribute data is nul-terminated. Suggested by Thomas Graf.

Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 lib/nlattr.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/lib/nlattr.c
+++ b/lib/nlattr.c
@@ -299,9 +299,15 @@ int nla_memcmp(const struct nlattr *nla,
  */
 int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str)
 {
-	int len = strlen(str) + 1;
-	int d = nla_len(nla) - len;
+	int len = strlen(str);
+	char *buf = nla_data(nla);
+	int attrlen = nla_len(nla);
+	int d;
 
+	if (attrlen > 0 && buf[attrlen - 1] == '\0')
+		attrlen--;
+
+	d = attrlen - len;
 	if (d == 0)
 		d = memcmp(nla_data(nla), str, len);
 

[PATCH 3.4 14/27] isdnloop: Validate NUL-terminated strings from user.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

[ Upstream commit 77bc6bed7121936bb2e019a8c336075f4c8eef62 ]

Return -EINVAL unless all of user-given strings are correctly
NUL-terminated.

Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c
+++ b/drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c
@@ -1070,6 +1070,12 @@ isdnloop_start(isdnloop_card *card, isdn
 		return -EBUSY;
 	if (copy_from_user((char *) &sdef, (char *) sdefp, sizeof(sdef)))
 		return -EFAULT;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		if (!memchr(sdef.num[i], 0, sizeof(sdef.num[i])))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&card->isdnloop_lock, flags);
 	switch (sdef.ptype) {
 	case ISDN_PTYPE_EURO:

[PATCH 3.4 15/27] isdnloop: several buffer overflows

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 7563487cbf865284dcd35e9ef5a95380da046737 ]

There are three buffer overflows addressed in this patch.

1) In isdnloop_fake_err() we add an 'E' to a 60 character string and
then copy it into a 60 character buffer.  I have made the destination
buffer 64 characters and I'm changed the sprintf() to a snprintf().

2) In isdnloop_parse_cmd(), p points to a 6 characters into a 60
character buffer so we have 54 characters.  The ->eazlist[] is 11
characters long.  I have modified the code to return if the source
buffer is too long.

3) In isdnloop_command() the cbuf[] array was 60 characters long but the
max length of the string then can be up to 79 characters.  I made the
cbuf array 80 characters long and changed the sprintf() to snprintf().
I also removed the temporary "dial" buffer and changed it to use "p"
directly.

Unfortunately, we pass the "cbuf" string from isdnloop_command() to
isdnloop_writecmd() which truncates anything over 60 characters to make
it fit in card->omsg[].  (It can accept values up to 255 characters so
long as there is a '\n' character every 60 characters).  For now I have
just fixed the memory corruption bug and left the other problems in this
driver alone.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c |   17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c
+++ b/drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c
@@ -518,9 +518,9 @@ static isdnloop_stat isdnloop_cmd_table[
 static void
 isdnloop_fake_err(isdnloop_card *card)
 {
-	char buf[60];
+	char buf[64];
 
-	sprintf(buf, "E%s", card->omsg);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "E%s", card->omsg);
 	isdnloop_fake(card, buf, -1);
 	isdnloop_fake(card, "NAK", -1);
 }
@@ -903,6 +903,8 @@ isdnloop_parse_cmd(isdnloop_card *card)
 	case 7:
 		/* 0x;EAZ */
 		p += 3;
+		if (strlen(p) >= sizeof(card->eazlist[0]))
+			break;
 		strcpy(card->eazlist[ch - 1], p);
 		break;
 	case 8:
@@ -1133,7 +1135,7 @@ isdnloop_command(isdn_ctrl *c, isdnloop_
 {
 	ulong a;
 	int i;
-	char cbuf[60];
+	char cbuf[80];
 	isdn_ctrl cmd;
 	isdnloop_cdef cdef;
 
@@ -1198,7 +1200,6 @@ isdnloop_command(isdn_ctrl *c, isdnloop_
 			break;
 		if ((c->arg & 255) < ISDNLOOP_BCH) {
 			char *p;
-			char dial[50];
 			char dcode[4];
 
 			a = c->arg;
@@ -1210,10 +1211,10 @@ isdnloop_command(isdn_ctrl *c, isdnloop_
 			} else
 				/* Normal Dial */
 				strcpy(dcode, "CAL");
-			strcpy(dial, p);
-			sprintf(cbuf, "%02d;D%s_R%s,%02d,%02d,%s\n", (int) (a + 1),
-				dcode, dial, c->parm.setup.si1,
-				c->parm.setup.si2, c->parm.setup.eazmsn);
+			snprintf(cbuf, sizeof(cbuf),
+				 "%02d;D%s_R%s,%02d,%02d,%s\n", (int) (a + 1),
+				 dcode, p, c->parm.setup.si1,
+				 c->parm.setup.si2, c->parm.setup.eazmsn);
 			i = isdnloop_writecmd(cbuf, strlen(cbuf), 0, card);
 		}
 		break;

[PATCH 3.4 16/27] rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device in rds_iw_laddr_check

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit bf39b4247b8799935ea91d90db250ab608a58e50 ]

Binding might result in a NULL device which is later dereferenced
without checking.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/rds/iw.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/rds/iw.c
+++ b/net/rds/iw.c
@@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ static int rds_iw_laddr_check(__be32 add
 	ret = rdma_bind_addr(cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&sin);
 	/* due to this, we will claim to support IB devices unless we
 	   check node_type. */
-	if (ret || cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_RNIC)
+	if (ret || !cm_id->device ||
+	    cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_RNIC)
 		ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
 	rdsdebug("addr %pI4 ret %d node type %d\n",

[PATCH 3.4 17/27] sparc: PCI: Fix incorrect address calculation of PCI Bridge windows on Simba-bridges

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: oftedal <oftedal@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 557fc5873ef178c4b3e1e36a42db547ecdc43f9b ]

The SIMBA APB Bridges lacks the 'ranges' of-property describing the
PCI I/O and memory areas located beneath the bridge. Faking this
information has been performed by reading range registers in the
APB bridge, and calculating the corresponding areas.

In commit 01f94c4a6ced476ce69b895426fc29bfc48c69bd
("Fix sabre pci controllers with new probing scheme.") a bug was
introduced into this calculation, causing the PCI memory areas
to be calculated incorrectly: The shift size was set to be
identical for I/O and MEM ranges, which is incorrect.

This patch set the shift size of the MEM range back to the
value used before 01f94c4a6ced476ce69b895426fc29bfc48c69bd.

Signed-off-by: Kjetil Oftedal <oftedal@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/kernel/pci.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/pci.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/pci.c
@@ -486,8 +486,8 @@ static void __devinit apb_fake_ranges(st
 	apb_calc_first_last(map, &first, &last);
 	res = bus->resource[1];
 	res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
-	region.start = (first << 21);
-	region.end = (last << 21) + ((1 << 21) - 1);
+	region.start = (first << 29);
+	region.end = (last << 29) + ((1 << 29) - 1);
 	pcibios_bus_to_resource(dev, res, &region);
 }
 

[PATCH 3.4 18/27] Revert "sparc64: Fix __copy_{to,from}_user_inatomic defines."

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 16932237f2978a2265662f8de4af743b1f55a209 ]

This reverts commit 145e1c0023585e0e8f6df22316308ec61c5066b2.

This commit broke the behavior of __copy_from_user_inatomic when
it is only partially successful. Instead of returning the number
of bytes not copied, it now returns 1. This translates to the
wrong value being returned by iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic.

xfstests generic/246 and LTP writev01 both fail on btrfs and nfs
because of this.

Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ extern long __strnlen_user(const char __
 
 #define strlen_user __strlen_user
 #define strnlen_user __strnlen_user
-#define __copy_to_user_inatomic ___copy_to_user
-#define __copy_from_user_inatomic ___copy_from_user
+#define __copy_to_user_inatomic __copy_to_user
+#define __copy_from_user_inatomic __copy_from_user
 
 #endif  /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 

[PATCH 3.4 19/27] sparc32: fix build failure for arch_jump_label_transform

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>

[ Upstream commit 4f6500fff5f7644a03c46728fd7ef0f62fa6940b ]

In arch/sparc/Kernel/Makefile, we see:

   obj-$(CONFIG_SPARC64)   += jump_label.o

However, the Kconfig selects HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL unconditionally
for all SPARC.  This in turn leads to the following failure when
doing allmodconfig coverage builds:

kernel/built-in.o: In function `__jump_label_update':
jump_label.c:(.text+0x8560c): undefined reference to `arch_jump_label_transform'
kernel/built-in.o: In function `arch_jump_label_transform_static':
(.text+0x85cf4): undefined reference to `arch_jump_label_transform'
make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1

Change HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL to be conditional on SPARC64 so that it
matches the Makefile.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/Kconfig |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/sparc/Kconfig
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ config SPARC
 	select HAVE_IRQ_WORK
 	select HAVE_DMA_ATTRS
 	select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
-	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL if SPARC64
 	select HAVE_GENERIC_HARDIRQS
 	select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW
 	select USE_GENERIC_SMP_HELPERS if SMP

[PATCH 3.4 20/27] sparc64: dont treat 64-bit syscall return codes as 32-bit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 1535bd8adbdedd60a0ee62e28fd5225d66434371 ]

When checking a system call return code for an error,
linux_sparc_syscall was sign-extending the lower 32-bit value and
comparing it to -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK. lseek can return valid return
codes whose lower 32-bits alone would indicate a failure (such as 4G-1).
Use the whole 64-bit value to check for errors. Only the 32-bit path
should sign extend the lower 32-bit value.

Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls.S |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls.S
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls.S
@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ linux_sparc_syscall32:
 	 mov	%i0, %l5				! IEU1
 5:	call	%l7					! CTI	Group brk forced
 	 srl	%i5, 0, %o5				! IEU1
-	ba,a,pt	%xcc, 3f
+	ba,pt	%xcc, 3f
+	 sra	%o0, 0, %o0
 
 	/* Linux native system calls enter here... */
 	.align	32
@@ -212,7 +213,6 @@ linux_sparc_syscall:
 3:	stx	%o0, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I0]
 ret_sys_call:
 	ldx	[%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_TSTATE], %g3
-	sra	%o0, 0, %o0
 	mov	%ulo(TSTATE_XCARRY | TSTATE_ICARRY), %g2
 	sllx	%g2, 32, %g2
 

[PATCH 3.4 21/27] Char: ipmi_bt_sm, fix infinite loop

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

commit a94cdd1f4d30f12904ab528152731fb13a812a16 upstream.

In read_all_bytes, we do

  unsigned char i;
  ...
  bt->read_data[0] = BMC2HOST;
  bt->read_count = bt->read_data[0];
  ...
  for (i = 1; i <= bt->read_count; i++)
    bt->read_data[i] = BMC2HOST;

If bt->read_data[0] == bt->read_count == 255, we loop infinitely in the
'for' loop.  Make 'i' an 'int' instead of 'char' to get rid of the
overflow and finish the loop after 255 iterations every time.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Reported-and-debugged-by: Rui Hui Dian <rhdian@novell.com>
Cc: Tomas Cech <tcech@suse.cz>
Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Cc: <openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_bt_sm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_bt_sm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_bt_sm.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static inline void write_all_bytes(struc
 
 static inline int read_all_bytes(struct si_sm_data *bt)
 {
-	unsigned char i;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	/*
 	 * length is "framing info", minimum = 4: NetFn, Seq, Cmd, cCode.

[PATCH 3.4 22/27] Bluetooth: Fix removing Long Term Key

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Claudio Takahasi <claudio.takahasi@openbossa.org>

commit 5981a8821b774ada0be512fd9bad7c241e17657e upstream.

This patch fixes authentication failure on LE link re-connection when
BlueZ acts as slave (peripheral). LTK is removed from the internal list
after its first use causing PIN or Key missing reply when re-connecting
the link. The LE Long Term Key Request event indicates that the master
is attempting to encrypt or re-encrypt the link.

Pre-condition: BlueZ host paired and running as slave.
How to reproduce(master):

  1) Establish an ACL LE encrypted link
  2) Disconnect the link
  3) Try to re-establish the ACL LE encrypted link (fails)

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19
      LE Connection Complete (0x01)
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 64
        Role: Slave (0x01)
...
@ Device Connected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) flags 0x0000
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 13
      LE Long Term Key Request (0x05)
        Handle: 64
        Random number: 875be18439d9aa37
        Encryption diversifier: 0x76ed
< HCI Command: LE Long Term Key Request Reply (0x08|0x001a) plen 18
        Handle: 64
        Long term key: 2aa531db2fce9f00a0569c7d23d17409
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6
      LE Long Term Key Request Reply (0x08|0x001a) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 64
> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 64
        Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x01)
...
@ Device Disconnected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) reason 3
< HCI Command: LE Set Advertise Enable (0x08|0x000a) plen 1
        Advertising: Enabled (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
      LE Set Advertise Enable (0x08|0x000a) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19
      LE Connection Complete (0x01)
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 64
        Role: Slave (0x01)
...
@ Device Connected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) flags 0x0000
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 13
      LE Long Term Key Request (0x05)
        Handle: 64
        Random number: 875be18439d9aa37
        Encryption diversifier: 0x76ed
< HCI Command: LE Long Term Key Request Neg Reply (0x08|0x001b) plen 2
        Handle: 64
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6
      LE Long Term Key Request Neg Reply (0x08|0x001b) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 64
> HCI Event: Disconnect Complete (0x05) plen 4
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 64
        Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
@ Device Disconnected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) reason 0

Signed-off-by: Claudio Takahasi <claudio.takahasi@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -3383,7 +3383,13 @@ static inline void hci_le_ltk_request_ev
 
 	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
-	if (ltk->type & HCI_SMP_STK) {
+	/* Ref. Bluetooth Core SPEC pages 1975 and 2004. STK is a
+	 * temporary key used to encrypt a connection following
+	 * pairing. It is used during the Encrypted Session Setup to
+	 * distribute the keys. Later, security can be re-established
+	 * using a distributed LTK.
+	 */
+	if (ltk->type == HCI_SMP_STK_SLAVE) {
 		list_del(&ltk->list);
 		kfree(ltk);
 	}

[PATCH 3.4 23/27] jffs2: Fix segmentation fault found in stress test

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kamlakant Patel <kamlakant.patel@broadcom.com>

commit 3367da5610c50e6b83f86d366d72b41b350b06a2 upstream.

Creating a large file on a JFFS2 partition sometimes crashes with this call
trace:

[  306.476000] CPU 13 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address c0000000dfff8002, epc == ffffffffc03a80a8, ra == ffffffffc03a8044
[  306.488000] Oops[#1]:
[  306.488000] Cpu 13
[  306.492000] $ 0   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000008008 0000000000008007
[  306.500000] $ 4   : c0000000dfff8002 000000000000009f c0000000e0007cde c0000000ee95fa58
[  306.508000] $ 8   : 0000000000000001 0000000000008008 0000000000010000 ffffffffffff8002
[  306.516000] $12   : 0000000000007fa9 000000000000ff0e 000000000000ff0f 80e55930aebb92bb
[  306.524000] $16   : c0000000e0000000 c0000000ee95fa5c c0000000efc80000 ffffffffc09edd70
[  306.532000] $20   : ffffffffc2b60000 c0000000ee95fa58 0000000000000000 c0000000efc80000
[  306.540000] $24   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000004
[  306.548000] $28   : c0000000ee950000 c0000000ee95f738 0000000000000000 ffffffffc03a8044
[  306.556000] Hi    : 00000000000574a5
[  306.560000] Lo    : 6193b7a7e903d8c9
[  306.564000] epc   : ffffffffc03a80a8 jffs2_rtime_compress+0x98/0x198
[  306.568000]     Tainted: G        W
[  306.572000] ra    : ffffffffc03a8044 jffs2_rtime_compress+0x34/0x198
[  306.580000] Status: 5000f8e3    KX SX UX KERNEL EXL IE
[  306.584000] Cause : 00800008
[  306.588000] BadVA : c0000000dfff8002
[  306.592000] PrId  : 000c1100 (Netlogic XLP)
[  306.596000] Modules linked in:
[  306.596000] Process dd (pid: 170, threadinfo=c0000000ee950000, task=c0000000ee6e0858, tls=0000000000c47490)
[  306.608000] Stack : 7c547f377ddc7ee4 7ffc7f967f5d7fae 7f617f507fc37ff4 7e7d7f817f487f5f
        7d8e7fec7ee87eb3 7e977ff27eec7f9e 7d677ec67f917f67 7f3d7e457f017ed7
        7fd37f517f867eb2 7fed7fd17ca57e1d 7e5f7fe87f257f77 7fd77f0d7ede7fdb
        7fba7fef7e197f99 7fde7fe07ee37eb5 7f5c7f8c7fc67f65 7f457fb87f847e93
        7f737f3e7d137cd9 7f8e7e9c7fc47d25 7dbb7fac7fb67e52 7ff17f627da97f64
        7f6b7df77ffa7ec5 80057ef17f357fb3 7f767fa27dfc7fd5 7fe37e8e7fd07e53
        7e227fcf7efb7fa1 7f547e787fa87fcc 7fcb7fc57f5a7ffb 7fc07f6c7ea97e80
        7e2d7ed17e587ee0 7fb17f9d7feb7f31 7f607e797e887faa 7f757fdd7c607ff3
        7e877e657ef37fbd 7ec17fd67fe67ff7 7ff67f797ff87dc4 7eef7f3a7c337fa6
        7fe57fc97ed87f4b 7ebe7f097f0b8003 7fe97e2a7d997cba 7f587f987f3c7fa9
        ...
[  306.676000] Call Trace:
[  306.680000] [<ffffffffc03a80a8>] jffs2_rtime_compress+0x98/0x198
[  306.684000] [<ffffffffc0394f10>] jffs2_selected_compress+0x110/0x230
[  306.692000] [<ffffffffc039508c>] jffs2_compress+0x5c/0x388
[  306.696000] [<ffffffffc039dc58>] jffs2_write_inode_range+0xd8/0x388
[  306.704000] [<ffffffffc03971bc>] jffs2_write_end+0x16c/0x2d0
[  306.708000] [<ffffffffc01d3d90>] generic_file_buffered_write+0xf8/0x2b8
[  306.716000] [<ffffffffc01d4e7c>] __generic_file_aio_write+0x1ac/0x350
[  306.720000] [<ffffffffc01d50a0>] generic_file_aio_write+0x80/0x168
[  306.728000] [<ffffffffc021f7dc>] do_sync_write+0x94/0xf8
[  306.732000] [<ffffffffc021ff6c>] vfs_write+0xa4/0x1a0
[  306.736000] [<ffffffffc02202e8>] SyS_write+0x50/0x90
[  306.744000] [<ffffffffc0116cc0>] handle_sys+0x180/0x1a0
[  306.748000]
[  306.748000]
Code: 020b202d  0205282d  90a50000 <90840000> 14a40038  00000000  0060602d  0000282d  016c5823
[  306.760000] ---[ end trace 79dd088435be02d0 ]---
Segmentation fault

This crash is caused because the 'positions' is declared as an array of signed
short. The value of position is in the range 0..65535, and will be converted
to a negative number when the position is greater than 32767 and causes a
corruption and crash. Changing the definition to 'unsigned short' fixes this
issue

Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jchandra@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel <kamlakant.patel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/jffs2/compr_rtime.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/jffs2/compr_rtime.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/compr_rtime.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static int jffs2_rtime_compress(unsigned
 				unsigned char *cpage_out,
 				uint32_t *sourcelen, uint32_t *dstlen)
 {
-	short positions[256];
+	unsigned short positions[256];
 	int outpos = 0;
 	int pos=0;
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int jffs2_rtime_decompress(unsign
 				  unsigned char *cpage_out,
 				  uint32_t srclen, uint32_t destlen)
 {
-	short positions[256];
+	unsigned short positions[256];
 	int outpos = 0;
 	int pos=0;
 

[PATCH 3.4 24/27] jffs2: Fix crash due to truncation of csize

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ajesh Kunhipurayil Vijayan <ajesh@broadcom.com>

commit 41bf1a24c1001f4d0d41a78e1ac575d2f14789d7 upstream.

mounting JFFS2 partition sometimes crashes with this call trace:

[ 1322.240000] Kernel bug detected[#1]:
[ 1322.244000] Cpu 2
[ 1322.244000] $ 0   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000018 000000003ff00070 0000000000000001
[ 1322.252000] $ 4   : 0000000000000000 c0000000f3980150 0000000000000000 0000000000010000
[ 1322.260000] $ 8   : ffffffffc09cd5f8 0000000000000001 0000000000000088 c0000000ed300de8
[ 1322.268000] $12   : e5e19d9c5f613a45 ffffffffc046d464 0000000000000000 66227ba5ea67b74e
[ 1322.276000] $16   : c0000000f1769c00 c0000000ed1e0200 c0000000f3980150 0000000000000000
[ 1322.284000] $20   : c0000000f3a80000 00000000fffffffc c0000000ed2cfbd8 c0000000f39818f0
[ 1322.292000] $24   : 0000000000000004 0000000000000000
[ 1322.300000] $28   : c0000000ed2c0000 c0000000ed2cfab8 0000000000010000 ffffffffc039c0b0
[ 1322.308000] Hi    : 000000000000023c
[ 1322.312000] Lo    : 000000000003f802
[ 1322.316000] epc   : ffffffffc039a9f8 check_tn_node+0x88/0x3b0
[ 1322.320000]     Not tainted
[ 1322.324000] ra    : ffffffffc039c0b0 jffs2_do_read_inode_internal+0x1250/0x1e48
[ 1322.332000] Status: 5400f8e3    KX SX UX KERNEL EXL IE
[ 1322.336000] Cause : 00800034
[ 1322.340000] PrId  : 000c1004 (Netlogic XLP)
[ 1322.344000] Modules linked in:
[ 1322.348000] Process jffs2_gcd_mtd7 (pid: 264, threadinfo=c0000000ed2c0000, task=c0000000f0e68dd8, tls=0000000000000000)
[ 1322.356000] Stack : c0000000f1769e30 c0000000ed010780 c0000000ed010780 c0000000ed300000
        c0000000f1769c00 c0000000f3980150 c0000000f3a80000 00000000fffffffc
        c0000000ed2cfbd8 ffffffffc039c0b0 ffffffffc09c6340 0000000000001000
        0000000000000dec ffffffffc016c9d8 c0000000f39805a0 c0000000f3980180
        0000008600000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
        0001000000000dec c0000000f1769d98 c0000000ed2cfb18 0000000000010000
        0000000000010000 0000000000000044 c0000000f3a80000 c0000000f1769c00
        c0000000f3d207a8 c0000000f1769d98 c0000000f1769de0 ffffffffc076f9c0
        0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffc039cf90
        0000000000000017 ffffffffc013fbdc 0000000000000001 000000010003e61c
        ...
[ 1322.424000] Call Trace:
[ 1322.428000] [<ffffffffc039a9f8>] check_tn_node+0x88/0x3b0
[ 1322.432000] [<ffffffffc039c0b0>] jffs2_do_read_inode_internal+0x1250/0x1e48
[ 1322.440000] [<ffffffffc039cf90>] jffs2_do_crccheck_inode+0x70/0xd0
[ 1322.448000] [<ffffffffc03a1b80>] jffs2_garbage_collect_pass+0x160/0x870
[ 1322.452000] [<ffffffffc03a392c>] jffs2_garbage_collect_thread+0xdc/0x1f0
[ 1322.460000] [<ffffffffc01541c8>] kthread+0xb8/0xc0
[ 1322.464000] [<ffffffffc0106d18>] kernel_thread_helper+0x10/0x18
[ 1322.472000]
[ 1322.472000]
Code: 67bd0050  94a4002c  2c830001 <00038036> de050218  2403fffc  0080a82d  00431824  24630044
[ 1322.480000] ---[ end trace b052bb90e97dfbf5 ]---

The variable csize in structure jffs2_tmp_dnode_info is of type uint16_t, but it
is used to hold the compressed data length(csize) which is declared as uint32_t.
So, when the value of csize exceeds 16bits, it gets truncated when assigned to
tn->csize. This is causing a kernel BUG.
Changing the definition of csize in jffs2_tmp_dnode_info to uint32_t fixes the issue.

Signed-off-by: Ajesh Kunhipurayil Vijayan <ajesh@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel <kamlakant.patel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/jffs2/nodelist.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/jffs2/nodelist.h
+++ b/fs/jffs2/nodelist.h
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ struct jffs2_tmp_dnode_info
 	uint32_t version;
 	uint32_t data_crc;
 	uint32_t partial_crc;
-	uint16_t csize;
+	uint32_t csize;
 	uint16_t overlapped;
 };
 

[PATCH 3.4 25/27] jffs2: avoid soft-lockup in jffs2_reserve_space_gc()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>

commit 13b546d96207c131eeae15dc7b26c6e7d0f1cad7 upstream.

We triggered soft-lockup under stress test on 2.6.34 kernel.

BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 60009ms! [lockf2.test:14488]
...
[<bf09a4d4>] (jffs2_do_reserve_space+0x420/0x440 [jffs2])
[<bf09a528>] (jffs2_reserve_space_gc+0x34/0x78 [jffs2])
[<bf0a1350>] (jffs2_garbage_collect_dnode.isra.3+0x264/0x478 [jffs2])
[<bf0a2078>] (jffs2_garbage_collect_pass+0x9c0/0xe4c [jffs2])
[<bf09a670>] (jffs2_reserve_space+0x104/0x2a8 [jffs2])
[<bf09dc48>] (jffs2_write_inode_range+0x5c/0x4d4 [jffs2])
[<bf097d8c>] (jffs2_write_end+0x198/0x2c0 [jffs2])
[<c00e00a4>] (generic_file_buffered_write+0x158/0x200)
[<c00e14f4>] (__generic_file_aio_write+0x3a4/0x414)
[<c00e15c0>] (generic_file_aio_write+0x5c/0xbc)
[<c012334c>] (do_sync_write+0x98/0xd4)
[<c0123a84>] (vfs_write+0xa8/0x150)
[<c0123d74>] (sys_write+0x3c/0xc0)]

Fix this by adding a cond_resched() in the while loop.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: don't initialize `ret']
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c
@@ -169,20 +169,25 @@ int jffs2_reserve_space(struct jffs2_sb_
 int jffs2_reserve_space_gc(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, uint32_t minsize,
 			   uint32_t *len, uint32_t sumsize)
 {
-	int ret = -EAGAIN;
+	int ret;
 	minsize = PAD(minsize);
 
 	jffs2_dbg(1, "%s(): Requested 0x%x bytes\n", __func__, minsize);
 
-	spin_lock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
-	while(ret == -EAGAIN) {
+	while (true) {
+		spin_lock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
 		ret = jffs2_do_reserve_space(c, minsize, len, sumsize);
 		if (ret) {
 			jffs2_dbg(1, "%s(): looping, ret is %d\n",
 				  __func__, ret);
 		}
+		spin_unlock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
+
+		if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+			cond_resched();
+		else
+			break;
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
 	if (!ret)
 		ret = jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs(c, c->nextblock, 1);
 

[PATCH 3.4 26/27] jffs2: remove from wait queue after schedule()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>

commit 3ead9578443b66ddb3d50ed4f53af8a0c0298ec5 upstream.

@wait is a local variable, so if we don't remove it from the wait queue
list, later wake_up() may end up accessing invalid memory.

This was spotted by eyes.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ int jffs2_reserve_space(struct jffs2_sb_
 					spin_unlock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
 
 					schedule();
+					remove_wait_queue(&c->erase_wait, &wait);
 				} else
 					spin_unlock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
 			} else if (ret)

[PATCH 3.4 27/27] wait: fix reparent_leader() vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE race

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>

commit dfccbb5e49a621c1b21a62527d61fc4305617aca upstream.

wait_task_zombie() first does EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_DEAD transition and
drops tasklist_lock.  If this task is not the natural child and it is
traced, we change its state back to EXIT_ZOMBIE for ->real_parent.

The last transition is racy, this is even documented in 50b8d257486a
"ptrace: partially fix the do_wait(WEXITED) vs EXIT_DEAD->EXIT_ZOMBIE
race".  wait_consider_task() tries to detect this transition and clear
->notask_error but we can't rely on ptrace_reparented(), debugger can
exit and do ptrace_unlink() before its sub-thread sets EXIT_ZOMBIE.

And there is another problem which were missed before: this transition
can also race with reparent_leader() which doesn't reset >exit_signal if
EXIT_DEAD, assuming that this task must be reaped by someone else.  So
the tracee can be re-parented with ->exit_signal != SIGCHLD, and if
/sbin/init doesn't use __WALL it becomes unreapable.

Change reparent_leader() to update ->exit_signal even if EXIT_DEAD.
Note: this is the simple temporary hack for -stable, it doesn't try to
solve all problems, it will be reverted by the next changes.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/exit.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -761,9 +761,6 @@ static void reparent_leader(struct task_
 				struct list_head *dead)
 {
 	list_move_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
-
-	if (p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD)
-		return;
 	/*
 	 * If this is a threaded reparent there is no need to
 	 * notify anyone anything has happened.
@@ -771,9 +768,19 @@ static void reparent_leader(struct task_
 	if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, father))
 		return;
 
-	/* We don't want people slaying init.  */
+	/*
+	 * We don't want people slaying init.
+	 *
+	 * Note: we do this even if it is EXIT_DEAD, wait_task_zombie()
+	 * can change ->exit_state to EXIT_ZOMBIE. If this is the final
+	 * state, do_notify_parent() was already called and ->exit_signal
+	 * doesn't matter.
+	 */
 	p->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
 
+	if (p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD)
+		return;
+
 	/* If it has exited notify the new parent about this child's death. */
 	if (!p->ptrace &&
 	    p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE && thread_group_empty(p)) {

Re: [PATCH 3.4 03/27] net: unix: non blocking recvmsg() should not return -EINTR

[Rainer Weikusat]

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> writes:
> 3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me
> know.

Since this is a machine generated bulk e-mail (as far as I understand
this) which is specifically not intended to be sent to me as person, as
per Eric Dumazet earlier statements, I object to being on the recipient
list without an opportunity to be removed from it as I have repeatedly
requested.

Insofar my understanding of European spam legislation goes, this is
illegal.

Re: [PATCH 3.4 03/27] net: unix: non blocking recvmsg() should not return -EINTR

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 11:01:54PM +0100, Rainer Weikusat wrote:
> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> writes:
> > 3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me
> > know.
> 
> Since this is a machine generated bulk e-mail (as far as I understand
> this) which is specifically not intended to be sent to me as person, as
> per Eric Dumazet earlier statements, I object to being on the recipient
> list without an opportunity to be removed from it as I have repeatedly
> requested.

Yes, you are right, this is an automated email, based on the changelog
comments in the kernel source tree, sorry about that.

> Insofar my understanding of European spam legislation goes, this is
> illegal.

Glad I don't live in Europe :)

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 3.4 00/27] 3.4.88-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On 04/24/2014 02:55 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.88 release.
> There are 27 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Apr 26 21:55:41 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
	total: 119 pass: 97 skipped: 18 fail: 4

Qemu tests all passed. Results are as expected.

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 3.4 00/27] 3.4.88-stable review

[Shuah Khan]

On 04/24/2014 03:55 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.88 release.
> There are 27 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Apr 26 21:55:41 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.88-rc1.gz
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Compiled and booted. No dmesg regressions.

-- Shuah
-- 
Shuah Khan
Senior Linux Kernel Developer - Open Source Group
Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley)
shuah.kh@samsung.com | (970) 672-0658