From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.15 03/12] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 16:21:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140612232045.042866426@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140612232044.886466924@linuxfoundation.org>
3.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.
Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_tas
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+ int word, bit;
+
+ if (val > 0xffffffff)
+ return false;
+
+ word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+ return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@@ -745,11 +761,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -769,20 +782,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_names *n,
struct audit_context *ctx) {
- int word, bit;
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
- word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
if (list_empty(list))
return 0;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
ctx->current_state = state;
return 1;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-12 23:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-12 23:21 [PATCH 3.15 00/12] 3.15.1-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 01/12] fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 02/12] lock_parent: dont step on stale ->d_parent of all-but-freed one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 04/12] PCI/MSI: Fix memory leak in free_msi_irqs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 05/12] mei: me: fix hw ready reset flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 06/12] mei: me: drop harmful wait optimization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 07/12] mei: me: read H_CSR after asserting reset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 08/12] [media] rtl28xxu: add 1b80:d395 Peak DVB-T USB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 09/12] [media] rtl28xxu: add [1b80:d39d] Sveon STV20 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-12 23:21 ` [PATCH 3.15 10/12] [media] rtl28xxu: add [1b80:d3af] Sveon STV27 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-13 15:16 ` [PATCH 3.15 00/12] 3.15.1-stable review Guenter Roeck
2014-06-13 16:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-06-13 16:18 ` Guenter Roeck
2014-06-14 10:31 ` Satoru Takeuchi
2014-06-14 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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