From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [CFT] Can I get some Tested-By's on this series?
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 20:49:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141215204930.GD28877@ubuntumail> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8761dcwu40.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> writes:
>
> > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> >> St�phane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com> writes:
> >>
> >> > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 03:38:18PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> >> Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> writes:
> >> >>
> >> >> > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Will people please test these patches with their container project?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> These changes break container userspace (hopefully in a minimal way) if
> >> >> >> I could have that confirmed by testing I would really appreciate it. I
> >> >> >> really don't want to send out a bug fix that accidentally breaks
> >> >> >> userspace again.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> The only issue sort of under discussion is if there is a better name for
> >> >> >> /proc/<pid>/setgroups, and the name of the file will not affect the
> >> >> >> functionality of the patchset.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> With the code reviewed and written in simple obviously correct, easily
> >> >> >> reviewable ways I am hoping/planning to send this to Linus ASAP.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Eric
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Is there a git tree we can clone?
> >> >>
> >> >> Have either of you been able to check to see if any of my changes
> >> >> affects lxc?
> >> >>
> >> >> I am trying to gauge how hard and how fast I should push to Linus. lxc
> >> >> being the largest adopter of unprivileged user namespaces for general
> >> >> purpose containers.
> >> >>
> >> >> I expect you just call newuidmap and newgidmap and don't actually care
> >> >> about not being able to set gid_map without privilege. But I really
> >> >> want to avoid pushing a security fix and then being surprised that
> >> >> things like lxc break.
> >> >>
> >> >> Eric
> >> >
> >> > Hi Eric,
> >> >
> >> > I've unfortunately been pretty busy this week as I was (well, still am)
> >> > travelling to South Africa for a meeting. I don't have a full kernel
> >> > tree around here and a full git clone isn't really doable over the kind
> >> > of Internet I've got here :)
> >> >
> >> > Hopefully Serge can give it a quick try, otherwise I should be able to
> >> > do some tests on Tuesday when I'm back home.
> >>
> >> I thought Serge was going to but I haven't heard yet so I am prodding ;-)
> >
> > Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels.
> > Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using
> > my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid
> > as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Serge unless you object will add your Tested-By to my pull message to Linus.
Sounds good.
> Minor question do you runprivileged nsexec test cases test to see if the
> write to gid_map succeeds? I would have expected the gid_map write to
> fail before the setgroups setgid system calls came into play.
Yes, I did that by hand, and it failed (with your kernel).
-serge
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-12-15 20:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-11-29 17:26 [PATCH v2] userns: Disallow setgroups unless the gid_map writer is privileged Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 12:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 18:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 19:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:25 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:28 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:30 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/3] userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 21:05 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 23:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 23:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:06 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/7] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/7] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87h9x5ok0h.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:17 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:27 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <874mt5ojfh.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/7] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:08 ` [CFT][PATCH 4/7] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:10 ` [CFT][PATCH 5/7] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:11 ` [CFT][PATCH 6/7] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 23:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 19:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:36 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/8] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:38 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/8] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/8] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 23:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 4/8] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41 ` [CFT][PATCH 5/8] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41 ` [CFT][PATCH 6/8] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:42 ` [CFT][PATCH 7/8] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <971ad3f6-90fd-4e3f-916c-8988af3c826d@email.android.com>
2014-12-10 0:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87wq5zf83t.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <87iohh3c9c.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12 1:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <8761dh3b7k.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <878uicy1r9.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12 21:54 ` [PATCH 1/2] proc.5: Document /proc/[pid]/setgroups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:36 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 8:01 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 13:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 13:53 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-21 7:57 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-03-03 11:39 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-12 21:54 ` [PATCH 2/2] user_namespaces.7: Update the documention to reflect the fixes for negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:37 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 8:02 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 14:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 10:11 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-02 21:31 ` Alban Crequy
2015-03-04 14:00 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-09 20:43 ` [CFT][PATCH 8/8] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 16:39 ` [CFT] Can I get some Tested-By's on this series? Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 22:48 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-10 22:50 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-10 23:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-11 19:27 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-12 6:56 ` Chen, Hanxiao
2014-12-13 22:31 ` serge
[not found] ` <87lhmcy2et.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <20141212220840.GF22091@castiana.ipv6.teksavvy.com>
[not found] ` <8761dgze56.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-15 19:38 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-15 20:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-15 20:49 ` Serge Hallyn [this message]
2014-12-16 2:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-16 9:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:14 ` [CFT][PATCH 7/7] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:58 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 22:48 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
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