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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.10 21/38] groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
Date: Tue,  6 Jan 2015 17:50:33 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150107014955.850496068@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150107014952.440109372@linuxfoundation.org>

3.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.

Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their
permission checking has diverged.  Add a common function so that
they may all share the same permission checking code.

This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks
and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.

A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c |    2 +-
 include/linux/cred.h            |    1 +
 kernel/groups.c                 |    9 ++++++++-
 kernel/uid16.c                  |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_setgroups16(int gi
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ extern void groups_free(struct group_inf
 extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *);
 extern int set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *);
 extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
+extern bool may_setgroups(void);
 
 /* access the groups "array" with this macro */
 #define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -223,6 +223,13 @@ out:
 	return i;
 }
 
+bool may_setgroups(void)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+	return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID);
+}
+
 /*
  *	SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
  *	without another task interfering.
@@ -233,7 +240,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsi
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
--- a/kernel/uid16.c
+++ b/kernel/uid16.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidset
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-01-07  1:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-01-07  1:50 [PATCH 3.10 00/38] 3.10.64-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 01/38] isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 02/38] x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 03/38] x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 04/38] x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 05/38] x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32s benefit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 06/38] md/bitmap: always wait for writes on unplug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 07/38] mfd: tc6393xb: Fail ohci suspend if full state restore is required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 08/38] mmc: block: add newline to sysfs display of force_ro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 09/38] megaraid_sas: corrected return of wait_event from abort frame path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 10/38] nfs41: fix nfs4_proc_layoutget error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 11/38] dm bufio: fix memleak when using a dm_buffers inline bio Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 12/38] dm space map metadata: fix sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 13/38] x86/tls: Dont validate lm in set_thread_area() after all Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 14/38] isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 15/38] KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 17/38] mac80211: free management frame keys when removing station Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 18/38] mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 19/38] mnt: Update unprivileged remount test Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 20/38] umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 22/38] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 23/38] userns: Dont allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 24/38] userns: Dont allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 25/38] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 26/38] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 27/38] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 28/38] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 29/38] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 30/38] userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 31/38] crypto: af_alg - fix backlog handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 32/38] ncpfs: return proper error from NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 33/38] exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 34/38] udf: Verify symlink size before loading it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 35/38] eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 36/38] eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 37/38] Btrfs: do not move em to modified list when unpinning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 38/38] Btrfs: fix fs corruption on transaction abort if device supports discard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 13:38 ` [PATCH 3.10 00/38] 3.10.64-stable review Guenter Roeck
2015-01-07 23:33 ` Shuah Khan

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