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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
	Priya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.10 35/38] eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled
Date: Tue,  6 Jan 2015 17:50:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150107014957.979750927@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150107014952.440109372@linuxfoundation.org>

3.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

commit 332b122d39c9cbff8b799007a825d94b2e7c12f2 upstream.

The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
information:

  e77a56d [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough

This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Priya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ecryptfs/file.c |   12 ------------
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c |   16 +++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
@@ -196,23 +196,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *i
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = NULL;
-	struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
 	struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	/* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in
 	 * ecryptfs_lookup() */
 	struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info;
 
-	mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
-		ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
-	if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
-	    && ((file->f_flags & O_WRONLY) || (file->f_flags & O_RDWR)
-		|| (file->f_flags & O_CREAT) || (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)
-		|| (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "Mount has encrypted view enabled; "
-		       "files may only be read\n");
-		rc = -EPERM;
-		goto out;
-	}
 	/* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */
 	file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 	ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info);
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
 {
 	struct super_block *s;
 	struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
+	struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
 	struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
 	const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
 	struct inode *inode;
@@ -512,6 +513,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
 		err = "Error parsing options";
 		goto out;
 	}
+	mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
 
 	s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(s)) {
@@ -558,11 +560,19 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
 
 	/**
 	 * Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
-	 * mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
-	 * Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
+	 * mount.
 	 */
 	s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
-	s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
+	s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_POSIXACL;
+
+	/**
+	 * Force a read-only eCryptfs mount when:
+	 *   1) The lower mount is ro
+	 *   2) The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified
+	 */
+	if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ||
+	    mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
+		s->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
 
 	s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
 	s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-01-07  1:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-01-07  1:50 [PATCH 3.10 00/38] 3.10.64-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 01/38] isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 02/38] x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 03/38] x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 04/38] x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 05/38] x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32s benefit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 06/38] md/bitmap: always wait for writes on unplug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 07/38] mfd: tc6393xb: Fail ohci suspend if full state restore is required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 08/38] mmc: block: add newline to sysfs display of force_ro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 09/38] megaraid_sas: corrected return of wait_event from abort frame path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 10/38] nfs41: fix nfs4_proc_layoutget error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 11/38] dm bufio: fix memleak when using a dm_buffers inline bio Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 12/38] dm space map metadata: fix sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 13/38] x86/tls: Dont validate lm in set_thread_area() after all Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 14/38] isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 15/38] KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 17/38] mac80211: free management frame keys when removing station Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 18/38] mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 19/38] mnt: Update unprivileged remount test Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 20/38] umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 21/38] groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 22/38] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 23/38] userns: Dont allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 24/38] userns: Dont allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 25/38] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 26/38] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 27/38] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 28/38] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 29/38] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 30/38] userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 31/38] crypto: af_alg - fix backlog handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 32/38] ncpfs: return proper error from NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 33/38] exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 34/38] udf: Verify symlink size before loading it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 36/38] eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 37/38] Btrfs: do not move em to modified list when unpinning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07  1:50 ` [PATCH 3.10 38/38] Btrfs: fix fs corruption on transaction abort if device supports discard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 13:38 ` [PATCH 3.10 00/38] 3.10.64-stable review Guenter Roeck
2015-01-07 23:33 ` Shuah Khan

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