From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
Priya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.14 49/52] eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled
Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2015 18:07:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150107020602.926279083@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150107020555.043793795@linuxfoundation.org>
3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
commit 332b122d39c9cbff8b799007a825d94b2e7c12f2 upstream.
The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
information:
e77a56d [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough
This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Priya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ecryptfs/file.c | 12 ------------
fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
@@ -191,23 +191,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *i
{
int rc = 0;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = NULL;
- struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
/* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in
* ecryptfs_lookup() */
struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info;
- mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
- ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
- if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
- && ((file->f_flags & O_WRONLY) || (file->f_flags & O_RDWR)
- || (file->f_flags & O_CREAT) || (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)
- || (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Mount has encrypted view enabled; "
- "files may only be read\n");
- rc = -EPERM;
- goto out;
- }
/* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */
file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info);
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
@@ -511,6 +512,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
+ mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
@@ -557,11 +559,19 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
- * mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
- * Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
+ * mount.
*/
s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
- s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
+ s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_POSIXACL;
+
+ /**
+ * Force a read-only eCryptfs mount when:
+ * 1) The lower mount is ro
+ * 2) The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified
+ */
+ if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ||
+ mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
+ s->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-01-07 2:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-01-07 2:06 [PATCH 3.14 00/52] 3.14.28-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 01/52] isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 02/52] x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 03/52] x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 04/52] x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 05/52] x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32s benefit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 06/52] md/bitmap: always wait for writes on unplug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 07/52] mfd: tc6393xb: Fail ohci suspend if full state restore is required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 08/52] mmc: dw_mmc: avoid write to CDTHRCTL on older versions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 09/52] mmc: block: add newline to sysfs display of force_ro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 10/52] mmc: sdhci-pci-o2micro: Fix Dell E5440 issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 11/52] megaraid_sas: corrected return of wait_event from abort frame path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 12/52] scsi: correct return values for .eh_abort_handler implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 13/52] nfs41: fix nfs4_proc_layoutget error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 14/52] dm bufio: fix memleak when using a dm_buffers inline bio Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 15/52] dm crypt: use memzero_explicit for on-stack buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 16/52] dm cache: only use overwrite optimisation for promotion when in writeback mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 17/52] dm cache: dirty flag was mistakenly being cleared when promoting via overwrite Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 18/52] dm space map metadata: fix sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 19/52] dm thin: fix inability to discard blocks when in out-of-data-space mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 20/52] dm thin: fix missing out-of-data-space to write mode transition if blocks are released Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 21/52] arm64: Add COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 22/52] ARM: tegra: Re-add removed SoC id macro to tegra_resume() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 24/52] x86/tls: Dont validate lm in set_thread_area() after all Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 25/52] isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 26/52] KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 28/52] mac80211: free management frame keys when removing station Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 29/52] mnt: Fix a memory stomp in umount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 30/52] thermal: Fix error path in thermal_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:06 ` [PATCH 3.14 31/52] mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 32/52] mnt: Update unprivileged remount test Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 33/52] umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 34/52] groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 35/52] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 36/52] userns: Dont allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 37/52] userns: Dont allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 38/52] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 39/52] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 40/52] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 41/52] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 42/52] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 43/52] userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 44/52] audit: restore AUDIT_LOGINUID unset ABI Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 45/52] crypto: af_alg - fix backlog handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 46/52] ncpfs: return proper error from NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 47/52] exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 48/52] udf: Verify symlink size before loading it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 50/52] eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 51/52] Btrfs: do not move em to modified list when unpinning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 2:07 ` [PATCH 3.14 52/52] Btrfs: fix fs corruption on transaction abort if device supports discard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-01-07 13:42 ` [PATCH 3.14 00/52] 3.14.28-stable review Guenter Roeck
2015-01-07 23:34 ` Shuah Khan
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