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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Subject: [ 04/48] x86, tls: Interpret an all-zero struct user_desc as "no segment"
Date: Fri, 15 May 2015 10:05:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150515080530.469148788@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9c2783dfae10ef2d1e9b08bcc1e562c5@local>

2.6.32-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

commit 3669ef9fa7d35f573ec9c0e0341b29251c2734a7 upstream.

The Witcher 2 did something like this to allocate a TLS segment index:

        struct user_desc u_info;
        bzero(&u_info, sizeof(u_info));
        u_info.entry_number = (uint32_t)-1;

        syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &u_info);

Strictly speaking, this code was never correct.  It should have set
read_exec_only and seg_not_present to 1 to indicate that it wanted
to find a free slot without putting anything there, or it should
have put something sensible in the TLS slot if it wanted to allocate
a TLS entry for real.  The actual effect of this code was to
allocate a bogus segment that could be used to exploit espfix.

The set_thread_area hardening patches changed the behavior, causing
set_thread_area to return -EINVAL and crashing the game.

This changes set_thread_area to interpret this as a request to find
a free slot and to leave it empty, which isn't *quite* what the game
expects but should be close enough to keep it working.  In
particular, using the code above to allocate two segments will
allocate the same segment both times.

According to FrostbittenKing on Github, this fixes The Witcher 2.

If this somehow still causes problems, we could instead allocate
a limit==0 32-bit data segment, but that seems rather ugly to me.

Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0cb251abe1ff0958b8e468a9a9a905b80ae3a746.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit 3175b4cb1aa4b1430fada4679be4598f6eb8872b)

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c       | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
index 66973a0..fe4652d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
@@ -261,6 +261,19 @@ static inline void native_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
 	 (info)->seg_not_present	== 1	&&	\
 	 (info)->useable		== 0)
 
+/* Lots of programs expect an all-zero user_desc to mean "no segment at all". */
+static inline bool LDT_zero(const struct user_desc *info)
+{
+	return (info->base_addr		== 0 &&
+		info->limit		== 0 &&
+		info->contents		== 0 &&
+		info->read_exec_only	== 0 &&
+		info->seg_32bit		== 0 &&
+		info->limit_in_pages	== 0 &&
+		info->seg_not_present	== 0 &&
+		info->useable		== 0);
+}
+
 static inline void clear_LDT(void)
 {
 	set_ldt(NULL, 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index 7af7338..8dda590 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -30,7 +30,28 @@ static int get_free_idx(void)
 
 static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
 {
-	if (LDT_empty(info))
+	/*
+	 * For historical reasons (i.e. no one ever documented how any
+	 * of the segmentation APIs work), user programs can and do
+	 * assume that a struct user_desc that's all zeros except for
+	 * entry_number means "no segment at all".  This never actually
+	 * worked.  In fact, up to Linux 3.19, a struct user_desc like
+	 * this would create a 16-bit read-write segment with base and
+	 * limit both equal to zero.
+	 *
+	 * That was close enough to "no segment at all" until we
+	 * hardened this function to disallow 16-bit TLS segments.  Fix
+	 * it up by interpreting these zeroed segments the way that they
+	 * were almost certainly intended to be interpreted.
+	 *
+	 * The correct way to ask for "no segment at all" is to specify
+	 * a user_desc that satisfies LDT_empty.  To keep everything
+	 * working, we accept both.
+	 *
+	 * Note that there's a similar kludge in modify_ldt -- look at
+	 * the distinction between modes 1 and 0x11.
+	 */
+	if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
 		return true;
 
 	/*
@@ -56,7 +77,7 @@ static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 	cpu = get_cpu();
 
 	while (n-- > 0) {
-		if (LDT_empty(info))
+		if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
 			desc->a = desc->b = 0;
 		else
 			fill_ldt(desc, info);
-- 
1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty




  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-05-15  8:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <9c2783dfae10ef2d1e9b08bcc1e562c5@local>
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 00/48] 2.6.32.66-longterm review Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 01/48] x86/asm/traps: Disable tracing and kprobes in fixup_bad_iret and sync_regs Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 02/48] x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 03/48] x86, tls, ldt: Stop checking lm in LDT_empty Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 05/48] x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15 12:32   ` Ben Hutchings
2015-05-15 13:38     ` Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15 14:25       ` Ben Hutchings
2015-05-15 14:31         ` Ben Hutchings
2015-05-15 14:37         ` Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15 15:53         ` Andi Kleen
2015-05-15 16:48           ` Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15 20:53           ` Ben Hutchings
2015-05-15 22:15             ` Andi Kleen
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 06/48] x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 07/48] x86/tls: Dont validate lm in set_thread_area() after all Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 08/48] x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32s benefit Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 09/48] x86_64, vdso: Fix the vdso address randomization algorithm Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15 21:02   ` Ben Hutchings
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 10/48] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 11/48] x86, cpu, amd: Add workaround for family 16h, erratum 793 Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 12/48] x86/asm/entry/64: Remove a bogus ret_from_fork optimization Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 13/48] x86: Conditionally update time when ack-ing pending irqs Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 14/48] serial: samsung: wait for transfer completion before clock disable Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 15/48] splice: Apply generic position and size checks to each write Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 16/48] netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15 21:05   ` Ben Hutchings
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 17/48] isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 18/48] isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 19/48] net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 20/48] net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 21/48] IB/uverbs: Prevent integer overflow in ib_umem_get address arithmetic Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 22/48] net: llc: use correct size for sysctl timeout entries Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 23/48] net: rds: use correct size for max unacked packets and bytes Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 24/48] ipv6: Dont reduce hop limit for an interface Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 25/48] fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 26/48] net:socket: set msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name is passed as NULL in msghdr struct from userland Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15 21:08   ` Ben Hutchings
2015-05-16  5:31     ` Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 27/48] ppp: deflate: never return len larger than output buffer Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:05 ` [ 29/48] net: reject creation of netdev names with colons Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 30/48] ipv4: Dont use ufo handling on later transformed packets Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 31/48] udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM sockets Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 32/48] net: avoid to hang up on sending due to sysctl configuration overflow Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 33/48] net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 34/48] rds: avoid potential stack overflow Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 35/48] rxrpc: bogus MSG_PEEK test in rxrpc_recvmsg() Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 36/48] tcp: make connect() mem charging friendly Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 37/48] ip_forward: Drop frames with attached skb->sk Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 38/48] tcp: avoid looping in tcp_send_fin() Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 39/48] spi: spidev: fix possible arithmetic overflow for multi-transfer message Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 40/48] IB/core: Avoid leakage from kernel to user space Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 41/48] ipvs: uninitialized data with IP_VS_IPV6 Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 42/48] ipv4: fix nexthop attlen check in fib_nh_match Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 43/48] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 44/48] lockd: Try to reconnect if statd has moved Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 45/48] scsi: Fix error handling in SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 46/48] posix-timers: Fix stack info leak in timer_create() Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 47/48] hfsplus: fix B-tree corruption after insertion at position 0 Willy Tarreau
2015-05-15  8:06 ` [ 48/48] sound/oss: fix deadlock in sequencer_ioctl(SNDCTL_SEQ_OUTOFBAND) Willy Tarreau

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