From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCHES] Networking
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 14:37:58 -0500 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151210.143758.931942885189069714.davem@davemloft.net> (raw)
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Please queue up the following networking bug fixes for 3.18, 4.1, 4.2,
and 4.3 -stable, respectively.
Thanks!
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From 7c242d9a871f5c9962d8b3a140712faab5dc3512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 22:07:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 01/23] unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
[ Upstream commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c ]
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index a175ba4..cb4a728 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0
#define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1
struct socket_wq peer_wq;
+ wait_queue_t peer_wake;
};
#define unix_sk(__sk) ((struct unix_sock *)__sk)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 8232118..b11562e 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -316,6 +316,118 @@ found:
return s;
}
+/* Support code for asymmetrically connected dgram sockets
+ *
+ * If a datagram socket is connected to a socket not itself connected
+ * to the first socket (eg, /dev/log), clients may only enqueue more
+ * messages if the present receive queue of the server socket is not
+ * "too large". This means there's a second writeability condition
+ * poll and sendmsg need to test. The dgram recv code will do a wake
+ * up on the peer_wait wait queue of a socket upon reception of a
+ * datagram which needs to be propagated to sleeping would-be writers
+ * since these might not have sent anything so far. This can't be
+ * accomplished via poll_wait because the lifetime of the server
+ * socket might be less than that of its clients if these break their
+ * association with it or if the server socket is closed while clients
+ * are still connected to it and there's no way to inform "a polling
+ * implementation" that it should let go of a certain wait queue
+ *
+ * In order to propagate a wake up, a wait_queue_t of the client
+ * socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server socket
+ * whose wake function does a wake_up on the ordinary client socket
+ * wait queue. This connection is established whenever a write (or
+ * poll for write) hit the flow control condition and broken when the
+ * association to the server socket is dissolved or after a wake up
+ * was relayed.
+ */
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay(wait_queue_t *q, unsigned mode, int flags,
+ void *key)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ wait_queue_head_t *u_sleep;
+
+ u = container_of(q, struct unix_sock, peer_wake);
+
+ __remove_wait_queue(&unix_sk(u->peer_wake.private)->peer_wait,
+ q);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+
+ /* relaying can only happen while the wq still exists */
+ u_sleep = sk_sleep(&u->sk);
+ if (u_sleep)
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(u_sleep, key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+ int rc;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ rc = 0;
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (!u->peer_wake.private) {
+ u->peer_wake.private = other;
+ __add_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+
+ rc = 1;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (u->peer_wake.private == other) {
+ __remove_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
+ POLLOUT |
+ POLLWRNORM |
+ POLLWRBAND);
+}
+
+/* preconditions:
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == other
+ * - association is stable
+ */
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ int connected;
+
+ connected = unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(sk, other);
+
+ if (unix_recvq_full(other))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (connected)
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk)
{
return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf;
@@ -420,6 +532,8 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
skpair->sk_state_change(skpair);
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
+
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, skpair);
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
@@ -653,6 +767,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
+ init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
@@ -1020,6 +1135,8 @@ restart:
if (unix_peer(sk)) {
struct sock *old_peer = unix_peer(sk);
unix_peer(sk) = other;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, old_peer);
+
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
if (other != old_peer)
@@ -1459,6 +1576,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
+ int sk_locked;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
@@ -1540,12 +1658,14 @@ restart:
goto out_free;
}
+ sk_locked = 0;
unix_state_lock(other);
+restart_locked:
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
- if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
+ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD))) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
@@ -1553,10 +1673,14 @@ restart:
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
+ if (!sk_locked)
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
err = 0;
- unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, other);
+
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
@@ -1582,21 +1706,38 @@ restart:
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
- if (!timeo) {
- err = -EAGAIN;
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ if (timeo) {
+ timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+
+ err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ goto out_free;
+
+ goto restart;
}
- timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+ unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
+ }
- err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
- if (signal_pending(current))
- goto out_free;
+ if (unix_peer(sk) != other ||
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
- goto restart;
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto restart_locked;
+ }
}
+ if (unlikely(sk_locked))
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
+
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
@@ -1610,6 +1751,8 @@ restart:
return len;
out_unlock:
+ if (sk_locked)
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -2255,14 +2398,16 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
return mask;
writable = unix_writable(sk);
- other = unix_peer_get(sk);
- if (other) {
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
- sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
- if (unix_recvq_full(other))
- writable = 0;
- }
- sock_put(other);
+ if (writable) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
+ other = unix_peer(sk);
+ if (other && unix_peer(other) != sk &&
+ unix_recvq_full(other) &&
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other))
+ writable = 0;
+
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
if (writable)
--
2.4.1
From 4c317c260868f448f5467535535a246c5a83b08b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 14:24:27 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 02/23] tools/net: Use include/uapi with __EXPORTED_HEADERS__
[ Upstream commit d7475de58575c904818efa369c82e88c6648ce2e ]
Use the local uapi headers to keep in sync with "recently" added #define's
(e.g. SKF_AD_VLAN_TPID). Refactored CFLAGS, and bpf_asm doesn't need -I.
Fixes: 3f356385e8a4 ("filter: bpf_asm: add minimal bpf asm tool")
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
tools/net/Makefile | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/net/Makefile b/tools/net/Makefile
index ee577ea..ddf8880 100644
--- a/tools/net/Makefile
+++ b/tools/net/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ CC = gcc
LEX = flex
YACC = bison
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2
+CFLAGS += -D__EXPORTED_HEADERS__ -I../../include/uapi -I../../include
+
%.yacc.c: %.y
$(YACC) -o $@ -d $<
@@ -12,15 +15,13 @@ YACC = bison
all : bpf_jit_disasm bpf_dbg bpf_asm
-bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
+bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS += -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
bpf_jit_disasm : LDLIBS = -lopcodes -lbfd -ldl
bpf_jit_disasm : bpf_jit_disasm.o
-bpf_dbg : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2
bpf_dbg : LDLIBS = -lreadline
bpf_dbg : bpf_dbg.o
-bpf_asm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -I.
bpf_asm : LDLIBS =
bpf_asm : bpf_asm.o bpf_exp.yacc.o bpf_exp.lex.o
bpf_exp.lex.o : bpf_exp.yacc.c
--
2.4.1
From 1add2a51ec1e0dd0e66b7b5d5594f120f1305748 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/23] packet: do skb_probe_transport_header when we actually
have data
[ Upstream commit efdfa2f7848f64517008136fb41f53c4a1faf93a ]
In tpacket_fill_skb() commit c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport
header before doing xmit") and later on 40893fd0fd4e ("net: switch
to use skb_probe_transport_header()") was probing for a transport
header on the skb from a ring buffer slot, but at a time, where
the skb has _not even_ been filled with data yet. So that call into
the flow dissector is pretty useless. Lets do it after we've set
up the skb frags.
Fixes: c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index bf60977..0a6868e 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2117,8 +2117,6 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) {
int off_min, off_max, off;
off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
@@ -2202,6 +2200,9 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
+ if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+
return tp_len;
}
--
2.4.1
From da661e19afc5895926fb2f9c8df503efee596dbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/23] packet: always probe for transport header
[ Upstream commit 8fd6c80d9dd938ca338c70698533a7e304752846 ]
We concluded that the skb_probe_transport_header() should better be
called unconditionally. Avoiding the call into the flow dissector has
also not really much to do with the direct xmit mode.
While it seems that only virtio_net code makes use of GSO from non
RX/TX ring packet socket paths, we should probe for a transport header
nevertheless before they hit devices.
Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/386173/
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 0a6868e..9ac51b5 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2200,8 +2200,7 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
return tp_len;
}
@@ -2538,8 +2537,8 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
len += vnet_hdr_len;
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+
if (unlikely(extra_len == 4))
skb->no_fcs = 1;
--
2.4.1
From 2a5cdc54f4969a5f67ed03db014ef80f61d3d407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Drozdov <al.drozdov@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:57:01 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 05/23] packet: tpacket_snd(): fix signed/unsigned comparison
[ Upstream commit dbd46ab412b8fb395f2b0ff6f6a7eec9df311550 ]
tpacket_fill_skb() can return a negative value (-errno) which
is stored in tp_len variable. In that case the following
condition will be (but shouldn't be) true:
tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len
as dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len are both unsigned.
That may lead to just returning an incorrect EMSGSIZE errno
to the user.
Fixes: 52f1454f629fa ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Drozdov <al.drozdov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 9ac51b5..40df7cd 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2274,7 +2274,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
- if (tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len) {
+ if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len) {
struct ethhdr *ehdr;
/* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
* double-check this now that we have the actual
--
2.4.1
From 81073407a1ed4ae3964838074284d25563c8b833 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/23] packet: only allow extra vlan len on ethernet devices
[ Upstream commit 3c70c132488794e2489ab045559b0ce0afcf17de ]
Packet sockets can be used by various net devices and are not
really restricted to ARPHRD_ETHER device types. However, when
currently checking for the extra 4 bytes that can be transmitted
in VLAN case, our assumption is that we generally probe on
ARPHRD_ETHER devices. Therefore, before looking into Ethernet
header, check the device type first.
This also fixes the issue where non-ARPHRD_ETHER devices could
have no dev->hard_header_len in TX_RING SOCK_RAW case, and thus
the check would test unfilled linear part of the skb (instead
of non-linear).
Fixes: 57f89bfa2140 ("network: Allow af_packet to transmit +4 bytes for VLAN packets.")
Fixes: 52f1454f629f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 40df7cd..8670ffb 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1507,6 +1507,20 @@ static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
}
+static bool packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, double-check
+ * this now that we have the actual packet in hand. We can only
+ * do this check on Ethernet devices.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER))
+ return false;
+
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ return likely(eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto == htons(ETH_P_8021Q));
+}
+
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops;
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops_spkt;
@@ -1668,18 +1682,10 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
- if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_unlock;
- }
+ if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
@@ -2275,18 +2281,10 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len) {
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
+ tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q))
- tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- }
if (unlikely(tp_len < 0)) {
if (po->tp_loss) {
__packet_set_status(po, ph,
@@ -2498,18 +2496,10 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
- if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_free;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
--
2.4.1
From 12bad87e4020abac47c7d198e4142c28dcee0552 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/23] packet: infer protocol from ethernet header if unset
[ Upstream commit c72219b75fde768efccf7666342282fab7f9e4e7 ]
In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet
socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then
skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol
passed via socket(2)/bind(2).
Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the
socket as socket(PF_PACKET, <mode>, 0) and do a bind(2) on the
TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook()
is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves
cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway.
That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore
the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric
reported that this leads to problems when using tools like
trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function
could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on
skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all
the traffic is then directed to a single slave.
Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header
when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only
done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len
length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to
cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after
the skb_store_bits().
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 8670ffb..81dfc66 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2087,6 +2087,15 @@ static void tpacket_destruct_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
sock_wfree(skb);
}
+static void tpacket_set_protocol(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER) {
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ skb->protocol = eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto;
+ }
+}
+
static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
void *frame, struct net_device *dev, int size_max,
__be16 proto, unsigned char *addr, int hlen)
@@ -2172,6 +2181,8 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
dev->hard_header_len);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
+ if (!skb->protocol)
+ tpacket_set_protocol(dev, skb);
data += dev->hard_header_len;
to_write -= dev->hard_header_len;
--
2.4.1
From 3a8d03f8a6c29869dc01f464529e42354b383961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/23] packet: fix tpacket_snd max frame len
[ Upstream commit 5cfb4c8d05b4409c4044cb9c05b19705c1d9818b ]
Since it's introduction in commit 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and
packet mmap"), TX_RING could be used from SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_RAW
side. When used with SOCK_DGRAM only, the size_max > dev->mtu +
reserve check should have reserve as 0, but currently, this is
unconditionally set (in it's original form as dev->hard_header_len).
I think this is not correct since tpacket_fill_skb() would then
take dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len into account for SOCK_DGRAM,
the extra VLAN_HLEN could be possible in both cases. Presumably, the
reserve code was copied from packet_snd(), but later on missed the
check. Make it similar as we have it in packet_snd().
Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 81dfc66..cb62daf 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2263,12 +2263,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
if (unlikely(!(dev->flags & IFF_UP)))
goto out_put;
- reserve = dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN;
+ if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW)
+ reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
size_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size
- (po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll));
- if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve)
- size_max = dev->mtu + reserve;
+ if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN)
+ size_max = dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN;
do {
ph = packet_current_frame(po, &po->tx_ring,
@@ -2292,7 +2293,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + reserve &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.4.1
From c2e34c5d0ffc482fcd229e73c47a452e06c40854 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lucien <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 13:07:07 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 09/23] sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid
[ Upstream commit ed5a377d87dc4c87fb3e1f7f698cba38cd893103 ]
now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which
is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix
it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs.
even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still
can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs():
if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index fb7976a..603c3bb 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -800,8 +800,8 @@ int sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (!has_sha1)
return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids, &hmacs->shmac_idents[0],
- hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
+ for (i = 0; i < hmacs->shmac_num_idents; i++)
+ ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids[i] = htons(hmacs->shmac_idents[i]);
ep->auth_hmacs_list->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) +
hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
return 0;
--
2.4.1
From e467d6fac3b48f1c3bbdd702a4612d224ce858e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 17:35:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/23] ip_tunnel: disable preemption when updating per-cpu
tstats
[ Upstream commit b4fe85f9c9146f60457e9512fb6055e69e6a7a65 ]
Drivers like vxlan use the recently introduced
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb/udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb APIs. udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb
makes use of ip6tunnel_xmit, and ip6tunnel_xmit, after sending the
packet, updates the struct stats using the usual
u64_stats_update_begin/end calls on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb makes use of iptunnel_xmit, which doesn't touch
tstats, so drivers like vxlan, immediately after, call
iptunnel_xmit_stats, which does the same thing - calls
u64_stats_update_begin/end on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
While vxlan is probably fine (I don't know?), calling a similar function
from, say, an unbound workqueue, on a fully preemptable kernel causes
real issues:
[ 188.434537] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u8:0/6
[ 188.435579] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 188.435583] CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 4.2.6 #2
[ 188.435607] Call Trace:
[ 188.435611] [<ffffffff8234e936>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
[ 188.435615] [<ffffffff81915f3d>] check_preemption_disabled+0x19d/0x1c0
[ 188.435619] [<ffffffff81915f77>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
The solution would be to protect the whole
this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats)/u64_stats_update_begin/end blocks with
disabling preemption and then reenabling it.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_tunnel.h | 3 ++-
include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
index a5593da..ef95576 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
@@ -79,11 +79,12 @@ static inline void ip6tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
err = ip6_local_out(skb);
if (net_xmit_eval(err) == 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += pkt_len;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else {
stats->tx_errors++;
stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
diff --git a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
index 5bc6ede..a3f2f80 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
@@ -186,12 +186,13 @@ static inline void iptunnel_xmit_stats(int err,
struct pcpu_sw_netstats __percpu *stats)
{
if (err > 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(stats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(stats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += err;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else if (err < 0) {
err_stats->tx_errors++;
err_stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
--
2.4.1
From e6195ff76c36e4a2d3173b8e05158da10c8d6985 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 13:09:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 11/23] snmp: Remove duplicate OUTMCAST stat increment
[ Upstream commit 41033f029e393a64e81966cbe34d66c6cf8a2e7e ]
the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code
itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its
not needed
Validated by the reporter, with good results
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/mcast.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/mcast.c b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
index ed2c4e4..5aedf76 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/mcast.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
@@ -1652,7 +1652,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
} else {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
}
@@ -2015,7 +2014,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, type);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, full_len);
} else
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
--
2.4.1
From f9b3ee630a8c8b5151d3ec759b9feae119d4cf43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <bjorn@mork.no>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:13:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/23] net: qmi_wwan: add XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit 68242a5a1e2edce39b069385cbafb82304eac0f1 ]
Thomas reports
"
4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name.
..
The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega"
..
Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for
network and MI01\6 for modem.
..
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Now all important things are there:
wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at)
There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at.
The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager.
"
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index b8a82b8..24f47fd 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -766,6 +766,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)}, /* TP-LINK MA260 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1201, 2)}, /* Telit LE920 */
+ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1c9e, 0x9b01, 3)}, /* XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc000, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 100 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc001, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 120 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc002, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 140 */
--
2.4.1
From f5cdc7c2e935e9a1508dc3f3b205e7180df5cea8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 12:40:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 13/23] tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation
[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01e19f001e9f93b39c32387961c91ed3cc ]
When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add()
with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we
will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway)
But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid
following splat :
[ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090934]
[ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
[ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795:
[ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90
[ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500
[ 8451.090958]
[ 8451.090958] stack backtrace:
[ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_
[ 8451.091215] Call Trace:
[ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
[ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110
[ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0
[ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0
[ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190
[ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500
[ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190
[ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0
[ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0
[ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80
[ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700
[ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0
[ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90
Fixes: a8afca0329988 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index a5fdfe9..6cd9f69 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -959,7 +959,8 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, const union tcp_md5_addr *addr,
}
md5sig = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info,
- sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ sock_owned_by_user(sk) ||
+ lockdep_is_held(&sk->sk_lock.slock));
if (!md5sig) {
md5sig = kmalloc(sizeof(*md5sig), gfp);
if (!md5sig)
--
2.4.1
From ee56324ce74d5b66df0bf44701634732ddbd0959 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:03:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 14/23] tcp: fix potential huge kmalloc() calls in TCP_REPAIR
[ Upstream commit 5d4c9bfbabdb1d497f21afd81501e5c54b0c85d9 ]
tcp_send_rcvq() is used for re-injecting data into tcp receive queue.
Problems :
- No check against size is performed, allowed user to fool kernel in
attempting very large memory allocations, eventually triggering
OOM when memory is fragmented.
- In case of fault during the copy we do not return correct errno.
Lets use alloc_skb_with_frags() to cook optimal skbs.
Fixes: 292e8d8c8538 ("tcp: Move rcvq sending to tcp_input.c")
Fixes: c0e88ff0f256 ("tcp: Repair socket queues")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 6f46cde..aa16715 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4356,19 +4356,34 @@ static int __must_check tcp_queue_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int
int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int data_len = 0;
bool fragstolen;
if (size == 0)
return 0;
- skb = alloc_skb(size, sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ int npages = min_t(size_t, size >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+
+ data_len = npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ size = data_len + (size & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ }
+ skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(size - data_len, data_len,
+ PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER,
+ &err, sk->sk_allocation);
if (!skb)
goto err;
+ skb_put(skb, size - data_len);
+ skb->data_len = data_len;
+ skb->len = size;
+
if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize))
goto err_free;
- if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, size), msg->msg_iov, size))
+ err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, size);
+ if (err)
goto err_free;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt;
@@ -4384,7 +4399,8 @@ int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
err_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
err:
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return err;
+
}
static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.4.1
From f52f4692c6cf5f3523c8142106e39e4d18292d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 08:18:14 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 15/23] tcp: initialize tp->copied_seq in case of cross SYN
connection
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7ece8d8ac0e818eb2c91f99ca894730e2a ]
Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
generated program that triggers the WARNING at
net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() :
WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
!(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC)));
His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange,
that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we
lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization.
Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index aa16715..0c96055 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -5540,6 +5540,7 @@ discard:
}
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
+ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is
--
2.4.1
From 1d26a5197c10ea419524fa731e456398e99cea42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 00:11:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/23] net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in
scm_detach_fds
[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ]
David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:
(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)
[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85
Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.
In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.
When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():
int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
if (!err)
err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
if (!err)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
} ... wrap-around
F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.
In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.
In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen
elsewhere.
Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).
Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!
Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).
Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").
RFC3542, section 20.2. says:
The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
application may or may not include padding at the end of last
ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
may set MSG_CTRUNC.
Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.
Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).
No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).
Reported-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
Reported-by: HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/scm.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index b442e7e..d30eb05 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int));
+ if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
+ cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
}
--
2.4.1
From 5069ce31b1d84fe1078a375d9640afaad9ca5239 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/23] net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ]
When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
(because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4....
ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
[<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
[<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
[<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
[<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
[<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
[<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
index c803458..abc7dbd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm);
static void mroute_netlink_event(struct mr_table *mrt, struct mfc_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ static int ipmr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1210,8 +1210,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
/* Shut down all active vif entries */
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1219,7 +1220,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
for (i = 0; i < MFC_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
list_del_rcu(&c->list);
mroute_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE);
@@ -1254,7 +1255,7 @@ static void mrtsock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL,
net->ipv4.devconf_all);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mrt->mroute_sk, NULL);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
}
}
rtnl_unlock();
--
2.4.1
From 9864bb362cb834d256d014ec56af69499e11f987 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/23] net: ip6mr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 4c6980462f32b4f282c5d8e5f7ea8070e2937725 ]
Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and
the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be
destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that
everything is cleaned up on netns destruction.
Fixes: 8229efdaef1e ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code")
CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
index 0d58542..4ca7cdd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static void mr6_netlink_event(struct mr6_table *mrt, struct mfc6_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
static int ip6mr_rtm_dumproute(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static struct mr6_table *ip6mr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ip6mr_free_table(struct mr6_table *mrt)
{
del_timer(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static int ip6mr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1550,8 +1550,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
* Shut down all active vif entries
*/
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1560,7 +1561,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
*/
for (i = 0; i < MFC6_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock);
list_del(&c->list);
@@ -1623,7 +1624,7 @@ int ip6mr_sk_done(struct sock *sk)
net->ipv6.devconf_all);
write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
err = 0;
break;
}
--
2.4.1
From 09cc45c483d72782e9216fc50ee6fe70d959118e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2015 01:08:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 19/23] broadcom: fix PHY_ID_BCM5481 entry in the id table
[ Upstream commit 3c25a860d17b7378822f35d8c9141db9507e3beb ]
Commit fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0
with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting
the original). Fix that.
Fixes: fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
index 854f2c9..64860c0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ static struct mdio_device_id __maybe_unused broadcom_tbl[] = {
{ PHY_ID_BCM5421, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5461, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5464, 0xfffffff0 },
- { PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
+ { PHY_ID_BCM5481, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610M, 0xfffffff0 },
--
2.4.1
From c720f326a09fffa78c2b714d62e6e78d6ed2904f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 15:07:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 20/23] ipv6: distinguish frag queues by device for multicast
and link-local packets
[ Upstream commit 264640fc2c5f4f913db5c73fa3eb1ead2c45e9d7 ]
If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.
To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
addresses.
Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/
but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ipv6.h | 1 +
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 5 +++--
net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 10 +++++++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index 4292929..bc56e8a 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ struct ip6_create_arg {
u32 user;
const struct in6_addr *src;
const struct in6_addr *dst;
+ int iif;
u8 ecn;
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
index 6f187c8..d235ed7 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static void nf_ct_frag6_expire(unsigned long data)
/* Creation primitives. */
static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
u32 user, struct in6_addr *src,
- struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
arg.user = user;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
local_bh_disable();
@@ -603,7 +604,7 @@ struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone);
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n");
goto ret_orig;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
index 1a157ca..28e72f3 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ bool ip6_frag_match(const struct inet_frag_queue *q, const void *a)
return fq->id == arg->id &&
fq->user == arg->user &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->saddr, arg->src) &&
- ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst);
+ ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst) &&
+ (arg->iif == fq->iif ||
+ !(ipv6_addr_type(arg->dst) & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST |
+ IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_frag_match);
@@ -180,7 +183,7 @@ static void ip6_frag_expire(unsigned long data)
static __inline__ struct frag_queue *
fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
- const struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ const struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -190,6 +193,7 @@ fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
arg.user = IP6_DEFRAG_LOCAL_DELIVER;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
hash = inet6_hash_frag(id, src, dst);
@@ -550,7 +554,7 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq != NULL) {
int ret;
--
2.4.1
From fbb52b8201993be2e0fbe9af7c44ba1c04f9ab3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 19:37:57 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 21/23] ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ]
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/ipv6.h | 2 +-
include/net/ipv6.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c | 11 ++++++++---
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
net/ipv6/raw.c | 8 ++++++--
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ipv6/udp.c | 8 ++++++--
net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 8 ++++++--
13 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index ff56053..2725b03 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ struct ipv6_pinfo {
struct ipv6_ac_socklist *ipv6_ac_list;
struct ipv6_fl_socklist __rcu *ipv6_fl_list;
- struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions __rcu *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktoptions;
struct sk_buff *rxpmtu;
struct {
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index bc56e8a..a5169a4 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern rwlock_t ip6_ra_lock;
*/
struct ipv6_txoptions {
+ atomic_t refcnt;
/* Length of this structure */
int tot_len;
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions {
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst0opt;
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *srcrt; /* Routing Header */
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst1opt;
-
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
/* Option buffer, as read by IPV6_PKTOPTIONS, starts here. */
};
@@ -252,6 +253,24 @@ struct ipv6_fl_socklist {
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
+static inline struct ipv6_txoptions *txopt_get(const struct ipv6_pinfo *np)
+{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt && !atomic_inc_not_zero(&opt->refcnt))
+ opt = NULL;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return opt;
+}
+
+static inline void txopt_put(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
+{
+ if (opt && atomic_dec_and_test(&opt->refcnt))
+ kfree_rcu(opt, rcu);
+}
+
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl6_sock_lookup(struct sock *sk, __be32 label);
struct ipv6_txoptions *fl6_merge_options(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_space,
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl,
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 6bcaa33..7bcb223 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -238,7 +238,9 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -255,7 +257,10 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
&ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -450,6 +455,7 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -573,13 +579,15 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt != NULL)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
@@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
@@ -933,7 +942,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -953,9 +963,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index e8c4400..05417c3 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -425,9 +425,11 @@ void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
/* Free tx options */
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt != NULL)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_destroy_sock);
@@ -656,7 +658,10 @@ int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index e069aeb2..9e3b0b6 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ ipv4_connected:
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : np->opt;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : rcu_dereference(np->opt);
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
err = 0;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
index bfde361..4f08a0f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ ipv6_dup_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst1opt) += dif;
if (opt2->srcrt)
*((char **)&opt2->srcrt) += dif;
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
}
return opt2;
}
@@ -790,7 +791,7 @@ ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
memset(opt2, 0, tot_len);
-
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
opt2->tot_len = tot_len;
p = (char *)(opt2 + 1);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
index 29b3220..6cc516c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(struct sock *sk,
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
@@ -208,7 +210,9 @@ static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_socket(struct sock *sk,
fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
@@ -241,7 +245,8 @@ int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl_unused
/* Restore final destination back after routing done */
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
- res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index e1a9583..f81fcc0 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -110,10 +110,12 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
- opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt,
+ opt);
} else {
spin_lock(&sk->sk_dst_lock);
- opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt,
+ opt);
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_dst_lock);
}
sk_dst_reset(sk);
@@ -213,9 +215,12 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt,
+ NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
@@ -385,7 +390,8 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
- opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
@@ -414,8 +420,10 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
@@ -468,6 +476,7 @@ sticky_done:
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
+ atomic_set(&opt->refcnt, 1);
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
@@ -484,8 +493,10 @@ update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
@@ -1092,10 +1103,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
lock_sock(sk);
- len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, np->opt,
- optname, optval, len);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, opt, optname, optval, len);
release_sock(sk);
/* check if ipv6_getsockopt_sticky() returns err code */
if (len < 0)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
index 896af88..a66a67d 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
@@ -735,6 +735,7 @@ static int rawv6_probe_proto_opt(struct flowi6 *fl6, struct msghdr *msg)
static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
@@ -840,8 +841,10 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
- if (opt == NULL)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -902,6 +905,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index 2f25cb6..aa96993 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index a3f9f11..26feadd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct rt6_info *rt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -253,7 +254,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
@@ -282,9 +284,9 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen +
+ opt->opt_nflen;
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
@@ -501,7 +503,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts));
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_mapping);
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -1052,6 +1055,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -1191,13 +1195,15 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index dd530f0..a5ce705 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -1082,6 +1082,7 @@ int udpv6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -1234,8 +1235,10 @@ do_udp_sendmsg:
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
- if (opt == NULL)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -1329,6 +1332,7 @@ do_append_data:
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index 0edb263..3865882 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -487,6 +487,7 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
@@ -576,8 +577,10 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
opt = NULL;
}
- if (opt == NULL)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -632,6 +635,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
--
2.4.1
From 16fd8938cc04d5e56e7ad83d2b79e1c176a53d12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 01:14:48 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 22/23] net/neighbour: fix crash at dumping device-agnostic
proxy entries
[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e ]
Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/neighbour.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c
index 2b0d99d..0478423 100644
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -2263,7 +2263,7 @@ static int pneigh_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct pneigh_entry *pn,
ndm->ndm_pad2 = 0;
ndm->ndm_flags = pn->flags | NTF_PROXY;
ndm->ndm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
- ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev->ifindex;
+ ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev ? pn->dev->ifindex : 0;
ndm->ndm_state = NUD_NONE;
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_DST, tbl->key_len, pn->key))
@@ -2337,7 +2337,7 @@ static int pneigh_dump_table(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (h > s_h)
s_idx = 0;
for (n = tbl->phash_buckets[h], idx = 0; n; n = n->next) {
- if (dev_net(n->dev) != net)
+ if (pneigh_net(n) != net)
continue;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto next;
--
2.4.1
From 98cc05e3c6c475a1c5f329e7d76fd81e0054f62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 07:20:07 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 23/23] ipv6: sctp: implement sctp_v6_destroy_sock()
[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets.
We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release
inet6 specific fields.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 99e640c..fb082aa 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -7393,6 +7393,13 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <net/transp_v6.h>
+static void sctp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ sctp_destroy_sock(sk);
+ inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
+}
+
struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.name = "SCTPv6",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -7402,7 +7409,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.accept = sctp_accept,
.ioctl = sctp_ioctl,
.init = sctp_init_sock,
- .destroy = sctp_destroy_sock,
+ .destroy = sctp_v6_destroy_sock,
.shutdown = sctp_shutdown,
.setsockopt = sctp_setsockopt,
.getsockopt = sctp_getsockopt,
--
2.4.1
[-- Attachment #3: net_41.mbox --]
[-- Type: Application/Octet-Stream, Size: 96593 bytes --]
From 52e9f9c82c084b07a5db10b1b9b425da19c7acc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 22:07:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 01/26] unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
[ Upstream commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c ]
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index dfe4ddf..e830c3d 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0
#define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1
struct socket_wq peer_wq;
+ wait_queue_t peer_wake;
};
static inline struct unix_sock *unix_sk(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 76e6669..1975fd8 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -316,6 +316,118 @@ found:
return s;
}
+/* Support code for asymmetrically connected dgram sockets
+ *
+ * If a datagram socket is connected to a socket not itself connected
+ * to the first socket (eg, /dev/log), clients may only enqueue more
+ * messages if the present receive queue of the server socket is not
+ * "too large". This means there's a second writeability condition
+ * poll and sendmsg need to test. The dgram recv code will do a wake
+ * up on the peer_wait wait queue of a socket upon reception of a
+ * datagram which needs to be propagated to sleeping would-be writers
+ * since these might not have sent anything so far. This can't be
+ * accomplished via poll_wait because the lifetime of the server
+ * socket might be less than that of its clients if these break their
+ * association with it or if the server socket is closed while clients
+ * are still connected to it and there's no way to inform "a polling
+ * implementation" that it should let go of a certain wait queue
+ *
+ * In order to propagate a wake up, a wait_queue_t of the client
+ * socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server socket
+ * whose wake function does a wake_up on the ordinary client socket
+ * wait queue. This connection is established whenever a write (or
+ * poll for write) hit the flow control condition and broken when the
+ * association to the server socket is dissolved or after a wake up
+ * was relayed.
+ */
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay(wait_queue_t *q, unsigned mode, int flags,
+ void *key)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ wait_queue_head_t *u_sleep;
+
+ u = container_of(q, struct unix_sock, peer_wake);
+
+ __remove_wait_queue(&unix_sk(u->peer_wake.private)->peer_wait,
+ q);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+
+ /* relaying can only happen while the wq still exists */
+ u_sleep = sk_sleep(&u->sk);
+ if (u_sleep)
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(u_sleep, key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+ int rc;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ rc = 0;
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (!u->peer_wake.private) {
+ u->peer_wake.private = other;
+ __add_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+
+ rc = 1;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (u->peer_wake.private == other) {
+ __remove_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
+ POLLOUT |
+ POLLWRNORM |
+ POLLWRBAND);
+}
+
+/* preconditions:
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == other
+ * - association is stable
+ */
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ int connected;
+
+ connected = unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(sk, other);
+
+ if (unix_recvq_full(other))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (connected)
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk)
{
return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf;
@@ -420,6 +532,8 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
skpair->sk_state_change(skpair);
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
+
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, skpair);
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
@@ -648,6 +762,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
+ init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
@@ -1015,6 +1130,8 @@ restart:
if (unix_peer(sk)) {
struct sock *old_peer = unix_peer(sk);
unix_peer(sk) = other;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, old_peer);
+
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
if (other != old_peer)
@@ -1453,6 +1570,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
+ int sk_locked;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, false);
@@ -1532,12 +1650,14 @@ restart:
goto out_free;
}
+ sk_locked = 0;
unix_state_lock(other);
+restart_locked:
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
- if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
+ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD))) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
@@ -1545,10 +1665,14 @@ restart:
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
+ if (!sk_locked)
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
err = 0;
- unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, other);
+
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
@@ -1574,21 +1698,38 @@ restart:
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
- if (!timeo) {
- err = -EAGAIN;
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ if (timeo) {
+ timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+
+ err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ goto out_free;
+
+ goto restart;
}
- timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+ unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
+ }
- err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
- if (signal_pending(current))
- goto out_free;
+ if (unix_peer(sk) != other ||
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
- goto restart;
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto restart_locked;
+ }
}
+ if (unlikely(sk_locked))
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
+
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
@@ -1602,6 +1743,8 @@ restart:
return len;
out_unlock:
+ if (sk_locked)
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -2245,14 +2388,16 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
return mask;
writable = unix_writable(sk);
- other = unix_peer_get(sk);
- if (other) {
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
- sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
- if (unix_recvq_full(other))
- writable = 0;
- }
- sock_put(other);
+ if (writable) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
+ other = unix_peer(sk);
+ if (other && unix_peer(other) != sk &&
+ unix_recvq_full(other) &&
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other))
+ writable = 0;
+
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
if (writable)
--
2.4.1
From ef3a10fb9d2cc82cbd2d66bfc1c19ffbd027e0bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 14:24:27 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 02/26] tools/net: Use include/uapi with __EXPORTED_HEADERS__
[ Upstream commit d7475de58575c904818efa369c82e88c6648ce2e ]
Use the local uapi headers to keep in sync with "recently" added #define's
(e.g. SKF_AD_VLAN_TPID). Refactored CFLAGS, and bpf_asm doesn't need -I.
Fixes: 3f356385e8a4 ("filter: bpf_asm: add minimal bpf asm tool")
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
tools/net/Makefile | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/net/Makefile b/tools/net/Makefile
index ee577ea..ddf8880 100644
--- a/tools/net/Makefile
+++ b/tools/net/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ CC = gcc
LEX = flex
YACC = bison
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2
+CFLAGS += -D__EXPORTED_HEADERS__ -I../../include/uapi -I../../include
+
%.yacc.c: %.y
$(YACC) -o $@ -d $<
@@ -12,15 +15,13 @@ YACC = bison
all : bpf_jit_disasm bpf_dbg bpf_asm
-bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
+bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS += -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
bpf_jit_disasm : LDLIBS = -lopcodes -lbfd -ldl
bpf_jit_disasm : bpf_jit_disasm.o
-bpf_dbg : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2
bpf_dbg : LDLIBS = -lreadline
bpf_dbg : bpf_dbg.o
-bpf_asm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -I.
bpf_asm : LDLIBS =
bpf_asm : bpf_asm.o bpf_exp.yacc.o bpf_exp.lex.o
bpf_exp.lex.o : bpf_exp.yacc.c
--
2.4.1
From e87cb0b0a67f28e45f222bfc6098c139874e4152 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/26] packet: do skb_probe_transport_header when we actually
have data
[ Upstream commit efdfa2f7848f64517008136fb41f53c4a1faf93a ]
In tpacket_fill_skb() commit c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport
header before doing xmit") and later on 40893fd0fd4e ("net: switch
to use skb_probe_transport_header()") was probing for a transport
header on the skb from a ring buffer slot, but at a time, where
the skb has _not even_ been filled with data yet. So that call into
the flow dissector is pretty useless. Lets do it after we've set
up the skb frags.
Fixes: c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 686e601..16a8b37 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2151,8 +2151,6 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) {
int off_min, off_max, off;
off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
@@ -2232,6 +2230,9 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
+ if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+
return tp_len;
}
--
2.4.1
From 5126f386276510bc7718663f79da3a6844940ea7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/26] packet: always probe for transport header
[ Upstream commit 8fd6c80d9dd938ca338c70698533a7e304752846 ]
We concluded that the skb_probe_transport_header() should better be
called unconditionally. Avoiding the call into the flow dissector has
also not really much to do with the direct xmit mode.
While it seems that only virtio_net code makes use of GSO from non
RX/TX ring packet socket paths, we should probe for a transport header
nevertheless before they hit devices.
Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/386173/
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 16a8b37..313119c 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2230,8 +2230,7 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
return tp_len;
}
@@ -2583,8 +2582,8 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
len += vnet_hdr_len;
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+
if (unlikely(extra_len == 4))
skb->no_fcs = 1;
--
2.4.1
From e60dfaba288b160759d0a28919c3129f68618218 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/26] packet: only allow extra vlan len on ethernet devices
[ Upstream commit 3c70c132488794e2489ab045559b0ce0afcf17de ]
Packet sockets can be used by various net devices and are not
really restricted to ARPHRD_ETHER device types. However, when
currently checking for the extra 4 bytes that can be transmitted
in VLAN case, our assumption is that we generally probe on
ARPHRD_ETHER devices. Therefore, before looking into Ethernet
header, check the device type first.
This also fixes the issue where non-ARPHRD_ETHER devices could
have no dev->hard_header_len in TX_RING SOCK_RAW case, and thus
the check would test unfilled linear part of the skb (instead
of non-linear).
Fixes: 57f89bfa2140 ("network: Allow af_packet to transmit +4 bytes for VLAN packets.")
Fixes: 52f1454f629f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 313119c..36ece6f 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1524,6 +1524,20 @@ static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
}
+static bool packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, double-check
+ * this now that we have the actual packet in hand. We can only
+ * do this check on Ethernet devices.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER))
+ return false;
+
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ return likely(eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto == htons(ETH_P_8021Q));
+}
+
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops;
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops_spkt;
@@ -1685,18 +1699,10 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
- if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_unlock;
- }
+ if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
@@ -2308,18 +2314,10 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len) {
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
+ tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q))
- tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- }
if (unlikely(tp_len < 0)) {
if (po->tp_loss) {
__packet_set_status(po, ph,
@@ -2540,18 +2538,10 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
- if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_free;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
--
2.4.1
From cadb1e319d6698f99d8559c50174c8479a233033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/26] packet: infer protocol from ethernet header if unset
[ Upstream commit c72219b75fde768efccf7666342282fab7f9e4e7 ]
In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet
socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then
skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol
passed via socket(2)/bind(2).
Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the
socket as socket(PF_PACKET, <mode>, 0) and do a bind(2) on the
TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook()
is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves
cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway.
That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore
the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric
reported that this leads to problems when using tools like
trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function
could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on
skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all
the traffic is then directed to a single slave.
Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header
when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only
done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len
length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to
cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after
the skb_store_bits().
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 36ece6f..2d83124 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2121,6 +2121,15 @@ static bool ll_header_truncated(const struct net_device *dev, int len)
return false;
}
+static void tpacket_set_protocol(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER) {
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ skb->protocol = eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto;
+ }
+}
+
static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
void *frame, struct net_device *dev, int size_max,
__be16 proto, unsigned char *addr, int hlen)
@@ -2202,6 +2211,8 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
dev->hard_header_len);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
+ if (!skb->protocol)
+ tpacket_set_protocol(dev, skb);
data += dev->hard_header_len;
to_write -= dev->hard_header_len;
--
2.4.1
From 4a3ccd6a25c83e2a184e465ef62d7a9e4dae9024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/26] packet: fix tpacket_snd max frame len
[ Upstream commit 5cfb4c8d05b4409c4044cb9c05b19705c1d9818b ]
Since it's introduction in commit 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and
packet mmap"), TX_RING could be used from SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_RAW
side. When used with SOCK_DGRAM only, the size_max > dev->mtu +
reserve check should have reserve as 0, but currently, this is
unconditionally set (in it's original form as dev->hard_header_len).
I think this is not correct since tpacket_fill_skb() would then
take dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len into account for SOCK_DGRAM,
the extra VLAN_HLEN could be possible in both cases. Presumably, the
reserve code was copied from packet_snd(), but later on missed the
check. Make it similar as we have it in packet_snd().
Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 2d83124..ebc39e6 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2293,12 +2293,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
if (unlikely(!(dev->flags & IFF_UP)))
goto out_put;
- reserve = dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN;
+ if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW)
+ reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
size_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size
- (po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll));
- if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve)
- size_max = dev->mtu + reserve;
+ if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN)
+ size_max = dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN;
do {
ph = packet_current_frame(po, &po->tx_ring,
@@ -2325,7 +2326,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + reserve &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.4.1
From 343ed7e573ba1b74599c602fcb885ea205b2fc34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lucien <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 13:07:07 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 08/26] sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid
[ Upstream commit ed5a377d87dc4c87fb3e1f7f698cba38cd893103 ]
now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which
is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix
it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs.
even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still
can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs():
if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 4f15b7d..1543e39 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -809,8 +809,8 @@ int sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (!has_sha1)
return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids, &hmacs->shmac_idents[0],
- hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
+ for (i = 0; i < hmacs->shmac_num_idents; i++)
+ ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids[i] = htons(hmacs->shmac_idents[i]);
ep->auth_hmacs_list->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) +
hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
return 0;
--
2.4.1
From 19478f73760e789ae70cd246d9c6aff87774d479 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 17:35:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/26] ip_tunnel: disable preemption when updating per-cpu
tstats
[ Upstream commit b4fe85f9c9146f60457e9512fb6055e69e6a7a65 ]
Drivers like vxlan use the recently introduced
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb/udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb APIs. udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb
makes use of ip6tunnel_xmit, and ip6tunnel_xmit, after sending the
packet, updates the struct stats using the usual
u64_stats_update_begin/end calls on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb makes use of iptunnel_xmit, which doesn't touch
tstats, so drivers like vxlan, immediately after, call
iptunnel_xmit_stats, which does the same thing - calls
u64_stats_update_begin/end on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
While vxlan is probably fine (I don't know?), calling a similar function
from, say, an unbound workqueue, on a fully preemptable kernel causes
real issues:
[ 188.434537] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u8:0/6
[ 188.435579] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 188.435583] CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 4.2.6 #2
[ 188.435607] Call Trace:
[ 188.435611] [<ffffffff8234e936>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
[ 188.435615] [<ffffffff81915f3d>] check_preemption_disabled+0x19d/0x1c0
[ 188.435619] [<ffffffff81915f77>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
The solution would be to protect the whole
this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats)/u64_stats_update_begin/end blocks with
disabling preemption and then reenabling it.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_tunnel.h | 3 ++-
include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
index b8529aa..b0f7445 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
@@ -83,11 +83,12 @@ static inline void ip6tunnel_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
err = ip6_local_out_sk(sk, skb);
if (net_xmit_eval(err) == 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += pkt_len;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else {
stats->tx_errors++;
stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
diff --git a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
index d8214cb..9c2897e 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
@@ -207,12 +207,13 @@ static inline void iptunnel_xmit_stats(int err,
struct pcpu_sw_netstats __percpu *stats)
{
if (err > 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(stats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(stats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += err;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else if (err < 0) {
err_stats->tx_errors++;
err_stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
--
2.4.1
From 31bef771ad862f6acc3205416f7bdfc7ca3da12d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 13:09:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 10/26] snmp: Remove duplicate OUTMCAST stat increment
[ Upstream commit 41033f029e393a64e81966cbe34d66c6cf8a2e7e ]
the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code
itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its
not needed
Validated by the reporter, with good results
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/mcast.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/mcast.c b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
index 083b292..41e3b5e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/mcast.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
@@ -1651,7 +1651,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
} else {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
}
@@ -2014,7 +2013,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, type);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, full_len);
} else
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
--
2.4.1
From d36c2376c2fa9d959e761ad554387e15bb71036c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <bjorn@mork.no>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:13:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/26] net: qmi_wwan: add XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit 68242a5a1e2edce39b069385cbafb82304eac0f1 ]
Thomas reports
"
4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name.
..
The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega"
..
Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for
network and MI01\6 for modem.
..
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Now all important things are there:
wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at)
There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at.
The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager.
"
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 4e0470d..71190dc 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -774,6 +774,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)}, /* TP-LINK MA260 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1201, 2)}, /* Telit LE920 */
+ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1c9e, 0x9b01, 3)}, /* XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc000, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 100 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc001, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 120 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc002, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 140 */
--
2.4.1
From 16a11a50ac4f185f0edbfe29047e18f3cbdc8bf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 12:40:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 12/26] tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation
[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01e19f001e9f93b39c32387961c91ed3cc ]
When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add()
with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we
will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway)
But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid
following splat :
[ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090934]
[ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
[ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795:
[ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90
[ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500
[ 8451.090958]
[ 8451.090958] stack backtrace:
[ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_
[ 8451.091215] Call Trace:
[ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
[ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110
[ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0
[ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0
[ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190
[ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500
[ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190
[ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0
[ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0
[ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80
[ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700
[ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0
[ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90
Fixes: a8afca0329988 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 441ca6f..88203e7 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -922,7 +922,8 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, const union tcp_md5_addr *addr,
}
md5sig = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info,
- sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ sock_owned_by_user(sk) ||
+ lockdep_is_held(&sk->sk_lock.slock));
if (!md5sig) {
md5sig = kmalloc(sizeof(*md5sig), gfp);
if (!md5sig)
--
2.4.1
From 36198366b533871e8796a4a9e0c6e0de7d017b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 18:17:30 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 13/26] tcp: disable Fast Open on timeouts after handshake
[ Upstream commit 0e45f4da5981895e885dd72fe912a3f8e32bae73 ]
Some middle-boxes black-hole the data after the Fast Open handshake
(https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf).
The exact reason is unknown. The work-around is to disable Fast Open
temporarily after multiple recurring timeouts with few or no data
delivered in the established state.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
index 8c65dc1..c8f9785 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
syn_set = true;
} else {
if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1, 0, 0)) {
+ /* Some middle-boxes may black-hole Fast Open _after_
+ * the handshake. Therefore we conservatively disable
+ * Fast Open on this path on recurring timeouts with
+ * few or zero bytes acked after Fast Open.
+ */
+ if (tp->syn_data_acked &&
+ tp->bytes_acked <= tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp) {
+ tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, 0, NULL, true, 0);
+ if (icsk->icsk_retransmits == sysctl_tcp_retries1)
+ NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
+ LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENACTIVEFAIL);
+ }
/* Black hole detection */
tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk);
--
2.4.1
From 77dce63294f13dc8ff12d1417b93aaf80f764f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:03:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 14/26] tcp: fix potential huge kmalloc() calls in TCP_REPAIR
[ Upstream commit 5d4c9bfbabdb1d497f21afd81501e5c54b0c85d9 ]
tcp_send_rcvq() is used for re-injecting data into tcp receive queue.
Problems :
- No check against size is performed, allowed user to fool kernel in
attempting very large memory allocations, eventually triggering
OOM when memory is fragmented.
- In case of fault during the copy we do not return correct errno.
Lets use alloc_skb_with_frags() to cook optimal skbs.
Fixes: 292e8d8c8538 ("tcp: Move rcvq sending to tcp_input.c")
Fixes: c0e88ff0f256 ("tcp: Repair socket queues")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index c9ab964..7b1fc95 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4438,19 +4438,34 @@ static int __must_check tcp_queue_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int
int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int data_len = 0;
bool fragstolen;
if (size == 0)
return 0;
- skb = alloc_skb(size, sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ int npages = min_t(size_t, size >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+
+ data_len = npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ size = data_len + (size & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ }
+ skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(size - data_len, data_len,
+ PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER,
+ &err, sk->sk_allocation);
if (!skb)
goto err;
+ skb_put(skb, size - data_len);
+ skb->data_len = data_len;
+ skb->len = size;
+
if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize))
goto err_free;
- if (memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, size), msg, size))
+ err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, size);
+ if (err)
goto err_free;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt;
@@ -4466,7 +4481,8 @@ int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
err_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
err:
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return err;
+
}
static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.4.1
From 58b66513bb8135193c2a3e0dce4afdec229eeb97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 08:18:14 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 15/26] tcp: initialize tp->copied_seq in case of cross SYN
connection
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7ece8d8ac0e818eb2c91f99ca894730e2a ]
Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
generated program that triggers the WARNING at
net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() :
WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
!(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC)));
His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange,
that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we
lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization.
Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 7b1fc95..87463c8 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -5638,6 +5638,7 @@ discard:
}
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
+ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is
--
2.4.1
From 3bbf94f5d1b83545d64c3caa81c83d3aad104a9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 00:11:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/26] net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in
scm_detach_fds
[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ]
David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:
(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)
[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85
Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.
In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.
When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():
int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
if (!err)
err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
if (!err)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
} ... wrap-around
F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.
In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.
In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen
elsewhere.
Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).
Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!
Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).
Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").
RFC3542, section 20.2. says:
The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
application may or may not include padding at the end of last
ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
may set MSG_CTRUNC.
Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.
Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).
No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).
Reported-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
Reported-by: HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/scm.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 3b6899b..8a1741b 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int));
+ if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
+ cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
}
--
2.4.1
From bc2a32a21580cb4a3f807a00e7355f365ec2f969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/26] net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ]
When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
(because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4....
ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
[<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
[<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
[<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
[<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
[<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
[<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
index df28693..c3bfebd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm);
static void mroute_netlink_event(struct mr_table *mrt, struct mfc_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static int ipmr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1218,8 +1218,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
/* Shut down all active vif entries */
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1227,7 +1228,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
for (i = 0; i < MFC_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
list_del_rcu(&c->list);
mroute_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE);
@@ -1262,7 +1263,7 @@ static void mrtsock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL,
net->ipv4.devconf_all);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mrt->mroute_sk, NULL);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
}
}
rtnl_unlock();
--
2.4.1
From 9fc21885648e14fbc1a5a782998c0e8b37840306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/26] net: ip6mr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 4c6980462f32b4f282c5d8e5f7ea8070e2937725 ]
Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and
the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be
destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that
everything is cleaned up on netns destruction.
Fixes: 8229efdaef1e ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code")
CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
index 5f36266..a7aef4b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void mr6_netlink_event(struct mr6_table *mrt, struct mfc6_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
static int ip6mr_rtm_dumproute(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static struct mr6_table *ip6mr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ip6mr_free_table(struct mr6_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ static int ip6mr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1553,8 +1553,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
* Shut down all active vif entries
*/
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1563,7 +1564,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
*/
for (i = 0; i < MFC6_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock);
list_del(&c->list);
@@ -1626,7 +1627,7 @@ int ip6mr_sk_done(struct sock *sk)
net->ipv6.devconf_all);
write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
err = 0;
break;
}
--
2.4.1
From da785b62ca9b54f2216e07521a517d599e984962 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2015 01:08:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 19/26] broadcom: fix PHY_ID_BCM5481 entry in the id table
[ Upstream commit 3c25a860d17b7378822f35d8c9141db9507e3beb ]
Commit fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0
with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting
the original). Fix that.
Fixes: fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
index 9c71295..85e64044 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct mdio_device_id __maybe_unused broadcom_tbl[] = {
{ PHY_ID_BCM5461, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM54616S, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5464, 0xfffffff0 },
- { PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
+ { PHY_ID_BCM5481, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610M, 0xfffffff0 },
--
2.4.1
From c0081fbfd50a8218611ef6a7a1543ed0c1a6d3e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 15:07:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 20/26] ipv6: distinguish frag queues by device for multicast
and link-local packets
[ Upstream commit 264640fc2c5f4f913db5c73fa3eb1ead2c45e9d7 ]
If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.
To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
addresses.
Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/
but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ipv6.h | 1 +
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 5 +++--
net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 10 +++++++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index eec8ad3..ab8ebd3 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ struct ip6_create_arg {
u32 user;
const struct in6_addr *src;
const struct in6_addr *dst;
+ int iif;
u8 ecn;
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
index 6f187c8..d235ed7 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static void nf_ct_frag6_expire(unsigned long data)
/* Creation primitives. */
static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
u32 user, struct in6_addr *src,
- struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
arg.user = user;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
local_bh_disable();
@@ -603,7 +604,7 @@ struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone);
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n");
goto ret_orig;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
index 8ffa2c8..9d1f6a2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ bool ip6_frag_match(const struct inet_frag_queue *q, const void *a)
return fq->id == arg->id &&
fq->user == arg->user &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->saddr, arg->src) &&
- ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst);
+ ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst) &&
+ (arg->iif == fq->iif ||
+ !(ipv6_addr_type(arg->dst) & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST |
+ IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_frag_match);
@@ -180,7 +183,7 @@ static void ip6_frag_expire(unsigned long data)
static struct frag_queue *
fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
- const struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ const struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -190,6 +193,7 @@ fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
arg.user = IP6_DEFRAG_LOCAL_DELIVER;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
hash = inet6_hash_frag(id, src, dst);
@@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq) {
int ret;
--
2.4.1
From 9fe1e6b2e6a567fa28de0ecbcbc6114a4b4608c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 17:13:21 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 21/26] RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on
unbound socket
[ Upstream commit 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a ]
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/rds/connection.c | 6 ------
net/rds/send.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rds/connection.c b/net/rds/connection.c
index 9d66705..da6da57 100644
--- a/net/rds/connection.c
+++ b/net/rds/connection.c
@@ -187,12 +187,6 @@ new_conn:
}
}
- if (trans == NULL) {
- kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
- conn = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
- goto out;
- }
-
conn->c_trans = trans;
ret = trans->conn_alloc(conn, gfp);
diff --git a/net/rds/send.c b/net/rds/send.c
index e9430f5..7b30c0f 100644
--- a/net/rds/send.c
+++ b/net/rds/send.c
@@ -986,11 +986,13 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t payload_len)
release_sock(sk);
}
- /* racing with another thread binding seems ok here */
+ lock_sock(sk);
if (daddr == 0 || rs->rs_bound_addr == 0) {
+ release_sock(sk);
ret = -ENOTCONN; /* XXX not a great errno */
goto out;
}
+ release_sock(sk);
/* size of rm including all sgs */
ret = rds_rm_size(msg, payload_len);
--
2.4.1
From 1182988535dd93cfc71bdb39202c733ce3974f36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 13:02:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 22/26] bpf, array: fix heap out-of-bounds access when updating
elements
[ Upstream commit fbca9d2d35c6ef1b323fae75cc9545005ba25097 ]
During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been
noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps
when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size
(specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes.
In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and
used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function
array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ...
memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from
map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER)
and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size).
Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds.
Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we
access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack.
Since 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an
official release yet, it only affects priviledged users.
In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs
from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also
from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to
user, so nothing could leak.
[1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller
Fixes: 28fbcfa08d8e ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 8a66165..1c1b8ab 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
/* all elements already exist */
return -EEXIST;
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
+ memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size);
return 0;
}
--
2.4.1
From d2033f7385494211f197d9ff53d8682a03bfec95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 19:37:57 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 23/26] ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ]
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/ipv6.h | 2 +-
include/net/ipv6.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c | 11 ++++++++---
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ipv6/raw.c | 8 ++++++--
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ipv6/udp.c | 8 ++++++--
net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 8 ++++++--
13 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index 82806c6..e4b4649 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ struct ipv6_pinfo {
struct ipv6_ac_socklist *ipv6_ac_list;
struct ipv6_fl_socklist __rcu *ipv6_fl_list;
- struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions __rcu *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktoptions;
struct sk_buff *rxpmtu;
struct inet6_cork cork;
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index ab8ebd3..df555ec 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ extern rwlock_t ip6_ra_lock;
*/
struct ipv6_txoptions {
+ atomic_t refcnt;
/* Length of this structure */
int tot_len;
@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions {
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst0opt;
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *srcrt; /* Routing Header */
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst1opt;
-
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
/* Option buffer, as read by IPV6_PKTOPTIONS, starts here. */
};
@@ -250,6 +251,24 @@ struct ipv6_fl_socklist {
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
+static inline struct ipv6_txoptions *txopt_get(const struct ipv6_pinfo *np)
+{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt && !atomic_inc_not_zero(&opt->refcnt))
+ opt = NULL;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return opt;
+}
+
+static inline void txopt_put(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
+{
+ if (opt && atomic_dec_and_test(&opt->refcnt))
+ kfree_rcu(opt, rcu);
+}
+
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl6_sock_lookup(struct sock *sk, __be32 label);
struct ipv6_txoptions *fl6_merge_options(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_space,
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl,
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 5165571..a049050 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -202,7 +202,9 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -219,7 +221,10 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
&ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -415,6 +420,7 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -534,13 +540,15 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt != NULL)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
@@ -793,6 +801,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
@@ -892,7 +901,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -912,9 +922,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index eef63b3..2d044d2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -425,9 +425,11 @@ void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
/* Free tx options */
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_destroy_sock);
@@ -656,7 +658,10 @@ int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index b10a889..13ca4cf 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ ipv4_connected:
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : np->opt;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : rcu_dereference(np->opt);
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
err = 0;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
index a7bbbe4..adbd695 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ ipv6_dup_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst1opt) += dif;
if (opt2->srcrt)
*((char **)&opt2->srcrt) += dif;
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
}
return opt2;
}
@@ -790,7 +791,7 @@ ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
memset(opt2, 0, tot_len);
-
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
opt2->tot_len = tot_len;
p = (char *)(opt2 + 1);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
index 6927f3f..9beed30 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(struct sock *sk,
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
@@ -207,7 +209,9 @@ static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_socket(struct sock *sk,
fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
@@ -240,7 +244,8 @@ int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl_unused
/* Restore final destination back after routing done */
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
- res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index 63e6956..4449ad1 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
- opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt,
+ opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
@@ -231,9 +232,12 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt,
+ NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
@@ -403,7 +407,8 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
- opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
@@ -432,8 +437,10 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
@@ -486,6 +493,7 @@ sticky_done:
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
+ atomic_set(&opt->refcnt, 1);
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
@@ -502,8 +510,10 @@ update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
@@ -1110,10 +1120,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
lock_sock(sk);
- len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, np->opt,
- optname, optval, len);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, opt, optname, optval, len);
release_sock(sk);
/* check if ipv6_getsockopt_sticky() returns err code */
if (len < 0)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
index 8072bd4..2c639ae 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
@@ -731,6 +731,7 @@ static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
@@ -837,8 +838,10 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
- if (!opt)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -901,6 +904,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index 21bc2eb..a4cf004 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index e541d68..cfb27f5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct rt6_info *rt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -237,7 +238,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
@@ -266,9 +268,9 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen +
+ opt->opt_nflen;
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
@@ -464,7 +466,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts));
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_mapping);
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -994,6 +997,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -1129,13 +1133,15 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
tcp_ca_openreq_child(newsk, dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index e51fc3e..7333f35 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -1107,6 +1107,7 @@ int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -1260,8 +1261,10 @@ do_udp_sendmsg:
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
- if (!opt)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -1370,6 +1373,7 @@ release_dst:
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index d1ded37..0ce9da9 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
@@ -575,8 +576,10 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
opt = NULL;
}
- if (opt == NULL)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -631,6 +634,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
--
2.4.1
From c1ab8e4c93f9a2417ada3aba0bfaad4c334f5e34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 01:14:48 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 24/26] net/neighbour: fix crash at dumping device-agnostic
proxy entries
[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e ]
Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/neighbour.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c
index 2237c1b..d6e8cfc 100644
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@ static int pneigh_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct pneigh_entry *pn,
ndm->ndm_pad2 = 0;
ndm->ndm_flags = pn->flags | NTF_PROXY;
ndm->ndm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
- ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev->ifindex;
+ ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev ? pn->dev->ifindex : 0;
ndm->ndm_state = NUD_NONE;
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_DST, tbl->key_len, pn->key))
@@ -2282,7 +2282,7 @@ static int pneigh_dump_table(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (h > s_h)
s_idx = 0;
for (n = tbl->phash_buckets[h], idx = 0; n; n = n->next) {
- if (dev_net(n->dev) != net)
+ if (pneigh_net(n) != net)
continue;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto next;
--
2.4.1
From 702a741580d73f3c39b842931127832c2150ac2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 07:20:07 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 25/26] ipv6: sctp: implement sctp_v6_destroy_sock()
[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets.
We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release
inet6 specific fields.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 5f6c4e6..66d7960 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -7387,6 +7387,13 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <net/transp_v6.h>
+static void sctp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ sctp_destroy_sock(sk);
+ inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
+}
+
struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.name = "SCTPv6",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -7396,7 +7403,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.accept = sctp_accept,
.ioctl = sctp_ioctl,
.init = sctp_init_sock,
- .destroy = sctp_destroy_sock,
+ .destroy = sctp_v6_destroy_sock,
.shutdown = sctp_shutdown,
.setsockopt = sctp_setsockopt,
.getsockopt = sctp_getsockopt,
--
2.4.1
From 62c39bfdff3ccadc0c406066aee3e0e6733148e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 20:08:51 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 26/26] net_sched: fix qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() races
[ Upstream commit 4eaf3b84f2881c9c028f1d5e76c52ab575fe3a66 ]
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() suffers from two problems on multiqueue
devices.
One problem is that it updates sch->q.qlen and sch->qstats.drops
on the mq/mqprio root qdisc, while it should not : Daniele
reported underflows errors :
[ 681.774821] PAX: sch->q.qlen: 0 n: 1
[ 681.774825] PAX: size overflow detected in function qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen net/sched/sch_api.c:769 cicus.693_49 min, count: 72, decl: qlen; num: 0; context: sk_buff_head;
[ 681.774954] CPU: 2 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Tainted: G O 4.2.6.201511282239-1-grsec #1
[ 681.774955] Hardware name: ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. X302LJ/X302LJ, BIOS X302LJ.202 03/05/2015
[ 681.774956] ffffffffa9a04863 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffa990ff7c
[ 681.774959] ffffc90000d3bc38 ffffffffa95d2810 0000000000000007 ffffffffa991002b
[ 681.774960] ffffc90000d3bc68 ffffffffa91a44f4 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
[ 681.774962] Call Trace:
[ 681.774967] [<ffffffffa95d2810>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x7f
[ 681.774970] [<ffffffffa91a44f4>] report_size_overflow+0x34/0x50
[ 681.774972] [<ffffffffa94d17e2>] qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen+0x152/0x160
[ 681.774976] [<ffffffffc02694b1>] fq_codel_dequeue+0x7b1/0x820 [sch_fq_codel]
[ 681.774978] [<ffffffffc02680a0>] ? qdisc_peek_dequeued+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_fq_codel]
[ 681.774980] [<ffffffffa94cd92d>] __qdisc_run+0x4d/0x1d0
[ 681.774983] [<ffffffffa949b2b2>] net_tx_action+0xc2/0x160
[ 681.774985] [<ffffffffa90664c1>] __do_softirq+0xf1/0x200
[ 681.774987] [<ffffffffa90665ee>] run_ksoftirqd+0x1e/0x30
[ 681.774989] [<ffffffffa90896b0>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x150/0x260
[ 681.774991] [<ffffffffa9089560>] ? sort_range+0x40/0x40
[ 681.774992] [<ffffffffa9085fe4>] kthread+0xe4/0x100
[ 681.774994] [<ffffffffa9085f00>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x170/0x170
[ 681.774995] [<ffffffffa95d8d1e>] ret_from_fork+0x3e/0x70
mq/mqprio have their own ways to report qlen/drops by folding stats on
all their queues, with appropriate locking.
A second problem is that qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() calls qdisc_lookup()
without proper locking : concurrent qdisc updates could corrupt the list
that qdisc_match_from_root() parses to find a qdisc given its handle.
Fix first problem adding a TCQ_F_NOPARENT qdisc flag that
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can use to abort its tree traversal,
as soon as it meets a mq/mqprio qdisc children.
Second problem can be fixed by RCU protection.
Qdisc are already freed after RCU grace period, so qdisc_list_add() and
qdisc_list_del() simply have to use appropriate rcu list variants.
A future patch will add a per struct netdev_queue list anchor, so that
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can have more efficient lookups.
Reported-by: Daniele Fucini <dfucini@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/sch_generic.h | 3 +++
net/sched/sch_api.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
net/sched/sch_generic.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_mq.c | 4 ++--
net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 4 ++--
5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h
index 6d778ef..080b657 100644
--- a/include/net/sch_generic.h
+++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ struct Qdisc {
*/
#define TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC (1 << 16)
#define TCQ_F_CPUSTATS 0x20 /* run using percpu statistics */
+#define TCQ_F_NOPARENT 0x40 /* root of its hierarchy :
+ * qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() should stop.
+ */
u32 limit;
const struct Qdisc_ops *ops;
struct qdisc_size_table __rcu *stab;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index 1e1c89e..d4b6f36 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ int qdisc_set_default(const char *name)
}
/* We know handle. Find qdisc among all qdisc's attached to device
- (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.)
+ * (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.)
+ * Note: caller either uses rtnl or rcu_read_lock()
*/
static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_root(struct Qdisc *root, u32 handle)
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_root(struct Qdisc *root, u32 handle)
root->handle == handle)
return root;
- list_for_each_entry(q, &root->list, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &root->list, list) {
if (q->handle == handle)
return q;
}
@@ -277,15 +278,18 @@ void qdisc_list_add(struct Qdisc *q)
struct Qdisc *root = qdisc_dev(q)->qdisc;
WARN_ON_ONCE(root == &noop_qdisc);
- list_add_tail(&q->list, &root->list);
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&q->list, &root->list);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_add);
void qdisc_list_del(struct Qdisc *q)
{
- if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS))
- list_del(&q->list);
+ if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS)) {
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+ list_del_rcu(&q->list);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_del);
@@ -750,14 +754,18 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned int n)
if (n == 0)
return;
drops = max_t(int, n, 0);
+ rcu_read_lock();
while ((parentid = sch->parent)) {
if (TC_H_MAJ(parentid) == TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_INGRESS))
- return;
+ break;
+ if (sch->flags & TCQ_F_NOPARENT)
+ break;
+ /* TODO: perform the search on a per txq basis */
sch = qdisc_lookup(qdisc_dev(sch), TC_H_MAJ(parentid));
if (sch == NULL) {
- WARN_ON(parentid != TC_H_ROOT);
- return;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(parentid != TC_H_ROOT);
+ break;
}
cops = sch->ops->cl_ops;
if (cops->qlen_notify) {
@@ -768,6 +776,7 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned int n)
sch->q.qlen -= n;
__qdisc_qstats_drop(sch, drops);
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen);
@@ -941,7 +950,7 @@ qdisc_create(struct net_device *dev, struct netdev_queue *dev_queue,
}
lockdep_set_class(qdisc_lock(sch), &qdisc_tx_lock);
if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev))
- sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
sch->handle = handle;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
index 6efca30..b453270 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ static void attach_one_default_qdisc(struct net_device *dev,
return;
}
if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev))
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping = qdisc;
}
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mq.c b/net/sched/sch_mq.c
index f3cbaec..3e82f04 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_mq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mq.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int mq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
if (qdisc == NULL)
goto err;
priv->qdiscs[ntx] = qdisc;
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
sch->flags |= TCQ_F_MQROOT;
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int mq_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl, struct Qdisc *new,
*old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
if (new)
- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
dev_activate(dev);
return 0;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
index 3811a74..ad70ecf 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
goto err;
}
priv->qdiscs[i] = qdisc;
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
/* If the mqprio options indicate that hardware should own
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int mqprio_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl, struct Qdisc *new,
*old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
if (new)
- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
dev_activate(dev);
--
2.4.1
[-- Attachment #4: net_42.mbox --]
[-- Type: Application/Octet-Stream, Size: 122630 bytes --]
From 0fd118097a0c34dec4fdd39716ce644de9d36bcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 16:23:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/37] af-unix: fix use-after-free with concurrent readers
while splicing
[ Upstream commit 73ed5d25dce0354ea381d6dc93005c3085fae03d ]
During splicing an af-unix socket to a pipe we have to drop all
af-unix socket locks. While doing so we allow another reader to enter
unix_stream_read_generic which can read, copy and finally free another
skb. If exactly this skb is just in process of being spliced we get a
use-after-free report by kasan.
First, we must make sure to not have a free while the skb is used during
the splice operation. We simply increment its use counter before unlocking
the reader lock.
Stream sockets have the nice characteristic that we don't care about
zero length writes and they never reach the peer socket's queue. That
said, we can take the UNIXCB.consumed field as the indicator if the
skb was already freed from the socket's receive queue. If the skb was
fully consumed after we locked the reader side again we know it has been
dropped by a second reader. We indicate a short read to user space and
abort the current splice operation.
This bug has been found with syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) by Dmitry Vyukov.
Fixes: 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream af_unix sockets")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 94f6582..a5afe41 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
unix_release_sock(skb->sk, 1);
/* passed fds are erased in the kfree_skb hook */
+ UNIXCB(skb).consumed = skb->len;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
@@ -2071,6 +2072,7 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state)
do {
int chunk;
+ bool drop_skb;
struct sk_buff *skb, *last;
unix_state_lock(sk);
@@ -2151,7 +2153,11 @@ unlock:
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, unix_skb_len(skb) - skip, size);
+ skb_get(skb);
chunk = state->recv_actor(skb, skip, chunk, state);
+ drop_skb = !unix_skb_len(skb);
+ /* skb is only safe to use if !drop_skb */
+ consume_skb(skb);
if (chunk < 0) {
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
@@ -2160,6 +2166,18 @@ unlock:
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
+ if (drop_skb) {
+ /* the skb was touched by a concurrent reader;
+ * we should not expect anything from this skb
+ * anymore and assume it invalid - we can be
+ * sure it was dropped from the socket queue
+ *
+ * let's report a short read
+ */
+ err = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
UNIXCB(skb).consumed += chunk;
--
2.1.0
From 1d24912c692fae2c2903feee18abfa4ed02ee4a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 16:25:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/37] af_unix: don't append consumed skbs to sk_receive_queue
[ Upstream commit 8844f97238ca6c1ca92a5d6c69f53efd361a266f ]
In case multiple writes to a unix stream socket race we could end up in a
situation where we pre-allocate a new skb for use in unix_stream_sendpage
but have to free it again in the locked section because another skb
has been appended meanwhile, which we must use. Accidentally we didn't
clear the pointer after consuming it and so we touched freed memory
while appending it to the sk_receive_queue. So, clear the pointer after
consuming the skb.
This bug has been found with syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) by Dmitry Vyukov.
Fixes: 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage support")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index a5afe41..3e2ca39 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1799,6 +1799,7 @@ alloc_skb:
* this - does no harm
*/
consume_skb(newskb);
+ newskb = NULL;
}
if (skb_append_pagefrags(skb, page, offset, size)) {
--
2.1.0
From 2607ebe2281295959ca39d65f07c2bdacd2afe55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2015 15:10:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/37] af_unix: take receive queue lock while appending new
skb
[ Upstream commit a3a116e04cc6a94d595ead4e956ab1bc1d2f4746 ]
While possibly in future we don't necessarily need to use
sk_buff_head.lock this is a rather larger change, as it affects the
af_unix fd garbage collector, diag and socket cleanups. This is too much
for a stable patch.
For the time being grab sk_buff_head.lock without disabling bh and irqs,
so don't use locked skb_queue_tail.
Fixes: 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage support")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3e2ca39..42ab2cc 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1812,8 +1812,11 @@ alloc_skb:
skb->truesize += size;
atomic_add(size, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
- if (newskb)
+ if (newskb) {
+ spin_lock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
__skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, newskb);
+ spin_unlock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+ }
unix_state_unlock(other);
mutex_unlock(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
--
2.1.0
From 918a9490949ffc1a920d695c2d5f5f83c87906de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 22:07:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 04/37] unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
[ Upstream commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c ]
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index cb1b9bb..49c7683 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0
#define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1
struct socket_wq peer_wq;
+ wait_queue_t peer_wake;
};
static inline struct unix_sock *unix_sk(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 42ab2cc..153b2f2 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -326,6 +326,118 @@ found:
return s;
}
+/* Support code for asymmetrically connected dgram sockets
+ *
+ * If a datagram socket is connected to a socket not itself connected
+ * to the first socket (eg, /dev/log), clients may only enqueue more
+ * messages if the present receive queue of the server socket is not
+ * "too large". This means there's a second writeability condition
+ * poll and sendmsg need to test. The dgram recv code will do a wake
+ * up on the peer_wait wait queue of a socket upon reception of a
+ * datagram which needs to be propagated to sleeping would-be writers
+ * since these might not have sent anything so far. This can't be
+ * accomplished via poll_wait because the lifetime of the server
+ * socket might be less than that of its clients if these break their
+ * association with it or if the server socket is closed while clients
+ * are still connected to it and there's no way to inform "a polling
+ * implementation" that it should let go of a certain wait queue
+ *
+ * In order to propagate a wake up, a wait_queue_t of the client
+ * socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server socket
+ * whose wake function does a wake_up on the ordinary client socket
+ * wait queue. This connection is established whenever a write (or
+ * poll for write) hit the flow control condition and broken when the
+ * association to the server socket is dissolved or after a wake up
+ * was relayed.
+ */
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay(wait_queue_t *q, unsigned mode, int flags,
+ void *key)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ wait_queue_head_t *u_sleep;
+
+ u = container_of(q, struct unix_sock, peer_wake);
+
+ __remove_wait_queue(&unix_sk(u->peer_wake.private)->peer_wait,
+ q);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+
+ /* relaying can only happen while the wq still exists */
+ u_sleep = sk_sleep(&u->sk);
+ if (u_sleep)
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(u_sleep, key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+ int rc;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ rc = 0;
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (!u->peer_wake.private) {
+ u->peer_wake.private = other;
+ __add_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+
+ rc = 1;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (u->peer_wake.private == other) {
+ __remove_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
+ POLLOUT |
+ POLLWRNORM |
+ POLLWRBAND);
+}
+
+/* preconditions:
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == other
+ * - association is stable
+ */
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ int connected;
+
+ connected = unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(sk, other);
+
+ if (unix_recvq_full(other))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (connected)
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk)
{
return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf;
@@ -430,6 +542,8 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
skpair->sk_state_change(skpair);
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
+
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, skpair);
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
@@ -665,6 +779,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
+ init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
@@ -1032,6 +1147,8 @@ restart:
if (unix_peer(sk)) {
struct sock *old_peer = unix_peer(sk);
unix_peer(sk) = other;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, old_peer);
+
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
if (other != old_peer)
@@ -1471,6 +1588,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
+ int sk_locked;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, false);
@@ -1549,12 +1667,14 @@ restart:
goto out_free;
}
+ sk_locked = 0;
unix_state_lock(other);
+restart_locked:
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
- if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
+ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD))) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
@@ -1562,10 +1682,14 @@ restart:
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
+ if (!sk_locked)
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
err = 0;
- unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, other);
+
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
@@ -1591,21 +1715,38 @@ restart:
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
- if (!timeo) {
- err = -EAGAIN;
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ if (timeo) {
+ timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+
+ err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ goto out_free;
+
+ goto restart;
}
- timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+ unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
+ }
- err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
- if (signal_pending(current))
- goto out_free;
+ if (unix_peer(sk) != other ||
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
- goto restart;
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto restart_locked;
+ }
}
+ if (unlikely(sk_locked))
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
+
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
@@ -1619,6 +1760,8 @@ restart:
return len;
out_unlock:
+ if (sk_locked)
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -2475,14 +2618,16 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
return mask;
writable = unix_writable(sk);
- other = unix_peer_get(sk);
- if (other) {
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
- sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
- if (unix_recvq_full(other))
- writable = 0;
- }
- sock_put(other);
+ if (writable) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
+ other = unix_peer(sk);
+ if (other && unix_peer(other) != sk &&
+ unix_recvq_full(other) &&
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other))
+ writable = 0;
+
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
if (writable)
--
2.1.0
From da5d960dbf4f1746d0055d668c5439e4bacbb5d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 12:08:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/37] af-unix: passcred support for sendpage
[ Upstream commit 9490f886b192964796285907d777ff00fba1fa0f ]
sendpage did not care about credentials at all. This could lead to
situations in which because of fd passing between processes we could
append data to skbs with different scm data. It is illegal to splice those
skbs together. Instead we have to allocate a new skb and if requested
fill out the scm details.
Fixes: 869e7c62486ec ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage support")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 153b2f2..128b098 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1550,6 +1550,14 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
return err;
}
+static bool unix_passcred_enabled(const struct socket *sock,
+ const struct sock *other)
+{
+ return test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
+ !other->sk_socket ||
+ test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags);
+}
+
/*
* Some apps rely on write() giving SCM_CREDENTIALS
* We include credentials if source or destination socket
@@ -1560,14 +1568,41 @@ static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
{
if (UNIXCB(skb).pid)
return;
- if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
- !other->sk_socket ||
- test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
+ if (unix_passcred_enabled(sock, other)) {
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid);
}
}
+static int maybe_init_creds(struct scm_cookie *scm,
+ struct socket *socket,
+ const struct sock *other)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct msghdr msg = { .msg_controllen = 0 };
+
+ err = scm_send(socket, &msg, scm, false);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (unix_passcred_enabled(socket, other)) {
+ scm->pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+ current_uid_gid(&scm->creds.uid, &scm->creds.gid);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static bool unix_skb_scm_eq(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+ const struct unix_skb_parms *u = &UNIXCB(skb);
+
+ return u->pid == scm->pid &&
+ uid_eq(u->uid, scm->creds.uid) &&
+ gid_eq(u->gid, scm->creds.gid) &&
+ unix_secdata_eq(scm, skb);
+}
+
/*
* Send AF_UNIX data.
*/
@@ -1883,8 +1918,10 @@ out_err:
static ssize_t unix_stream_sendpage(struct socket *socket, struct page *page,
int offset, size_t size, int flags)
{
- int err = 0;
- bool send_sigpipe = true;
+ int err;
+ bool send_sigpipe = false;
+ bool init_scm = true;
+ struct scm_cookie scm;
struct sock *other, *sk = socket->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb, *newskb = NULL, *tail = NULL;
@@ -1902,7 +1939,7 @@ alloc_skb:
newskb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, 0, 0, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
&err, 0);
if (!newskb)
- return err;
+ goto err;
}
/* we must acquire readlock as we modify already present
@@ -1911,12 +1948,12 @@ alloc_skb:
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
if (err) {
err = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT ? -EAGAIN : -ERESTARTSYS;
- send_sigpipe = false;
goto err;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
err = -EPIPE;
+ send_sigpipe = true;
goto err_unlock;
}
@@ -1925,17 +1962,27 @@ alloc_skb:
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) ||
other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
err = -EPIPE;
+ send_sigpipe = true;
goto err_state_unlock;
}
+ if (init_scm) {
+ err = maybe_init_creds(&scm, socket, other);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_state_unlock;
+ init_scm = false;
+ }
+
skb = skb_peek_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue);
if (tail && tail == skb) {
skb = newskb;
- } else if (!skb) {
- if (newskb)
+ } else if (!skb || !unix_skb_scm_eq(skb, &scm)) {
+ if (newskb) {
skb = newskb;
- else
+ } else {
+ tail = skb;
goto alloc_skb;
+ }
} else if (newskb) {
/* this is fast path, we don't necessarily need to
* call to kfree_skb even though with newskb == NULL
@@ -1956,6 +2003,9 @@ alloc_skb:
atomic_add(size, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
if (newskb) {
+ err = unix_scm_to_skb(&scm, skb, false);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_state_unlock;
spin_lock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
__skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, newskb);
spin_unlock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
@@ -1965,7 +2015,7 @@ alloc_skb:
mutex_unlock(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
other->sk_data_ready(other);
-
+ scm_destroy(&scm);
return size;
err_state_unlock:
@@ -1976,6 +2026,8 @@ err:
kfree_skb(newskb);
if (send_sigpipe && !(flags & MSG_NOSIGNAL))
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
+ if (!init_scm)
+ scm_destroy(&scm);
return err;
}
@@ -2279,10 +2331,7 @@ unlock:
if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */
- if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != scm.pid) ||
- !uid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).uid, scm.creds.uid) ||
- !gid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).gid, scm.creds.gid) ||
- !unix_secdata_eq(&scm, skb))
+ if (!unix_skb_scm_eq(skb, &scm))
break;
} else if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
/* Copy credentials */
--
2.1.0
From 17a04262d29701d1aae327645916a427deb79636 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 11:51:06 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 06/37] ipv6: Avoid creating RTF_CACHE from a rt that is not
managed by fib6 tree
[ Upstream commit 0d3f6d297bfb7af24d0508460fdb3d1ec4903fa3 ]
The original bug report:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1272571
The setup has a IPv4 GRE tunnel running in a IPSec. The bug
happens when ndisc starts sending router solicitation at the gre
interface. The simplified oops stack is like:
__lock_acquire+0x1b2/0x1c30
lock_acquire+0xb9/0x140
_raw_write_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50
__ip6_ins_rt+0x2e/0x60
ip6_ins_rt+0x49/0x50
~~~~~~~~
__ip6_rt_update_pmtu.part.54+0x145/0x250
ip6_rt_update_pmtu+0x2e/0x40
~~~~~~~~
ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1f1/0xf40
__gre_xmit+0x7a/0x90
ipgre_xmit+0x15a/0x220
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2bd/0x480
__dev_queue_xmit+0x696/0x730
dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
neigh_direct_output+0x11/0x20
ip6_finish_output2+0x21f/0x770
ip6_finish_output+0xa7/0x1d0
ip6_output+0x56/0x190
~~~~~~~~
ndisc_send_skb+0x1d9/0x400
ndisc_send_rs+0x88/0xc0
~~~~~~~~
The rt passed to ip6_rt_update_pmtu() is created by
icmp6_dst_alloc() and it is not managed by the fib6 tree,
so its rt6i_table == NULL. When __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() creates
a RTF_CACHE clone, the newly created clone also has rt6i_table == NULL
and it causes the ip6_ins_rt() oops.
During pmtu update, we only want to create a RTF_CACHE clone
from a rt which is currently managed (or owned) by the
fib6 tree. It means either rt->rt6i_node != NULL or
rt is a RTF_PCPU clone.
It is worth to note that rt6i_table may not be NULL even it is
not (yet) managed by the fib6 tree (e.g. addrconf_dst_alloc()).
Hence, rt6i_node is a better check instead of rt6i_table.
Fixes: 45e4fd26683c ("ipv6: Only create RTF_CACHE routes after encountering pmtu")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reported-by: Chris Siebenmann <cks-rhbugzilla@cs.toronto.edu>
Cc: Chris Siebenmann <cks-rhbugzilla@cs.toronto.edu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/route.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index dd6ebba..5533cb4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1326,6 +1326,12 @@ static void rt6_do_update_pmtu(struct rt6_info *rt, u32 mtu)
rt6_update_expires(rt, net->ipv6.sysctl.ip6_rt_mtu_expires);
}
+static bool rt6_cache_allowed_for_pmtu(const struct rt6_info *rt)
+{
+ return !(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) &&
+ (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || rt->rt6i_node);
+}
+
static void __ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, const struct sock *sk,
const struct ipv6hdr *iph, u32 mtu)
{
@@ -1339,7 +1345,7 @@ static void __ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, const struct sock *sk,
if (mtu >= dst_mtu(dst))
return;
- if (rt6->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) {
+ if (!rt6_cache_allowed_for_pmtu(rt6)) {
rt6_do_update_pmtu(rt6, mtu);
} else {
const struct in6_addr *daddr, *saddr;
--
2.1.0
From f9cbc9ca6507dbe0f472cf4fcb0c407b0883c2ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 11:51:07 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 07/37] ipv6: Check expire on DST_NOCACHE route
[ Upstream commit 5973fb1e245086071bf71994c8b54d99526ded03 ]
Since the expires of the DST_NOCACHE rt can be set during
the ip6_rt_update_pmtu(), we also need to consider the expires
value when doing ip6_dst_check().
This patches creates __rt6_check_expired() to only
check the expire value (if one exists) of the current rt.
In rt6_dst_from_check(), it adds __rt6_check_expired() as
one of the condition check.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/route.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index 5533cb4..fcb239b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -401,6 +401,14 @@ static void ip6_dst_ifdown(struct dst_entry *dst, struct net_device *dev,
}
}
+static bool __rt6_check_expired(const struct rt6_info *rt)
+{
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES)
+ return time_after(jiffies, rt->dst.expires);
+ else
+ return false;
+}
+
static bool rt6_check_expired(const struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES) {
@@ -1255,7 +1263,8 @@ static struct dst_entry *rt6_check(struct rt6_info *rt, u32 cookie)
static struct dst_entry *rt6_dst_from_check(struct rt6_info *rt, u32 cookie)
{
- if (rt->dst.obsolete == DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK &&
+ if (!__rt6_check_expired(rt) &&
+ rt->dst.obsolete == DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK &&
rt6_check((struct rt6_info *)(rt->dst.from), cookie))
return &rt->dst;
else
--
2.1.0
From 340d0787b0972ef4147101bf5e55b823d8df5757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 11:51:08 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 08/37] ipv6: Check rt->dst.from for the DST_NOCACHE route
[ Upstrem commit 02bcf4e082e4dc634409a6a6cb7def8806d6e5e6 ]
All DST_NOCACHE rt6_info used to have rt->dst.from set to
its parent.
After commit 8e3d5be73681 ("ipv6: Avoid double dst_free"),
DST_NOCACHE is also set to rt6_info which does not have
a parent (i.e. rt->dst.from is NULL).
This patch catches the rt->dst.from == NULL case.
Fixes: 8e3d5be73681 ("ipv6: Avoid double dst_free")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_fib.h | 3 ++-
net/ipv6/route.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_fib.h b/include/net/ip6_fib.h
index 3b76849..75a888c 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_fib.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_fib.h
@@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ static inline void rt6_update_expires(struct rt6_info *rt0, int timeout)
static inline u32 rt6_get_cookie(const struct rt6_info *rt)
{
- if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || unlikely(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOCACHE))
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU ||
+ (unlikely(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOCACHE) && rt->dst.from))
rt = (struct rt6_info *)(rt->dst.from);
return rt->rt6i_node ? rt->rt6i_node->fn_sernum : 0;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index fcb239b..8478719 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1284,7 +1284,8 @@ static struct dst_entry *ip6_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie)
rt6_dst_from_metrics_check(rt);
- if ((rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU) || unlikely(dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE))
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU ||
+ (unlikely(dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE) && rt->dst.from))
return rt6_dst_from_check(rt, cookie);
else
return rt6_check(rt, cookie);
--
2.1.0
From 40acbe3e895c5d0ece424eaeb01a021068a36e10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 14:24:27 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 09/37] tools/net: Use include/uapi with __EXPORTED_HEADERS__
[ Upstream commit d7475de58575c904818efa369c82e88c6648ce2e ]
Use the local uapi headers to keep in sync with "recently" added #define's
(e.g. SKF_AD_VLAN_TPID). Refactored CFLAGS, and bpf_asm doesn't need -I.
Fixes: 3f356385e8a4 ("filter: bpf_asm: add minimal bpf asm tool")
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
tools/net/Makefile | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/net/Makefile b/tools/net/Makefile
index ee577ea..ddf8880 100644
--- a/tools/net/Makefile
+++ b/tools/net/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ CC = gcc
LEX = flex
YACC = bison
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2
+CFLAGS += -D__EXPORTED_HEADERS__ -I../../include/uapi -I../../include
+
%.yacc.c: %.y
$(YACC) -o $@ -d $<
@@ -12,15 +15,13 @@ YACC = bison
all : bpf_jit_disasm bpf_dbg bpf_asm
-bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
+bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS += -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
bpf_jit_disasm : LDLIBS = -lopcodes -lbfd -ldl
bpf_jit_disasm : bpf_jit_disasm.o
-bpf_dbg : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2
bpf_dbg : LDLIBS = -lreadline
bpf_dbg : bpf_dbg.o
-bpf_asm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -I.
bpf_asm : LDLIBS =
bpf_asm : bpf_asm.o bpf_exp.yacc.o bpf_exp.lex.o
bpf_exp.lex.o : bpf_exp.yacc.c
--
2.1.0
From a034f79d2acef0a3542c281c704b6ee172380bc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/37] packet: do skb_probe_transport_header when we actually
have data
[ Upstream commit efdfa2f7848f64517008136fb41f53c4a1faf93a ]
In tpacket_fill_skb() commit c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport
header before doing xmit") and later on 40893fd0fd4e ("net: switch
to use skb_probe_transport_header()") was probing for a transport
header on the skb from a ring buffer slot, but at a time, where
the skb has _not even_ been filled with data yet. So that call into
the flow dissector is pretty useless. Lets do it after we've set
up the skb frags.
Fixes: c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 71cb085..ff4586f 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2249,8 +2249,6 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) {
int off_min, off_max, off;
off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
@@ -2330,6 +2328,9 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
+ if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+
return tp_len;
}
--
2.1.0
From 1cae18b3f25c63298e4807e5c636bb45e9a53da9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/37] packet: always probe for transport header
[ Upstream commit 8fd6c80d9dd938ca338c70698533a7e304752846 ]
We concluded that the skb_probe_transport_header() should better be
called unconditionally. Avoiding the call into the flow dissector has
also not really much to do with the direct xmit mode.
While it seems that only virtio_net code makes use of GSO from non
RX/TX ring packet socket paths, we should probe for a transport header
nevertheless before they hit devices.
Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/386173/
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index ff4586f..5b1eadb 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2328,8 +2328,7 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
return tp_len;
}
@@ -2681,8 +2680,8 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
len += vnet_hdr_len;
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+
if (unlikely(extra_len == 4))
skb->no_fcs = 1;
--
2.1.0
From a98eb2ff39373be45cc5e07efe8917fd664f4065 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/37] packet: only allow extra vlan len on ethernet devices
[ Upstream commit 3c70c132488794e2489ab045559b0ce0afcf17de ]
Packet sockets can be used by various net devices and are not
really restricted to ARPHRD_ETHER device types. However, when
currently checking for the extra 4 bytes that can be transmitted
in VLAN case, our assumption is that we generally probe on
ARPHRD_ETHER devices. Therefore, before looking into Ethernet
header, check the device type first.
This also fixes the issue where non-ARPHRD_ETHER devices could
have no dev->hard_header_len in TX_RING SOCK_RAW case, and thus
the check would test unfilled linear part of the skb (instead
of non-linear).
Fixes: 57f89bfa2140 ("network: Allow af_packet to transmit +4 bytes for VLAN packets.")
Fixes: 52f1454f629f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 5b1eadb..4710f22 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1622,6 +1622,20 @@ static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
+static bool packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, double-check
+ * this now that we have the actual packet in hand. We can only
+ * do this check on Ethernet devices.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER))
+ return false;
+
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ return likely(eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto == htons(ETH_P_8021Q));
+}
+
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops;
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops_spkt;
@@ -1783,18 +1797,10 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
- if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_unlock;
- }
+ if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
@@ -2406,18 +2412,10 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len) {
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
+ tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q))
- tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- }
if (unlikely(tp_len < 0)) {
if (po->tp_loss) {
__packet_set_status(po, ph,
@@ -2638,18 +2636,10 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
- if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_free;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
--
2.1.0
From 97c2fd875f74faa9b79b712908992746d257c97b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/37] packet: infer protocol from ethernet header if unset
[ Upstream commit c72219b75fde768efccf7666342282fab7f9e4e7 ]
In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet
socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then
skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol
passed via socket(2)/bind(2).
Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the
socket as socket(PF_PACKET, <mode>, 0) and do a bind(2) on the
TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook()
is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves
cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway.
That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore
the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric
reported that this leads to problems when using tools like
trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function
could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on
skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all
the traffic is then directed to a single slave.
Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header
when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only
done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len
length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to
cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after
the skb_store_bits().
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 4710f22..ecad899 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2219,6 +2219,15 @@ static bool ll_header_truncated(const struct net_device *dev, int len)
return false;
}
+static void tpacket_set_protocol(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER) {
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ skb->protocol = eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto;
+ }
+}
+
static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
void *frame, struct net_device *dev, int size_max,
__be16 proto, unsigned char *addr, int hlen)
@@ -2300,6 +2309,8 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
dev->hard_header_len);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
+ if (!skb->protocol)
+ tpacket_set_protocol(dev, skb);
data += dev->hard_header_len;
to_write -= dev->hard_header_len;
--
2.1.0
From 89e7a93e5747abb845ad058cdf7d1bb374d656b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 14/37] packet: fix tpacket_snd max frame len
[ Upstream commit 5cfb4c8d05b4409c4044cb9c05b19705c1d9818b ]
Since it's introduction in commit 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and
packet mmap"), TX_RING could be used from SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_RAW
side. When used with SOCK_DGRAM only, the size_max > dev->mtu +
reserve check should have reserve as 0, but currently, this is
unconditionally set (in it's original form as dev->hard_header_len).
I think this is not correct since tpacket_fill_skb() would then
take dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len into account for SOCK_DGRAM,
the extra VLAN_HLEN could be possible in both cases. Presumably, the
reserve code was copied from packet_snd(), but later on missed the
check. Make it similar as we have it in packet_snd().
Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index ecad899..71d671c 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2391,12 +2391,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
if (unlikely(!(dev->flags & IFF_UP)))
goto out_put;
- reserve = dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN;
+ if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW)
+ reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
size_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size
- (po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll));
- if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve)
- size_max = dev->mtu + reserve;
+ if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN)
+ size_max = dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN;
do {
ph = packet_current_frame(po, &po->tx_ring,
@@ -2423,7 +2424,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + reserve &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.1.0
From 147ba7b20131040aa8f8256667a6a719818058fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lucien <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 13:07:07 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 15/37] sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid
[ Upstream commit ed5a377d87dc4c87fb3e1f7f698cba38cd893103 ]
now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which
is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix
it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs.
even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still
can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs():
if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 4f15b7d..1543e39 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -809,8 +809,8 @@ int sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (!has_sha1)
return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids, &hmacs->shmac_idents[0],
- hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
+ for (i = 0; i < hmacs->shmac_num_idents; i++)
+ ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids[i] = htons(hmacs->shmac_idents[i]);
ep->auth_hmacs_list->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) +
hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
return 0;
--
2.1.0
From a7ff2e38b473647c6b05c6e9c25165e0f1a6651c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 19:35:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 16/37] net/mlx4_core: Fix sleeping while holding spinlock at
rem_slave_counters
[ Upstream commit f5adbfee72282bb1f456d52b04adacd4fe6ac502 ]
When cleaning slave's counter resources, we hold a spinlock that
protects the slave's counters list. As part of the clean, we call
__mlx4_clear_if_stat which calls mlx4_alloc_cmd_mailbox which is a
sleepable function.
In order to fix this issue, hold the spinlock, and copy all counter
indices into a temporary array, and release the spinlock. Afterwards,
iterate over this array and free every counter. Repeat this scenario
until the original list is empty (a new counter might have been added
while releasing the counters from the temporary array).
Fixes: b72ca7e96acf ("net/mlx4_core: Reset counters data when freed")
Reported-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Eran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c
index 731423c..8bead97 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c
@@ -4934,26 +4934,41 @@ static void rem_slave_counters(struct mlx4_dev *dev, int slave)
struct res_counter *counter;
struct res_counter *tmp;
int err;
- int index;
+ int *counters_arr = NULL;
+ int i, j;
err = move_all_busy(dev, slave, RES_COUNTER);
if (err)
mlx4_warn(dev, "rem_slave_counters: Could not move all counters - too busy for slave %d\n",
slave);
- spin_lock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
- list_for_each_entry_safe(counter, tmp, counter_list, com.list) {
- if (counter->com.owner == slave) {
- index = counter->com.res_id;
- rb_erase(&counter->com.node,
- &tracker->res_tree[RES_COUNTER]);
- list_del(&counter->com.list);
- kfree(counter);
- __mlx4_counter_free(dev, index);
+ counters_arr = kmalloc_array(dev->caps.max_counters,
+ sizeof(*counters_arr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!counters_arr)
+ return;
+
+ do {
+ i = 0;
+ j = 0;
+ spin_lock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(counter, tmp, counter_list, com.list) {
+ if (counter->com.owner == slave) {
+ counters_arr[i++] = counter->com.res_id;
+ rb_erase(&counter->com.node,
+ &tracker->res_tree[RES_COUNTER]);
+ list_del(&counter->com.list);
+ kfree(counter);
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
+
+ while (j < i) {
+ __mlx4_counter_free(dev, counters_arr[j++]);
mlx4_release_resource(dev, slave, RES_COUNTER, 1, 0);
}
- }
- spin_unlock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
+ } while (i);
+
+ kfree(counters_arr);
}
static void rem_slave_xrcdns(struct mlx4_dev *dev, int slave)
--
2.1.0
From dd68d7f48af24378d4b88918bee9089b2c0467cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 17:35:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/37] ip_tunnel: disable preemption when updating per-cpu
tstats
[ Upstream commit b4fe85f9c9146f60457e9512fb6055e69e6a7a65 ]
Drivers like vxlan use the recently introduced
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb/udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb APIs. udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb
makes use of ip6tunnel_xmit, and ip6tunnel_xmit, after sending the
packet, updates the struct stats using the usual
u64_stats_update_begin/end calls on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb makes use of iptunnel_xmit, which doesn't touch
tstats, so drivers like vxlan, immediately after, call
iptunnel_xmit_stats, which does the same thing - calls
u64_stats_update_begin/end on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
While vxlan is probably fine (I don't know?), calling a similar function
from, say, an unbound workqueue, on a fully preemptable kernel causes
real issues:
[ 188.434537] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u8:0/6
[ 188.435579] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 188.435583] CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 4.2.6 #2
[ 188.435607] Call Trace:
[ 188.435611] [<ffffffff8234e936>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
[ 188.435615] [<ffffffff81915f3d>] check_preemption_disabled+0x19d/0x1c0
[ 188.435619] [<ffffffff81915f77>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
The solution would be to protect the whole
this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats)/u64_stats_update_begin/end blocks with
disabling preemption and then reenabling it.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_tunnel.h | 3 ++-
include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
index b8529aa..b0f7445 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
@@ -83,11 +83,12 @@ static inline void ip6tunnel_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
err = ip6_local_out_sk(sk, skb);
if (net_xmit_eval(err) == 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += pkt_len;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else {
stats->tx_errors++;
stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
diff --git a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
index d8214cb..9c2897e 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
@@ -207,12 +207,13 @@ static inline void iptunnel_xmit_stats(int err,
struct pcpu_sw_netstats __percpu *stats)
{
if (err > 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(stats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(stats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += err;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else if (err < 0) {
err_stats->tx_errors++;
err_stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
--
2.1.0
From 52964ecb13dcfb471ae4209e04a0e9cd18aa9cbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dragos Tatulea <dragos@endocode.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 10:52:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/37] net: switchdev: fix return code of fdb_dump stub
[ Upstream commit 24cb7055a3066634a0f3fa0cd6a4780652905d35 ]
rtnl_fdb_dump always expects an index to be returned by the ndo_fdb_dump op,
but when CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV is off, it returns an error.
Fix that by returning the given unmodified idx.
A similar fix was 0890cf6cb6ab ("switchdev: fix return value of
switchdev_port_fdb_dump in case of error") but for the CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV=y
case.
Fixes: 45d4122ca7cd ("switchdev: add support for fdb add/del/dump via switchdev_port_obj ops.")
Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <dragos@endocode.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/switchdev.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/net/switchdev.h b/include/net/switchdev.h
index d5671f1..0b91979 100644
--- a/include/net/switchdev.h
+++ b/include/net/switchdev.h
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static inline int switchdev_port_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *filter_dev,
int idx)
{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return idx;
}
#endif
--
2.1.0
From 673a57ec4f0f21fea3ddd2f330374546dc2c6b38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pavel Fedin <p.fedin@samsung.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 17:51:34 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 19/37] net: thunder: Check for driver data in nicvf_remove()
[ Upstream commit 7750130d93decff06120df0d8ea024ff8a038a21 ]
In some cases the crash is caused by nicvf_remove() being called from
outside. For example, if we try to feed the device to vfio after the
probe has failed for some reason. So, move the check to better place.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Fedin <p.fedin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c
index 3b90afb..6f2a748 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c
@@ -1325,7 +1325,12 @@ err_disable_device:
static void nicvf_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct net_device *netdev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
- struct nicvf *nic = netdev_priv(netdev);
+ struct nicvf *nic;
+
+ if (!netdev)
+ return;
+
+ nic = netdev_priv(netdev);
unregister_netdev(netdev);
nicvf_unregister_interrupts(nic);
--
2.1.0
From 4c72e38e5a02a52c33bc4c613082c8c0aaca8a8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 13:09:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 20/37] snmp: Remove duplicate OUTMCAST stat increment
[ Upstream commit 41033f029e393a64e81966cbe34d66c6cf8a2e7e ]
the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code
itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its
not needed
Validated by the reporter, with good results
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/mcast.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/mcast.c b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
index 083b292..41e3b5e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/mcast.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
@@ -1651,7 +1651,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
} else {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
}
@@ -2014,7 +2013,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, type);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, full_len);
} else
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
--
2.1.0
From ec69f679b948f8a51cfeacf9ea5abc5a61b5cbb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <bjorn@mork.no>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:13:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 21/37] net: qmi_wwan: add XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit 68242a5a1e2edce39b069385cbafb82304eac0f1 ]
Thomas reports
"
4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name.
..
The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega"
..
Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for
network and MI01\6 for modem.
..
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Now all important things are there:
wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at)
There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at.
The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager.
"
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 8f1738c..de27f51 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -775,6 +775,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)}, /* TP-LINK MA260 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1201, 2)}, /* Telit LE920 */
+ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1c9e, 0x9b01, 3)}, /* XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc000, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 100 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc001, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 120 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc002, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 140 */
--
2.1.0
From 20eb0f0537467a8452ae6a53a4ca9bb150660e0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 12:40:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 22/37] tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation
[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01e19f001e9f93b39c32387961c91ed3cc ]
When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add()
with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we
will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway)
But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid
following splat :
[ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090934]
[ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
[ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795:
[ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90
[ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500
[ 8451.090958]
[ 8451.090958] stack backtrace:
[ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_
[ 8451.091215] Call Trace:
[ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
[ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110
[ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0
[ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0
[ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190
[ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500
[ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190
[ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0
[ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0
[ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80
[ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700
[ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0
[ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90
Fixes: a8afca0329988 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 0ea2e1c..569c638 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -922,7 +922,8 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, const union tcp_md5_addr *addr,
}
md5sig = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info,
- sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ sock_owned_by_user(sk) ||
+ lockdep_is_held(&sk->sk_lock.slock));
if (!md5sig) {
md5sig = kmalloc(sizeof(*md5sig), gfp);
if (!md5sig)
--
2.1.0
From dd711f463bb9faafe25f9ab98af1656655137441 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 18:17:30 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 23/37] tcp: disable Fast Open on timeouts after handshake
[ Upstream commit 0e45f4da5981895e885dd72fe912a3f8e32bae73 ]
Some middle-boxes black-hole the data after the Fast Open handshake
(https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf).
The exact reason is unknown. The work-around is to disable Fast Open
temporarily after multiple recurring timeouts with few or no data
delivered in the established state.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
index 5b752f5..1e63c8f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
syn_set = true;
} else {
if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1, 0, 0)) {
+ /* Some middle-boxes may black-hole Fast Open _after_
+ * the handshake. Therefore we conservatively disable
+ * Fast Open on this path on recurring timeouts with
+ * few or zero bytes acked after Fast Open.
+ */
+ if (tp->syn_data_acked &&
+ tp->bytes_acked <= tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp) {
+ tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, 0, NULL, true, 0);
+ if (icsk->icsk_retransmits == sysctl_tcp_retries1)
+ NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
+ LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENACTIVEFAIL);
+ }
/* Black hole detection */
tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk);
--
2.1.0
From 6abdc9f3582b7d7878480648bf185e9aad6a8fb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:03:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 24/37] tcp: fix potential huge kmalloc() calls in TCP_REPAIR
[ Upstream commit 5d4c9bfbabdb1d497f21afd81501e5c54b0c85d9 ]
tcp_send_rcvq() is used for re-injecting data into tcp receive queue.
Problems :
- No check against size is performed, allowed user to fool kernel in
attempting very large memory allocations, eventually triggering
OOM when memory is fragmented.
- In case of fault during the copy we do not return correct errno.
Lets use alloc_skb_with_frags() to cook optimal skbs.
Fixes: 292e8d8c8538 ("tcp: Move rcvq sending to tcp_input.c")
Fixes: c0e88ff0f256 ("tcp: Repair socket queues")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 728f5b3..c990105 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4434,19 +4434,34 @@ static int __must_check tcp_queue_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int
int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int data_len = 0;
bool fragstolen;
if (size == 0)
return 0;
- skb = alloc_skb(size, sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ int npages = min_t(size_t, size >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+
+ data_len = npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ size = data_len + (size & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ }
+ skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(size - data_len, data_len,
+ PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER,
+ &err, sk->sk_allocation);
if (!skb)
goto err;
+ skb_put(skb, size - data_len);
+ skb->data_len = data_len;
+ skb->len = size;
+
if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize))
goto err_free;
- if (memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, size), msg, size))
+ err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, size);
+ if (err)
goto err_free;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt;
@@ -4462,7 +4477,8 @@ int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
err_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
err:
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return err;
+
}
static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.1.0
From 9f5bbd968c4fea392d92d486adfccb588f963d68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 08:18:14 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 25/37] tcp: initialize tp->copied_seq in case of cross SYN
connection
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7ece8d8ac0e818eb2c91f99ca894730e2a ]
Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
generated program that triggers the WARNING at
net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() :
WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
!(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC)));
His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange,
that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we
lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization.
Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index c990105..77730b4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -5636,6 +5636,7 @@ discard:
}
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
+ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is
--
2.1.0
From eae7ab74ca54ad3593c52b6ded2717cd31d2a74d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 00:11:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 26/37] net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in
scm_detach_fds
[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ]
David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:
(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)
[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85
Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.
In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.
When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():
int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
if (!err)
err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
if (!err)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
} ... wrap-around
F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.
In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.
In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen
elsewhere.
Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).
Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!
Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).
Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").
RFC3542, section 20.2. says:
The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
application may or may not include padding at the end of last
ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
may set MSG_CTRUNC.
Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.
Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).
No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).
Reported-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
Reported-by: HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/scm.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 3b6899b..8a1741b 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int));
+ if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
+ cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
}
--
2.1.0
From 7aa12b718983d04b4ced5c7649504f0307f2c82e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 27/37] net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ]
When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
(because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4....
ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
[<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
[<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
[<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
[<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
[<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
[<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
index df28693..c3bfebd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm);
static void mroute_netlink_event(struct mr_table *mrt, struct mfc_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static int ipmr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1218,8 +1218,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
/* Shut down all active vif entries */
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1227,7 +1228,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
for (i = 0; i < MFC_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
list_del_rcu(&c->list);
mroute_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE);
@@ -1262,7 +1263,7 @@ static void mrtsock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL,
net->ipv4.devconf_all);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mrt->mroute_sk, NULL);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
}
}
rtnl_unlock();
--
2.1.0
From bbd383a3ea991780cfc41fb89b063d4a6b5f0c23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 28/37] net: ip6mr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 4c6980462f32b4f282c5d8e5f7ea8070e2937725 ]
Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and
the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be
destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that
everything is cleaned up on netns destruction.
Fixes: 8229efdaef1e ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code")
CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
index 5f36266..a7aef4b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void mr6_netlink_event(struct mr6_table *mrt, struct mfc6_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
static int ip6mr_rtm_dumproute(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static struct mr6_table *ip6mr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ip6mr_free_table(struct mr6_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ static int ip6mr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1553,8 +1553,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
* Shut down all active vif entries
*/
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1563,7 +1564,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
*/
for (i = 0; i < MFC6_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock);
list_del(&c->list);
@@ -1626,7 +1627,7 @@ int ip6mr_sk_done(struct sock *sk)
net->ipv6.devconf_all);
write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
err = 0;
break;
}
--
2.1.0
From a683fe9e6bd517c1e0af74a4e6af434c932524e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2015 01:08:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 29/37] broadcom: fix PHY_ID_BCM5481 entry in the id table
[ Upstream commit 3c25a860d17b7378822f35d8c9141db9507e3beb ]
Commit fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0
with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting
the original). Fix that.
Fixes: fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
index 9c71295..85e64044 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct mdio_device_id __maybe_unused broadcom_tbl[] = {
{ PHY_ID_BCM5461, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM54616S, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5464, 0xfffffff0 },
- { PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
+ { PHY_ID_BCM5481, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610M, 0xfffffff0 },
--
2.1.0
From 26d430e69b1a190683cf3ff5feed35e81e13d621 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 15:07:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 30/37] ipv6: distinguish frag queues by device for multicast
and link-local packets
[ Upstream commit 264640fc2c5f4f913db5c73fa3eb1ead2c45e9d7 ]
If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.
To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
addresses.
Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/
but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ipv6.h | 1 +
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 5 +++--
net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 10 +++++++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index 82dbdb0..13aecd1 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ struct ip6_create_arg {
u32 user;
const struct in6_addr *src;
const struct in6_addr *dst;
+ int iif;
u8 ecn;
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
index 6d02498..2a4682c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static void nf_ct_frag6_expire(unsigned long data)
/* Creation primitives. */
static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
u32 user, struct in6_addr *src,
- struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
arg.user = user;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
local_bh_disable();
@@ -603,7 +604,7 @@ struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone);
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n");
goto ret_orig;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
index f1159bb..04013a9 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ bool ip6_frag_match(const struct inet_frag_queue *q, const void *a)
return fq->id == arg->id &&
fq->user == arg->user &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->saddr, arg->src) &&
- ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst);
+ ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst) &&
+ (arg->iif == fq->iif ||
+ !(ipv6_addr_type(arg->dst) & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST |
+ IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_frag_match);
@@ -180,7 +183,7 @@ static void ip6_frag_expire(unsigned long data)
static struct frag_queue *
fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
- const struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ const struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -190,6 +193,7 @@ fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
arg.user = IP6_DEFRAG_LOCAL_DELIVER;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
hash = inet6_hash_frag(id, src, dst);
@@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq) {
int ret;
--
2.1.0
From 30493fb29bc5af48ee13b44fde0e09e25ee2d38e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 17:13:21 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 31/37] RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on
unbound socket
[ Upstream commit 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a ]
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/rds/connection.c | 6 ------
net/rds/send.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rds/connection.c b/net/rds/connection.c
index 9d66705..da6da57 100644
--- a/net/rds/connection.c
+++ b/net/rds/connection.c
@@ -187,12 +187,6 @@ new_conn:
}
}
- if (trans == NULL) {
- kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
- conn = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
- goto out;
- }
-
conn->c_trans = trans;
ret = trans->conn_alloc(conn, gfp);
diff --git a/net/rds/send.c b/net/rds/send.c
index e9430f5..7b30c0f 100644
--- a/net/rds/send.c
+++ b/net/rds/send.c
@@ -986,11 +986,13 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t payload_len)
release_sock(sk);
}
- /* racing with another thread binding seems ok here */
+ lock_sock(sk);
if (daddr == 0 || rs->rs_bound_addr == 0) {
+ release_sock(sk);
ret = -ENOTCONN; /* XXX not a great errno */
goto out;
}
+ release_sock(sk);
/* size of rm including all sgs */
ret = rds_rm_size(msg, payload_len);
--
2.1.0
From 89399541540e210498d755d37b6c2477818e6aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 13:02:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 32/37] bpf, array: fix heap out-of-bounds access when updating
elements
[ Upstream commit fbca9d2d35c6ef1b323fae75cc9545005ba25097 ]
During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been
noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps
when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size
(specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes.
In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and
used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function
array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ...
memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from
map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER)
and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size).
Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds.
Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we
access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack.
Since 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an
official release yet, it only affects priviledged users.
In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs
from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also
from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to
user, so nothing could leak.
[1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller
Fixes: 28fbcfa08d8e ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index cb31229..34265a1 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
/* all elements already exist */
return -EEXIST;
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
+ memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size);
return 0;
}
--
2.1.0
From 88a52cf2de740c4c77684c2f74e6c58a004c1f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 19:37:57 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 33/37] ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ]
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/ipv6.h | 2 +-
include/net/ipv6.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c | 11 ++++++++---
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ipv6/raw.c | 8 ++++++--
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ipv6/udp.c | 8 ++++++--
net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 8 ++++++--
13 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index 82806c6..e4b4649 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ struct ipv6_pinfo {
struct ipv6_ac_socklist *ipv6_ac_list;
struct ipv6_fl_socklist __rcu *ipv6_fl_list;
- struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions __rcu *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktoptions;
struct sk_buff *rxpmtu;
struct inet6_cork cork;
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index 13aecd1..177a896 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ extern rwlock_t ip6_ra_lock;
*/
struct ipv6_txoptions {
+ atomic_t refcnt;
/* Length of this structure */
int tot_len;
@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions {
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst0opt;
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *srcrt; /* Routing Header */
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst1opt;
-
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
/* Option buffer, as read by IPV6_PKTOPTIONS, starts here. */
};
@@ -252,6 +253,24 @@ struct ipv6_fl_socklist {
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
+static inline struct ipv6_txoptions *txopt_get(const struct ipv6_pinfo *np)
+{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt && !atomic_inc_not_zero(&opt->refcnt))
+ opt = NULL;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return opt;
+}
+
+static inline void txopt_put(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
+{
+ if (opt && atomic_dec_and_test(&opt->refcnt))
+ kfree_rcu(opt, rcu);
+}
+
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl6_sock_lookup(struct sock *sk, __be32 label);
struct ipv6_txoptions *fl6_merge_options(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_space,
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl,
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 5165571..a049050 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -202,7 +202,9 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -219,7 +221,10 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
&ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -415,6 +420,7 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -534,13 +540,15 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt != NULL)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
@@ -793,6 +801,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
@@ -892,7 +901,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -912,9 +922,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index 7de52b6..d87519e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -426,9 +426,11 @@ void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
/* Free tx options */
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_destroy_sock);
@@ -657,7 +659,10 @@ int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index b10a889..13ca4cf 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ ipv4_connected:
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : np->opt;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : rcu_dereference(np->opt);
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
err = 0;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
index a7bbbe4..adbd695 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ ipv6_dup_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst1opt) += dif;
if (opt2->srcrt)
*((char **)&opt2->srcrt) += dif;
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
}
return opt2;
}
@@ -790,7 +791,7 @@ ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
memset(opt2, 0, tot_len);
-
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
opt2->tot_len = tot_len;
p = (char *)(opt2 + 1);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
index 6927f3f..9beed30 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(struct sock *sk,
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
@@ -207,7 +209,9 @@ static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_socket(struct sock *sk,
fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
@@ -240,7 +244,8 @@ int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl_unused
/* Restore final destination back after routing done */
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
- res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index 63e6956..4449ad1 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
- opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt,
+ opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
@@ -231,9 +232,12 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt,
+ NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
@@ -403,7 +407,8 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
- opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
@@ -432,8 +437,10 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
@@ -486,6 +493,7 @@ sticky_done:
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
+ atomic_set(&opt->refcnt, 1);
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
@@ -502,8 +510,10 @@ update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
@@ -1110,10 +1120,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
lock_sock(sk);
- len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, np->opt,
- optname, optval, len);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, opt, optname, optval, len);
release_sock(sk);
/* check if ipv6_getsockopt_sticky() returns err code */
if (len < 0)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
index ca4700c..92d5329 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
@@ -731,6 +731,7 @@ static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
@@ -837,8 +838,10 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
- if (!opt)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -904,6 +907,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index 0909f4e..f30bfdc 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 7a6cea5..45e473e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
@@ -235,7 +236,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
@@ -263,9 +265,9 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen +
+ opt->opt_nflen;
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
@@ -461,7 +463,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts));
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_mapping);
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -991,6 +994,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -1126,13 +1130,15 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
tcp_ca_openreq_child(newsk, dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index e51fc3e..7333f35 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -1107,6 +1107,7 @@ int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -1260,8 +1261,10 @@ do_udp_sendmsg:
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
- if (!opt)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -1370,6 +1373,7 @@ release_dst:
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index d1ded37..0ce9da9 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
@@ -575,8 +576,10 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
opt = NULL;
}
- if (opt == NULL)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -631,6 +634,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
--
2.1.0
From 265b1a0aef414f7ded963f97f93b217901bf5d35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 01:14:48 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 34/37] net/neighbour: fix crash at dumping device-agnostic
proxy entries
[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e ]
Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/neighbour.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c
index 84195da..ecdb171 100644
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -2210,7 +2210,7 @@ static int pneigh_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct pneigh_entry *pn,
ndm->ndm_pad2 = 0;
ndm->ndm_flags = pn->flags | NTF_PROXY;
ndm->ndm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
- ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev->ifindex;
+ ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev ? pn->dev->ifindex : 0;
ndm->ndm_state = NUD_NONE;
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_DST, tbl->key_len, pn->key))
@@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ static int pneigh_dump_table(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (h > s_h)
s_idx = 0;
for (n = tbl->phash_buckets[h], idx = 0; n; n = n->next) {
- if (dev_net(n->dev) != net)
+ if (pneigh_net(n) != net)
continue;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto next;
--
2.1.0
From ab005ac72d13e866c39f2589b0499ae78b091116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 07:20:07 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 35/37] ipv6: sctp: implement sctp_v6_destroy_sock()
[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets.
We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release
inet6 specific fields.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 17bef01..3ec88be 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -7375,6 +7375,13 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <net/transp_v6.h>
+static void sctp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ sctp_destroy_sock(sk);
+ inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
+}
+
struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.name = "SCTPv6",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -7384,7 +7391,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.accept = sctp_accept,
.ioctl = sctp_ioctl,
.init = sctp_init_sock,
- .destroy = sctp_destroy_sock,
+ .destroy = sctp_v6_destroy_sock,
.shutdown = sctp_shutdown,
.setsockopt = sctp_setsockopt,
.getsockopt = sctp_getsockopt,
--
2.1.0
From 04b53c85122a9889c07dcae0d9aaa1f8491425b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 20:08:51 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 36/37] net_sched: fix qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() races
[ Upstream commit 4eaf3b84f2881c9c028f1d5e76c52ab575fe3a66 ]
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() suffers from two problems on multiqueue
devices.
One problem is that it updates sch->q.qlen and sch->qstats.drops
on the mq/mqprio root qdisc, while it should not : Daniele
reported underflows errors :
[ 681.774821] PAX: sch->q.qlen: 0 n: 1
[ 681.774825] PAX: size overflow detected in function qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen net/sched/sch_api.c:769 cicus.693_49 min, count: 72, decl: qlen; num: 0; context: sk_buff_head;
[ 681.774954] CPU: 2 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Tainted: G O 4.2.6.201511282239-1-grsec #1
[ 681.774955] Hardware name: ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. X302LJ/X302LJ, BIOS X302LJ.202 03/05/2015
[ 681.774956] ffffffffa9a04863 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffa990ff7c
[ 681.774959] ffffc90000d3bc38 ffffffffa95d2810 0000000000000007 ffffffffa991002b
[ 681.774960] ffffc90000d3bc68 ffffffffa91a44f4 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
[ 681.774962] Call Trace:
[ 681.774967] [<ffffffffa95d2810>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x7f
[ 681.774970] [<ffffffffa91a44f4>] report_size_overflow+0x34/0x50
[ 681.774972] [<ffffffffa94d17e2>] qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen+0x152/0x160
[ 681.774976] [<ffffffffc02694b1>] fq_codel_dequeue+0x7b1/0x820 [sch_fq_codel]
[ 681.774978] [<ffffffffc02680a0>] ? qdisc_peek_dequeued+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_fq_codel]
[ 681.774980] [<ffffffffa94cd92d>] __qdisc_run+0x4d/0x1d0
[ 681.774983] [<ffffffffa949b2b2>] net_tx_action+0xc2/0x160
[ 681.774985] [<ffffffffa90664c1>] __do_softirq+0xf1/0x200
[ 681.774987] [<ffffffffa90665ee>] run_ksoftirqd+0x1e/0x30
[ 681.774989] [<ffffffffa90896b0>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x150/0x260
[ 681.774991] [<ffffffffa9089560>] ? sort_range+0x40/0x40
[ 681.774992] [<ffffffffa9085fe4>] kthread+0xe4/0x100
[ 681.774994] [<ffffffffa9085f00>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x170/0x170
[ 681.774995] [<ffffffffa95d8d1e>] ret_from_fork+0x3e/0x70
mq/mqprio have their own ways to report qlen/drops by folding stats on
all their queues, with appropriate locking.
A second problem is that qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() calls qdisc_lookup()
without proper locking : concurrent qdisc updates could corrupt the list
that qdisc_match_from_root() parses to find a qdisc given its handle.
Fix first problem adding a TCQ_F_NOPARENT qdisc flag that
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can use to abort its tree traversal,
as soon as it meets a mq/mqprio qdisc children.
Second problem can be fixed by RCU protection.
Qdisc are already freed after RCU grace period, so qdisc_list_add() and
qdisc_list_del() simply have to use appropriate rcu list variants.
A future patch will add a per struct netdev_queue list anchor, so that
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can have more efficient lookups.
Reported-by: Daniele Fucini <dfucini@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/sch_generic.h | 3 +++
net/sched/sch_api.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
net/sched/sch_generic.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_mq.c | 4 ++--
net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 4 ++--
5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h
index 2738f6f..49dda38 100644
--- a/include/net/sch_generic.h
+++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ struct Qdisc {
*/
#define TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC (1 << 16)
#define TCQ_F_CPUSTATS 0x20 /* run using percpu statistics */
+#define TCQ_F_NOPARENT 0x40 /* root of its hierarchy :
+ * qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() should stop.
+ */
u32 limit;
const struct Qdisc_ops *ops;
struct qdisc_size_table __rcu *stab;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index f06aa01..1a0aa2a 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ int qdisc_set_default(const char *name)
}
/* We know handle. Find qdisc among all qdisc's attached to device
- (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.)
+ * (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.)
+ * Note: caller either uses rtnl or rcu_read_lock()
*/
static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_root(struct Qdisc *root, u32 handle)
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_root(struct Qdisc *root, u32 handle)
root->handle == handle)
return root;
- list_for_each_entry(q, &root->list, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &root->list, list) {
if (q->handle == handle)
return q;
}
@@ -277,15 +278,18 @@ void qdisc_list_add(struct Qdisc *q)
struct Qdisc *root = qdisc_dev(q)->qdisc;
WARN_ON_ONCE(root == &noop_qdisc);
- list_add_tail(&q->list, &root->list);
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&q->list, &root->list);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_add);
void qdisc_list_del(struct Qdisc *q)
{
- if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS))
- list_del(&q->list);
+ if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS)) {
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+ list_del_rcu(&q->list);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_del);
@@ -750,14 +754,18 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned int n)
if (n == 0)
return;
drops = max_t(int, n, 0);
+ rcu_read_lock();
while ((parentid = sch->parent)) {
if (TC_H_MAJ(parentid) == TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_INGRESS))
- return;
+ break;
+ if (sch->flags & TCQ_F_NOPARENT)
+ break;
+ /* TODO: perform the search on a per txq basis */
sch = qdisc_lookup(qdisc_dev(sch), TC_H_MAJ(parentid));
if (sch == NULL) {
- WARN_ON(parentid != TC_H_ROOT);
- return;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(parentid != TC_H_ROOT);
+ break;
}
cops = sch->ops->cl_ops;
if (cops->qlen_notify) {
@@ -768,6 +776,7 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned int n)
sch->q.qlen -= n;
__qdisc_qstats_drop(sch, drops);
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen);
@@ -941,7 +950,7 @@ qdisc_create(struct net_device *dev, struct netdev_queue *dev_queue,
}
lockdep_set_class(qdisc_lock(sch), &qdisc_tx_lock);
if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev))
- sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
sch->handle = handle;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
index 6efca30..b453270 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ static void attach_one_default_qdisc(struct net_device *dev,
return;
}
if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev))
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping = qdisc;
}
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mq.c b/net/sched/sch_mq.c
index f3cbaec..3e82f04 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_mq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mq.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int mq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
if (qdisc == NULL)
goto err;
priv->qdiscs[ntx] = qdisc;
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
sch->flags |= TCQ_F_MQROOT;
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int mq_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl, struct Qdisc *new,
*old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
if (new)
- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
dev_activate(dev);
return 0;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
index 3811a74..ad70ecf 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
goto err;
}
priv->qdiscs[i] = qdisc;
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
/* If the mqprio options indicate that hardware should own
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int mqprio_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl, struct Qdisc *new,
*old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
if (new)
- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
dev_activate(dev);
--
2.1.0
From 1be90963346785f5a081544af299f7a7e4de8a6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrej Ota <andrej@ota.si>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 00:14:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 37/37] via-rhine: fix VLAN receive handling regression.
[ Upstream commit 5f715c097965c0ad037f64393d0b95c50287775b ]
Because eth_type_trans() consumes ethernet header worth of bytes, a call
to read TCI from end of packet using rhine_rx_vlan_tag() no longer works
as it's reading from an invalid offset.
Tested to be working on PCEngines Alix board.
Fixes: 810f19bcb862 ("via-rhine: add consistent memory barrier in vlan receive code.")
Signed-off-by: Andrej Ota <andrej@ota.si>
Acked-by: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-rhine.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-rhine.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-rhine.c
index a832637..2b7550c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-rhine.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/via/via-rhine.c
@@ -2134,10 +2134,11 @@ static int rhine_rx(struct net_device *dev, int limit)
}
skb_put(skb, pkt_len);
- skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
rhine_rx_vlan_tag(skb, desc, data_size);
+ skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
+
netif_receive_skb(skb);
u64_stats_update_begin(&rp->rx_stats.syncp);
--
2.1.0
[-- Attachment #5: net_43.mbox --]
[-- Type: Application/Octet-Stream, Size: 143618 bytes --]
From 19900d0bd94181ffa4d2130b5d6afcc6aef805e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?fran=C3=A7ois=20romieu?= <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:35:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/43] r8169: fix kasan reported skb use-after-free.
[ Upstream commit 39174291d8e8acfd1113214a943263aaa03c57c8 ]
Signed-off-by: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Fixes: d7d2d89d4b0af ("r8169: Add software counter for multicast packages")
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
index b4f2123..79ef799 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
@@ -7429,15 +7429,15 @@ process_pkt:
rtl8169_rx_vlan_tag(desc, skb);
+ if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_MULTICAST)
+ dev->stats.multicast++;
+
napi_gro_receive(&tp->napi, skb);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tp->rx_stats.syncp);
tp->rx_stats.packets++;
tp->rx_stats.bytes += pkt_size;
u64_stats_update_end(&tp->rx_stats.syncp);
-
- if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_MULTICAST)
- dev->stats.multicast++;
}
release_descriptor:
desc->opts2 = 0;
--
2.1.0
From 16e46199ccdb834330ed801019d6b96077291d7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 16:23:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/43] af-unix: fix use-after-free with concurrent readers
while splicing
[ Upstream commit 73ed5d25dce0354ea381d6dc93005c3085fae03d ]
During splicing an af-unix socket to a pipe we have to drop all
af-unix socket locks. While doing so we allow another reader to enter
unix_stream_read_generic which can read, copy and finally free another
skb. If exactly this skb is just in process of being spliced we get a
use-after-free report by kasan.
First, we must make sure to not have a free while the skb is used during
the splice operation. We simply increment its use counter before unlocking
the reader lock.
Stream sockets have the nice characteristic that we don't care about
zero length writes and they never reach the peer socket's queue. That
said, we can take the UNIXCB.consumed field as the indicator if the
skb was already freed from the socket's receive queue. If the skb was
fully consumed after we locked the reader side again we know it has been
dropped by a second reader. We indicate a short read to user space and
abort the current splice operation.
This bug has been found with syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) by Dmitry Vyukov.
Fixes: 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream af_unix sockets")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 94f6582..a5afe41 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
unix_release_sock(skb->sk, 1);
/* passed fds are erased in the kfree_skb hook */
+ UNIXCB(skb).consumed = skb->len;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
@@ -2071,6 +2072,7 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state)
do {
int chunk;
+ bool drop_skb;
struct sk_buff *skb, *last;
unix_state_lock(sk);
@@ -2151,7 +2153,11 @@ unlock:
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, unix_skb_len(skb) - skip, size);
+ skb_get(skb);
chunk = state->recv_actor(skb, skip, chunk, state);
+ drop_skb = !unix_skb_len(skb);
+ /* skb is only safe to use if !drop_skb */
+ consume_skb(skb);
if (chunk < 0) {
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
@@ -2160,6 +2166,18 @@ unlock:
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
+ if (drop_skb) {
+ /* the skb was touched by a concurrent reader;
+ * we should not expect anything from this skb
+ * anymore and assume it invalid - we can be
+ * sure it was dropped from the socket queue
+ *
+ * let's report a short read
+ */
+ err = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
UNIXCB(skb).consumed += chunk;
--
2.1.0
From 75262dbd214a2a628aa333d51531b9e64fd7dc7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 16:25:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/43] af_unix: don't append consumed skbs to sk_receive_queue
[ Upstream commit 8844f97238ca6c1ca92a5d6c69f53efd361a266f ]
In case multiple writes to a unix stream socket race we could end up in a
situation where we pre-allocate a new skb for use in unix_stream_sendpage
but have to free it again in the locked section because another skb
has been appended meanwhile, which we must use. Accidentally we didn't
clear the pointer after consuming it and so we touched freed memory
while appending it to the sk_receive_queue. So, clear the pointer after
consuming the skb.
This bug has been found with syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) by Dmitry Vyukov.
Fixes: 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage support")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index a5afe41..3e2ca39 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1799,6 +1799,7 @@ alloc_skb:
* this - does no harm
*/
consume_skb(newskb);
+ newskb = NULL;
}
if (skb_append_pagefrags(skb, page, offset, size)) {
--
2.1.0
From faa83c6e01f8604c385c4e0ccc7ca1da591100a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2015 15:10:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/43] af_unix: take receive queue lock while appending new
skb
[ Upstream commit a3a116e04cc6a94d595ead4e956ab1bc1d2f4746 ]
While possibly in future we don't necessarily need to use
sk_buff_head.lock this is a rather larger change, as it affects the
af_unix fd garbage collector, diag and socket cleanups. This is too much
for a stable patch.
For the time being grab sk_buff_head.lock without disabling bh and irqs,
so don't use locked skb_queue_tail.
Fixes: 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage support")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3e2ca39..42ab2cc 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1812,8 +1812,11 @@ alloc_skb:
skb->truesize += size;
atomic_add(size, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
- if (newskb)
+ if (newskb) {
+ spin_lock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
__skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, newskb);
+ spin_unlock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+ }
unix_state_unlock(other);
mutex_unlock(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
--
2.1.0
From a46b9d2bac864f3ef6b21eb96864ddd88794222d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 22:07:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 05/43] unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
[ Upstream commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c ]
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index b36d837..2a91a05 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0
#define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1
struct socket_wq peer_wq;
+ wait_queue_t peer_wake;
};
static inline struct unix_sock *unix_sk(const struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 42ab2cc..153b2f2 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -326,6 +326,118 @@ found:
return s;
}
+/* Support code for asymmetrically connected dgram sockets
+ *
+ * If a datagram socket is connected to a socket not itself connected
+ * to the first socket (eg, /dev/log), clients may only enqueue more
+ * messages if the present receive queue of the server socket is not
+ * "too large". This means there's a second writeability condition
+ * poll and sendmsg need to test. The dgram recv code will do a wake
+ * up on the peer_wait wait queue of a socket upon reception of a
+ * datagram which needs to be propagated to sleeping would-be writers
+ * since these might not have sent anything so far. This can't be
+ * accomplished via poll_wait because the lifetime of the server
+ * socket might be less than that of its clients if these break their
+ * association with it or if the server socket is closed while clients
+ * are still connected to it and there's no way to inform "a polling
+ * implementation" that it should let go of a certain wait queue
+ *
+ * In order to propagate a wake up, a wait_queue_t of the client
+ * socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server socket
+ * whose wake function does a wake_up on the ordinary client socket
+ * wait queue. This connection is established whenever a write (or
+ * poll for write) hit the flow control condition and broken when the
+ * association to the server socket is dissolved or after a wake up
+ * was relayed.
+ */
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay(wait_queue_t *q, unsigned mode, int flags,
+ void *key)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ wait_queue_head_t *u_sleep;
+
+ u = container_of(q, struct unix_sock, peer_wake);
+
+ __remove_wait_queue(&unix_sk(u->peer_wake.private)->peer_wait,
+ q);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+
+ /* relaying can only happen while the wq still exists */
+ u_sleep = sk_sleep(&u->sk);
+ if (u_sleep)
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(u_sleep, key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+ int rc;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ rc = 0;
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (!u->peer_wake.private) {
+ u->peer_wake.private = other;
+ __add_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+
+ rc = 1;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (u->peer_wake.private == other) {
+ __remove_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
+ POLLOUT |
+ POLLWRNORM |
+ POLLWRBAND);
+}
+
+/* preconditions:
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == other
+ * - association is stable
+ */
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ int connected;
+
+ connected = unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(sk, other);
+
+ if (unix_recvq_full(other))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (connected)
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk)
{
return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf;
@@ -430,6 +542,8 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
skpair->sk_state_change(skpair);
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
+
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, skpair);
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
@@ -665,6 +779,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
+ init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
@@ -1032,6 +1147,8 @@ restart:
if (unix_peer(sk)) {
struct sock *old_peer = unix_peer(sk);
unix_peer(sk) = other;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, old_peer);
+
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
if (other != old_peer)
@@ -1471,6 +1588,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
+ int sk_locked;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, false);
@@ -1549,12 +1667,14 @@ restart:
goto out_free;
}
+ sk_locked = 0;
unix_state_lock(other);
+restart_locked:
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
- if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
+ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD))) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
@@ -1562,10 +1682,14 @@ restart:
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
+ if (!sk_locked)
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
err = 0;
- unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, other);
+
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
@@ -1591,21 +1715,38 @@ restart:
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
- if (!timeo) {
- err = -EAGAIN;
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ if (timeo) {
+ timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+
+ err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ goto out_free;
+
+ goto restart;
}
- timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+ unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
+ }
- err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
- if (signal_pending(current))
- goto out_free;
+ if (unix_peer(sk) != other ||
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
- goto restart;
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto restart_locked;
+ }
}
+ if (unlikely(sk_locked))
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
+
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
@@ -1619,6 +1760,8 @@ restart:
return len;
out_unlock:
+ if (sk_locked)
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -2475,14 +2618,16 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
return mask;
writable = unix_writable(sk);
- other = unix_peer_get(sk);
- if (other) {
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
- sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
- if (unix_recvq_full(other))
- writable = 0;
- }
- sock_put(other);
+ if (writable) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
+ other = unix_peer(sk);
+ if (other && unix_peer(other) != sk &&
+ unix_recvq_full(other) &&
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other))
+ writable = 0;
+
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
if (writable)
--
2.1.0
From 8a029a6b8df3a955bd24253ce77cfc93834ce71f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 12:08:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/43] af-unix: passcred support for sendpage
[ Upstream commit 9490f886b192964796285907d777ff00fba1fa0f ]
sendpage did not care about credentials at all. This could lead to
situations in which because of fd passing between processes we could
append data to skbs with different scm data. It is illegal to splice those
skbs together. Instead we have to allocate a new skb and if requested
fill out the scm details.
Fixes: 869e7c62486ec ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage support")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 153b2f2..128b098 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1550,6 +1550,14 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
return err;
}
+static bool unix_passcred_enabled(const struct socket *sock,
+ const struct sock *other)
+{
+ return test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
+ !other->sk_socket ||
+ test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags);
+}
+
/*
* Some apps rely on write() giving SCM_CREDENTIALS
* We include credentials if source or destination socket
@@ -1560,14 +1568,41 @@ static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
{
if (UNIXCB(skb).pid)
return;
- if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
- !other->sk_socket ||
- test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
+ if (unix_passcred_enabled(sock, other)) {
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid);
}
}
+static int maybe_init_creds(struct scm_cookie *scm,
+ struct socket *socket,
+ const struct sock *other)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct msghdr msg = { .msg_controllen = 0 };
+
+ err = scm_send(socket, &msg, scm, false);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (unix_passcred_enabled(socket, other)) {
+ scm->pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+ current_uid_gid(&scm->creds.uid, &scm->creds.gid);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static bool unix_skb_scm_eq(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+ const struct unix_skb_parms *u = &UNIXCB(skb);
+
+ return u->pid == scm->pid &&
+ uid_eq(u->uid, scm->creds.uid) &&
+ gid_eq(u->gid, scm->creds.gid) &&
+ unix_secdata_eq(scm, skb);
+}
+
/*
* Send AF_UNIX data.
*/
@@ -1883,8 +1918,10 @@ out_err:
static ssize_t unix_stream_sendpage(struct socket *socket, struct page *page,
int offset, size_t size, int flags)
{
- int err = 0;
- bool send_sigpipe = true;
+ int err;
+ bool send_sigpipe = false;
+ bool init_scm = true;
+ struct scm_cookie scm;
struct sock *other, *sk = socket->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb, *newskb = NULL, *tail = NULL;
@@ -1902,7 +1939,7 @@ alloc_skb:
newskb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, 0, 0, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
&err, 0);
if (!newskb)
- return err;
+ goto err;
}
/* we must acquire readlock as we modify already present
@@ -1911,12 +1948,12 @@ alloc_skb:
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
if (err) {
err = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT ? -EAGAIN : -ERESTARTSYS;
- send_sigpipe = false;
goto err;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
err = -EPIPE;
+ send_sigpipe = true;
goto err_unlock;
}
@@ -1925,17 +1962,27 @@ alloc_skb:
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) ||
other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
err = -EPIPE;
+ send_sigpipe = true;
goto err_state_unlock;
}
+ if (init_scm) {
+ err = maybe_init_creds(&scm, socket, other);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_state_unlock;
+ init_scm = false;
+ }
+
skb = skb_peek_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue);
if (tail && tail == skb) {
skb = newskb;
- } else if (!skb) {
- if (newskb)
+ } else if (!skb || !unix_skb_scm_eq(skb, &scm)) {
+ if (newskb) {
skb = newskb;
- else
+ } else {
+ tail = skb;
goto alloc_skb;
+ }
} else if (newskb) {
/* this is fast path, we don't necessarily need to
* call to kfree_skb even though with newskb == NULL
@@ -1956,6 +2003,9 @@ alloc_skb:
atomic_add(size, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
if (newskb) {
+ err = unix_scm_to_skb(&scm, skb, false);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_state_unlock;
spin_lock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
__skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, newskb);
spin_unlock(&other->sk_receive_queue.lock);
@@ -1965,7 +2015,7 @@ alloc_skb:
mutex_unlock(&unix_sk(other)->readlock);
other->sk_data_ready(other);
-
+ scm_destroy(&scm);
return size;
err_state_unlock:
@@ -1976,6 +2026,8 @@ err:
kfree_skb(newskb);
if (send_sigpipe && !(flags & MSG_NOSIGNAL))
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
+ if (!init_scm)
+ scm_destroy(&scm);
return err;
}
@@ -2279,10 +2331,7 @@ unlock:
if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */
- if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != scm.pid) ||
- !uid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).uid, scm.creds.uid) ||
- !gid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).gid, scm.creds.gid) ||
- !unix_secdata_eq(&scm, skb))
+ if (!unix_skb_scm_eq(skb, &scm))
break;
} else if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
/* Copy credentials */
--
2.1.0
From 6f61ebb821b04690a54ae998160cb758dbaa7f9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 11:51:06 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 07/43] ipv6: Avoid creating RTF_CACHE from a rt that is not
managed by fib6 tree
[ Upstream commit 0d3f6d297bfb7af24d0508460fdb3d1ec4903fa3 ]
The original bug report:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1272571
The setup has a IPv4 GRE tunnel running in a IPSec. The bug
happens when ndisc starts sending router solicitation at the gre
interface. The simplified oops stack is like:
__lock_acquire+0x1b2/0x1c30
lock_acquire+0xb9/0x140
_raw_write_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50
__ip6_ins_rt+0x2e/0x60
ip6_ins_rt+0x49/0x50
~~~~~~~~
__ip6_rt_update_pmtu.part.54+0x145/0x250
ip6_rt_update_pmtu+0x2e/0x40
~~~~~~~~
ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1f1/0xf40
__gre_xmit+0x7a/0x90
ipgre_xmit+0x15a/0x220
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2bd/0x480
__dev_queue_xmit+0x696/0x730
dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
neigh_direct_output+0x11/0x20
ip6_finish_output2+0x21f/0x770
ip6_finish_output+0xa7/0x1d0
ip6_output+0x56/0x190
~~~~~~~~
ndisc_send_skb+0x1d9/0x400
ndisc_send_rs+0x88/0xc0
~~~~~~~~
The rt passed to ip6_rt_update_pmtu() is created by
icmp6_dst_alloc() and it is not managed by the fib6 tree,
so its rt6i_table == NULL. When __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() creates
a RTF_CACHE clone, the newly created clone also has rt6i_table == NULL
and it causes the ip6_ins_rt() oops.
During pmtu update, we only want to create a RTF_CACHE clone
from a rt which is currently managed (or owned) by the
fib6 tree. It means either rt->rt6i_node != NULL or
rt is a RTF_PCPU clone.
It is worth to note that rt6i_table may not be NULL even it is
not (yet) managed by the fib6 tree (e.g. addrconf_dst_alloc()).
Hence, rt6i_node is a better check instead of rt6i_table.
Fixes: 45e4fd26683c ("ipv6: Only create RTF_CACHE routes after encountering pmtu")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reported-by: Chris Siebenmann <cks-rhbugzilla@cs.toronto.edu>
Cc: Chris Siebenmann <cks-rhbugzilla@cs.toronto.edu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/route.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index 946880a..711ec7a 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1340,6 +1340,12 @@ static void rt6_do_update_pmtu(struct rt6_info *rt, u32 mtu)
rt6_update_expires(rt, net->ipv6.sysctl.ip6_rt_mtu_expires);
}
+static bool rt6_cache_allowed_for_pmtu(const struct rt6_info *rt)
+{
+ return !(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) &&
+ (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || rt->rt6i_node);
+}
+
static void __ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, const struct sock *sk,
const struct ipv6hdr *iph, u32 mtu)
{
@@ -1353,7 +1359,7 @@ static void __ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, const struct sock *sk,
if (mtu >= dst_mtu(dst))
return;
- if (rt6->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) {
+ if (!rt6_cache_allowed_for_pmtu(rt6)) {
rt6_do_update_pmtu(rt6, mtu);
} else {
const struct in6_addr *daddr, *saddr;
--
2.1.0
From 36e5325023d53e603ce46bfcd55587f164850102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 11:51:07 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 08/43] ipv6: Check expire on DST_NOCACHE route
[ Upstream commit 5973fb1e245086071bf71994c8b54d99526ded03 ]
Since the expires of the DST_NOCACHE rt can be set during
the ip6_rt_update_pmtu(), we also need to consider the expires
value when doing ip6_dst_check().
This patches creates __rt6_check_expired() to only
check the expire value (if one exists) of the current rt.
In rt6_dst_from_check(), it adds __rt6_check_expired() as
one of the condition check.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/route.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index 711ec7a..ea892c1 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -403,6 +403,14 @@ static void ip6_dst_ifdown(struct dst_entry *dst, struct net_device *dev,
}
}
+static bool __rt6_check_expired(const struct rt6_info *rt)
+{
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES)
+ return time_after(jiffies, rt->dst.expires);
+ else
+ return false;
+}
+
static bool rt6_check_expired(const struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES) {
@@ -1270,7 +1278,8 @@ static struct dst_entry *rt6_check(struct rt6_info *rt, u32 cookie)
static struct dst_entry *rt6_dst_from_check(struct rt6_info *rt, u32 cookie)
{
- if (rt->dst.obsolete == DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK &&
+ if (!__rt6_check_expired(rt) &&
+ rt->dst.obsolete == DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK &&
rt6_check((struct rt6_info *)(rt->dst.from), cookie))
return &rt->dst;
else
--
2.1.0
From 037104a8ac4a3509ee800cfa124897600c9483e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 11:51:08 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 09/43] ipv6: Check rt->dst.from for the DST_NOCACHE route
[ Upstrem commit 02bcf4e082e4dc634409a6a6cb7def8806d6e5e6 ]
All DST_NOCACHE rt6_info used to have rt->dst.from set to
its parent.
After commit 8e3d5be73681 ("ipv6: Avoid double dst_free"),
DST_NOCACHE is also set to rt6_info which does not have
a parent (i.e. rt->dst.from is NULL).
This patch catches the rt->dst.from == NULL case.
Fixes: 8e3d5be73681 ("ipv6: Avoid double dst_free")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_fib.h | 3 ++-
net/ipv6/route.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_fib.h b/include/net/ip6_fib.h
index aaf9700..fb961a5 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_fib.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_fib.h
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ static inline void rt6_update_expires(struct rt6_info *rt0, int timeout)
static inline u32 rt6_get_cookie(const struct rt6_info *rt)
{
- if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || unlikely(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOCACHE))
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU ||
+ (unlikely(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOCACHE) && rt->dst.from))
rt = (struct rt6_info *)(rt->dst.from);
return rt->rt6i_node ? rt->rt6i_node->fn_sernum : 0;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index ea892c1..d377326 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1299,7 +1299,8 @@ static struct dst_entry *ip6_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie)
rt6_dst_from_metrics_check(rt);
- if ((rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU) || unlikely(dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE))
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU ||
+ (unlikely(dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE) && rt->dst.from))
return rt6_dst_from_check(rt, cookie);
else
return rt6_check(rt, cookie);
--
2.1.0
From bbecfdcd08494929d0cde9176346d51007fb77ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2015 18:17:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/43] Revert "ipv6: ndisc: inherit metadata dst when creating
ndisc requests"
[ Upstream commit 304d888b29cf96f1dd53511ee686499cd8cdf249 ]
This reverts commit ab450605b35caa768ca33e86db9403229bf42be4.
In IPv6, we cannot inherit the dst of the original dst. ndisc packets
are IPv6 packets and may take another route than the original packet.
This patch breaks the following scenario: a packet comes from eth0 and
is forwarded through vxlan1. The encapsulated packet triggers an NS
which cannot be sent because of the wrong route.
CC: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
CC: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ndisc.h | 3 +--
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 10 +++-------
net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ndisc.h b/include/net/ndisc.h
index aba5695..b3a7751 100644
--- a/include/net/ndisc.h
+++ b/include/net/ndisc.h
@@ -182,8 +182,7 @@ int ndisc_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb);
void ndisc_send_ns(struct net_device *dev, struct neighbour *neigh,
const struct in6_addr *solicit,
- const struct in6_addr *daddr, const struct in6_addr *saddr,
- struct sk_buff *oskb);
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr, const struct in6_addr *saddr);
void ndisc_send_rs(struct net_device *dev,
const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index dd00828..3939dd2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -3628,7 +3628,7 @@ static void addrconf_dad_work(struct work_struct *w)
/* send a neighbour solicitation for our addr */
addrconf_addr_solict_mult(&ifp->addr, &mcaddr);
- ndisc_send_ns(ifp->idev->dev, NULL, &ifp->addr, &mcaddr, &in6addr_any, NULL);
+ ndisc_send_ns(ifp->idev->dev, NULL, &ifp->addr, &mcaddr, &in6addr_any);
out:
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
rtnl_unlock();
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
index 64a7135..9ad46cd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
@@ -553,8 +553,7 @@ static void ndisc_send_unsol_na(struct net_device *dev)
void ndisc_send_ns(struct net_device *dev, struct neighbour *neigh,
const struct in6_addr *solicit,
- const struct in6_addr *daddr, const struct in6_addr *saddr,
- struct sk_buff *oskb)
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr, const struct in6_addr *saddr)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct in6_addr addr_buf;
@@ -590,9 +589,6 @@ void ndisc_send_ns(struct net_device *dev, struct neighbour *neigh,
ndisc_fill_addr_option(skb, ND_OPT_SOURCE_LL_ADDR,
dev->dev_addr);
- if (!(dev->priv_flags & IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE) && oskb)
- skb_dst_copy(skb, oskb);
-
ndisc_send_skb(skb, daddr, saddr);
}
@@ -679,12 +675,12 @@ static void ndisc_solicit(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb)
"%s: trying to ucast probe in NUD_INVALID: %pI6\n",
__func__, target);
}
- ndisc_send_ns(dev, neigh, target, target, saddr, skb);
+ ndisc_send_ns(dev, neigh, target, target, saddr);
} else if ((probes -= NEIGH_VAR(neigh->parms, APP_PROBES)) < 0) {
neigh_app_ns(neigh);
} else {
addrconf_addr_solict_mult(target, &mcaddr);
- ndisc_send_ns(dev, NULL, target, &mcaddr, saddr, skb);
+ ndisc_send_ns(dev, NULL, target, &mcaddr, saddr);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index d377326..fd0e674 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static void rt6_probe_deferred(struct work_struct *w)
container_of(w, struct __rt6_probe_work, work);
addrconf_addr_solict_mult(&work->target, &mcaddr);
- ndisc_send_ns(work->dev, NULL, &work->target, &mcaddr, NULL, NULL);
+ ndisc_send_ns(work->dev, NULL, &work->target, &mcaddr, NULL);
dev_put(work->dev);
kfree(work);
}
--
2.1.0
From 3855e07a82c0180d9110ac03d84405f9ecc79866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 14:24:27 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 11/43] tools/net: Use include/uapi with __EXPORTED_HEADERS__
[ Upstream commit d7475de58575c904818efa369c82e88c6648ce2e ]
Use the local uapi headers to keep in sync with "recently" added #define's
(e.g. SKF_AD_VLAN_TPID). Refactored CFLAGS, and bpf_asm doesn't need -I.
Fixes: 3f356385e8a4 ("filter: bpf_asm: add minimal bpf asm tool")
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
tools/net/Makefile | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/net/Makefile b/tools/net/Makefile
index ee577ea..ddf8880 100644
--- a/tools/net/Makefile
+++ b/tools/net/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ CC = gcc
LEX = flex
YACC = bison
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2
+CFLAGS += -D__EXPORTED_HEADERS__ -I../../include/uapi -I../../include
+
%.yacc.c: %.y
$(YACC) -o $@ -d $<
@@ -12,15 +15,13 @@ YACC = bison
all : bpf_jit_disasm bpf_dbg bpf_asm
-bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
+bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS += -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm'
bpf_jit_disasm : LDLIBS = -lopcodes -lbfd -ldl
bpf_jit_disasm : bpf_jit_disasm.o
-bpf_dbg : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2
bpf_dbg : LDLIBS = -lreadline
bpf_dbg : bpf_dbg.o
-bpf_asm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -I.
bpf_asm : LDLIBS =
bpf_asm : bpf_asm.o bpf_exp.yacc.o bpf_exp.lex.o
bpf_exp.lex.o : bpf_exp.yacc.c
--
2.1.0
From 00e7c45712e9d826a2908cdfb4d15581f825e47d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/43] packet: do skb_probe_transport_header when we actually
have data
[ Upstream commit efdfa2f7848f64517008136fb41f53c4a1faf93a ]
In tpacket_fill_skb() commit c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport
header before doing xmit") and later on 40893fd0fd4e ("net: switch
to use skb_probe_transport_header()") was probing for a transport
header on the skb from a ring buffer slot, but at a time, where
the skb has _not even_ been filled with data yet. So that call into
the flow dissector is pretty useless. Lets do it after we've set
up the skb frags.
Fixes: c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 27b2898..be038c9 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2368,8 +2368,6 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) {
int off_min, off_max, off;
off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
@@ -2449,6 +2447,9 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
+ if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+
return tp_len;
}
--
2.1.0
From 995afa88f27c706e0daf329f6fb07398414f2334 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/43] packet: always probe for transport header
[ Upstream commit 8fd6c80d9dd938ca338c70698533a7e304752846 ]
We concluded that the skb_probe_transport_header() should better be
called unconditionally. Avoiding the call into the flow dissector has
also not really much to do with the direct xmit mode.
While it seems that only virtio_net code makes use of GSO from non
RX/TX ring packet socket paths, we should probe for a transport header
nevertheless before they hit devices.
Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/386173/
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index be038c9..3059f51 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2447,8 +2447,7 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write);
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
return tp_len;
}
@@ -2800,8 +2799,8 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
len += vnet_hdr_len;
}
- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po))
- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
+
if (unlikely(extra_len == 4))
skb->no_fcs = 1;
--
2.1.0
From 85df0fab1bfabd5a88b9d53a09d34df51672282a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 14/43] packet: only allow extra vlan len on ethernet devices
[ Upstream commit 3c70c132488794e2489ab045559b0ce0afcf17de ]
Packet sockets can be used by various net devices and are not
really restricted to ARPHRD_ETHER device types. However, when
currently checking for the extra 4 bytes that can be transmitted
in VLAN case, our assumption is that we generally probe on
ARPHRD_ETHER devices. Therefore, before looking into Ethernet
header, check the device type first.
This also fixes the issue where non-ARPHRD_ETHER devices could
have no dev->hard_header_len in TX_RING SOCK_RAW case, and thus
the check would test unfilled linear part of the skb (instead
of non-linear).
Fixes: 57f89bfa2140 ("network: Allow af_packet to transmit +4 bytes for VLAN packets.")
Fixes: 52f1454f629f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 3059f51..6e3cd2f 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1741,6 +1741,20 @@ static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
+static bool packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, double-check
+ * this now that we have the actual packet in hand. We can only
+ * do this check on Ethernet devices.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER))
+ return false;
+
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ return likely(eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto == htons(ETH_P_8021Q));
+}
+
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops;
static const struct proto_ops packet_ops_spkt;
@@ -1902,18 +1916,10 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
- if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_unlock;
- }
+ if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
@@ -2525,18 +2531,10 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len) {
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
+ tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q))
- tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
- }
if (unlikely(tp_len < 0)) {
if (po->tp_loss) {
__packet_set_status(po, ph,
@@ -2757,18 +2755,10 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
- if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len)) {
- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt,
- * double-check this now that we have the actual
- * packet in hand.
- */
- struct ethhdr *ehdr;
- skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb);
- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
- err = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) &&
+ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out_free;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
--
2.1.0
From 3862137bdee867b99ade815a3c4d966ab223ac6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 15/43] packet: infer protocol from ethernet header if unset
[ Upstream commit c72219b75fde768efccf7666342282fab7f9e4e7 ]
In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet
socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then
skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol
passed via socket(2)/bind(2).
Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the
socket as socket(PF_PACKET, <mode>, 0) and do a bind(2) on the
TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook()
is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves
cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway.
That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore
the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric
reported that this leads to problems when using tools like
trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function
could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on
skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all
the traffic is then directed to a single slave.
Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header
when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only
done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len
length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to
cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after
the skb_store_bits().
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 6e3cd2f..45d4196 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2338,6 +2338,15 @@ static bool ll_header_truncated(const struct net_device *dev, int len)
return false;
}
+static void tpacket_set_protocol(const struct net_device *dev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER) {
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+ skb->protocol = eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto;
+ }
+}
+
static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
void *frame, struct net_device *dev, int size_max,
__be16 proto, unsigned char *addr, int hlen)
@@ -2419,6 +2428,8 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
dev->hard_header_len);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
+ if (!skb->protocol)
+ tpacket_set_protocol(dev, skb);
data += dev->hard_header_len;
to_write -= dev->hard_header_len;
--
2.1.0
From c5cde0ccf91927c87fd06b86d39d580a9244fb57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/43] packet: fix tpacket_snd max frame len
[ Upstream commit 5cfb4c8d05b4409c4044cb9c05b19705c1d9818b ]
Since it's introduction in commit 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and
packet mmap"), TX_RING could be used from SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_RAW
side. When used with SOCK_DGRAM only, the size_max > dev->mtu +
reserve check should have reserve as 0, but currently, this is
unconditionally set (in it's original form as dev->hard_header_len).
I think this is not correct since tpacket_fill_skb() would then
take dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len into account for SOCK_DGRAM,
the extra VLAN_HLEN could be possible in both cases. Presumably, the
reserve code was copied from packet_snd(), but later on missed the
check. Make it similar as we have it in packet_snd().
Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 45d4196..4695a36 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2510,12 +2510,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
if (unlikely(!(dev->flags & IFF_UP)))
goto out_put;
- reserve = dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN;
+ if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW)
+ reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
size_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size
- (po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll));
- if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve)
- size_max = dev->mtu + reserve;
+ if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN)
+ size_max = dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN;
do {
ph = packet_current_frame(po, &po->tx_ring,
@@ -2542,7 +2543,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto,
addr, hlen);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len &&
+ tp_len > dev->mtu + reserve &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.1.0
From 93d8395a99eefdd3b470cf9c04e947c6cb8bb85a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lucien <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 13:07:07 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 17/43] sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid
[ Upstream commit ed5a377d87dc4c87fb3e1f7f698cba38cd893103 ]
now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which
is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix
it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs.
even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still
can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs():
if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 4f15b7d..1543e39 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -809,8 +809,8 @@ int sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (!has_sha1)
return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids, &hmacs->shmac_idents[0],
- hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
+ for (i = 0; i < hmacs->shmac_num_idents; i++)
+ ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids[i] = htons(hmacs->shmac_idents[i]);
ep->auth_hmacs_list->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) +
hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16));
return 0;
--
2.1.0
From d53e3dbdedfaa2e1e0fd8b37a5e34b0df8a295c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 19:35:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 18/43] net/mlx5e: Added self loopback prevention
[ Upstream commit 66189961e986e53ae39822898fc2ce88f44c61bb ]
Prevent outgoing multicast frames from looping back to the RX queue.
By introducing new HW capability self_lb_en_modifiable, which indicates
the support to modify self_lb_en bit in modify_tir command.
When this capability is set we can prevent TIRs from sending back
loopback multicast traffic to their own RQs, by "refreshing TIRs" with
modify_tir command, on every time new channels (SQs/RQs) are created at
device open.
This is needed since TIRs are static and only allocated once on driver
load, and the loopback decision is under their responsibility.
Fixes issues of the kind:
"IPv6: eth2: IPv6 duplicate address fe80::e61d:2dff:fe5c:f2e9 detected!"
The issue is seen since the IPv6 solicitations multicast messages are
loopedback and the network stack thinks they are coming from another host.
Fixes: 5c50368f3831 ("net/mlx5e: Light-weight netdev open/stop")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h | 24 ++++++----
2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
index 59874d6..443632d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
@@ -1332,6 +1332,42 @@ static int mlx5e_modify_tir_lro(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, int tt)
return err;
}
+static int mlx5e_refresh_tir_self_loopback_enable(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev,
+ u32 tirn)
+{
+ void *in;
+ int inlen;
+ int err;
+
+ inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(modify_tir_in);
+ in = mlx5_vzalloc(inlen);
+ if (!in)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ MLX5_SET(modify_tir_in, in, bitmask.self_lb_en, 1);
+
+ err = mlx5_core_modify_tir(mdev, tirn, in, inlen);
+
+ kvfree(in);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int mlx5e_refresh_tirs_self_loopback_enable(struct mlx5e_priv *priv)
+{
+ int err;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MLX5E_NUM_TT; i++) {
+ err = mlx5e_refresh_tir_self_loopback_enable(priv->mdev,
+ priv->tirn[i]);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int mlx5e_set_dev_port_mtu(struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
@@ -1367,13 +1403,20 @@ int mlx5e_open_locked(struct net_device *netdev)
err = mlx5e_set_dev_port_mtu(netdev);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto err_clear_state_opened_flag;
err = mlx5e_open_channels(priv);
if (err) {
netdev_err(netdev, "%s: mlx5e_open_channels failed, %d\n",
__func__, err);
- return err;
+ goto err_clear_state_opened_flag;
+ }
+
+ err = mlx5e_refresh_tirs_self_loopback_enable(priv);
+ if (err) {
+ netdev_err(netdev, "%s: mlx5e_refresh_tirs_self_loopback_enable failed, %d\n",
+ __func__, err);
+ goto err_close_channels;
}
mlx5e_update_carrier(priv);
@@ -1382,6 +1425,12 @@ int mlx5e_open_locked(struct net_device *netdev)
schedule_delayed_work(&priv->update_stats_work, 0);
return 0;
+
+err_close_channels:
+ mlx5e_close_channels(priv);
+err_clear_state_opened_flag:
+ clear_bit(MLX5E_STATE_OPENED, &priv->state);
+ return err;
}
static int mlx5e_open(struct net_device *netdev)
@@ -1899,6 +1948,9 @@ static int mlx5e_check_required_hca_cap(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev)
"Not creating net device, some required device capabilities are missing\n");
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
+ if (!MLX5_CAP_ETH(mdev, self_lb_en_modifiable))
+ mlx5_core_warn(mdev, "Self loop back prevention is not supported\n");
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h b/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h
index dd20974..1565324 100644
--- a/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h
+++ b/include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h
@@ -453,26 +453,28 @@ struct mlx5_ifc_per_protocol_networking_offload_caps_bits {
u8 lro_cap[0x1];
u8 lro_psh_flag[0x1];
u8 lro_time_stamp[0x1];
- u8 reserved_0[0x6];
+ u8 reserved_0[0x3];
+ u8 self_lb_en_modifiable[0x1];
+ u8 reserved_1[0x2];
u8 max_lso_cap[0x5];
- u8 reserved_1[0x4];
+ u8 reserved_2[0x4];
u8 rss_ind_tbl_cap[0x4];
- u8 reserved_2[0x3];
+ u8 reserved_3[0x3];
u8 tunnel_lso_const_out_ip_id[0x1];
- u8 reserved_3[0x2];
+ u8 reserved_4[0x2];
u8 tunnel_statless_gre[0x1];
u8 tunnel_stateless_vxlan[0x1];
- u8 reserved_4[0x20];
+ u8 reserved_5[0x20];
- u8 reserved_5[0x10];
+ u8 reserved_6[0x10];
u8 lro_min_mss_size[0x10];
- u8 reserved_6[0x120];
+ u8 reserved_7[0x120];
u8 lro_timer_supported_periods[4][0x20];
- u8 reserved_7[0x600];
+ u8 reserved_8[0x600];
};
struct mlx5_ifc_roce_cap_bits {
@@ -4051,9 +4053,11 @@ struct mlx5_ifc_modify_tis_in_bits {
};
struct mlx5_ifc_modify_tir_bitmask_bits {
- u8 reserved[0x20];
+ u8 reserved_0[0x20];
- u8 reserved1[0x1f];
+ u8 reserved_1[0x1b];
+ u8 self_lb_en[0x1];
+ u8 reserved_2[0x3];
u8 lro[0x1];
};
--
2.1.0
From 752f833f18bc5af0d0f5172cbeb554cf9b836311 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 19:35:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 19/43] net/mlx4_core: Fix sleeping while holding spinlock at
rem_slave_counters
[ Upstream commit f5adbfee72282bb1f456d52b04adacd4fe6ac502 ]
When cleaning slave's counter resources, we hold a spinlock that
protects the slave's counters list. As part of the clean, we call
__mlx4_clear_if_stat which calls mlx4_alloc_cmd_mailbox which is a
sleepable function.
In order to fix this issue, hold the spinlock, and copy all counter
indices into a temporary array, and release the spinlock. Afterwards,
iterate over this array and free every counter. Repeat this scenario
until the original list is empty (a new counter might have been added
while releasing the counters from the temporary array).
Fixes: b72ca7e96acf ("net/mlx4_core: Reset counters data when freed")
Reported-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Eran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c
index 731423c..8bead97 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c
@@ -4934,26 +4934,41 @@ static void rem_slave_counters(struct mlx4_dev *dev, int slave)
struct res_counter *counter;
struct res_counter *tmp;
int err;
- int index;
+ int *counters_arr = NULL;
+ int i, j;
err = move_all_busy(dev, slave, RES_COUNTER);
if (err)
mlx4_warn(dev, "rem_slave_counters: Could not move all counters - too busy for slave %d\n",
slave);
- spin_lock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
- list_for_each_entry_safe(counter, tmp, counter_list, com.list) {
- if (counter->com.owner == slave) {
- index = counter->com.res_id;
- rb_erase(&counter->com.node,
- &tracker->res_tree[RES_COUNTER]);
- list_del(&counter->com.list);
- kfree(counter);
- __mlx4_counter_free(dev, index);
+ counters_arr = kmalloc_array(dev->caps.max_counters,
+ sizeof(*counters_arr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!counters_arr)
+ return;
+
+ do {
+ i = 0;
+ j = 0;
+ spin_lock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(counter, tmp, counter_list, com.list) {
+ if (counter->com.owner == slave) {
+ counters_arr[i++] = counter->com.res_id;
+ rb_erase(&counter->com.node,
+ &tracker->res_tree[RES_COUNTER]);
+ list_del(&counter->com.list);
+ kfree(counter);
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
+
+ while (j < i) {
+ __mlx4_counter_free(dev, counters_arr[j++]);
mlx4_release_resource(dev, slave, RES_COUNTER, 1, 0);
}
- }
- spin_unlock_irq(mlx4_tlock(dev));
+ } while (i);
+
+ kfree(counters_arr);
}
static void rem_slave_xrcdns(struct mlx4_dev *dev, int slave)
--
2.1.0
From 30de3861d01de70551c41529a9933cc2d3221c7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 17:35:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 20/43] ip_tunnel: disable preemption when updating per-cpu
tstats
[ Upstream commit b4fe85f9c9146f60457e9512fb6055e69e6a7a65 ]
Drivers like vxlan use the recently introduced
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb/udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb APIs. udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb
makes use of ip6tunnel_xmit, and ip6tunnel_xmit, after sending the
packet, updates the struct stats using the usual
u64_stats_update_begin/end calls on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb makes use of iptunnel_xmit, which doesn't touch
tstats, so drivers like vxlan, immediately after, call
iptunnel_xmit_stats, which does the same thing - calls
u64_stats_update_begin/end on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats).
While vxlan is probably fine (I don't know?), calling a similar function
from, say, an unbound workqueue, on a fully preemptable kernel causes
real issues:
[ 188.434537] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u8:0/6
[ 188.435579] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 188.435583] CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 4.2.6 #2
[ 188.435607] Call Trace:
[ 188.435611] [<ffffffff8234e936>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
[ 188.435615] [<ffffffff81915f3d>] check_preemption_disabled+0x19d/0x1c0
[ 188.435619] [<ffffffff81915f77>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
The solution would be to protect the whole
this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats)/u64_stats_update_begin/end blocks with
disabling preemption and then reenabling it.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_tunnel.h | 3 ++-
include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
index fa915fa..d49a8f8 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h
@@ -90,11 +90,12 @@ static inline void ip6tunnel_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
err = ip6_local_out_sk(sk, skb);
if (net_xmit_eval(err) == 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += pkt_len;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else {
stats->tx_errors++;
stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
diff --git a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
index f6dafec..62a750a 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
@@ -287,12 +287,13 @@ static inline void iptunnel_xmit_stats(int err,
struct pcpu_sw_netstats __percpu *stats)
{
if (err > 0) {
- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(stats);
+ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(stats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp);
tstats->tx_bytes += err;
tstats->tx_packets++;
u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp);
+ put_cpu_ptr(tstats);
} else if (err < 0) {
err_stats->tx_errors++;
err_stats->tx_aborted_errors++;
--
2.1.0
From b532a633740a46806a53d618634ff1169c5e9a4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dragos Tatulea <dragos@endocode.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 10:52:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 21/43] net: switchdev: fix return code of fdb_dump stub
[ Upstream commit 24cb7055a3066634a0f3fa0cd6a4780652905d35 ]
rtnl_fdb_dump always expects an index to be returned by the ndo_fdb_dump op,
but when CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV is off, it returns an error.
Fix that by returning the given unmodified idx.
A similar fix was 0890cf6cb6ab ("switchdev: fix return value of
switchdev_port_fdb_dump in case of error") but for the CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV=y
case.
Fixes: 45d4122ca7cd ("switchdev: add support for fdb add/del/dump via switchdev_port_obj ops.")
Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <dragos@endocode.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/switchdev.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/net/switchdev.h b/include/net/switchdev.h
index 319baab..731c40e 100644
--- a/include/net/switchdev.h
+++ b/include/net/switchdev.h
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static inline int switchdev_port_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *filter_dev,
int idx)
{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return idx;
}
static inline void switchdev_port_fwd_mark_set(struct net_device *dev,
--
2.1.0
From 06416634e5b57f33854a5905bdf87ddc68f99ff4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pavel Fedin <p.fedin@samsung.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 17:51:34 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 22/43] net: thunder: Check for driver data in nicvf_remove()
[ Upstream commit 7750130d93decff06120df0d8ea024ff8a038a21 ]
In some cases the crash is caused by nicvf_remove() being called from
outside. For example, if we try to feed the device to vfio after the
probe has failed for some reason. So, move the check to better place.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Fedin <p.fedin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c
index a937772..7f709cb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c
@@ -1583,8 +1583,14 @@ err_disable_device:
static void nicvf_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct net_device *netdev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
- struct nicvf *nic = netdev_priv(netdev);
- struct net_device *pnetdev = nic->pnicvf->netdev;
+ struct nicvf *nic;
+ struct net_device *pnetdev;
+
+ if (!netdev)
+ return;
+
+ nic = netdev_priv(netdev);
+ pnetdev = nic->pnicvf->netdev;
/* Check if this Qset is assigned to different VF.
* If yes, clean primary and all secondary Qsets.
--
2.1.0
From fba5174af82c781b154aa5ffcc0fad2229767ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 13:09:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 23/43] snmp: Remove duplicate OUTMCAST stat increment
[ Upstream commit 41033f029e393a64e81966cbe34d66c6cf8a2e7e ]
the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code
itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its
not needed
Validated by the reporter, with good results
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com>
CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/mcast.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/mcast.c b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
index 083b292..41e3b5e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/mcast.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/mcast.c
@@ -1651,7 +1651,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
} else {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
}
@@ -2014,7 +2013,6 @@ out:
if (!err) {
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, type);
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, full_len);
} else
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
--
2.1.0
From 677298fd534e16274c8859e7658e57864bddb2a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 16:40:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 24/43] net/ip6_tunnel: fix dst leak
[ Upstream commit 206b49500df558dbc15d8836b09f6397ec5ed8bb ]
the commit cdf3464e6c6b ("ipv6: Fix dst_entry refcnt bugs in ip6_tunnel")
introduced percpu storage for ip6_tunnel dst cache, but while clearing
such cache it used raw_cpu_ptr to walk the per cpu entries, so cached
dst on non current cpu are not actually reset.
This patch replaces raw_cpu_ptr with per_cpu_ptr, properly cleaning
such storage.
Fixes: cdf3464e6c6b ("ipv6: Fix dst_entry refcnt bugs in ip6_tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
index eabffbb..137fca4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ void ip6_tnl_dst_reset(struct ip6_tnl *t)
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
- ip6_tnl_per_cpu_dst_set(raw_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache), NULL);
+ ip6_tnl_per_cpu_dst_set(per_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache, i), NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip6_tnl_dst_reset);
--
2.1.0
From 1451e186dddbd12331cbbd82cd1ec4df6207d598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <bjorn@mork.no>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:13:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 25/43] net: qmi_wwan: add XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit 68242a5a1e2edce39b069385cbafb82304eac0f1 ]
Thomas reports
"
4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name.
..
The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega"
..
Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for
network and MI01\6 for modem.
..
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id
echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Now all important things are there:
wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at)
There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at.
The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager.
"
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 2a7c1be..66e0853 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -775,6 +775,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)}, /* TP-LINK MA260 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1201, 2)}, /* Telit LE920 */
+ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1c9e, 0x9b01, 3)}, /* XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc000, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 100 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc001, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 120 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc002, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 140 */
--
2.1.0
From c137397256ef9502cfba4de0fa77f850ed0ad7a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 12:40:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 26/43] tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation
[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01e19f001e9f93b39c32387961c91ed3cc ]
When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add()
with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we
will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway)
But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid
following splat :
[ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 8451.090932]
[ 8451.090934]
[ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
[ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795:
[ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90
[ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500
[ 8451.090958]
[ 8451.090958] stack backtrace:
[ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_
[ 8451.091215] Call Trace:
[ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
[ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110
[ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0
[ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0
[ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190
[ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500
[ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190
[ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0
[ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0
[ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
[ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80
[ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700
[ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0
[ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90
Fixes: a8afca0329988 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 93898e0..a7739c8 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -922,7 +922,8 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, const union tcp_md5_addr *addr,
}
md5sig = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info,
- sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ sock_owned_by_user(sk) ||
+ lockdep_is_held(&sk->sk_lock.slock));
if (!md5sig) {
md5sig = kmalloc(sizeof(*md5sig), gfp);
if (!md5sig)
--
2.1.0
From 9a9201e594f1e328a927ea12f672a3541b03d797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 18:17:30 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 27/43] tcp: disable Fast Open on timeouts after handshake
[ Upstream commit 0e45f4da5981895e885dd72fe912a3f8e32bae73 ]
Some middle-boxes black-hole the data after the Fast Open handshake
(https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf).
The exact reason is unknown. The work-around is to disable Fast Open
temporarily after multiple recurring timeouts with few or no data
delivered in the established state.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
index 7149ebc..04f0a05 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
syn_set = true;
} else {
if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1, 0, 0)) {
+ /* Some middle-boxes may black-hole Fast Open _after_
+ * the handshake. Therefore we conservatively disable
+ * Fast Open on this path on recurring timeouts with
+ * few or zero bytes acked after Fast Open.
+ */
+ if (tp->syn_data_acked &&
+ tp->bytes_acked <= tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp) {
+ tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, 0, NULL, true, 0);
+ if (icsk->icsk_retransmits == sysctl_tcp_retries1)
+ NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
+ LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENACTIVEFAIL);
+ }
/* Black hole detection */
tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk);
--
2.1.0
From fc6c61249dd9e249b96291b83c0751b441cda8de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:03:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 28/43] tcp: fix potential huge kmalloc() calls in TCP_REPAIR
[ Upstream commit 5d4c9bfbabdb1d497f21afd81501e5c54b0c85d9 ]
tcp_send_rcvq() is used for re-injecting data into tcp receive queue.
Problems :
- No check against size is performed, allowed user to fool kernel in
attempting very large memory allocations, eventually triggering
OOM when memory is fragmented.
- In case of fault during the copy we do not return correct errno.
Lets use alloc_skb_with_frags() to cook optimal skbs.
Fixes: 292e8d8c8538 ("tcp: Move rcvq sending to tcp_input.c")
Fixes: c0e88ff0f256 ("tcp: Repair socket queues")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index a8f515b..cc6bd43 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4457,19 +4457,34 @@ static int __must_check tcp_queue_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int
int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int data_len = 0;
bool fragstolen;
if (size == 0)
return 0;
- skb = alloc_skb(size, sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ int npages = min_t(size_t, size >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+
+ data_len = npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ size = data_len + (size & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ }
+ skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(size - data_len, data_len,
+ PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER,
+ &err, sk->sk_allocation);
if (!skb)
goto err;
+ skb_put(skb, size - data_len);
+ skb->data_len = data_len;
+ skb->len = size;
+
if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize))
goto err_free;
- if (memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, size), msg, size))
+ err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, size);
+ if (err)
goto err_free;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt;
@@ -4485,7 +4500,8 @@ int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
err_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
err:
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return err;
+
}
static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.1.0
From 419ee3eb1d6dea668f00ee440c670f8f479f8216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 08:18:14 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 29/43] tcp: initialize tp->copied_seq in case of cross SYN
connection
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7ece8d8ac0e818eb2c91f99ca894730e2a ]
Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
generated program that triggers the WARNING at
net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() :
WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
!(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC)));
His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange,
that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we
lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization.
Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index cc6bd43..0a2b61d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -5659,6 +5659,7 @@ discard:
}
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
+ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is
--
2.1.0
From 4d8baf23458211113b2b4aaac26d715a1cfa9a4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 00:11:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 30/43] net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in
scm_detach_fds
[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ]
David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:
(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)
[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85
Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.
In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.
When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():
int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
if (!err)
err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
if (!err)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
} ... wrap-around
F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.
In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.
In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen
elsewhere.
Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).
Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!
Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).
Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").
RFC3542, section 20.2. says:
The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
application may or may not include padding at the end of last
ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
may set MSG_CTRUNC.
Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.
Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).
No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).
Reported-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
Reported-by: HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/scm.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 3b6899b..8a1741b 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
if (!err) {
cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int));
+ if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
+ cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
msg->msg_control += cmlen;
msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
}
--
2.1.0
From fd10116065e9a7bde6eb70f3f69c5e9ec2722e2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 31/43] net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ]
When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
(because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4....
ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
[<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
[<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
[<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
[<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
[<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
[<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
index 8e8203d..ef7e2c4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm);
static void mroute_netlink_event(struct mr_table *mrt, struct mfc_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ static int ipmr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1217,8 +1217,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
/* Shut down all active vif entries */
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1226,7 +1227,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
for (i = 0; i < MFC_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
list_del_rcu(&c->list);
mroute_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE);
@@ -1261,7 +1262,7 @@ static void mrtsock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL,
net->ipv4.devconf_all);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mrt->mroute_sk, NULL);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
}
}
rtnl_unlock();
--
2.1.0
From 6fea7a6bf9a832ea306a816204984e2244000784 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 32/43] net: ip6mr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table
destruction
[ Upstream commit 4c6980462f32b4f282c5d8e5f7ea8070e2937725 ]
Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and
the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be
destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that
everything is cleaned up on netns destruction.
Fixes: 8229efdaef1e ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code")
CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
index 0e004cc..35eee72 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void mr6_netlink_event(struct mr6_table *mrt, struct mfc6_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
static int ip6mr_rtm_dumproute(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static struct mr6_table *ip6mr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ip6mr_free_table(struct mr6_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -1542,7 +1542,7 @@ static int ip6mr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1552,8 +1552,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
* Shut down all active vif entries
*/
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1562,7 +1563,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt)
*/
for (i = 0; i < MFC6_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock);
list_del(&c->list);
@@ -1625,7 +1626,7 @@ int ip6mr_sk_done(struct sock *sk)
net->ipv6.devconf_all);
write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
err = 0;
break;
}
--
2.1.0
From 46b15261453a821e3d33889189715d61c4fb0af2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2015 19:46:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 33/43] vrf: fix double free and memory corruption on
register_netdevice failure
[ Upstream commit 7f109f7cc37108cba7243bc832988525b0d85909 ]
When vrf's ->newlink is called, if register_netdevice() fails then it
does free_netdev(), but that's also done by rtnl_newlink() so a second
free happens and memory gets corrupted, to reproduce execute the
following line a couple of times (1 - 5 usually is enough):
$ for i in `seq 1 5`; do ip link add vrf: type vrf table 1; done;
This works because we fail in register_netdevice() because of the wrong
name "vrf:".
And here's a trace of one crash:
[ 28.792157] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 28.792407] kernel BUG at fs/namei.c:246!
[ 28.792608] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 28.793240] Modules linked in: vrf nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry
nfs_acl nfs lockd grace sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
crc32c_intel qxl drm_kms_helper ttm drm aesni_intel aes_x86_64 psmouse
glue_helper lrw evdev gf128mul i2c_piix4 ablk_helper cryptd ppdev
parport_pc parport serio_raw pcspkr virtio_balloon virtio_console
i2c_core acpi_cpufreq button 9pnet_virtio 9p 9pnet fscache ipv6 autofs4
ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 virtio_blk virtio_net sg sr_mod cdrom
ata_generic ehci_pci uhci_hcd ehci_hcd e1000 usbcore usb_common ata_piix
libata virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio scsi_mod floppy
[ 28.796016] CPU: 0 PID: 1148 Comm: ld-linux-x86-64 Not tainted
4.4.0-rc1+ #24
[ 28.796016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014
[ 28.796016] task: ffff8800352561c0 ti: ffff88003592c000 task.ti:
ffff88003592c000
[ 28.796016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812187b3>] [<ffffffff812187b3>]
putname+0x43/0x60
[ 28.796016] RSP: 0018:ffff88003592fe88 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 28.796016] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800352561c0 RCX:
0000000000000001
[ 28.796016] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
ffff88003784f000
[ 28.796016] RBP: ffff88003592ff08 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:
0000000000000000
[ 28.796016] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
0000000000000000
[ 28.796016] R13: 000000000000047c R14: ffff88003784f000 R15:
ffff8800358c4a00
[ 28.796016] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 28.796016] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 28.796016] CR2: 00007ffd583bc2d9 CR3: 0000000035a99000 CR4:
00000000000406f0
[ 28.796016] Stack:
[ 28.796016] ffffffff8121045d ffffffff812102d3 ffff8800352561c0
ffff880035a91660
[ 28.796016] ffff8800008a9880 0000000000000000 ffffffff81a49940
00ffffff81218684
[ 28.796016] ffff8800352561c0 000000000000047c 0000000000000000
ffff880035b36d80
[ 28.796016] Call Trace:
[ 28.796016] [<ffffffff8121045d>] ?
do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x74d/0x930
[ 28.796016] [<ffffffff812102d3>] ?
do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x5c3/0x930
[ 28.796016] [<ffffffff8121066c>] do_execve+0x2c/0x30
[ 28.796016] [<ffffffff810939a0>]
call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xf0/0x140
[ 28.796016] [<ffffffff810938b0>] ? umh_complete+0x40/0x40
[ 28.796016] [<ffffffff815cb1af>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 28.796016] Code: 48 8d 47 1c 48 89 e5 53 48 8b 37 48 89 fb 48 39 c6
74 1a 48 8b 3d 7e e9 8f 00 e8 49 fa fc ff 48 89 df e8 f1 01 fd ff 5b 5d
f3 c3 <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 48 8b 3d 61 e9 8f 00 e8 2c fa fc ff 5b 5d eb e9
[ 28.796016] RIP [<ffffffff812187b3>] putname+0x43/0x60
[ 28.796016] RSP <ffff88003592fe88>
Fixes: 193125dbd8eb ("net: Introduce VRF device driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/vrf.c | 15 ++-------------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/vrf.c b/drivers/net/vrf.c
index 488c6f5..c9e309c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/vrf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vrf.c
@@ -581,7 +581,6 @@ static int vrf_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev,
{
struct net_vrf *vrf = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_vrf_dev *vrf_ptr;
- int err;
if (!data || !data[IFLA_VRF_TABLE])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -590,26 +589,16 @@ static int vrf_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev,
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_VRF_MASTER;
- err = -ENOMEM;
vrf_ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*dev->vrf_ptr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vrf_ptr)
- goto out_fail;
+ return -ENOMEM;
vrf_ptr->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
vrf_ptr->tb_id = vrf->tb_id;
- err = register_netdevice(dev);
- if (err < 0)
- goto out_fail;
-
rcu_assign_pointer(dev->vrf_ptr, vrf_ptr);
- return 0;
-
-out_fail:
- kfree(vrf_ptr);
- free_netdev(dev);
- return err;
+ return register_netdev(dev);
}
static size_t vrf_nl_getsize(const struct net_device *dev)
--
2.1.0
From 3ac4063f990a9e106c8971d60e1b430518fb5cec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2015 01:08:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 34/43] broadcom: fix PHY_ID_BCM5481 entry in the id table
[ Upstream commit 3c25a860d17b7378822f35d8c9141db9507e3beb ]
Commit fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0
with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting
the original). Fix that.
Fixes: fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
index 9c71295..85e64044 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct mdio_device_id __maybe_unused broadcom_tbl[] = {
{ PHY_ID_BCM5461, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM54616S, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5464, 0xfffffff0 },
- { PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
+ { PHY_ID_BCM5481, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610, 0xfffffff0 },
{ PHY_ID_BCM50610M, 0xfffffff0 },
--
2.1.0
From d71b7cd7146378b31252e33a23ad693b6d461ed8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 13:57:57 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 35/43] tipc: fix error handling of expanding buffer headroom
[ Upstream commit 7098356baca723513e97ca0020df4e18bc353be3 ]
Coverity says:
*** CID 1338065: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
/net/tipc/udp_media.c: 162 in tipc_udp_send_msg()
156 struct udp_media_addr *dst = (struct udp_media_addr *)&dest->value;
157 struct udp_media_addr *src = (struct udp_media_addr *)&b->addr.value;
158 struct sk_buff *clone;
159 struct rtable *rt;
160
161 if (skb_headroom(skb) < UDP_MIN_HEADROOM)
>>> CID 1338065: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
>>> Calling "pskb_expand_head" without checking return value (as is done elsewhere 51 out of 56 times).
162 pskb_expand_head(skb, UDP_MIN_HEADROOM, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
163
164 clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
165 skb_set_inner_protocol(clone, htons(ETH_P_TIPC));
166 ub = rcu_dereference_rtnl(b->media_ptr);
167 if (!ub) {
When expanding buffer headroom over udp tunnel with pskb_expand_head(),
it's unfortunate that we don't check its return value. As a result, if
the function returns an error code due to the lack of memory, it may
cause unpredictable consequence as we unconditionally consider that
it's always successful.
Fixes: e53567948f82 ("tipc: conditionally expand buffer headroom over udp tunnel")
Reported-by: <scan-admin@coverity.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/tipc/udp_media.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/udp_media.c b/net/tipc/udp_media.c
index cd7c5f1..86f2e7c 100644
--- a/net/tipc/udp_media.c
+++ b/net/tipc/udp_media.c
@@ -159,8 +159,11 @@ static int tipc_udp_send_msg(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_buff *clone;
struct rtable *rt;
- if (skb_headroom(skb) < UDP_MIN_HEADROOM)
- pskb_expand_head(skb, UDP_MIN_HEADROOM, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (skb_headroom(skb) < UDP_MIN_HEADROOM) {
+ err = pskb_expand_head(skb, UDP_MIN_HEADROOM, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (err)
+ goto tx_error;
+ }
clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
skb_set_inner_protocol(clone, htons(ETH_P_TIPC));
--
2.1.0
From d26834684ff963259ed7fd9e19c816ed71d7bf61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 15:07:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 36/43] ipv6: distinguish frag queues by device for multicast
and link-local packets
[ Upstream commit 264640fc2c5f4f913db5c73fa3eb1ead2c45e9d7 ]
If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.
To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
addresses.
Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/
but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ipv6.h | 1 +
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 5 +++--
net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 10 +++++++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index 711cca4..1b63717 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ struct ip6_create_arg {
u32 user;
const struct in6_addr *src;
const struct in6_addr *dst;
+ int iif;
u8 ecn;
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
index c7196ad..dc50143 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static void nf_ct_frag6_expire(unsigned long data)
/* Creation primitives. */
static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
u32 user, struct in6_addr *src,
- struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id,
arg.user = user;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
local_bh_disable();
@@ -603,7 +604,7 @@ struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone);
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n");
goto ret_orig;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
index f1159bb..04013a9 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ bool ip6_frag_match(const struct inet_frag_queue *q, const void *a)
return fq->id == arg->id &&
fq->user == arg->user &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->saddr, arg->src) &&
- ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst);
+ ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst) &&
+ (arg->iif == fq->iif ||
+ !(ipv6_addr_type(arg->dst) & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST |
+ IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_frag_match);
@@ -180,7 +183,7 @@ static void ip6_frag_expire(unsigned long data)
static struct frag_queue *
fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
- const struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn)
+ const struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
@@ -190,6 +193,7 @@ fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src,
arg.user = IP6_DEFRAG_LOCAL_DELIVER;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.iif = iif;
arg.ecn = ecn;
hash = inet6_hash_frag(id, src, dst);
@@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr,
- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
+ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr));
if (fq) {
int ret;
--
2.1.0
From a9bb7b65ac7cd16bafc5cbd4ebb182ce5bbcb488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 17:13:21 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 37/43] RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on
unbound socket
[ Upstream commit 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a ]
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/rds/connection.c | 6 ------
net/rds/send.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rds/connection.c b/net/rds/connection.c
index 49adeef..9b2de5e 100644
--- a/net/rds/connection.c
+++ b/net/rds/connection.c
@@ -190,12 +190,6 @@ new_conn:
}
}
- if (trans == NULL) {
- kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
- conn = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
- goto out;
- }
-
conn->c_trans = trans;
ret = trans->conn_alloc(conn, gfp);
diff --git a/net/rds/send.c b/net/rds/send.c
index 4df61a5..859de6f 100644
--- a/net/rds/send.c
+++ b/net/rds/send.c
@@ -1009,11 +1009,13 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t payload_len)
release_sock(sk);
}
- /* racing with another thread binding seems ok here */
+ lock_sock(sk);
if (daddr == 0 || rs->rs_bound_addr == 0) {
+ release_sock(sk);
ret = -ENOTCONN; /* XXX not a great errno */
goto out;
}
+ release_sock(sk);
if (payload_len > rds_sk_sndbuf(rs)) {
ret = -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.1.0
From f6c7967f25e8220913bedf596c260c379dab5341 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 13:02:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 38/43] bpf, array: fix heap out-of-bounds access when updating
elements
[ Upstream commit fbca9d2d35c6ef1b323fae75cc9545005ba25097 ]
During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been
noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps
when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size
(specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes.
In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and
used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function
array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ...
memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from
map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER)
and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size).
Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds.
Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we
access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack.
Since 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an
official release yet, it only affects priviledged users.
In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs
from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also
from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to
user, so nothing could leak.
[1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller
Fixes: 28fbcfa08d8e ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 29ace10..7a0decf 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
/* all elements already exist */
return -EEXIST;
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
+ memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size);
return 0;
}
--
2.1.0
From 5c3c67ba34c640fa3d93ff4e0506cb5826619de2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 19:37:57 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 39/43] ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ]
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/ipv6.h | 2 +-
include/net/ipv6.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c | 11 ++++++++---
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ipv6/raw.c | 8 ++++++--
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
net/ipv6/udp.c | 8 ++++++--
net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 8 ++++++--
13 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index f1f32af..3e4ff3f 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ struct ipv6_pinfo {
struct ipv6_ac_socklist *ipv6_ac_list;
struct ipv6_fl_socklist __rcu *ipv6_fl_list;
- struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions __rcu *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktoptions;
struct sk_buff *rxpmtu;
struct inet6_cork cork;
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index 1b63717..b14e158 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ extern rwlock_t ip6_ra_lock;
*/
struct ipv6_txoptions {
+ atomic_t refcnt;
/* Length of this structure */
int tot_len;
@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions {
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst0opt;
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *srcrt; /* Routing Header */
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst1opt;
-
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
/* Option buffer, as read by IPV6_PKTOPTIONS, starts here. */
};
@@ -252,6 +253,24 @@ struct ipv6_fl_socklist {
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
+static inline struct ipv6_txoptions *txopt_get(const struct ipv6_pinfo *np)
+{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt && !atomic_inc_not_zero(&opt->refcnt))
+ opt = NULL;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return opt;
+}
+
+static inline void txopt_put(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
+{
+ if (opt && atomic_dec_and_test(&opt->refcnt))
+ kfree_rcu(opt, rcu);
+}
+
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl6_sock_lookup(struct sock *sk, __be32 label);
struct ipv6_txoptions *fl6_merge_options(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_space,
struct ip6_flowlabel *fl,
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 5165571..a049050 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -202,7 +202,9 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -219,7 +221,10 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
&ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -415,6 +420,7 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -534,13 +540,15 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt != NULL)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
@@ -793,6 +801,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
@@ -892,7 +901,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
@@ -912,9 +922,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt != NULL)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index 44bb66b..38d66dd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -428,9 +428,11 @@ void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
/* Free tx options */
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_destroy_sock);
@@ -659,7 +661,10 @@ int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index 9aadd57..a42a673 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ ipv4_connected:
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
- opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : np->opt;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : rcu_dereference(np->opt);
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
err = 0;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
index ce203b0..ea7c4d6 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ ipv6_dup_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
*((char **)&opt2->dst1opt) += dif;
if (opt2->srcrt)
*((char **)&opt2->srcrt) += dif;
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
}
return opt2;
}
@@ -790,7 +791,7 @@ ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
memset(opt2, 0, tot_len);
-
+ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
opt2->tot_len = tot_len;
p = (char *)(opt2 + 1);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
index 6927f3f..9beed30 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(struct sock *sk,
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
@@ -207,7 +209,9 @@ static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_socket(struct sock *sk,
fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
@@ -240,7 +244,8 @@ int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl_unused
/* Restore final destination back after routing done */
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
- res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index 63e6956..4449ad1 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
- opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt,
+ opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
@@ -231,9 +232,12 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt,
+ NULL);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
@@ -403,7 +407,8 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
- opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
@@ -432,8 +437,10 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
@@ -486,6 +493,7 @@ sticky_done:
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
+ atomic_set(&opt->refcnt, 1);
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
@@ -502,8 +510,10 @@ update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
- if (opt)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
+ if (opt) {
+ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+ txopt_put(opt);
+ }
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
@@ -1110,10 +1120,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
lock_sock(sk);
- len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, np->opt,
- optname, optval, len);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, opt, optname, optval, len);
release_sock(sk);
/* check if ipv6_getsockopt_sticky() returns err code */
if (len < 0)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
index fdbada156..fe97729 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
@@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
@@ -838,8 +839,10 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
- if (!opt)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -905,6 +908,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index 0909f4e..f30bfdc 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 97d9314..9e9b77b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
@@ -235,7 +236,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
@@ -263,9 +265,9 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (np->opt)
- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
- np->opt->opt_nflen);
+ if (opt)
+ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen +
+ opt->opt_nflen;
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
@@ -461,7 +463,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts));
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_mapping);
- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
@@ -991,6 +994,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
@@ -1126,13 +1130,15 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
- if (np->opt)
- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
-
+ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
+ if (opt) {
+ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
+ }
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
- if (newnp->opt)
- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
- newnp->opt->opt_flen);
+ if (opt)
+ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
+ opt->opt_flen;
tcp_ca_openreq_child(newsk, dst);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index 0aba654..8379fc2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -1107,6 +1107,7 @@ int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -1260,8 +1261,10 @@ do_udp_sendmsg:
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
- if (!opt)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -1370,6 +1373,7 @@ release_dst:
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index d1ded37..0ce9da9 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
@@ -575,8 +576,10 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
opt = NULL;
}
- if (opt == NULL)
- opt = np->opt;
+ if (!opt) {
+ opt = txopt_get(np);
+ opt_to_free = opt;
+ }
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
@@ -631,6 +634,7 @@ done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
--
2.1.0
From 42b4973eefcdcfc62b49c61f50f9f1e81ae6a615 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 01:14:48 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 40/43] net/neighbour: fix crash at dumping device-agnostic
proxy entries
[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e ]
Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/neighbour.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c
index 2b515ba..c169bba 100644
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -2215,7 +2215,7 @@ static int pneigh_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct pneigh_entry *pn,
ndm->ndm_pad2 = 0;
ndm->ndm_flags = pn->flags | NTF_PROXY;
ndm->ndm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
- ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev->ifindex;
+ ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev ? pn->dev->ifindex : 0;
ndm->ndm_state = NUD_NONE;
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_DST, tbl->key_len, pn->key))
@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ static int pneigh_dump_table(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (h > s_h)
s_idx = 0;
for (n = tbl->phash_buckets[h], idx = 0; n; n = n->next) {
- if (dev_net(n->dev) != net)
+ if (pneigh_net(n) != net)
continue;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto next;
--
2.1.0
From f7391ce93c846664fb548ff4054edc165e7a5442 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 07:20:07 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 41/43] ipv6: sctp: implement sctp_v6_destroy_sock()
[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets.
We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release
inet6 specific fields.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 17bef01..3ec88be 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -7375,6 +7375,13 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <net/transp_v6.h>
+static void sctp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ sctp_destroy_sock(sk);
+ inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
+}
+
struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.name = "SCTPv6",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -7384,7 +7391,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
.accept = sctp_accept,
.ioctl = sctp_ioctl,
.init = sctp_init_sock,
- .destroy = sctp_destroy_sock,
+ .destroy = sctp_v6_destroy_sock,
.shutdown = sctp_shutdown,
.setsockopt = sctp_setsockopt,
.getsockopt = sctp_getsockopt,
--
2.1.0
From c391cc510c3cf6b5a8dd57fbc1de26b4b28bd7e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 18:33:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 42/43] openvswitch: fix hangup on vxlan/gre/geneve device
deletion
[ Upstream commit 13175303024c8f4cd09e51079a8fcbbe572111ec ]
Each openvswitch tunnel vport (vxlan,gre,geneve) holds a reference
to the underlying tunnel device, but never released it when such
device is deleted.
Deleting the underlying device via the ip tool cause the kernel to
hangup in the netdev_wait_allrefs() loop.
This commit ensure that on device unregistration dp_detach_port_notify()
is called for all vports that hold the device reference, properly
releasing it.
Fixes: 614732eaa12d ("openvswitch: Use regular VXLAN net_device device")
Fixes: b2acd1dc3949 ("openvswitch: Use regular GRE net_device instead of vport")
Fixes: 6b001e682e90 ("openvswitch: Use Geneve device.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Flavio Leitner <fbl@sysclose.org>
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/openvswitch/dp_notify.c | 2 +-
net/openvswitch/vport-netdev.c | 8 ++++++--
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/dp_notify.c b/net/openvswitch/dp_notify.c
index a7a80a6..653d073 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/dp_notify.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/dp_notify.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ovs_dp_notify_wq(struct work_struct *work)
struct hlist_node *n;
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(vport, n, &dp->ports[i], dp_hash_node) {
- if (vport->ops->type != OVS_VPORT_TYPE_NETDEV)
+ if (vport->ops->type == OVS_VPORT_TYPE_INTERNAL)
continue;
if (!(vport->dev->priv_flags & IFF_OVS_DATAPATH))
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/vport-netdev.c b/net/openvswitch/vport-netdev.c
index f7e8dcc..ac14c48 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/vport-netdev.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/vport-netdev.c
@@ -180,9 +180,13 @@ void ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy(struct vport *vport)
if (vport->dev->priv_flags & IFF_OVS_DATAPATH)
ovs_netdev_detach_dev(vport);
- /* Early release so we can unregister the device */
+ /* We can be invoked by both explicit vport deletion and
+ * underlying netdev deregistration; delete the link only
+ * if it's not already shutting down.
+ */
+ if (vport->dev->reg_state == NETREG_REGISTERED)
+ rtnl_delete_link(vport->dev);
dev_put(vport->dev);
- rtnl_delete_link(vport->dev);
vport->dev = NULL;
rtnl_unlock();
--
2.1.0
From d6c39cbd9479fcce790b2381042c9405fc170384 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 20:08:51 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 43/43] net_sched: fix qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() races
[ Upstream commit 4eaf3b84f2881c9c028f1d5e76c52ab575fe3a66 ]
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() suffers from two problems on multiqueue
devices.
One problem is that it updates sch->q.qlen and sch->qstats.drops
on the mq/mqprio root qdisc, while it should not : Daniele
reported underflows errors :
[ 681.774821] PAX: sch->q.qlen: 0 n: 1
[ 681.774825] PAX: size overflow detected in function qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen net/sched/sch_api.c:769 cicus.693_49 min, count: 72, decl: qlen; num: 0; context: sk_buff_head;
[ 681.774954] CPU: 2 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Tainted: G O 4.2.6.201511282239-1-grsec #1
[ 681.774955] Hardware name: ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. X302LJ/X302LJ, BIOS X302LJ.202 03/05/2015
[ 681.774956] ffffffffa9a04863 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffa990ff7c
[ 681.774959] ffffc90000d3bc38 ffffffffa95d2810 0000000000000007 ffffffffa991002b
[ 681.774960] ffffc90000d3bc68 ffffffffa91a44f4 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
[ 681.774962] Call Trace:
[ 681.774967] [<ffffffffa95d2810>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x7f
[ 681.774970] [<ffffffffa91a44f4>] report_size_overflow+0x34/0x50
[ 681.774972] [<ffffffffa94d17e2>] qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen+0x152/0x160
[ 681.774976] [<ffffffffc02694b1>] fq_codel_dequeue+0x7b1/0x820 [sch_fq_codel]
[ 681.774978] [<ffffffffc02680a0>] ? qdisc_peek_dequeued+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_fq_codel]
[ 681.774980] [<ffffffffa94cd92d>] __qdisc_run+0x4d/0x1d0
[ 681.774983] [<ffffffffa949b2b2>] net_tx_action+0xc2/0x160
[ 681.774985] [<ffffffffa90664c1>] __do_softirq+0xf1/0x200
[ 681.774987] [<ffffffffa90665ee>] run_ksoftirqd+0x1e/0x30
[ 681.774989] [<ffffffffa90896b0>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x150/0x260
[ 681.774991] [<ffffffffa9089560>] ? sort_range+0x40/0x40
[ 681.774992] [<ffffffffa9085fe4>] kthread+0xe4/0x100
[ 681.774994] [<ffffffffa9085f00>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x170/0x170
[ 681.774995] [<ffffffffa95d8d1e>] ret_from_fork+0x3e/0x70
mq/mqprio have their own ways to report qlen/drops by folding stats on
all their queues, with appropriate locking.
A second problem is that qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() calls qdisc_lookup()
without proper locking : concurrent qdisc updates could corrupt the list
that qdisc_match_from_root() parses to find a qdisc given its handle.
Fix first problem adding a TCQ_F_NOPARENT qdisc flag that
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can use to abort its tree traversal,
as soon as it meets a mq/mqprio qdisc children.
Second problem can be fixed by RCU protection.
Qdisc are already freed after RCU grace period, so qdisc_list_add() and
qdisc_list_del() simply have to use appropriate rcu list variants.
A future patch will add a per struct netdev_queue list anchor, so that
qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can have more efficient lookups.
Reported-by: Daniele Fucini <dfucini@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/sch_generic.h | 3 +++
net/sched/sch_api.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
net/sched/sch_generic.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_mq.c | 4 ++--
net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 4 ++--
5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h
index 444faa8..f1ad8f8 100644
--- a/include/net/sch_generic.h
+++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ struct Qdisc {
*/
#define TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC (1 << 16)
#define TCQ_F_CPUSTATS 0x20 /* run using percpu statistics */
+#define TCQ_F_NOPARENT 0x40 /* root of its hierarchy :
+ * qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() should stop.
+ */
u32 limit;
const struct Qdisc_ops *ops;
struct qdisc_size_table __rcu *stab;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index f43c8f3..7ec667d 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ int qdisc_set_default(const char *name)
}
/* We know handle. Find qdisc among all qdisc's attached to device
- (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.)
+ * (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.)
+ * Note: caller either uses rtnl or rcu_read_lock()
*/
static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_root(struct Qdisc *root, u32 handle)
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_root(struct Qdisc *root, u32 handle)
root->handle == handle)
return root;
- list_for_each_entry(q, &root->list, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &root->list, list) {
if (q->handle == handle)
return q;
}
@@ -277,15 +278,18 @@ void qdisc_list_add(struct Qdisc *q)
struct Qdisc *root = qdisc_dev(q)->qdisc;
WARN_ON_ONCE(root == &noop_qdisc);
- list_add_tail(&q->list, &root->list);
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&q->list, &root->list);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_add);
void qdisc_list_del(struct Qdisc *q)
{
- if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS))
- list_del(&q->list);
+ if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS)) {
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+ list_del_rcu(&q->list);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_del);
@@ -750,14 +754,18 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned int n)
if (n == 0)
return;
drops = max_t(int, n, 0);
+ rcu_read_lock();
while ((parentid = sch->parent)) {
if (TC_H_MAJ(parentid) == TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_INGRESS))
- return;
+ break;
+ if (sch->flags & TCQ_F_NOPARENT)
+ break;
+ /* TODO: perform the search on a per txq basis */
sch = qdisc_lookup(qdisc_dev(sch), TC_H_MAJ(parentid));
if (sch == NULL) {
- WARN_ON(parentid != TC_H_ROOT);
- return;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(parentid != TC_H_ROOT);
+ break;
}
cops = sch->ops->cl_ops;
if (cops->qlen_notify) {
@@ -768,6 +776,7 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned int n)
sch->q.qlen -= n;
__qdisc_qstats_drop(sch, drops);
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen);
@@ -941,7 +950,7 @@ qdisc_create(struct net_device *dev, struct netdev_queue *dev_queue,
}
lockdep_set_class(qdisc_lock(sch), &qdisc_tx_lock);
if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev))
- sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
sch->handle = handle;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
index cb5d4ad..e82a1ad 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ static void attach_one_default_qdisc(struct net_device *dev,
return;
}
if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev))
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping = qdisc;
}
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mq.c b/net/sched/sch_mq.c
index f3cbaec..3e82f04 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_mq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mq.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int mq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
if (qdisc == NULL)
goto err;
priv->qdiscs[ntx] = qdisc;
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
sch->flags |= TCQ_F_MQROOT;
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int mq_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl, struct Qdisc *new,
*old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
if (new)
- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
dev_activate(dev);
return 0;
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
index 3811a74..ad70ecf 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
goto err;
}
priv->qdiscs[i] = qdisc;
- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
}
/* If the mqprio options indicate that hardware should own
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int mqprio_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl, struct Qdisc *new,
*old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
if (new)
- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE;
+ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
dev_activate(dev);
--
2.1.0
next reply other threads:[~2015-12-10 19:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 308+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-10 19:37 David Miller [this message]
2015-12-11 16:49 ` [PATCHES] Networking Greg KH
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2019-05-15 6:02 ` Greg KH
2019-05-04 7:01 David Miller
2019-05-04 7:34 ` Greg KH
2019-04-30 2:06 David Miller
2019-04-30 7:53 ` Greg KH
2019-04-18 22:53 David Miller
2019-04-23 20:06 ` Greg KH
2019-04-10 3:55 David Miller
2019-04-10 15:35 ` Sasha Levin
2019-03-28 19:24 David Miller
2019-03-28 20:55 ` Greg KH
2019-03-28 21:51 ` Greg KH
2019-03-28 23:18 ` David Miller
2019-03-29 6:18 ` Greg KH
2019-03-15 1:47 David Miller
2019-03-15 6:30 ` Greg KH
2019-03-19 13:03 ` Greg KH
2019-03-07 22:47 David Miller
2019-03-08 6:38 ` Greg KH
2019-02-24 5:18 David Miller
2019-02-24 7:52 ` Greg KH
2019-02-20 20:42 David Miller
2019-02-21 3:08 ` Sasha Levin
2019-02-21 7:21 ` Greg KH
2019-02-09 23:21 David Miller
2019-02-10 12:21 ` Greg KH
2019-02-01 21:45 David Miller
2019-02-02 9:55 ` Greg KH
2019-01-26 0:18 David Miller
2019-01-26 9:29 ` Greg KH
2019-01-21 23:28 David Miller
2019-01-22 7:18 ` Greg KH
2019-01-23 7:33 ` Greg KH
2019-01-20 19:12 David Miller
2019-01-21 8:00 ` Greg KH
2019-01-04 18:17 David Miller
2019-01-04 18:48 ` Greg KH
2018-12-12 6:31 David Miller
2018-12-13 9:53 ` Greg KH
2018-12-03 7:01 David Miller
2018-12-03 9:13 ` Greg KH
2018-11-21 3:49 David Miller
2018-11-21 17:49 ` Greg KH
2018-11-02 3:55 David Miller
2018-11-02 5:27 ` Greg KH
2018-09-24 16:46 David Miller
2018-09-26 9:32 ` Greg KH
2018-09-18 16:14 David Miller
2018-09-20 5:25 ` Greg KH
2018-09-11 6:15 David Miller
2018-09-11 8:29 ` Greg KH
2018-08-17 19:32 David Miller
2018-08-18 9:43 ` Greg KH
2018-08-04 5:05 David Miller
2018-08-04 7:33 ` Greg KH
2018-08-01 5:32 David Miller
2018-08-01 6:20 ` Greg KH
2018-07-26 23:50 David Miller
2018-07-27 0:06 ` Eric Dumazet
2018-07-27 6:34 ` Greg KH
2018-07-23 3:51 David Miller
2018-07-23 6:21 ` Greg KH
2018-07-18 23:35 David Miller
2018-07-19 6:33 ` Greg KH
2018-06-20 12:37 David Miller
2018-06-21 21:10 ` Greg KH
2018-06-24 11:20 ` Greg KH
2018-06-08 2:18 David Miller
2018-06-08 4:52 ` Greg KH
2018-05-15 20:50 David Miller
2018-05-16 8:40 ` Greg KH
2018-04-26 18:38 David Miller
2018-04-26 18:50 ` Greg KH
2018-04-13 17:47 David Miller
2018-04-14 14:04 ` Greg KH
2018-04-10 19:39 David Miller
2018-04-10 21:26 ` Greg KH
2018-03-28 15:35 David Miller
2018-03-28 15:40 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-03-28 15:46 ` David Miller
2018-03-28 16:36 ` Greg KH
2018-03-28 16:49 ` Greg KH
2018-03-07 2:28 David Miller
2018-03-07 3:30 ` Greg KH
2018-02-06 20:19 David Miller
2018-02-07 19:39 ` Greg KH
2018-01-28 16:22 David Miller
2018-01-28 16:39 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 21:12 David Miller
2018-01-13 9:54 ` Greg KH
2017-12-31 4:15 David Miller
2017-12-31 10:14 ` Greg KH
2017-12-12 15:44 David Miller
2017-12-14 17:51 ` Greg KH
2017-11-20 11:47 David Miller
2017-11-21 14:04 ` Greg KH
2017-11-14 6:36 David Miller
2017-11-16 14:12 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 4:02 David Miller
2017-10-09 7:34 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 7:56 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 16:55 ` David Miller
2017-10-09 19:04 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 22:54 ` David Miller
2017-10-10 14:10 ` Greg KH
2017-09-15 4:57 David Miller
2017-09-15 6:24 ` Greg KH
2018-06-07 7:00 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-06-07 9:21 ` Greg KH
2018-06-07 10:47 ` Ido Schimmel
2018-06-07 10:52 ` Greg KH
2018-07-05 16:15 ` Greg KH
2018-07-05 16:42 ` Ido Schimmel
2017-08-24 3:24 David Miller
2017-08-25 0:55 ` Greg KH
2017-08-11 5:25 David Miller
2017-08-11 16:22 ` Greg KH
2017-08-08 23:21 David Miller
2017-08-08 23:30 ` Greg KH
2017-07-17 16:44 David Miller
2017-07-17 19:23 ` Greg KH
2017-07-19 10:27 ` Greg KH
2017-06-29 16:19 David Miller
2017-06-29 17:34 ` Greg KH
2017-05-30 23:14 David Miller
2017-05-31 0:18 ` Greg KH
2017-05-11 2:41 David Miller
2017-05-11 13:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-22 10:16 ` Greg KH
2017-04-28 19:41 David Miller
2017-04-29 6:23 ` Greg KH
2017-03-25 7:53 David Miller
2017-03-25 9:26 ` Thomas Backlund
2017-03-25 17:38 ` David Miller
2017-03-26 18:47 ` Thomas Backlund
2017-03-27 16:19 ` Greg KH
2017-03-17 1:48 David Miller
2017-03-18 14:13 ` Greg KH
2017-02-23 19:54 David Miller
2017-02-23 20:19 ` Greg KH
2017-02-13 17:15 David Miller
2017-02-15 17:21 ` Greg KH
2017-01-31 21:50 [PATCHES] networking David Miller
2017-02-01 8:10 ` Greg KH
2017-01-12 18:55 [PATCHES] Networking David Miller
2017-01-12 20:40 ` Greg KH
2016-12-07 23:43 David Miller
2016-12-08 6:34 ` Greg KH
2016-11-18 2:59 David Miller
2016-11-18 10:36 ` Greg KH
2016-11-09 17:19 David Miller
2016-11-10 15:50 ` Greg KH
2016-09-21 5:07 David Miller
2016-09-21 9:23 ` Greg KH
2016-08-12 0:50 David Miller
2016-08-12 7:37 ` Greg KH
2016-07-13 21:43 David Miller
2016-07-13 22:38 ` Greg KH
2016-07-06 5:02 David Miller
2016-07-07 0:35 ` Greg KH
2016-06-17 7:03 David Miller
2016-06-18 1:01 ` Greg KH
2016-05-16 16:35 David Miller
2016-05-16 21:50 ` Greg KH
2016-04-15 4:45 David Miller
2016-04-16 17:49 ` Greg KH
2016-02-29 21:56 David Miller
2016-02-29 22:45 ` Greg KH
2016-01-27 2:00 David Miller
2016-01-27 6:35 ` Greg KH
2015-12-22 21:51 David Miller
2016-01-19 5:20 ` Greg KH
2016-01-19 12:00 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-19 13:29 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-19 17:39 ` Greg KH
2016-01-19 17:41 ` Josh Boyer
2015-11-13 21:38 David Miller
2015-11-14 15:59 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-11-15 17:55 ` David Miller
2015-12-06 5:25 ` Greg KH
2015-10-21 3:51 David Miller
2015-10-23 16:25 ` Greg KH
2015-09-29 4:54 David Miller
2015-09-30 3:33 ` Greg KH
2015-08-27 6:05 David Miller
2015-08-27 7:29 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-08-27 13:35 ` Luis Henriques
2015-08-27 16:34 ` David Miller
2015-09-28 14:04 ` Greg KH
2015-09-26 19:21 ` Greg KH
2015-07-03 22:31 David Miller
2015-07-04 3:04 ` Greg KH
2015-06-10 3:01 David Miller
2015-06-10 13:26 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-06-19 18:03 ` Greg KH
2015-05-05 17:34 [PATCHES] NETWORKING David Miller
2015-05-06 6:57 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-05-08 11:14 ` Greg KH
2015-05-08 14:42 ` Greg KH
2015-04-29 4:48 [PATCHES] Networking David Miller
2015-04-29 11:09 ` Greg KH
2015-04-29 16:03 ` David Miller
2015-04-30 12:25 ` Jiri Slaby
[not found] <20150421.143012.2106864724544609194.davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-27 9:23 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-05-04 19:53 ` Ben Hutchings
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