From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCHES] Networking
Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 16:56:15 -0500 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160229.165615.2232238957282850211.davem@davemloft.net> (raw)
[-- Attachment #1: Type: Text/Plain, Size: 93 bytes --]
Please queue up the following bug fixes for 4.1.x and 4.4.x -stable,
respectively.
Thanks!
[-- Attachment #2: net_41.mbox --]
[-- Type: Application/Octet-Stream, Size: 95022 bytes --]
From 75230205ba83c6938ab4b4d3f7cabccda29d8436 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 10:41:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/34] af_iucv: Validate socket address length in
iucv_sock_bind()
[ Upstream commit 52a82e23b9f2a9e1d429c5207f8575784290d008 ]
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Evgeny Cherkashin <Eugene.Crosser@ru.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
index 6daa52a..123f6f9 100644
--- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
+++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
@@ -709,6 +709,9 @@ static int iucv_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_IUCV)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_iucv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
--
2.4.1
From 3f585b16ac9c4aa592528dac16f3155ce5ad20cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manfred Rudigier <Manfred.Rudigier@omicron.at>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 11:22:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/34] net: dp83640: Fix tx timestamp overflow handling.
[ Upstream commit 81e8f2e930fe76b9814c71b9d87c30760b5eb705 ]
PHY status frames are not reliable, the PHY may not be able to send them
during heavy receive traffic. This overflow condition is signaled by the
PHY in the next status frame, but the driver did not make use of it.
Instead it always reported wrong tx timestamps to user space after an
overflow happened because it assigned newly received tx timestamps to old
packets in the queue.
This commit fixes this issue by clearing the tx timestamp queue every time
an overflow happens, so that no timestamps are delivered for overflow
packets. This way time stamping will continue correctly after an overflow.
Signed-off-by: Manfred Rudigier <manfred.rudigier@omicron.at>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
index 00cb41e..c56cf0b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
@@ -833,6 +833,11 @@ static void decode_rxts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps = NULL;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned long flags;
+ u8 overflow;
+
+ overflow = (phy_rxts->ns_hi >> 14) & 0x3;
+ if (overflow)
+ pr_debug("rx timestamp queue overflow, count %d\n", overflow);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dp83640->rx_lock, flags);
@@ -875,6 +880,7 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps shhwtstamps;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u64 ns;
+ u8 overflow;
/* We must already have the skb that triggered this. */
@@ -884,6 +890,17 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
pr_debug("have timestamp but tx_queue empty\n");
return;
}
+
+ overflow = (phy_txts->ns_hi >> 14) & 0x3;
+ if (overflow) {
+ pr_debug("tx timestamp queue overflow, count %d\n", overflow);
+ while (skb) {
+ skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, NULL);
+ skb = skb_dequeue(&dp83640->tx_queue);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
ns = phy2txts(phy_txts);
memset(&shhwtstamps, 0, sizeof(shhwtstamps));
shhwtstamps.hwtstamp = ns_to_ktime(ns);
--
2.4.1
From 41340b951894aedff9adce10fe01bfd80c9b144f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:02:54 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 03/34] tcp: fix NULL deref in tcp_v4_send_ack()
[ Upstream commit e62a123b8ef7c5dc4db2c16383d506860ad21b47 ]
Neal reported crashes with this stack trace :
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8c57231b>] tcp_v4_send_ack+0x41/0x20f
...
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000044005c000 CR4: 00000000001427e0
...
[<ffffffff8c57258e>] tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack+0xa5/0xb4
[<ffffffff8c1a7caa>] tcp_check_req+0x2ea/0x3e0
[<ffffffff8c19e420>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x850/0x2500
[<ffffffff8c1a6d21>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x141/0x330
[<ffffffff8c56cdb2>] sk_backlog_rcv+0x21/0x30
[<ffffffff8c098bbd>] tcp_recvmsg+0x75d/0xf90
[<ffffffff8c0a8700>] inet_recvmsg+0x80/0xa0
[<ffffffff8c17623e>] sock_aio_read+0xee/0x110
[<ffffffff8c066fcf>] do_sync_read+0x6f/0xa0
[<ffffffff8c0673a1>] SyS_read+0x1e1/0x290
[<ffffffff8c5ca262>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The problem here is the skb we provide to tcp_v4_send_ack() had to
be parked in the backlog of a new TCP fastopen child because this child
was owned by the user at the time an out of window packet arrived.
Before queuing a packet, TCP has to set skb->dev to NULL as the device
could disappear before packet is removed from the queue.
Fix this issue by using the net pointer provided by the socket (being a
timewait or a request socket).
IPv6 is immune to the bug : tcp_v6_send_response() already gets the net
pointer from the socket if provided.
Fixes: 168a8f58059a ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path")
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index cd18c3d..13b92d5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -705,7 +705,8 @@ release_sk1:
outside socket context is ugly, certainly. What can I do?
*/
-static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
+static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct net *net,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
u32 win, u32 tsval, u32 tsecr, int oif,
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
int reply_flags, u8 tos)
@@ -720,7 +721,6 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
];
} rep;
struct ip_reply_arg arg;
- struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
memset(&rep.th, 0, sizeof(struct tcphdr));
memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
@@ -782,7 +782,8 @@ static void tcp_v4_timewait_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk);
struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk(sk);
- tcp_v4_send_ack(skb, tcptw->tw_snd_nxt, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt,
+ tcp_v4_send_ack(sock_net(sk), skb,
+ tcptw->tw_snd_nxt, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt,
tcptw->tw_rcv_wnd >> tw->tw_rcv_wscale,
tcp_time_stamp + tcptw->tw_ts_offset,
tcptw->tw_ts_recent,
@@ -801,8 +802,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN -> for regular TCP_SYN_RECV
* sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV -> for Fast Open.
*/
- tcp_v4_send_ack(skb, (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) ?
- tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 : tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt,
+ u32 seq = (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) ? tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 :
+ tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt;
+
+ tcp_v4_send_ack(sock_net(sk), skb, seq,
tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt, req->rcv_wnd,
tcp_time_stamp,
req->ts_recent,
--
2.4.1
From a8b19ec2254fd7c4d9c9d32b6bbcfdb7a5ad50ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2016 13:53:50 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 04/34] af_unix: fix struct pid memory leak
[ Upstream commit fa0dc04df259ba2df3ce1920e9690c7842f8fa4b ]
Dmitry reported a struct pid leak detected by a syzkaller program.
Bug happens in unix_stream_recvmsg() when we break the loop when a
signal is pending, without properly releasing scm.
Fixes: b3ca9b02b007 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index cb3a01a..c741d83 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -2131,6 +2131,7 @@ again:
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ scm_destroy(&scm);
goto out;
}
--
2.4.1
From 8f077a7a428d457c12a10f0fc1cfd15d57651c59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 01:39:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/34] pptp: fix illegal memory access caused by multiple
bind()s
[ Upstream commit 9a368aff9cb370298fa02feeffa861f2db497c18 ]
Several times already this has been reported as kasan reports caused by
syzkaller and trinity and people always looked at RCU races, but it is
much more simple. :)
In case we bind a pptp socket multiple times, we simply add it to
the callid_sock list but don't remove the old binding. Thus the old
socket stays in the bucket with unused call_id indexes and doesn't get
cleaned up. This causes various forms of kasan reports which were hard
to pinpoint.
Simply don't allow multiple binds and correct error handling in
pptp_bind. Also keep sk_state bits in place in pptp_connect.
Fixes: 00959ade36acad ("PPTP: PPP over IPv4 (Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol)")
Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <xeb@mail.ru>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
index 0bacabf..b35199c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
@@ -131,24 +131,27 @@ static int lookup_chan_dst(u16 call_id, __be32 d_addr)
return i < MAX_CALLID;
}
-static int add_chan(struct pppox_sock *sock)
+static int add_chan(struct pppox_sock *sock,
+ struct pptp_addr *sa)
{
static int call_id;
spin_lock(&chan_lock);
- if (!sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id) {
+ if (!sa->call_id) {
call_id = find_next_zero_bit(callid_bitmap, MAX_CALLID, call_id + 1);
if (call_id == MAX_CALLID) {
call_id = find_next_zero_bit(callid_bitmap, MAX_CALLID, 1);
if (call_id == MAX_CALLID)
goto out_err;
}
- sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id = call_id;
- } else if (test_bit(sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id, callid_bitmap))
+ sa->call_id = call_id;
+ } else if (test_bit(sa->call_id, callid_bitmap)) {
goto out_err;
+ }
- set_bit(sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id, callid_bitmap);
- rcu_assign_pointer(callid_sock[sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id], sock);
+ sock->proto.pptp.src_addr = *sa;
+ set_bit(sa->call_id, callid_bitmap);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(callid_sock[sa->call_id], sock);
spin_unlock(&chan_lock);
return 0;
@@ -417,7 +420,6 @@ static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
- struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
int error = 0;
if (sockaddr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppox))
@@ -425,10 +427,22 @@ static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
lock_sock(sk);
- opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
- if (add_chan(po))
+ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) {
+ error = -EALREADY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
error = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (add_chan(po, &sp->sa_addr.pptp))
+ error = -EBUSY;
+ else
+ sk->sk_state |= PPPOX_BOUND;
+out:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
@@ -499,7 +513,7 @@ static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
}
opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
- sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
+ sk->sk_state |= PPPOX_CONNECTED;
end:
release_sock(sk);
--
2.4.1
From 943b170d487203b94394c0990ab4c5fea903395e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 18:29:49 -0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/34] sctp: allow setting SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY by the
application
[ Upstream commit 27f7ed2b11d42ab6d796e96533c2076ec220affc ]
This patch extends commit b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side
for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension") as it didn't white list
SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY on sctp_msghdr_parse(), causing it to be
understood as an invalid flag and returning -EINVAL to the application.
Note that the actual handling of the flag is already there in
sctp_datamsg_from_user().
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7053#section-7
Fixes: b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 76e6ec6..1b80f20 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -6653,6 +6653,7 @@ static int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg, sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
if (cmsgs->srinfo->sinfo_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
+ SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -6676,6 +6677,7 @@ static int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg, sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
if (cmsgs->sinfo->snd_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
+ SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
break;
--
2.4.1
From 2316e82d255a6110c35afb7cbbf0d01d08f083c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <parthasarathy.bhuvaragan@ericsson.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 11:35:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/34] tipc: fix connection abort during subscription cancel
[ Upstream commit 4d5cfcba2f6ec494d8810b9e3c0a7b06255c8067 ]
In 'commit 7fe8097cef5f ("tipc: fix nullpointer bug when subscribing
to events")', we terminate the connection if the subscription
creation fails.
In the same commit, the subscription creation result was based on
the value of the subscription pointer (set in the function) instead
of the return code.
Unfortunately, the same function tipc_subscrp_create() handles
subscription cancel request. For a subscription cancellation request,
the subscription pointer cannot be set. Thus if a subscriber has
several subscriptions and cancels any of them, the connection is
terminated.
In this commit, we terminate the connection based on the return value
of tipc_subscrp_create().
Fixes: commit 7fe8097cef5f ("tipc: fix nullpointer bug when subscribing to events")
Reviewed-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <parthasarathy.bhuvaragan@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/tipc/subscr.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/subscr.c b/net/tipc/subscr.c
index 1c147c8..948f316 100644
--- a/net/tipc/subscr.c
+++ b/net/tipc/subscr.c
@@ -302,11 +302,10 @@ static void subscr_conn_msg_event(struct net *net, int conid,
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
spin_lock_bh(&subscriber->lock);
- subscr_subscribe(net, (struct tipc_subscr *)buf, subscriber, &sub);
- if (sub)
- tipc_nametbl_subscribe(sub);
- else
+ if (subscr_subscribe(net, (struct tipc_subscr *)buf, subscriber, &sub))
tipc_conn_terminate(tn->topsrv, subscriber->conid);
+ else
+ tipc_nametbl_subscribe(sub);
spin_unlock_bh(&subscriber->lock);
}
--
2.4.1
From b407fdbb44b3bad4a99f495f1436306230bd86dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 15:16:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/34] switchdev: Require RTNL mutex to be held when sending
FDB notifications
[ Upstream commit 4f2c6ae5c64c353fb1b0425e4747e5603feadba1 ]
When switchdev drivers process FDB notifications from the underlying
device they resolve the netdev to which the entry points to and notify
the bridge using the switchdev notifier.
However, since the RTNL mutex is not held there is nothing preventing
the netdev from disappearing in the middle, which will cause
br_switchdev_event() to dereference a non-existing netdev.
Make switchdev drivers hold the lock at the beginning of the
notification processing session and release it once it ends, after
notifying the bridge.
Also, remove switchdev_mutex and fdb_lock, as they are no longer needed
when RTNL mutex is held.
Fixes: 03bf0c281234 ("switchdev: introduce switchdev notifier")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c | 2 ++
net/bridge/br.c | 3 +--
net/switchdev/switchdev.c | 15 ++++++++-------
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c
index 73b6fc2..4fedf7f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c
@@ -3384,12 +3384,14 @@ static void rocker_port_fdb_learn_work(struct work_struct *work)
info.addr = lw->addr;
info.vid = lw->vid;
+ rtnl_lock();
if (learned && removing)
call_netdev_switch_notifiers(NETDEV_SWITCH_FDB_DEL,
lw->dev, &info.info);
else if (learned && !removing)
call_netdev_switch_notifiers(NETDEV_SWITCH_FDB_ADD,
lw->dev, &info.info);
+ rtnl_unlock();
kfree(work);
}
diff --git a/net/bridge/br.c b/net/bridge/br.c
index 02c24cf..c72e01c 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static struct notifier_block br_device_notifier = {
.notifier_call = br_device_event
};
+/* called with RTNL */
static int br_netdev_switch_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
@@ -130,7 +131,6 @@ static int br_netdev_switch_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
struct netdev_switch_notifier_fdb_info *fdb_info;
int err = NOTIFY_DONE;
- rtnl_lock();
p = br_port_get_rtnl(dev);
if (!p)
goto out;
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int br_netdev_switch_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
}
out:
- rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/switchdev/switchdev.c b/net/switchdev/switchdev.c
index 055453d..a8dbe80 100644
--- a/net/switchdev/switchdev.c
+++ b/net/switchdev/switchdev.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <net/ip_fib.h>
#include <net/switchdev.h>
@@ -64,7 +65,6 @@ int netdev_switch_port_stp_update(struct net_device *dev, u8 state)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(netdev_switch_port_stp_update);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(netdev_switch_mutex);
static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(netdev_switch_notif_chain);
/**
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ int register_netdev_switch_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
int err;
- mutex_lock(&netdev_switch_mutex);
+ rtnl_lock();
err = raw_notifier_chain_register(&netdev_switch_notif_chain, nb);
- mutex_unlock(&netdev_switch_mutex);
+ rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_netdev_switch_notifier);
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ int unregister_netdev_switch_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
int err;
- mutex_lock(&netdev_switch_mutex);
+ rtnl_lock();
err = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&netdev_switch_notif_chain, nb);
- mutex_unlock(&netdev_switch_mutex);
+ rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_netdev_switch_notifier);
@@ -113,16 +113,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_netdev_switch_notifier);
* Call all network notifier blocks. This should be called by driver
* when it needs to propagate hardware event.
* Return values are same as for atomic_notifier_call_chain().
+ * rtnl_lock must be held.
*/
int call_netdev_switch_notifiers(unsigned long val, struct net_device *dev,
struct netdev_switch_notifier_info *info)
{
int err;
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+
info->dev = dev;
- mutex_lock(&netdev_switch_mutex);
err = raw_notifier_call_chain(&netdev_switch_notif_chain, val, info);
- mutex_unlock(&netdev_switch_mutex);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(call_netdev_switch_notifiers);
--
2.4.1
From bdd9c26852c741ff12b2a563b76f6cb5accfdc61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 10:52:43 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 09/34] tcp: beware of alignments in tcp_get_info()
[ Upstream commit ff5d749772018602c47509bdc0093ff72acd82ec ]
With some combinations of user provided flags in netlink command,
it is possible to call tcp_get_info() with a buffer that is not 8-bytes
aligned.
It does matter on some arches, so we need to use put_unaligned() to
store the u64 fields.
Current iproute2 package does not trigger this particular issue.
Fixes: 0df48c26d841 ("tcp: add tcpi_bytes_acked to tcp_info")
Fixes: 977cb0ecf82e ("tcp: add pacing_rate information into tcp_info")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index bb2ce74..b5f4f5c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/busy_poll.h>
int sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout __read_mostly = TCP_FIN_TIMEOUT;
@@ -2603,6 +2604,7 @@ void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
u32 now = tcp_time_stamp;
unsigned int start;
+ u64 rate64;
u32 rate;
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
@@ -2665,15 +2667,17 @@ void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
info->tcpi_total_retrans = tp->total_retrans;
rate = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_pacing_rate);
- info->tcpi_pacing_rate = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ rate64 = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ put_unaligned(rate64, &info->tcpi_pacing_rate);
rate = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_pacing_rate);
- info->tcpi_max_pacing_rate = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ rate64 = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ put_unaligned(rate64, &info->tcpi_max_pacing_rate);
do {
start = u64_stats_fetch_begin_irq(&tp->syncp);
- info->tcpi_bytes_acked = tp->bytes_acked;
- info->tcpi_bytes_received = tp->bytes_received;
+ put_unaligned(tp->bytes_acked, &info->tcpi_bytes_acked);
+ put_unaligned(tp->bytes_received, &info->tcpi_bytes_received);
} while (u64_stats_fetch_retry_irq(&tp->syncp, start));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_get_info);
--
2.4.1
From 0822b6e3c189f8c47979ff58e6fbf37dc309ca36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 12:30:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/34] ipv6: enforce flowi6_oif usage in ip6_dst_lookup_tail()
[ Upstream commit 6f21c96a78b835259546d8f3fb4edff0f651d478 ]
The current implementation of ip6_dst_lookup_tail basically
ignore the egress ifindex match: if the saddr is set,
ip6_route_output() purposefully ignores flowi6_oif, due
to the commit d46a9d678e4c ("net: ipv6: Dont add RT6_LOOKUP_F_IFACE
flag if saddr set"), if the saddr is 'any' the first route lookup
in ip6_dst_lookup_tail fails, but upon failure a second lookup will
be performed with saddr set, thus ignoring the ifindex constraint.
This commit adds an output route lookup function variant, which
allows the caller to specify lookup flags, and modify
ip6_dst_lookup_tail() to enforce the ifindex match on the second
lookup via said helper.
ip6_route_output() becames now a static inline function build on
top of ip6_route_output_flags(); as a side effect, out-of-tree
modules need now a GPL license to access the output route lookup
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_route.h | 12 ++++++++++--
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 6 +++++-
net/ipv6/route.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_route.h b/include/net/ip6_route.h
index 5e19206..388dea4 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_route.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_route.h
@@ -64,8 +64,16 @@ static inline bool rt6_need_strict(const struct in6_addr *daddr)
void ip6_route_input(struct sk_buff *skb);
-struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
- struct flowi6 *fl6);
+struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
+ struct flowi6 *fl6, int flags);
+
+static inline struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net,
+ const struct sock *sk,
+ struct flowi6 *fl6)
+{
+ return ip6_route_output_flags(net, sk, fl6, 0);
+}
+
struct dst_entry *ip6_route_lookup(struct net *net, struct flowi6 *fl6,
int flags);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index f50228b..36b9ac4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ static int ip6_dst_lookup_tail(struct sock *sk,
struct rt6_info *rt;
#endif
int err;
+ int flags = 0;
/* The correct way to handle this would be to do
* ip6_route_get_saddr, and then ip6_route_output; however,
@@ -916,10 +917,13 @@ static int ip6_dst_lookup_tail(struct sock *sk,
dst_release(*dst);
*dst = NULL;
}
+
+ if (fl6->flowi6_oif)
+ flags |= RT6_LOOKUP_F_IFACE;
}
if (!*dst)
- *dst = ip6_route_output(net, sk, fl6);
+ *dst = ip6_route_output_flags(net, sk, fl6, flags);
err = (*dst)->error;
if (err)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index f371fef..fe70bd6 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1030,11 +1030,9 @@ static struct rt6_info *ip6_pol_route_output(struct net *net, struct fib6_table
return ip6_pol_route(net, table, fl6->flowi6_oif, fl6, flags);
}
-struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
- struct flowi6 *fl6)
+struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
+ struct flowi6 *fl6, int flags)
{
- int flags = 0;
-
fl6->flowi6_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
if ((sk && sk->sk_bound_dev_if) || rt6_need_strict(&fl6->daddr))
@@ -1047,7 +1045,7 @@ struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
return fib6_rule_lookup(net, fl6, flags, ip6_pol_route_output);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_route_output);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip6_route_output_flags);
struct dst_entry *ip6_blackhole_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig)
{
--
2.4.1
From 4ab8d66399bd0c3bf51742376f753f9fe45d13a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 12:30:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/34] ipv6/udp: use sticky pktinfo egress ifindex on
connect()
[ Upstream commit 1cdda91871470f15e79375991bd2eddc6e86ddb1 ]
Currently, the egress interface index specified via IPV6_PKTINFO
is ignored by __ip6_datagram_connect(), so that RFC 3542 section 6.7
can be subverted when the user space application calls connect()
before sendmsg().
Fix it by initializing properly flowi6_oif in connect() before
performing the route lookup.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index 13ca4cf..8e6cb3f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ ipv4_connected:
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
+ if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
+ fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
+
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && (addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
--
2.4.1
From b47c8e84f58cb28628f8b685e2179c3a58375cb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:28:42 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 12/34] net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit
[ Upstream commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4 ]
Commit 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface")
disabled accept hop limit from RA if it is smaller than the current hop
limit for security stuff. But this behavior kind of break the RFC definition.
RFC 4861, 6.3.4. Processing Received Router Advertisements
A Router Advertisement field (e.g., Cur Hop Limit, Reachable Time,
and Retrans Timer) may contain a value denoting that it is
unspecified. In such cases, the parameter should be ignored and the
host should continue using whatever value it is already using.
If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set
its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.
So add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit to let user choose the minimum
hop limit value they can accept from RA. And set default to 1 to meet RFC
standards.
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/ipv6.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h | 2 ++
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 10 ++++++++++
net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 16 +++++++---------
5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
index 071fb18..07fad3d 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
@@ -1321,6 +1321,14 @@ accept_ra_from_local - BOOLEAN
disabled if accept_ra_from_local is disabled
on a specific interface.
+accept_ra_min_hop_limit - INTEGER
+ Minimum hop limit Information in Router Advertisement.
+
+ Hop limit Information in Router Advertisement less than this
+ variable shall be ignored.
+
+ Default: 1
+
accept_ra_pinfo - BOOLEAN
Learn Prefix Information in Router Advertisement.
diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index e4b4649..01c2592 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct ipv6_devconf {
__s32 max_desync_factor;
__s32 max_addresses;
__s32 accept_ra_defrtr;
+ __s32 accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
__s32 accept_ra_pinfo;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
__s32 accept_ra_rtr_pref;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
index 5efa54a..80f3b74 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ enum {
DEVCONF_USE_OPTIMISTIC,
DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MTU,
DEVCONF_STABLE_SECRET,
+ DEVCONF_USE_OIF_ADDRS_ONLY,
+ DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT,
DEVCONF_MAX
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index f4795b0..28c4bc5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf __read_mostly = {
.max_addresses = IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
.accept_ra_defrtr = 1,
.accept_ra_from_local = 0,
+ .accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
.accept_ra_pinfo = 1,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 1,
@@ -236,6 +237,7 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf_dflt __read_mostly = {
.max_addresses = IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
.accept_ra_defrtr = 1,
.accept_ra_from_local = 0,
+ .accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
.accept_ra_pinfo = 1,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 1,
@@ -4565,6 +4567,7 @@ static inline void ipv6_store_devconf(struct ipv6_devconf *cnf,
array[DEVCONF_MAX_DESYNC_FACTOR] = cnf->max_desync_factor;
array[DEVCONF_MAX_ADDRESSES] = cnf->max_addresses;
array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_DEFRTR] = cnf->accept_ra_defrtr;
+ array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT] = cnf->accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_PINFO] = cnf->accept_ra_pinfo;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_RTR_PREF] = cnf->accept_ra_rtr_pref;
@@ -5458,6 +5461,13 @@ static struct addrconf_sysctl_table
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
+ .procname = "accept_ra_min_hop_limit",
+ .data = &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ },
+ {
.procname = "accept_ra_pinfo",
.data = &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_pinfo,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
index 96f153c..abb0bdd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
@@ -1225,18 +1225,16 @@ static void ndisc_router_discovery(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (rt)
rt6_set_expires(rt, jiffies + (HZ * lifetime));
- if (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
- /* Only set hop_limit on the interface if it is higher than
- * the current hop_limit.
- */
- if (in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit < ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+ if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit < 256 &&
+ ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+ if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit <= ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit;
+ if (rt)
+ dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
+ ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
} else {
- ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than current\n");
+ ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than minimum\n");
}
- if (rt)
- dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
- ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
}
skip_defrtr:
--
2.4.1
From 4f0cc857de55aaac5e791f341c1d3b22ef55bbff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "subashab@codeaurora.org" <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 02:11:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 13/34] ipv6: addrconf: Fix recursive spin lock call
[ Upstream commit 16186a82de1fdd868255448274e64ae2616e2640 ]
A rcu stall with the following backtrace was seen on a system with
forwarding, optimistic_dad and use_optimistic set. To reproduce,
set these flags and allow ipv6 autoconf.
This occurs because the device write_lock is acquired while already
holding the read_lock. Back trace below -
INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU { 1} (t=2100 jiffies
g=3992 c=3991 q=4471)
<6> Task dump for CPU 1:
<2> kworker/1:0 R running task 12168 15 2 0x00000002
<2> Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
<6> Call trace:
<2> [<ffffffc000084da8>] el1_irq+0x68/0xdc
<2> [<ffffffc000cc4e0c>] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x20/0x30
<2> [<ffffffc000bc5dd8>] __ipv6_dev_ac_inc+0x64/0x1b4
<2> [<ffffffc000bcbd2c>] addrconf_join_anycast+0x9c/0xc4
<2> [<ffffffc000bcf9f0>] __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x160/0x29c
<2> [<ffffffc000bcfb7c>] ipv6_ifa_notify+0x50/0x70
<2> [<ffffffc000bd035c>] addrconf_dad_work+0x314/0x334
<2> [<ffffffc0000b64c8>] process_one_work+0x244/0x3fc
<2> [<ffffffc0000b7324>] worker_thread+0x2f8/0x418
<2> [<ffffffc0000bb40c>] kthread+0xe0/0xec
v2: do addrconf_dad_kick inside read lock and then acquire write
lock for ipv6_ifa_notify as suggested by Eric
Fixes: 7fd2561e4ebdd ("net: ipv6: Add a sysctl to make optimistic
addresses useful candidates")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Erik Kline <ek@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index 28c4bc5..fcfbd05 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -3423,6 +3423,7 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = ifp->idev;
struct net_device *dev = idev->dev;
+ bool notify = false;
addrconf_join_solict(dev, &ifp->addr);
@@ -3468,7 +3469,7 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
/* Because optimistic nodes can use this address,
* notify listeners. If DAD fails, RTM_DELADDR is sent.
*/
- ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
+ notify = true;
}
}
@@ -3476,6 +3477,8 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
out:
spin_unlock(&ifp->lock);
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
+ if (notify)
+ ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
}
static void addrconf_dad_start(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
--
2.4.1
From 61b970c511fb87bebd773bdf7606dddabf564ffd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 17:55:01 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 14/34] ipv6: fix a lockdep splat
[ Upstream commit 44c3d0c1c0a880354e9de5d94175742e2c7c9683 ]
Silence lockdep false positive about rcu_dereference() being
used in the wrong context.
First one should use rcu_dereference_protected() as we own the spinlock.
Second one should be a normal assignation, as no barrier is needed.
Fixes: 18367681a10bd ("ipv6 flowlabel: Convert np->ipv6_fl_list to RCU.")
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
index d491125..db939e4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
@@ -540,12 +540,13 @@ int ipv6_flowlabel_opt(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int optlen)
}
spin_lock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
for (sflp = &np->ipv6_fl_list;
- (sfl = rcu_dereference(*sflp)) != NULL;
+ (sfl = rcu_dereference_protected(*sflp,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ip6_sk_fl_lock))) != NULL;
sflp = &sfl->next) {
if (sfl->fl->label == freq.flr_label) {
if (freq.flr_label == (np->flow_label&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK))
np->flow_label &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
- *sflp = rcu_dereference(sfl->next);
+ *sflp = sfl->next;
spin_unlock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
fl_release(sfl->fl);
kfree_rcu(sfl, rcu);
--
2.4.1
From 1bf445552ac764132b27d611f2f367061ac11a10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 02:11:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 15/34] unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process
user_struct
[ Upstream commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 ]
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 4 ++--
include/net/scm.h | 1 +
net/core/scm.c | 7 +++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++--
net/unix/garbage.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index e830c3d..7bb69c9 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
void unix_gc(void);
void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 262532d..59fa93c 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct scm_creds {
struct scm_fp_list {
short count;
short max;
+ struct user_struct *user;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 8a1741b..dce0acb 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fplp = fpl;
fpl->count = 0;
fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+ fpl->user = NULL;
}
fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
@@ -107,6 +108,10 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fpp++ = file;
fpl->count++;
}
+
+ if (!fpl->user)
+ fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
return num;
}
@@ -119,6 +124,7 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
scm->fp = NULL;
for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+ free_uid(fpl->user);
kfree(fpl);
}
}
@@ -336,6 +342,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+ new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
}
return new_fpl;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index c741d83..d644042 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1529,7 +1529,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 8fcdc22..6a0d485 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
* descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
*/
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -133,11 +133,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+ user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+ user->unix_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
--
2.4.1
From 88ad25c59ee9a8a1227d56649506eba1719e6312 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hans Westgaard Ry <hans.westgaard.ry@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 09:26:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/34] net:Add sysctl_max_skb_frags
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit 5f74f82ea34c0da80ea0b49192bb5ea06e063593 ]
Devices may have limits on the number of fragments in an skb they support.
Current codebase uses a constant as maximum for number of fragments one
skb can hold and use.
When enabling scatter/gather and running traffic with many small messages
the codebase uses the maximum number of fragments and may thereby violate
the max for certain devices.
The patch introduces a global variable as max number of fragments.
Signed-off-by: Hans Westgaard Ry <hans.westgaard.ry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/skbuff.h | 1 +
net/core/skbuff.c | 2 ++
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 10 ++++++++++
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 1f17abe..6633b0c 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ struct sk_buff;
#else
#define MAX_SKB_FRAGS (65536/PAGE_SIZE + 1)
#endif
+extern int sysctl_max_skb_frags;
typedef struct skb_frag_struct skb_frag_t;
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 2e5fcda..c9793c6 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache __read_mostly;
static struct kmem_cache *skbuff_fclone_cache __read_mostly;
+int sysctl_max_skb_frags __read_mostly = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_max_skb_frags);
/**
* skb_panic - private function for out-of-line support
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index 95b6139..a6beb7b 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static int zero = 0;
static int one = 1;
static int min_sndbuf = SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF;
static int min_rcvbuf = SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF;
+static int max_skb_frags = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
static int net_msg_warn; /* Unused, but still a sysctl */
@@ -392,6 +393,15 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
+ {
+ .procname = "max_skb_frags",
+ .data = &sysctl_max_skb_frags,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &one,
+ .extra2 = &max_skb_frags,
+ },
{ }
};
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index b5f4f5c..19d385a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ new_segment:
i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
can_coalesce = skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, page, offset);
- if (!can_coalesce && i >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
+ if (!can_coalesce && i >= sysctl_max_skb_frags) {
tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
goto new_segment;
}
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ new_segment:
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
- if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS || !sg) {
+ if (i == sysctl_max_skb_frags || !sg) {
tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
goto new_segment;
}
--
2.4.1
From d8aa3c292681b63f6aa0ee1ebd2c130832b9917b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Siva Reddy Kallam <siva.kallam@broadcom.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 14:09:38 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 17/34] tg3: Fix for tg3 transmit queue 0 timed out when too
many gso_segs
[ Upstream commit b7d987295c74500b733a0ba07f9a9bcc4074fa83 ]
tg3_tso_bug() can hit a condition where the entire tx ring is not big
enough to segment the GSO packet. For example, if MSS is very small,
gso_segs can exceed the tx ring size. When we hit the condition, it
will cause tx timeout.
tg3_tso_bug() is called to handle TSO and DMA hardware bugs.
For TSO bugs, if tg3_tso_bug() cannot succeed, we have to drop the packet.
For DMA bugs, we can still fall back to linearize the SKB and let the
hardware transmit the TSO packet.
This patch adds a function tg3_tso_bug_gso_check() to check if there
are enough tx descriptors for GSO before calling tg3_tso_bug().
The caller will then handle the error appropriately - drop or
lineraize the SKB.
v2: Corrected patch description to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Siva Reddy Kallam <siva.kallam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
index 0d8af5b..d541520 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
@@ -7833,6 +7833,14 @@ static int tigon3_dma_hwbug_workaround(struct tg3_napi *tnapi,
return ret;
}
+static bool tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(struct tg3_napi *tnapi, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ /* Check if we will never have enough descriptors,
+ * as gso_segs can be more than current ring size
+ */
+ return skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs < tnapi->tx_pending / 3;
+}
+
static netdev_tx_t tg3_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *);
/* Use GSO to workaround all TSO packets that meet HW bug conditions
@@ -7936,14 +7944,19 @@ static netdev_tx_t tg3_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
* vlan encapsulated.
*/
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021Q) ||
- skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021AD))
- return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
+ skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021AD)) {
+ if (tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(tnapi, skb))
+ return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
+ goto drop;
+ }
if (!skb_is_gso_v6(skb)) {
if (unlikely((ETH_HLEN + hdr_len) > 80) &&
- tg3_flag(tp, TSO_BUG))
- return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
-
+ tg3_flag(tp, TSO_BUG)) {
+ if (tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(tnapi, skb))
+ return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
+ goto drop;
+ }
ip_csum = iph->check;
ip_tot_len = iph->tot_len;
iph->check = 0;
@@ -8075,7 +8088,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t tg3_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
if (would_hit_hwbug) {
tg3_tx_skb_unmap(tnapi, tnapi->tx_prod, i);
- if (mss) {
+ if (mss && tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(tnapi, skb)) {
/* If it's a TSO packet, do GSO instead of
* allocating and copying to a large linear SKB
*/
--
2.4.1
From 89e06932ea735e5bca99fdeee29e446d0c013c0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 23:33:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 18/34] sctp: translate network order to host order when users
get a hmacid
[ Upstream commit 7a84bd46647ff181eb2659fdc99590e6f16e501d ]
Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid") corrected the hmacid byte-order when setting a hmacid.
but the same issue also exists on getting a hmacid.
We fix it by changing hmacids to host order when users get them with
getsockopt.
Fixes: Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 1b80f20..3c58330 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -5555,6 +5555,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
__u16 data_len = 0;
u32 num_idents;
+ int i;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
@@ -5572,8 +5573,12 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(num_idents, &p->shmac_num_idents))
return -EFAULT;
- if (copy_to_user(p->shmac_idents, hmacs->hmac_ids, data_len))
- return -EFAULT;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_idents; i++) {
+ __u16 hmacid = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(&p->shmac_idents[i], &hmacid, sizeof(__u16)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
return 0;
}
--
2.4.1
From d21955e438460e31e6d35d891c7f3120ad66b47c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 02:49:54 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 19/34] flow_dissector: Fix unaligned access in
__skb_flow_dissector when used by eth_get_headlen
[ Upstream commit 461547f3158978c180d74484d58e82be9b8e7357, since
we lack the flow dissector flags in this release we guard the
flow label access using a test on 'skb' being NULL ]
This patch fixes an issue with unaligned accesses when using
eth_get_headlen on a page that was DMA aligned instead of being IP aligned.
The fact is when trying to check the length we don't need to be looking at
the flow label so we can reorder the checks to first check if we are
supposed to gather the flow label and then make the call to actually get
it.
v2: Updated path so that either STOP_AT_FLOW_LABEL or KEY_FLOW_LABEL can
cause us to check for the flow label.
Reported-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/flow_dissector.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/flow_dissector.c b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
index 2c35c02..f96d2ca 100644
--- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ ip:
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6): {
const struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct ipv6hdr _iph;
- __be32 flow_label;
ipv6:
iph = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_iph), data, hlen, &_iph);
@@ -130,8 +129,9 @@ ipv6:
flow->src = (__force __be32)ipv6_addr_hash(&iph->saddr);
flow->dst = (__force __be32)ipv6_addr_hash(&iph->daddr);
- flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(iph);
- if (flow_label) {
+ if (skb && ip6_flowlabel(iph)) {
+ __be32 flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(iph);
+
/* Awesome, IPv6 packet has a flow label so we can
* use that to represent the ports without any
* further dissection.
--
2.4.1
From 4126e8100d4a4c11497e098545a99acbf5483f8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 06:14:43 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 20/34] net: Copy inner L3 and L4 headers as unaligned on GRE
TEB
[ Upstream commit 78565208d73ca9b654fb9a6b142214d52eeedfd1 ]
This patch corrects the unaligned accesses seen on GRE TEB tunnels when
generating hash keys. Specifically what this patch does is make it so that
we force the use of skb_copy_bits when the GRE inner headers will be
unaligned due to NET_IP_ALIGNED being a non-zero value.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Acked-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/flow_dissector.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/flow_dissector.c b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
index f96d2ca..3556791 100644
--- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
@@ -233,6 +233,13 @@ ipv6:
return false;
proto = eth->h_proto;
nhoff += sizeof(*eth);
+
+ /* Cap headers that we access via pointers at the
+ * end of the Ethernet header as our maximum alignment
+ * at that point is only 2 bytes.
+ */
+ if (NET_IP_ALIGN)
+ hlen = nhoff;
}
goto again;
}
--
2.4.1
From 2fab3b421ef1a12bd4a24eff8b6fdc5a78e3f594 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 16:47:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 21/34] bpf: fix branch offset adjustment on backjumps after
patching ctx expansion
[ Upstream commit a1b14d27ed0965838350f1377ff97c93ee383492 ]
When ctx access is used, the kernel often needs to expand/rewrite
instructions, so after that patching, branch offsets have to be
adjusted for both forward and backward jumps in the new eBPF program,
but for backward jumps it fails to account the delta. Meaning, for
example, if the expansion happens exactly on the insn that sits at
the jump target, it doesn't fix up the back jump offset.
Analysis on what the check in adjust_branches() is currently doing:
/* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */
if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
insn->off += delta;
else if (i > pos && i + insn->off + 1 < pos)
insn->off -= delta;
First condition (forward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- i/insn insns[1] <--- i/insn
insns[2] <--- pos insns[P] <--- pos
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- target_X insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- target_X
insns[5]
First case is if we cross pos-boundary and the jump instruction was
before pos. This is handeled correctly. I.e. if i == pos, then this
would mean our jump that we currently check was the patchlet itself
that we just injected. Since such patchlets are self-contained and
have no awareness of any insns before or after the patched one, the
delta is correctly not adjusted. Also, for the second condition in
case of i + insn->off + 1 == pos, means we jump to that newly patched
instruction, so no offset adjustment are needed. That part is correct.
Second condition (backward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- target_X insns[1] <--- target_X
insns[2] <--- pos <-- target_Y insns[P] <--- pos <-- target_Y
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- i/insn insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- i/insn
insns[5]
Second interesting case is where we cross pos-boundary and the jump
instruction was after pos. Backward jump with i == pos would be
impossible and pose a bug somewhere in the patchlet, so the first
condition checking i > pos is okay only by itself. However, i +
insn->off + 1 < pos does not always work as intended to trigger the
adjustment. It works when jump targets would be far off where the
delta wouldn't matter. But, for example, where the fixed insn->off
before pointed to pos (target_Y), it now points to pos + delta, so
that additional room needs to be taken into account for the check.
This means that i) both tests here need to be adjusted into pos + delta,
and ii) for the second condition, the test needs to be <= as pos
itself can be a target in the backjump, too.
Fixes: 9bac3d6d548e ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 141d562..6582410 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1944,7 +1944,7 @@ static void adjust_branches(struct bpf_prog *prog, int pos, int delta)
/* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */
if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
insn->off += delta;
- else if (i > pos && i + insn->off + 1 < pos)
+ else if (i > pos + delta && i + insn->off + 1 <= pos + delta)
insn->off -= delta;
}
}
--
2.4.1
From e8b38a5db8a2b0f6d5480af6594ed4365235d82f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 13:35:56 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 22/34] bonding: Fix ARP monitor validation
[ Upstream commit 21a75f0915dde8674708b39abfcda113911c49b1 ]
The current logic in bond_arp_rcv will accept an incoming ARP for
validation if (a) the receiving slave is either "active" (which includes
the currently active slave, or the current ARP slave) or, (b) there is a
currently active slave, and it has received an ARP since it became active.
For case (b), the receiving slave isn't the currently active slave, and is
receiving the original broadcast ARP request, not an ARP reply from the
target.
This logic can fail if there is no currently active slave. In
this situation, the ARP probe logic cycles through all slaves, assigning
each in turn as the "current_arp_slave" for one arp_interval, then setting
that one as "active," and sending an ARP probe from that slave. The
current logic expects the ARP reply to arrive on the sending
current_arp_slave, however, due to switch FDB updating delays, the reply
may be directed to another slave.
This can arise if the bonding slaves and switch are working, but
the ARP target is not responding. When the ARP target recovers, a
condition may result wherein the ARP target host replies faster than the
switch can update its forwarding table, causing each ARP reply to be sent
to the previous current_arp_slave. This will never pass the logic in
bond_arp_rcv, as neither of the above conditions (a) or (b) are met.
Some experimentation on a LAN shows ARP reply round trips in the
200 usec range, but my available switches never update their FDB in less
than 4000 usec.
This patch changes the logic in bond_arp_rcv to additionally
accept an ARP reply for validation on any slave if there is a current ARP
slave and it sent an ARP probe during the previous arp_interval.
Fixes: aeea64ac717a ("bonding: don't trust arp requests unless active slave really works")
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index 72ba774..bd744e3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -214,6 +214,8 @@ static void bond_uninit(struct net_device *bond_dev);
static struct rtnl_link_stats64 *bond_get_stats(struct net_device *bond_dev,
struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats);
static void bond_slave_arr_handler(struct work_struct *work);
+static bool bond_time_in_interval(struct bonding *bond, unsigned long last_act,
+ int mod);
/*---------------------------- General routines -----------------------------*/
@@ -2397,7 +2399,7 @@ int bond_arp_rcv(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond,
struct slave *slave)
{
struct arphdr *arp = (struct arphdr *)skb->data;
- struct slave *curr_active_slave;
+ struct slave *curr_active_slave, *curr_arp_slave;
unsigned char *arp_ptr;
__be32 sip, tip;
int alen, is_arp = skb->protocol == __cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_ARP);
@@ -2444,26 +2446,41 @@ int bond_arp_rcv(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond,
&sip, &tip);
curr_active_slave = rcu_dereference(bond->curr_active_slave);
+ curr_arp_slave = rcu_dereference(bond->current_arp_slave);
- /* Backup slaves won't see the ARP reply, but do come through
- * here for each ARP probe (so we swap the sip/tip to validate
- * the probe). In a "redundant switch, common router" type of
- * configuration, the ARP probe will (hopefully) travel from
- * the active, through one switch, the router, then the other
- * switch before reaching the backup.
+ /* We 'trust' the received ARP enough to validate it if:
+ *
+ * (a) the slave receiving the ARP is active (which includes the
+ * current ARP slave, if any), or
+ *
+ * (b) the receiving slave isn't active, but there is a currently
+ * active slave and it received valid arp reply(s) after it became
+ * the currently active slave, or
+ *
+ * (c) there is an ARP slave that sent an ARP during the prior ARP
+ * interval, and we receive an ARP reply on any slave. We accept
+ * these because switch FDB update delays may deliver the ARP
+ * reply to a slave other than the sender of the ARP request.
*
- * We 'trust' the arp requests if there is an active slave and
- * it received valid arp reply(s) after it became active. This
- * is done to avoid endless looping when we can't reach the
+ * Note: for (b), backup slaves are receiving the broadcast ARP
+ * request, not a reply. This request passes from the sending
+ * slave through the L2 switch(es) to the receiving slave. Since
+ * this is checking the request, sip/tip are swapped for
+ * validation.
+ *
+ * This is done to avoid endless looping when we can't reach the
* arp_ip_target and fool ourselves with our own arp requests.
*/
-
if (bond_is_active_slave(slave))
bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, sip, tip);
else if (curr_active_slave &&
time_after(slave_last_rx(bond, curr_active_slave),
curr_active_slave->last_link_up))
bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, tip, sip);
+ else if (curr_arp_slave && (arp->ar_op == htons(ARPOP_REPLY)) &&
+ bond_time_in_interval(bond,
+ dev_trans_start(curr_arp_slave->dev), 1))
+ bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, sip, tip);
out_unlock:
if (arp != (struct arphdr *)skb->data)
--
2.4.1
From b3410b06fb9b7ea3bb4fc85940387c01507f8119 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 06:23:28 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 23/34] ipv4: fix memory leaks in ip_cmsg_send() callers
[ Upstream commit 919483096bfe75dda338e98d56da91a263746a0a ]
Dmitry reported memory leaks of IP options allocated in
ip_cmsg_send() when/if this function returns an error.
Callers are responsible for the freeing.
Many thanks to Dmitry for the report and diagnostic.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 ++
net/ipv4/ping.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/raw.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/udp.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 6ddde89..b6c7bde 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ int ip_cmsg_send(struct net *net, struct msghdr *msg, struct ipcm_cookie *ipc,
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case IP_RETOPTS:
err = cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr));
+
+ /* Our caller is responsible for freeing ipc->opt */
err = ip_options_get(net, &ipc->opt, CMSG_DATA(cmsg),
err < 40 ? err : 40);
if (err)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index 05ff44b..f6ee0d5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -745,8 +745,10 @@ static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc, false);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index 561cd4b..c77aac7 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -543,8 +543,10 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc, false);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
goto out;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index 1b8c5ba..a390174 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -963,8 +963,10 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc,
sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
connected = 0;
--
2.4.1
From 631df6b90c7eeff42da24023f4ba3ebc2cab2296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 19:37:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 24/34] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in
unix_dgram_sendmsg
[ Upstream commit a5527dda344fff0514b7989ef7a755729769daa1 ]
The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either
established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an
unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the
specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or
because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of
the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In
both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which
might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock
the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk
check to guard against this.
Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")
Reported-By: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index d644042..535a642 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1714,7 +1714,12 @@ restart_locked:
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ /* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock
+ */
+ if (other != sk &&
+ unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
if (timeo) {
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
--
2.4.1
From 08bde5fe438f572f92b5869ecfa27abd192d9926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <bjorn@mork.no>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 16:42:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 25/34] qmi_wwan: add "4G LTE usb-modem U901"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit aac8d3c282e024c344c5b86dc1eab7af88bb9716 ]
Thomas reports:
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=05c6 ProdID=6001 Rev=00.00
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=1234567890ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 71190dc..cffb252 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
/* 3. Combined interface devices matching on interface number */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0408, 0xea42, 4)}, /* Yota / Megafon M100-1 */
+ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x6001, 3)}, /* 4G LTE usb-modem U901 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7000, 0)},
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7001, 1)},
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7002, 1)},
--
2.4.1
From 8e1208d15c594fd8c8380d31ec0c48a90c457401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amir Vadai <amir@vadai.me>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 17:24:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 26/34] net/mlx4_en: Count HW buffer overrun only once
[ Upstream commit 281e8b2fdf8e4ef366b899453cae50e09b577ada ]
RdropOvflw counts overrun of HW buffer, therefore should
be used for rx_fifo_errors only.
Currently RdropOvflw counter is mistakenly also set into
rx_missed_errors and rx_over_errors too, which makes the
device total dropped packets accounting to show wrong results.
Fix that. Use it for rx_fifo_errors only.
Fixes: c27a02cd94d6 ('mlx4_en: Add driver for Mellanox ConnectX 10GbE NIC')
Signed-off-by: Amir Vadai <amir@vadai.me>
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
index 0a56f01..760a8b3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
@@ -223,11 +223,11 @@ int mlx4_en_DUMP_ETH_STATS(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev, u8 port, u8 reset)
stats->collisions = 0;
stats->rx_dropped = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RDROP);
stats->rx_length_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropLength);
- stats->rx_over_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
+ stats->rx_over_errors = 0;
stats->rx_crc_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RCRC);
stats->rx_frame_errors = 0;
stats->rx_fifo_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
- stats->rx_missed_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
+ stats->rx_missed_errors = 0;
stats->tx_aborted_errors = 0;
stats->tx_carrier_errors = 0;
stats->tx_fifo_errors = 0;
--
2.4.1
From 860101bf000a6d18cb5ae385a6b8041c173cd0c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 17:24:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 27/34] net/mlx4_en: Choose time-stamping shift value according
to HW frequency
[ Upstream commit 31c128b66e5b28f468076e4f3ca3025c35342041 ]
Previously, the shift value used for time-stamping was constant and didn't
depend on the HW chip frequency. Change that to take the frequency into account
and calculate the maximal value in cycles per wraparound of ten seconds. This
time slot was chosen since it gives a good accuracy in time synchronization.
Algorithm for shift value calculation:
* Round up the maximal value in cycles to nearest power of two
* Calculate maximal multiplier by division of all 64 bits set
to above result
* Then, invert the function clocksource_khz2mult() to get the shift from
maximal mult value
Fixes: ec693d47010e ('net/mlx4_en: Add HW timestamping (TS) support')
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Matan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
index 8a083d7..dae2ebb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
@@ -236,6 +236,24 @@ static const struct ptp_clock_info mlx4_en_ptp_clock_info = {
.enable = mlx4_en_phc_enable,
};
+#define MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC 10ULL
+
+/* This function calculates the max shift that enables the user range
+ * of MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC values in the cycles register.
+ */
+static u32 freq_to_shift(u16 freq)
+{
+ u32 freq_khz = freq * 1000;
+ u64 max_val_cycles = freq_khz * 1000 * MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC;
+ u64 max_val_cycles_rounded = is_power_of_2(max_val_cycles + 1) ?
+ max_val_cycles : roundup_pow_of_two(max_val_cycles) - 1;
+ /* calculate max possible multiplier in order to fit in 64bit */
+ u64 max_mul = div_u64(0xffffffffffffffffULL, max_val_cycles_rounded);
+
+ /* This comes from the reverse of clocksource_khz2mult */
+ return ilog2(div_u64(max_mul * freq_khz, 1000000));
+}
+
void mlx4_en_init_timestamp(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev)
{
struct mlx4_dev *dev = mdev->dev;
@@ -247,12 +265,7 @@ void mlx4_en_init_timestamp(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev)
memset(&mdev->cycles, 0, sizeof(mdev->cycles));
mdev->cycles.read = mlx4_en_read_clock;
mdev->cycles.mask = CLOCKSOURCE_MASK(48);
- /* Using shift to make calculation more accurate. Since current HW
- * clock frequency is 427 MHz, and cycles are given using a 48 bits
- * register, the biggest shift when calculating using u64, is 14
- * (max_cycles * multiplier < 2^64)
- */
- mdev->cycles.shift = 14;
+ mdev->cycles.shift = freq_to_shift(dev->caps.hca_core_clock);
mdev->cycles.mult =
clocksource_khz2mult(1000 * dev->caps.hca_core_clock, mdev->cycles.shift);
mdev->nominal_c_mult = mdev->cycles.mult;
--
2.4.1
From 46edd100765589d9a783ccff96423b785e501aca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 17:24:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 28/34] net/mlx4_en: Avoid changing dev->features directly in
run-time
[ Upstream commit 925ab1aa9394bbaeac47ee5b65d3fdf0fb8135cf ]
It's forbidden to manually change dev->features in run-time. Currently, this is
done in the driver to make sure that GSO_UDP_TUNNEL is advertized only when
VXLAN tunnel is set. However, since the stack actually does features intersection
with hw_enc_features, we can safely revert to advertizing features early when
registering the netdevice.
Fixes: f4a1edd56120 ('net/mlx4_en: Advertize encapsulation offloads [...]')
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
index a5a0b84..e918959 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
@@ -2330,8 +2330,6 @@ out:
/* set offloads */
priv->dev->hw_enc_features |= NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
- priv->dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
- priv->dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
}
static void mlx4_en_del_vxlan_offloads(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -2342,8 +2340,6 @@ static void mlx4_en_del_vxlan_offloads(struct work_struct *work)
/* unset offloads */
priv->dev->hw_enc_features &= ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL);
- priv->dev->hw_features &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
- priv->dev->features &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
ret = mlx4_SET_PORT_VXLAN(priv->mdev->dev, priv->port,
VXLAN_STEER_BY_OUTER_MAC, 0);
@@ -2940,6 +2936,11 @@ int mlx4_en_init_netdev(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev, int port,
priv->rss_hash_fn = ETH_RSS_HASH_TOP;
}
+ if (mdev->dev->caps.tunnel_offload_mode == MLX4_TUNNEL_OFFLOAD_MODE_VXLAN) {
+ dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
+ dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
+ }
+
mdev->pndev[port] = dev;
mdev->upper[port] = NULL;
--
2.4.1
From 446b8f5e12e2b12b3c06eb2814332a1820b3c8fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Tomlinson <mark.tomlinson@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 16:24:44 +1300
Subject: [PATCH 29/34] l2tp: Fix error creating L2TP tunnels
[ Upstream commit 853effc55b0f975abd6d318cca486a9c1b67e10f ]
A previous commit (33f72e6) added notification via netlink for tunnels
when created/modified/deleted. If the notification returned an error,
this error was returned from the tunnel function. If there were no
listeners, the error code ESRCH was returned, even though having no
listeners is not an error. Other calls to this and other similar
notification functions either ignore the error code, or filter ESRCH.
This patch checks for ESRCH and does not flag this as an error.
Reviewed-by: Hamish Martin <hamish.martin@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tomlinson <mark.tomlinson@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
index 9e13c2f..fe92a08 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
@@ -124,8 +124,13 @@ static int l2tp_tunnel_notify(struct genl_family *family,
ret = l2tp_nl_tunnel_send(msg, info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq,
NLM_F_ACK, tunnel, cmd);
- if (ret >= 0)
- return genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ ret = genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ /* We don't care if no one is listening */
+ if (ret == -ESRCH)
+ ret = 0;
+ return ret;
+ }
nlmsg_free(msg);
@@ -147,8 +152,13 @@ static int l2tp_session_notify(struct genl_family *family,
ret = l2tp_nl_session_send(msg, info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq,
NLM_F_ACK, session, cmd);
- if (ret >= 0)
- return genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ ret = genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ /* We don't care if no one is listening */
+ if (ret == -ESRCH)
+ ret = 0;
+ return ret;
+ }
nlmsg_free(msg);
--
2.4.1
From 47428bcfddd944e0c2d5b048de440dc96ecf8b0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 17:01:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 30/34] pppoe: fix reference counting in PPPoE proxy
[ Upstream commit 29e73269aa4d36f92b35610c25f8b01c789b0dc8 ]
Drop reference on the relay_po socket when __pppoe_xmit() succeeds.
This is already handled correctly in the error path.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
index 9c8fabe..d1c4bc1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ static int pppoe_rcv_core(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!__pppoe_xmit(sk_pppox(relay_po), skb))
goto abort_put;
+
+ sock_put(sk_pppox(relay_po));
} else {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
goto abort_kfree;
--
2.4.1
From 6fa83f7aa46ec6035c1c41f19e63833ecdcd49ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 21:21:19 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 31/34] route: check and remove route cache when we get route
[ Upstream commit deed49df7390d5239024199e249190328f1651e7 ]
Since the gc of ipv4 route was removed, the route cached would has
no chance to be removed, and even it has been timeout, it still could
be used, cause no code to check it's expires.
Fix this issue by checking and removing route cache when we get route.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip_fib.h | 1 +
net/ipv4/route.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip_fib.h b/include/net/ip_fib.h
index 54271ed..13f1a97 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_fib.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_fib.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct fib_nh_exception {
struct rtable __rcu *fnhe_rth_input;
struct rtable __rcu *fnhe_rth_output;
unsigned long fnhe_stamp;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
};
struct fnhe_hash_bucket {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index f45f2a1..1d3cdb4d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static int ip_rt_mtu_expires __read_mostly = 10 * 60 * HZ;
static int ip_rt_min_pmtu __read_mostly = 512 + 20 + 20;
static int ip_rt_min_advmss __read_mostly = 256;
+static int ip_rt_gc_timeout __read_mostly = RT_GC_TIMEOUT;
/*
* Interface to generic destination cache.
*/
@@ -753,7 +754,7 @@ static void __ip_do_redirect(struct rtable *rt, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flow
struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(res);
update_or_create_fnhe(nh, fl4->daddr, new_gw,
- 0, 0);
+ 0, jiffies + ip_rt_gc_timeout);
}
if (kill_route)
rt->dst.obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_KILL;
@@ -1538,6 +1539,36 @@ static void ip_handle_martian_source(struct net_device *dev,
#endif
}
+static void ip_del_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
+{
+ struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
+ struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, __rcu **fnhe_p;
+ u32 hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+
+ hash = rcu_dereference_protected(nh->nh_exceptions,
+ lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+ hash += hval;
+
+ fnhe_p = &hash->chain;
+ fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+ while (fnhe) {
+ if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(*fnhe_p, rcu_dereference_protected(
+ fnhe->fnhe_next, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)));
+ fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
+ kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu);
+ break;
+ }
+ fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next;
+ fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(fnhe->fnhe_next,
+ lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+}
+
/* called in rcu_read_lock() section */
static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct fib_result *res,
@@ -1592,11 +1623,20 @@ static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
fnhe = find_exception(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
if (do_cache) {
- if (fnhe)
+ if (fnhe) {
rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
- else
- rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
+ if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
+ time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
+ ip_del_fnhe(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
+ fnhe = NULL;
+ } else {
+ goto rt_cache;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
+rt_cache:
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
goto out;
@@ -1945,19 +1985,29 @@ static struct rtable *__mkroute_output(const struct fib_result *res,
struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(*res);
fnhe = find_exception(nh, fl4->daddr);
- if (fnhe)
+ if (fnhe) {
prth = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
- else {
- if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
- FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
- !(nh->nh_gw &&
- nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
- do_cache = false;
- goto add;
+ rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
+ if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
+ time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
+ ip_del_fnhe(nh, fl4->daddr);
+ fnhe = NULL;
+ } else {
+ goto rt_cache;
}
- prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
}
+
+ if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
+ FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
+ !(nh->nh_gw &&
+ nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
+ do_cache = false;
+ goto add;
+ }
+ prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
+
+rt_cache:
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
dst_hold(&rth->dst);
return rth;
@@ -2504,7 +2554,6 @@ void ip_rt_multicast_event(struct in_device *in_dev)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-static int ip_rt_gc_timeout __read_mostly = RT_GC_TIMEOUT;
static int ip_rt_gc_interval __read_mostly = 60 * HZ;
static int ip_rt_gc_min_interval __read_mostly = HZ / 2;
static int ip_rt_gc_elasticity __read_mostly = 8;
--
2.4.1
From 1f3ccbd82112896b6d775fa9988296e65a84ec83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 21:43:16 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 32/34] rtnl: RTM_GETNETCONF: fix wrong return value
[ Upstream commit a97eb33ff225f34a8124774b3373fd244f0e83ce ]
An error response from a RTM_GETNETCONF request can return the positive
error value EINVAL in the struct nlmsgerr that can mislead userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/devinet.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index 419d23c..280d46f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@ static int inet_netconf_get_devconf(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = EINVAL;
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (!tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX])
goto errout;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index fcfbd05..f555f4f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static int inet6_netconf_get_devconf(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = EINVAL;
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (!tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX])
goto errout;
--
2.4.1
From 23a177abe9bc1f608dde418c1b3f8a8ac73f0abe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 04:27:48 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 33/34] unix_diag: fix incorrect sign extension in
unix_lookup_by_ino
[ Upstream commit b5f0549231ffb025337be5a625b0ff9f52b016f0 ]
The value passed by unix_diag_get_exact to unix_lookup_by_ino has type
__u32, but unix_lookup_by_ino's argument ino has type int, which is not
a problem yet.
However, when ino is compared with sock_i_ino return value of type
unsigned long, ino is sign extended to signed long, and this results
to incorrect comparison on 64-bit architectures for inode numbers
greater than INT_MAX.
This bug was found by strace test suite.
Fixes: 5d3cae8bc39d ("unix_diag: Dumping exact socket core")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/diag.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/diag.c b/net/unix/diag.c
index c512f64..4d96797 100644
--- a/net/unix/diag.c
+++ b/net/unix/diag.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ done:
return skb->len;
}
-static struct sock *unix_lookup_by_ino(int ino)
+static struct sock *unix_lookup_by_ino(unsigned int ino)
{
int i;
struct sock *sk;
--
2.4.1
From 79eb6ee61e06f1b95b25365401c6bccbe012cf51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 16:10:57 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 34/34] sctp: Fix port hash table size computation
[ Upstream commit d9749fb5942f51555dc9ce1ac0dbb1806960a975 ]
Dmitry Vyukov noted recently that the sctp_port_hashtable had an error in
its size computation, observing that the current method never guaranteed
that the hashsize (measured in number of entries) would be a power of two,
which the input hash function for that table requires. The root cause of
the problem is that two values need to be computed (one, the allocation
order of the storage requries, as passed to __get_free_pages, and two the
number of entries for the hash table). Both need to be ^2, but for
different reasons, and the existing code is simply computing one order
value, and using it as the basis for both, which is wrong (i.e. it assumes
that ((1<<order)*PAGE_SIZE)/sizeof(bucket) is still ^2 when its not).
To fix this, we change the logic slightly. We start by computing a goal
allocation order (which is limited by the maximum size hash table we want
to support. Then we attempt to allocate that size table, decreasing the
order until a successful allocation is made. Then, with the resultant
successful order we compute the number of buckets that hash table supports,
which we then round down to the nearest power of two, giving us the number
of entries the table actually supports.
I've tested this locally here, using non-debug and spinlock-debug kernels,
and the number of entries in the hashtable consistently work out to be
powers of two in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CC: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CC: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/protocol.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index e13c3c3..9d134ab 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
+#define MAX_SCTP_PORT_HASH_ENTRIES (64 * 1024)
+
/* Global data structures. */
struct sctp_globals sctp_globals __read_mostly;
@@ -1332,6 +1334,8 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
unsigned long limit;
int max_share;
int order;
+ int num_entries;
+ int max_entry_order;
sock_skb_cb_check_size(sizeof(struct sctp_ulpevent));
@@ -1384,14 +1388,24 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
/* Size and allocate the association hash table.
* The methodology is similar to that of the tcp hash tables.
+ * Though not identical. Start by getting a goal size
*/
if (totalram_pages >= (128 * 1024))
goal = totalram_pages >> (22 - PAGE_SHIFT);
else
goal = totalram_pages >> (24 - PAGE_SHIFT);
- for (order = 0; (1UL << order) < goal; order++)
- ;
+ /* Then compute the page order for said goal */
+ order = get_order(goal);
+
+ /* Now compute the required page order for the maximum sized table we
+ * want to create
+ */
+ max_entry_order = get_order(MAX_SCTP_PORT_HASH_ENTRIES *
+ sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket));
+
+ /* Limit the page order by that maximum hash table size */
+ order = min(order, max_entry_order);
do {
sctp_assoc_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
@@ -1425,27 +1439,42 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain);
}
- /* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table. */
+ /* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table.
+ * Note that order is initalized to start at the max sized
+ * table we want to support. If we can't get that many pages
+ * reduce the order and try again
+ */
do {
- sctp_port_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
- sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
- if ((sctp_port_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0)
- continue;
sctp_port_hashtable = (struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order);
} while (!sctp_port_hashtable && --order > 0);
+
if (!sctp_port_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed bind hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_bhash_alloc;
}
+
+ /* Now compute the number of entries that will fit in the
+ * port hash space we allocated
+ */
+ num_entries = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
+ sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
+
+ /* And finish by rounding it down to the nearest power of two
+ * this wastes some memory of course, but its needed because
+ * the hash function operates based on the assumption that
+ * that the number of entries is a power of two
+ */
+ sctp_port_hashsize = rounddown_pow_of_two(num_entries);
+
for (i = 0; i < sctp_port_hashsize; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain);
}
- pr_info("Hash tables configured (established %d bind %d)\n",
- sctp_assoc_hashsize, sctp_port_hashsize);
+ pr_info("Hash tables configured (established %d bind %d/%d)\n",
+ sctp_assoc_hashsize, sctp_port_hashsize, num_entries);
sctp_sysctl_register();
--
2.4.1
[-- Attachment #3: net_44.mbox --]
[-- Type: Application/Octet-Stream, Size: 132632 bytes --]
From 9fa527a0fe2f2df2665ac7aaa28bc0d75ff779ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 10:41:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/47] af_iucv: Validate socket address length in
iucv_sock_bind()
[ Upstream commit 52a82e23b9f2a9e1d429c5207f8575784290d008 ]
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Evgeny Cherkashin <Eugene.Crosser@ru.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
index 435608c..20ab7b2 100644
--- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
+++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
@@ -708,6 +708,9 @@ static int iucv_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_IUCV)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_iucv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
--
2.1.0
From 68931e770f545953e63fb17c847fd6299a05daa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 17:59:49 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 02/47] gro: Make GRO aware of lightweight tunnels.
[ Upstream commit ce87fc6ce3f9f4488546187e3757cf666d9d4a2a ]
GRO is currently not aware of tunnel metadata generated by lightweight
tunnels and stored in the dst. This leads to two possible problems:
* Incorrectly merging two frames that have different metadata.
* Leaking of allocated metadata from merged frames.
This avoids those problems by comparing the tunnel information before
merging, similar to how we handle other metadata (such as vlan tags),
and releasing any state when we are done.
Reported-by: John <john.phillips5@hpe.com>
Fixes: 2e15ea39 ("ip_gre: Add support to collect tunnel metadata.")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/dst_metadata.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
net/core/dev.c | 7 +++++--
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/dst_metadata.h b/include/net/dst_metadata.h
index 6816f0f..30a56ab 100644
--- a/include/net/dst_metadata.h
+++ b/include/net/dst_metadata.h
@@ -44,6 +44,24 @@ static inline bool skb_valid_dst(const struct sk_buff *skb)
return dst && !(dst->flags & DST_METADATA);
}
+static inline int skb_metadata_dst_cmp(const struct sk_buff *skb_a,
+ const struct sk_buff *skb_b)
+{
+ const struct metadata_dst *a, *b;
+
+ if (!(skb_a->_skb_refdst | skb_b->_skb_refdst))
+ return 0;
+
+ a = (const struct metadata_dst *) skb_dst(skb_a);
+ b = (const struct metadata_dst *) skb_dst(skb_b);
+
+ if (!a != !b || a->u.tun_info.options_len != b->u.tun_info.options_len)
+ return 1;
+
+ return memcmp(&a->u.tun_info, &b->u.tun_info,
+ sizeof(a->u.tun_info) + a->u.tun_info.options_len);
+}
+
struct metadata_dst *metadata_dst_alloc(u8 optslen, gfp_t flags);
struct metadata_dst __percpu *metadata_dst_alloc_percpu(u8 optslen, gfp_t flags);
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 7f00f24..7dc137f 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -4145,6 +4145,7 @@ static void gro_list_prepare(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
diffs = (unsigned long)p->dev ^ (unsigned long)skb->dev;
diffs |= p->vlan_tci ^ skb->vlan_tci;
+ diffs |= skb_metadata_dst_cmp(p, skb);
if (maclen == ETH_HLEN)
diffs |= compare_ether_header(skb_mac_header(p),
skb_mac_header(skb));
@@ -4342,10 +4343,12 @@ static gro_result_t napi_skb_finish(gro_result_t ret, struct sk_buff *skb)
break;
case GRO_MERGED_FREE:
- if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free == NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD)
+ if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free == NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD) {
+ skb_dst_drop(skb);
kmem_cache_free(skbuff_head_cache, skb);
- else
+ } else {
__kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
break;
case GRO_HELD:
--
2.1.0
From 16fee63d42a89481c5d435ef51fb7e4d89a3184a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manfred Rudigier <Manfred.Rudigier@omicron.at>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 11:22:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/47] net: dp83640: Fix tx timestamp overflow handling.
[ Upstream commit 81e8f2e930fe76b9814c71b9d87c30760b5eb705 ]
PHY status frames are not reliable, the PHY may not be able to send them
during heavy receive traffic. This overflow condition is signaled by the
PHY in the next status frame, but the driver did not make use of it.
Instead it always reported wrong tx timestamps to user space after an
overflow happened because it assigned newly received tx timestamps to old
packets in the queue.
This commit fixes this issue by clearing the tx timestamp queue every time
an overflow happens, so that no timestamps are delivered for overflow
packets. This way time stamping will continue correctly after an overflow.
Signed-off-by: Manfred Rudigier <manfred.rudigier@omicron.at>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
index 47b7117..e6cefd0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
@@ -845,6 +845,11 @@ static void decode_rxts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps = NULL;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned long flags;
+ u8 overflow;
+
+ overflow = (phy_rxts->ns_hi >> 14) & 0x3;
+ if (overflow)
+ pr_debug("rx timestamp queue overflow, count %d\n", overflow);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dp83640->rx_lock, flags);
@@ -887,6 +892,7 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps shhwtstamps;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u64 ns;
+ u8 overflow;
/* We must already have the skb that triggered this. */
@@ -896,6 +902,17 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
pr_debug("have timestamp but tx_queue empty\n");
return;
}
+
+ overflow = (phy_txts->ns_hi >> 14) & 0x3;
+ if (overflow) {
+ pr_debug("tx timestamp queue overflow, count %d\n", overflow);
+ while (skb) {
+ skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, NULL);
+ skb = skb_dequeue(&dp83640->tx_queue);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
ns = phy2txts(phy_txts);
memset(&shhwtstamps, 0, sizeof(shhwtstamps));
shhwtstamps.hwtstamp = ns_to_ktime(ns);
--
2.1.0
From e7b24525edb7de3eedd2df4e5b7e40d0d04dc971 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 16:22:47 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 04/47] tunnels: Allow IPv6 UDP checksums to be correctly
controlled.
[ Upstream commit 35e2d1152b22eae99c961affbe85374bef05a775 ]
When configuring checksums on UDP tunnels, the flags are different
for IPv4 vs. IPv6 (and reversed). However, when lightweight tunnels
are enabled the flags used are always the IPv4 versions, which are
ignored in the IPv6 code paths. This uses the correct IPv6 flags, so
checksums can be controlled appropriately.
Fixes: a725e514 ("vxlan: metadata based tunneling for IPv6")
Fixes: abe492b4 ("geneve: UDP checksum configuration via netlink")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/vxlan.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/vxlan.c b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
index 405a7b6..e0fcda4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
@@ -1984,11 +1984,6 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
vxlan->cfg.port_max, true);
if (info) {
- if (info->key.tun_flags & TUNNEL_CSUM)
- flags |= VXLAN_F_UDP_CSUM;
- else
- flags &= ~VXLAN_F_UDP_CSUM;
-
ttl = info->key.ttl;
tos = info->key.tos;
@@ -2003,8 +1998,15 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
goto drop;
sk = vxlan->vn4_sock->sock->sk;
- if (info && (info->key.tun_flags & TUNNEL_DONT_FRAGMENT))
- df = htons(IP_DF);
+ if (info) {
+ if (info->key.tun_flags & TUNNEL_DONT_FRAGMENT)
+ df = htons(IP_DF);
+
+ if (info->key.tun_flags & TUNNEL_CSUM)
+ flags |= VXLAN_F_UDP_CSUM;
+ else
+ flags &= ~VXLAN_F_UDP_CSUM;
+ }
memset(&fl4, 0, sizeof(fl4));
fl4.flowi4_oif = rdst ? rdst->remote_ifindex : 0;
@@ -2102,6 +2104,13 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
return;
}
+ if (info) {
+ if (info->key.tun_flags & TUNNEL_CSUM)
+ flags &= ~VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX;
+ else
+ flags |= VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX;
+ }
+
ttl = ttl ? : ip6_dst_hoplimit(ndst);
err = vxlan6_xmit_skb(ndst, sk, skb, dev, &saddr, &dst->sin6.sin6_addr,
0, ttl, src_port, dst_port, htonl(vni << 8), md,
--
2.1.0
From 30b7b7dd18f55b33cf35027ce67975ddc2d7fd02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 19:30:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/47] lwt: fix rx checksum setting for lwt devices tunneling
over ipv6
[ Upstream commit c868ee7063bdb53f3ef9eac7bcec84960980b471 ]
the commit 35e2d1152b22 ("tunnels: Allow IPv6 UDP checksums to be
correctly controlled.") changed the default xmit checksum setting
for lwt vxlan/geneve ipv6 tunnels, so that now the checksum is not
set into external UDP header.
This commit changes the rx checksum setting for both lwt vxlan/geneve
devices created by openvswitch accordingly, so that lwt over ipv6
tunnel pairs are again able to communicate with default values.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/openvswitch/vport-vxlan.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/vport-vxlan.c b/net/openvswitch/vport-vxlan.c
index 1605691..d933cb8 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/vport-vxlan.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/vport-vxlan.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static struct vport *vxlan_tnl_create(const struct vport_parms *parms)
int err;
struct vxlan_config conf = {
.no_share = true,
- .flags = VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA,
+ .flags = VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA | VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX,
};
if (!options) {
--
2.1.0
From 5f7ba02e2e587ae13897a45b7c8fcfe3a9efd627 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:02:54 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 06/47] tcp: fix NULL deref in tcp_v4_send_ack()
[ Upstream commit e62a123b8ef7c5dc4db2c16383d506860ad21b47 ]
Neal reported crashes with this stack trace :
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8c57231b>] tcp_v4_send_ack+0x41/0x20f
...
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000044005c000 CR4: 00000000001427e0
...
[<ffffffff8c57258e>] tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack+0xa5/0xb4
[<ffffffff8c1a7caa>] tcp_check_req+0x2ea/0x3e0
[<ffffffff8c19e420>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x850/0x2500
[<ffffffff8c1a6d21>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x141/0x330
[<ffffffff8c56cdb2>] sk_backlog_rcv+0x21/0x30
[<ffffffff8c098bbd>] tcp_recvmsg+0x75d/0xf90
[<ffffffff8c0a8700>] inet_recvmsg+0x80/0xa0
[<ffffffff8c17623e>] sock_aio_read+0xee/0x110
[<ffffffff8c066fcf>] do_sync_read+0x6f/0xa0
[<ffffffff8c0673a1>] SyS_read+0x1e1/0x290
[<ffffffff8c5ca262>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The problem here is the skb we provide to tcp_v4_send_ack() had to
be parked in the backlog of a new TCP fastopen child because this child
was owned by the user at the time an out of window packet arrived.
Before queuing a packet, TCP has to set skb->dev to NULL as the device
could disappear before packet is removed from the queue.
Fix this issue by using the net pointer provided by the socket (being a
timewait or a request socket).
IPv6 is immune to the bug : tcp_v6_send_response() already gets the net
pointer from the socket if provided.
Fixes: 168a8f58059a ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path")
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index d8841a2..4627717 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -705,7 +705,8 @@ release_sk1:
outside socket context is ugly, certainly. What can I do?
*/
-static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
+static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct net *net,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
u32 win, u32 tsval, u32 tsecr, int oif,
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
int reply_flags, u8 tos)
@@ -720,7 +721,6 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
];
} rep;
struct ip_reply_arg arg;
- struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
memset(&rep.th, 0, sizeof(struct tcphdr));
memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
@@ -782,7 +782,8 @@ static void tcp_v4_timewait_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk);
struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk(sk);
- tcp_v4_send_ack(skb, tcptw->tw_snd_nxt, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt,
+ tcp_v4_send_ack(sock_net(sk), skb,
+ tcptw->tw_snd_nxt, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt,
tcptw->tw_rcv_wnd >> tw->tw_rcv_wscale,
tcp_time_stamp + tcptw->tw_ts_offset,
tcptw->tw_ts_recent,
@@ -801,8 +802,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN -> for regular TCP_SYN_RECV
* sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV -> for Fast Open.
*/
- tcp_v4_send_ack(skb, (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) ?
- tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 : tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt,
+ u32 seq = (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) ? tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 :
+ tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt;
+
+ tcp_v4_send_ack(sock_net(sk), skb, seq,
tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt, req->rsk_rcv_wnd,
tcp_time_stamp,
req->ts_recent,
--
2.1.0
From 7ff516ac42dc47146116c5698685d342a2c293cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2016 13:53:50 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 07/47] af_unix: fix struct pid memory leak
[ Upstream commit fa0dc04df259ba2df3ce1920e9690c7842f8fa4b ]
Dmitry reported a struct pid leak detected by a syzkaller program.
Bug happens in unix_stream_recvmsg() when we break the loop when a
signal is pending, without properly releasing scm.
Fixes: b3ca9b02b007 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index e3f85bc..775855e 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -2332,6 +2332,7 @@ again:
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ scm_destroy(&scm);
goto out;
}
--
2.1.0
From 494c9dd2cd0ee53d2d914219d91a062b3c355da3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 01:39:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/47] pptp: fix illegal memory access caused by multiple
bind()s
[ Upstream commit 9a368aff9cb370298fa02feeffa861f2db497c18 ]
Several times already this has been reported as kasan reports caused by
syzkaller and trinity and people always looked at RCU races, but it is
much more simple. :)
In case we bind a pptp socket multiple times, we simply add it to
the callid_sock list but don't remove the old binding. Thus the old
socket stays in the bucket with unused call_id indexes and doesn't get
cleaned up. This causes various forms of kasan reports which were hard
to pinpoint.
Simply don't allow multiple binds and correct error handling in
pptp_bind. Also keep sk_state bits in place in pptp_connect.
Fixes: 00959ade36acad ("PPTP: PPP over IPv4 (Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol)")
Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <xeb@mail.ru>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
index 597c53e..f7e8c79 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
@@ -129,24 +129,27 @@ static int lookup_chan_dst(u16 call_id, __be32 d_addr)
return i < MAX_CALLID;
}
-static int add_chan(struct pppox_sock *sock)
+static int add_chan(struct pppox_sock *sock,
+ struct pptp_addr *sa)
{
static int call_id;
spin_lock(&chan_lock);
- if (!sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id) {
+ if (!sa->call_id) {
call_id = find_next_zero_bit(callid_bitmap, MAX_CALLID, call_id + 1);
if (call_id == MAX_CALLID) {
call_id = find_next_zero_bit(callid_bitmap, MAX_CALLID, 1);
if (call_id == MAX_CALLID)
goto out_err;
}
- sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id = call_id;
- } else if (test_bit(sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id, callid_bitmap))
+ sa->call_id = call_id;
+ } else if (test_bit(sa->call_id, callid_bitmap)) {
goto out_err;
+ }
- set_bit(sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id, callid_bitmap);
- rcu_assign_pointer(callid_sock[sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id], sock);
+ sock->proto.pptp.src_addr = *sa;
+ set_bit(sa->call_id, callid_bitmap);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(callid_sock[sa->call_id], sock);
spin_unlock(&chan_lock);
return 0;
@@ -416,7 +419,6 @@ static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
- struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
int error = 0;
if (sockaddr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppox))
@@ -424,10 +426,22 @@ static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
lock_sock(sk);
- opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
- if (add_chan(po))
+ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) {
+ error = -EALREADY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
error = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (add_chan(po, &sp->sa_addr.pptp))
+ error = -EBUSY;
+ else
+ sk->sk_state |= PPPOX_BOUND;
+out:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
@@ -498,7 +512,7 @@ static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
}
opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
- sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
+ sk->sk_state |= PPPOX_CONNECTED;
end:
release_sock(sk);
--
2.1.0
From 1bf3c1dcb5a1cabf2d76c7e6e99f46d396dd5f53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 18:29:49 -0200
Subject: [PATCH 09/47] sctp: allow setting SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY by the
application
[ Upstream commit 27f7ed2b11d42ab6d796e96533c2076ec220affc ]
This patch extends commit b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side
for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension") as it didn't white list
SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY on sctp_msghdr_parse(), causing it to be
understood as an invalid flag and returning -EINVAL to the application.
Note that the actual handling of the flag is already there in
sctp_datamsg_from_user().
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7053#section-7
Fixes: b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index ef1d90f..06a9cfb 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -6640,6 +6640,7 @@ static int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg, sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
if (cmsgs->srinfo->sinfo_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
+ SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -6663,6 +6664,7 @@ static int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg, sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
if (cmsgs->sinfo->snd_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
+ SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
break;
--
2.1.0
From 592d9e5b6987a271ebb95f53eaac9e53c3f4969f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2016 09:22:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 10/47] net: dsa: fix mv88e6xxx switches
[ Upstream commit db0e51afa481088e6396f11e02018d64113a6578 ]
Since commit 76e398a62712 ("net: dsa: use switchdev obj for VLAN add/del
ops"), the Marvell 88E6xxx switch has been unable to pass traffic
between ports - any received traffic is discarded by the switch.
Taking a port out of bridge mode and configuring a vlan on it also the
port to start passing traffic.
With the debugfs files re-instated to allow debug of this issue by
comparing the register settings between the working and non-working
case, the reason becomes clear:
GLOBAL GLOBAL2 SERDES 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
- 7: 1111 707f 2001 2 2 2 2 2 0 2
+ 7: 1111 707f 2001 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Register 7 for the ports is the default vlan tag register, and in the
non-working setup, it has been set to 2, despite vlan 2 not being
configured. This causes the switch to drop all packets coming in to
these ports. The working setup has the default vlan tag register set
to 1, which is the default vlan when none is configured.
Inspection of the code reveals why. The code prior to this commit
was:
- for (vid = vlan->vid_begin; vid <= vlan->vid_end; ++vid) {
...
- if (!err && vlan->flags & BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_PVID)
- err = ds->drv->port_pvid_set(ds, p->port, vid);
but the new code is:
+ for (vid = vlan->vid_begin; vid <= vlan->vid_end; ++vid) {
...
+ }
...
+ if (pvid)
+ err = _mv88e6xxx_port_pvid_set(ds, port, vid);
This causes the new code to always set the default vlan to one higher
than the old code.
Fix this.
Fixes: 76e398a62712 ("net: dsa: use switchdev obj for VLAN add/del ops")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx.c
index b06dba0..2dea39b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx.c
@@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ int mv88e6xxx_port_vlan_add(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port,
/* no PVID with ranges, otherwise it's a bug */
if (pvid)
- err = _mv88e6xxx_port_pvid_set(ds, port, vid);
+ err = _mv88e6xxx_port_pvid_set(ds, port, vlan->vid_end);
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ps->smi_mutex);
--
2.1.0
From d4ad57cc78bcb85d96445d00083c9f8f1f61d29d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <parthasarathy.bhuvaragan@ericsson.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 11:35:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/47] tipc: fix connection abort during subscription cancel
[ Upstream commit 4d5cfcba2f6ec494d8810b9e3c0a7b06255c8067 ]
In 'commit 7fe8097cef5f ("tipc: fix nullpointer bug when subscribing
to events")', we terminate the connection if the subscription
creation fails.
In the same commit, the subscription creation result was based on
the value of the subscription pointer (set in the function) instead
of the return code.
Unfortunately, the same function tipc_subscrp_create() handles
subscription cancel request. For a subscription cancellation request,
the subscription pointer cannot be set. Thus if a subscriber has
several subscriptions and cancels any of them, the connection is
terminated.
In this commit, we terminate the connection based on the return value
of tipc_subscrp_create().
Fixes: commit 7fe8097cef5f ("tipc: fix nullpointer bug when subscribing to events")
Reviewed-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <parthasarathy.bhuvaragan@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/tipc/subscr.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/subscr.c b/net/tipc/subscr.c
index 350cca3..69ee2ee 100644
--- a/net/tipc/subscr.c
+++ b/net/tipc/subscr.c
@@ -289,15 +289,14 @@ static void tipc_subscrb_rcv_cb(struct net *net, int conid,
struct sockaddr_tipc *addr, void *usr_data,
void *buf, size_t len)
{
- struct tipc_subscriber *subscriber = usr_data;
+ struct tipc_subscriber *subscrb = usr_data;
struct tipc_subscription *sub = NULL;
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
- tipc_subscrp_create(net, (struct tipc_subscr *)buf, subscriber, &sub);
- if (sub)
- tipc_nametbl_subscribe(sub);
- else
- tipc_conn_terminate(tn->topsrv, subscriber->conid);
+ if (tipc_subscrp_create(net, (struct tipc_subscr *)buf, subscrb, &sub))
+ return tipc_conn_terminate(tn->topsrv, subscrb->conid);
+
+ tipc_nametbl_subscribe(sub);
}
/* Handle one request to establish a new subscriber */
--
2.1.0
From e867177d0385fd90f5daba0f6b459cf4a3f8d300 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 15:49:12 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 12/47] inet: frag: Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()
[ Upstream commit 8282f27449bf15548cb82c77b6e04ee0ab827bdc ]
Later parts of the stack (including fragmentation) expect that there is
never a socket attached to frag in a frag_list, however this invariant
was not enforced on all defrag paths. This could lead to the
BUG_ON(skb->sk) during ip_do_fragment(), as per the call stack at the
end of this commit message.
While the call could be added to openvswitch to fix this particular
error, the head and tail of the frags list are already orphaned
indirectly inside ip_defrag(), so it seems like the remaining fragments
should all be orphaned in all circumstances.
kernel BUG at net/ipv4/ip_output.c:586!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa0205270>] ? do_output.isra.29+0x1b0/0x1b0 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa02167a7>] ovs_fragment+0xcc/0x214 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffff81667830>] ? dst_discard_out+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff81667810>] ? dst_ifdown+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffffa0212072>] ? find_bucket.isra.2+0x62/0x70 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffff810e0ba5>] ? mod_timer_pending+0x65/0x210
[<ffffffff810b732b>] ? __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x1b90
[<ffffffffa03205a2>] ? nf_conntrack_in+0x252/0x500 [nf_conntrack]
[<ffffffff810b63c4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x70
[<ffffffffa02051a3>] do_output.isra.29+0xe3/0x1b0 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa0206411>] do_execute_actions+0xe11/0x11f0 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffff810b63c4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x70
[<ffffffffa0206822>] ovs_execute_actions+0x32/0xd0 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa020b505>] ovs_dp_process_packet+0x85/0x140 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffff810b63c4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x70
[<ffffffffa02068a2>] ovs_execute_actions+0xb2/0xd0 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa020b505>] ovs_dp_process_packet+0x85/0x140 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa0215019>] ? ovs_ct_get_labels+0x49/0x80 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa0213a1d>] ovs_vport_receive+0x5d/0xa0 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffff810b732b>] ? __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x1b90
[<ffffffff810b732b>] ? __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x1b90
[<ffffffff810b732b>] ? __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x1b90
[<ffffffffa0214895>] ? internal_dev_xmit+0x5/0x140 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa02148fc>] internal_dev_xmit+0x6c/0x140 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffffa0214895>] ? internal_dev_xmit+0x5/0x140 [openvswitch]
[<ffffffff81660299>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2b9/0x5e0
[<ffffffff8165fc21>] ? netif_skb_features+0xd1/0x1f0
[<ffffffff81660f20>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x800/0x930
[<ffffffff81660770>] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x50/0x930
[<ffffffff810b53f1>] ? mark_held_locks+0x71/0x90
[<ffffffff81669876>] ? neigh_resolve_output+0x106/0x220
[<ffffffff81661060>] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
[<ffffffff816698e8>] neigh_resolve_output+0x178/0x220
[<ffffffff816a8e6f>] ? ip_finish_output2+0x1ff/0x590
[<ffffffff816a8e6f>] ip_finish_output2+0x1ff/0x590
[<ffffffff816a8cee>] ? ip_finish_output2+0x7e/0x590
[<ffffffff816a9a31>] ip_do_fragment+0x831/0x8a0
[<ffffffff816a8c70>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1b0/0x1b0
[<ffffffff816a9ae3>] ip_fragment.constprop.49+0x43/0x80
[<ffffffff816a9c9c>] ip_finish_output+0x17c/0x340
[<ffffffff8169a6f4>] ? nf_hook_slow+0xe4/0x190
[<ffffffff816ab4c0>] ip_output+0x70/0x110
[<ffffffff816a9b20>] ? ip_fragment.constprop.49+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff816aa9f9>] ip_local_out+0x39/0x70
[<ffffffff816abf89>] ip_send_skb+0x19/0x40
[<ffffffff816abfe3>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x33/0x40
[<ffffffff816df21a>] icmp_push_reply+0xea/0x120
[<ffffffff816df93d>] icmp_reply.constprop.23+0x1ed/0x230
[<ffffffff816df9ce>] icmp_echo.part.21+0x4e/0x50
[<ffffffff810b63c4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x70
[<ffffffff810d5f9e>] ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x5e/0x70
[<ffffffff816dfa06>] icmp_echo+0x36/0x70
[<ffffffff816e0d11>] icmp_rcv+0x271/0x450
[<ffffffff816a4ca7>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x127/0x3a0
[<ffffffff816a4bc1>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x41/0x3a0
[<ffffffff816a5160>] ip_local_deliver+0x60/0xd0
[<ffffffff816a4b80>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x560/0x560
[<ffffffff816a46fd>] ip_rcv_finish+0xdd/0x560
[<ffffffff816a5453>] ip_rcv+0x283/0x3e0
[<ffffffff810b6302>] ? match_held_lock+0x192/0x200
[<ffffffff816a4620>] ? inet_del_offload+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff8165d062>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x392/0xae0
[<ffffffff8165e68e>] ? process_backlog+0x8e/0x230
[<ffffffff810b53f1>] ? mark_held_locks+0x71/0x90
[<ffffffff8165d7c8>] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
[<ffffffff8165e678>] process_backlog+0x78/0x230
[<ffffffff8165e6dd>] ? process_backlog+0xdd/0x230
[<ffffffff8165e355>] net_rx_action+0x155/0x400
[<ffffffff8106b48c>] __do_softirq+0xcc/0x420
[<ffffffff816a8e87>] ? ip_finish_output2+0x217/0x590
[<ffffffff8178e78c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
<EOI>
[<ffffffff8106b88e>] do_softirq+0x4e/0x60
[<ffffffff8106b948>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffff816a8eb0>] ip_finish_output2+0x240/0x590
[<ffffffff816a9a31>] ? ip_do_fragment+0x831/0x8a0
[<ffffffff816a9a31>] ip_do_fragment+0x831/0x8a0
[<ffffffff816a8c70>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1b0/0x1b0
[<ffffffff816a9ae3>] ip_fragment.constprop.49+0x43/0x80
[<ffffffff816a9c9c>] ip_finish_output+0x17c/0x340
[<ffffffff8169a6f4>] ? nf_hook_slow+0xe4/0x190
[<ffffffff816ab4c0>] ip_output+0x70/0x110
[<ffffffff816a9b20>] ? ip_fragment.constprop.49+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff816aa9f9>] ip_local_out+0x39/0x70
[<ffffffff816abf89>] ip_send_skb+0x19/0x40
[<ffffffff816abfe3>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x33/0x40
[<ffffffff816d55d3>] raw_sendmsg+0x7d3/0xc30
[<ffffffff810b732b>] ? __lock_acquire+0x3db/0x1b90
[<ffffffff816e7557>] ? inet_sendmsg+0xc7/0x1d0
[<ffffffff810b63c4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x70
[<ffffffff816e759a>] inet_sendmsg+0x10a/0x1d0
[<ffffffff816e7495>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x1d0
[<ffffffff8163e398>] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x50
[<ffffffff8163ec5f>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x25f/0x270
[<ffffffff811aadad>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x8dd/0x1320
[<ffffffff8178c147>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[<ffffffff810529b2>] ? __do_page_fault+0x1e2/0x460
[<ffffffff81204886>] ? __fget_light+0x66/0x90
[<ffffffff8163f8e2>] __sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x80
[<ffffffff8163f932>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
[<ffffffff8178cb17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Code: 00 00 44 89 e0 e9 7c fb ff ff 4c 89 ff e8 e7 e7 ff ff 41 8b 9d 80 00 00 00 2b 5d d4 89 d8 c1 f8 03 0f b7 c0 e9 33 ff ff f
66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48
RIP [<ffffffff816a9a92>] ip_do_fragment+0x892/0x8a0
RSP <ffff88006d603170>
Fixes: 7f8a436eaa2c ("openvswitch: Add conntrack action")
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c | 2 --
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
index 1fe55ae..b8a0607d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
@@ -661,6 +661,7 @@ int ip_defrag(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
struct ipq *qp;
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMREQDS);
+ skb_orphan(skb);
/* Lookup (or create) queue header */
qp = ip_find(net, ip_hdr(skb), user, vif);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c
index 6fb869f6..a04dee5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ static int nf_ct_ipv4_gather_frags(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
int err;
- skb_orphan(skb);
-
local_bh_disable();
err = ip_defrag(net, skb, user);
local_bh_enable();
--
2.1.0
From c416cebf49e48078c5f65855b703373df486e2c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 15:16:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/47] switchdev: Require RTNL mutex to be held when sending
FDB notifications
[ Upstream commit 4f2c6ae5c64c353fb1b0425e4747e5603feadba1 ]
When switchdev drivers process FDB notifications from the underlying
device they resolve the netdev to which the entry points to and notify
the bridge using the switchdev notifier.
However, since the RTNL mutex is not held there is nothing preventing
the netdev from disappearing in the middle, which will cause
br_switchdev_event() to dereference a non-existing netdev.
Make switchdev drivers hold the lock at the beginning of the
notification processing session and release it once it ends, after
notifying the bridge.
Also, remove switchdev_mutex and fdb_lock, as they are no longer needed
when RTNL mutex is held.
Fixes: 03bf0c281234 ("switchdev: introduce switchdev notifier")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c | 3 +++
drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c | 2 ++
net/bridge/br.c | 3 +--
net/switchdev/switchdev.c | 15 ++++++++-------
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c
index 617fb22..7dbeafa 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <linux/if_bridge.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <net/switchdev.h>
#include "spectrum.h"
@@ -812,6 +813,7 @@ static void mlxsw_sp_fdb_notify_work(struct work_struct *work)
mlxsw_sp = container_of(work, struct mlxsw_sp, fdb_notify.dw.work);
+ rtnl_lock();
do {
mlxsw_reg_sfn_pack(sfn_pl);
err = mlxsw_reg_query(mlxsw_sp->core, MLXSW_REG(sfn), sfn_pl);
@@ -824,6 +826,7 @@ static void mlxsw_sp_fdb_notify_work(struct work_struct *work)
mlxsw_sp_fdb_notify_rec_process(mlxsw_sp, sfn_pl, i);
} while (num_rec);
+ rtnl_unlock();
kfree(sfn_pl);
mlxsw_sp_fdb_notify_work_schedule(mlxsw_sp);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c
index e9f2349..52ec3d6 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker.c
@@ -3531,12 +3531,14 @@ static void rocker_port_fdb_learn_work(struct work_struct *work)
info.addr = lw->addr;
info.vid = lw->vid;
+ rtnl_lock();
if (learned && removing)
call_switchdev_notifiers(SWITCHDEV_FDB_DEL,
lw->rocker_port->dev, &info.info);
else if (learned && !removing)
call_switchdev_notifiers(SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD,
lw->rocker_port->dev, &info.info);
+ rtnl_unlock();
rocker_port_kfree(lw->trans, work);
}
diff --git a/net/bridge/br.c b/net/bridge/br.c
index a1abe49..3addc05 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static struct notifier_block br_device_notifier = {
.notifier_call = br_device_event
};
+/* called with RTNL */
static int br_switchdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
@@ -130,7 +131,6 @@ static int br_switchdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
struct switchdev_notifier_fdb_info *fdb_info;
int err = NOTIFY_DONE;
- rtnl_lock();
p = br_port_get_rtnl(dev);
if (!p)
goto out;
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int br_switchdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
}
out:
- rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/switchdev/switchdev.c b/net/switchdev/switchdev.c
index f34e535..d5d7132 100644
--- a/net/switchdev/switchdev.c
+++ b/net/switchdev/switchdev.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/if_vlan.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <net/ip_fib.h>
#include <net/switchdev.h>
@@ -565,7 +566,6 @@ int switchdev_port_obj_dump(struct net_device *dev, struct switchdev_obj *obj,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(switchdev_port_obj_dump);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(switchdev_mutex);
static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(switchdev_notif_chain);
/**
@@ -580,9 +580,9 @@ int register_switchdev_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
int err;
- mutex_lock(&switchdev_mutex);
+ rtnl_lock();
err = raw_notifier_chain_register(&switchdev_notif_chain, nb);
- mutex_unlock(&switchdev_mutex);
+ rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_switchdev_notifier);
@@ -598,9 +598,9 @@ int unregister_switchdev_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
int err;
- mutex_lock(&switchdev_mutex);
+ rtnl_lock();
err = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&switchdev_notif_chain, nb);
- mutex_unlock(&switchdev_mutex);
+ rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_switchdev_notifier);
@@ -614,16 +614,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_switchdev_notifier);
* Call all network notifier blocks. This should be called by driver
* when it needs to propagate hardware event.
* Return values are same as for atomic_notifier_call_chain().
+ * rtnl_lock must be held.
*/
int call_switchdev_notifiers(unsigned long val, struct net_device *dev,
struct switchdev_notifier_info *info)
{
int err;
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+
info->dev = dev;
- mutex_lock(&switchdev_mutex);
err = raw_notifier_call_chain(&switchdev_notif_chain, val, info);
- mutex_unlock(&switchdev_mutex);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(call_switchdev_notifiers);
--
2.1.0
From 9f1b1e47c8aacb370028b6f4ef7a2bc95e081b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 10:52:43 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 14/47] tcp: beware of alignments in tcp_get_info()
[ Upstream commit ff5d749772018602c47509bdc0093ff72acd82ec ]
With some combinations of user provided flags in netlink command,
it is possible to call tcp_get_info() with a buffer that is not 8-bytes
aligned.
It does matter on some arches, so we need to use put_unaligned() to
store the u64 fields.
Current iproute2 package does not trigger this particular issue.
Fixes: 0df48c26d841 ("tcp: add tcpi_bytes_acked to tcp_info")
Fixes: 977cb0ecf82e ("tcp: add pacing_rate information into tcp_info")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index c82cca1..9c1241e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/busy_poll.h>
int sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout __read_mostly = TCP_FIN_TIMEOUT;
@@ -2637,6 +2638,7 @@ void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
u32 now = tcp_time_stamp;
unsigned int start;
+ u64 rate64;
u32 rate;
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
@@ -2702,15 +2704,17 @@ void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
info->tcpi_total_retrans = tp->total_retrans;
rate = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_pacing_rate);
- info->tcpi_pacing_rate = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ rate64 = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ put_unaligned(rate64, &info->tcpi_pacing_rate);
rate = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_pacing_rate);
- info->tcpi_max_pacing_rate = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ rate64 = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
+ put_unaligned(rate64, &info->tcpi_max_pacing_rate);
do {
start = u64_stats_fetch_begin_irq(&tp->syncp);
- info->tcpi_bytes_acked = tp->bytes_acked;
- info->tcpi_bytes_received = tp->bytes_received;
+ put_unaligned(tp->bytes_acked, &info->tcpi_bytes_acked);
+ put_unaligned(tp->bytes_received, &info->tcpi_bytes_received);
} while (u64_stats_fetch_retry_irq(&tp->syncp, start));
info->tcpi_segs_out = tp->segs_out;
info->tcpi_segs_in = tp->segs_in;
--
2.1.0
From b31af060afe04db01a3c374264801351589b75e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 12:30:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 15/47] ipv6: enforce flowi6_oif usage in ip6_dst_lookup_tail()
[ Upstream commit 6f21c96a78b835259546d8f3fb4edff0f651d478 ]
The current implementation of ip6_dst_lookup_tail basically
ignore the egress ifindex match: if the saddr is set,
ip6_route_output() purposefully ignores flowi6_oif, due
to the commit d46a9d678e4c ("net: ipv6: Dont add RT6_LOOKUP_F_IFACE
flag if saddr set"), if the saddr is 'any' the first route lookup
in ip6_dst_lookup_tail fails, but upon failure a second lookup will
be performed with saddr set, thus ignoring the ifindex constraint.
This commit adds an output route lookup function variant, which
allows the caller to specify lookup flags, and modify
ip6_dst_lookup_tail() to enforce the ifindex match on the second
lookup via said helper.
ip6_route_output() becames now a static inline function build on
top of ip6_route_output_flags(); as a side effect, out-of-tree
modules need now a GPL license to access the output route lookup
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip6_route.h | 12 ++++++++++--
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 6 +++++-
net/ipv6/route.c | 7 +++----
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_route.h b/include/net/ip6_route.h
index 877f682..295d291 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_route.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_route.h
@@ -64,8 +64,16 @@ static inline bool rt6_need_strict(const struct in6_addr *daddr)
void ip6_route_input(struct sk_buff *skb);
-struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
- struct flowi6 *fl6);
+struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
+ struct flowi6 *fl6, int flags);
+
+static inline struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net,
+ const struct sock *sk,
+ struct flowi6 *fl6)
+{
+ return ip6_route_output_flags(net, sk, fl6, 0);
+}
+
struct dst_entry *ip6_route_lookup(struct net *net, struct flowi6 *fl6,
int flags);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 6473889..31144c4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -909,6 +909,7 @@ static int ip6_dst_lookup_tail(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
struct rt6_info *rt;
#endif
int err;
+ int flags = 0;
/* The correct way to handle this would be to do
* ip6_route_get_saddr, and then ip6_route_output; however,
@@ -940,10 +941,13 @@ static int ip6_dst_lookup_tail(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
dst_release(*dst);
*dst = NULL;
}
+
+ if (fl6->flowi6_oif)
+ flags |= RT6_LOOKUP_F_IFACE;
}
if (!*dst)
- *dst = ip6_route_output(net, sk, fl6);
+ *dst = ip6_route_output_flags(net, sk, fl6, flags);
err = (*dst)->error;
if (err)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index 826e6aa..3f164d3 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1174,11 +1174,10 @@ static struct rt6_info *ip6_pol_route_output(struct net *net, struct fib6_table
return ip6_pol_route(net, table, fl6->flowi6_oif, fl6, flags);
}
-struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
- struct flowi6 *fl6)
+struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
+ struct flowi6 *fl6, int flags)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
- int flags = 0;
bool any_src;
dst = l3mdev_rt6_dst_by_oif(net, fl6);
@@ -1199,7 +1198,7 @@ struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
return fib6_rule_lookup(net, fl6, flags, ip6_pol_route_output);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_route_output);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip6_route_output_flags);
struct dst_entry *ip6_blackhole_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig)
{
--
2.1.0
From cdde8a05ab4c9384596dfc6c67e04a75296c55cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 12:30:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/47] ipv6/udp: use sticky pktinfo egress ifindex on
connect()
[ Upstream commit 1cdda91871470f15e79375991bd2eddc6e86ddb1 ]
Currently, the egress interface index specified via IPV6_PKTINFO
is ignored by __ip6_datagram_connect(), so that RFC 3542 section 6.7
can be subverted when the user space application calls connect()
before sendmsg().
Fix it by initializing properly flowi6_oif in connect() before
performing the route lookup.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index 517c55b..4281621 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ ipv4_connected:
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
+ if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
+ fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
+
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && (addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
--
2.1.0
From 0ec365e650c3f9af9af4233aac389cba1b8ebdfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "subashab@codeaurora.org" <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 02:11:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 17/47] ipv6: addrconf: Fix recursive spin lock call
[ Upstream commit 16186a82de1fdd868255448274e64ae2616e2640 ]
A rcu stall with the following backtrace was seen on a system with
forwarding, optimistic_dad and use_optimistic set. To reproduce,
set these flags and allow ipv6 autoconf.
This occurs because the device write_lock is acquired while already
holding the read_lock. Back trace below -
INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU { 1} (t=2100 jiffies
g=3992 c=3991 q=4471)
<6> Task dump for CPU 1:
<2> kworker/1:0 R running task 12168 15 2 0x00000002
<2> Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
<6> Call trace:
<2> [<ffffffc000084da8>] el1_irq+0x68/0xdc
<2> [<ffffffc000cc4e0c>] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x20/0x30
<2> [<ffffffc000bc5dd8>] __ipv6_dev_ac_inc+0x64/0x1b4
<2> [<ffffffc000bcbd2c>] addrconf_join_anycast+0x9c/0xc4
<2> [<ffffffc000bcf9f0>] __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x160/0x29c
<2> [<ffffffc000bcfb7c>] ipv6_ifa_notify+0x50/0x70
<2> [<ffffffc000bd035c>] addrconf_dad_work+0x314/0x334
<2> [<ffffffc0000b64c8>] process_one_work+0x244/0x3fc
<2> [<ffffffc0000b7324>] worker_thread+0x2f8/0x418
<2> [<ffffffc0000bb40c>] kthread+0xe0/0xec
v2: do addrconf_dad_kick inside read lock and then acquire write
lock for ipv6_ifa_notify as suggested by Eric
Fixes: 7fd2561e4ebdd ("net: ipv6: Add a sysctl to make optimistic
addresses useful candidates")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Erik Kline <ek@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index 1f21087..828ab28 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -3506,6 +3506,7 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = ifp->idev;
struct net_device *dev = idev->dev;
+ bool notify = false;
addrconf_join_solict(dev, &ifp->addr);
@@ -3551,7 +3552,7 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
/* Because optimistic nodes can use this address,
* notify listeners. If DAD fails, RTM_DELADDR is sent.
*/
- ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
+ notify = true;
}
}
@@ -3559,6 +3560,8 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
out:
spin_unlock(&ifp->lock);
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
+ if (notify)
+ ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
}
static void addrconf_dad_start(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
--
2.1.0
From 8dd81b32c8f18c1e2791b4a60262e83041af4566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 17:55:01 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 18/47] ipv6: fix a lockdep splat
[ Upstream commit 44c3d0c1c0a880354e9de5d94175742e2c7c9683 ]
Silence lockdep false positive about rcu_dereference() being
used in the wrong context.
First one should use rcu_dereference_protected() as we own the spinlock.
Second one should be a normal assignation, as no barrier is needed.
Fixes: 18367681a10bd ("ipv6 flowlabel: Convert np->ipv6_fl_list to RCU.")
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
index 1f9ebe3..dc2db4f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
@@ -540,12 +540,13 @@ int ipv6_flowlabel_opt(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int optlen)
}
spin_lock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
for (sflp = &np->ipv6_fl_list;
- (sfl = rcu_dereference(*sflp)) != NULL;
+ (sfl = rcu_dereference_protected(*sflp,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ip6_sk_fl_lock))) != NULL;
sflp = &sfl->next) {
if (sfl->fl->label == freq.flr_label) {
if (freq.flr_label == (np->flow_label&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK))
np->flow_label &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
- *sflp = rcu_dereference(sfl->next);
+ *sflp = sfl->next;
spin_unlock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
fl_release(sfl->fl);
kfree_rcu(sfl, rcu);
--
2.1.0
From 15ddbc126c8e92959e261f49ca9f9be7385ac1e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 02:11:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 19/47] unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process
user_struct
[ Upstream commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 ]
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 4 ++--
include/net/scm.h | 1 +
net/core/scm.c | 7 +++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++--
net/unix/garbage.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 2a91a05..9b4c418 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
void unix_gc(void);
void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 262532d..59fa93c 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct scm_creds {
struct scm_fp_list {
short count;
short max;
+ struct user_struct *user;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 8a1741b..dce0acb 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fplp = fpl;
fpl->count = 0;
fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+ fpl->user = NULL;
}
fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
@@ -107,6 +108,10 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fpp++ = file;
fpl->count++;
}
+
+ if (!fpl->user)
+ fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
return num;
}
@@ -119,6 +124,7 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
scm->fp = NULL;
for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+ free_uid(fpl->user);
kfree(fpl);
}
}
@@ -336,6 +342,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+ new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
}
return new_fpl;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 775855e..6de41c3 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 8fcdc22..6a0d485 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
* descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
*/
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -133,11 +133,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+ user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+ user->unix_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
--
2.1.0
From ae6b0d02de1a9931012e1ef12e688a4c3997daa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 19:31:12 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 20/47] tcp: do not drop syn_recv on all icmp reports
[ Upstream commit 9cf7490360bf2c46a16b7525f899e4970c5fc144 ]
Petr Novopashenniy reported that ICMP redirects on SYN_RECV sockets
were leading to RST.
This is of course incorrect.
A specific list of ICMP messages should be able to drop a SYN_RECV.
For instance, a REDIRECT on SYN_RECV shall be ignored, as we do
not hold a dst per SYN_RECV pseudo request.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111751
Fixes: 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table")
Reported-by: Petr Novopashenniy <pety@rusnet.ru>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/tcp.h | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 11 ++++++++---
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 5 +++--
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index f80e74c..414d822 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th);
void tcp_v4_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
void tcp_v4_mtu_reduced(struct sock *sk);
-void tcp_req_err(struct sock *sk, u32 seq);
+void tcp_req_err(struct sock *sk, u32 seq, bool abort);
int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(const struct sock *sk,
struct request_sock *req,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 4627717..f66696c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static void do_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
/* handle ICMP messages on TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request sockets */
-void tcp_req_err(struct sock *sk, u32 seq)
+void tcp_req_err(struct sock *sk, u32 seq, bool abort)
{
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ void tcp_req_err(struct sock *sk, u32 seq)
if (seq != tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
- } else {
+ } else if (abort) {
/*
* Still in SYN_RECV, just remove it silently.
* There is no good way to pass the error to the newly
@@ -384,7 +384,12 @@ void tcp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *icmp_skb, u32 info)
}
seq = ntohl(th->seq);
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV)
- return tcp_req_err(sk, seq);
+ return tcp_req_err(sk, seq,
+ type == ICMP_PARAMETERPROB ||
+ type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED ||
+ (type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH &&
+ (code == ICMP_NET_UNREACH ||
+ code == ICMP_HOST_UNREACH)));
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* If too many ICMPs get dropped on busy
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index bd100b4..aea071e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ static void tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
struct tcp_sock *tp;
__u32 seq, snd_una;
struct sock *sk;
+ bool fatal;
int err;
sk = __inet6_lookup_established(net, &tcp_hashinfo,
@@ -346,8 +347,9 @@ static void tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
return;
}
seq = ntohl(th->seq);
+ fatal = icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err);
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV)
- return tcp_req_err(sk, seq);
+ return tcp_req_err(sk, seq, fatal);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk) && type != ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG)
@@ -401,7 +403,6 @@ static void tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
goto out;
}
- icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err);
/* Might be for an request_sock */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
--
2.1.0
From 06fd34194441c30fb8f8fc53846ebc2292b46893 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hans Westgaard Ry <hans.westgaard.ry@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 09:26:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 21/47] net:Add sysctl_max_skb_frags
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit 5f74f82ea34c0da80ea0b49192bb5ea06e063593 ]
Devices may have limits on the number of fragments in an skb they support.
Current codebase uses a constant as maximum for number of fragments one
skb can hold and use.
When enabling scatter/gather and running traffic with many small messages
the codebase uses the maximum number of fragments and may thereby violate
the max for certain devices.
The patch introduces a global variable as max number of fragments.
Signed-off-by: Hans Westgaard Ry <hans.westgaard.ry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/skbuff.h | 1 +
net/core/skbuff.c | 2 ++
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 10 ++++++++++
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 9147f9f..75f136a 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ struct sk_buff;
#else
#define MAX_SKB_FRAGS (65536/PAGE_SIZE + 1)
#endif
+extern int sysctl_max_skb_frags;
typedef struct skb_frag_struct skb_frag_t;
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index b2df375..5bf88f5 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache __read_mostly;
static struct kmem_cache *skbuff_fclone_cache __read_mostly;
+int sysctl_max_skb_frags __read_mostly = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_max_skb_frags);
/**
* skb_panic - private function for out-of-line support
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index 95b6139..a6beb7b 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static int zero = 0;
static int one = 1;
static int min_sndbuf = SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF;
static int min_rcvbuf = SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF;
+static int max_skb_frags = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
static int net_msg_warn; /* Unused, but still a sysctl */
@@ -392,6 +393,15 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
+ {
+ .procname = "max_skb_frags",
+ .data = &sysctl_max_skb_frags,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &one,
+ .extra2 = &max_skb_frags,
+ },
{ }
};
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 9c1241e..036a76b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ new_segment:
i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
can_coalesce = skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, page, offset);
- if (!can_coalesce && i >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
+ if (!can_coalesce && i >= sysctl_max_skb_frags) {
tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
goto new_segment;
}
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ new_segment:
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
- if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS || !sg) {
+ if (i == sysctl_max_skb_frags || !sg) {
tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
goto new_segment;
}
--
2.1.0
From cd62a6368231e29455f2c44bf772403b5d1bdb11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Siva Reddy Kallam <siva.kallam@broadcom.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 14:09:38 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 22/47] tg3: Fix for tg3 transmit queue 0 timed out when too
many gso_segs
[ Upstream commit b7d987295c74500b733a0ba07f9a9bcc4074fa83 ]
tg3_tso_bug() can hit a condition where the entire tx ring is not big
enough to segment the GSO packet. For example, if MSS is very small,
gso_segs can exceed the tx ring size. When we hit the condition, it
will cause tx timeout.
tg3_tso_bug() is called to handle TSO and DMA hardware bugs.
For TSO bugs, if tg3_tso_bug() cannot succeed, we have to drop the packet.
For DMA bugs, we can still fall back to linearize the SKB and let the
hardware transmit the TSO packet.
This patch adds a function tg3_tso_bug_gso_check() to check if there
are enough tx descriptors for GSO before calling tg3_tso_bug().
The caller will then handle the error appropriately - drop or
lineraize the SKB.
v2: Corrected patch description to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Siva Reddy Kallam <siva.kallam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
index 79789d8..ca5ac5d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
@@ -7833,6 +7833,14 @@ static int tigon3_dma_hwbug_workaround(struct tg3_napi *tnapi,
return ret;
}
+static bool tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(struct tg3_napi *tnapi, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ /* Check if we will never have enough descriptors,
+ * as gso_segs can be more than current ring size
+ */
+ return skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs < tnapi->tx_pending / 3;
+}
+
static netdev_tx_t tg3_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *);
/* Use GSO to workaround all TSO packets that meet HW bug conditions
@@ -7936,14 +7944,19 @@ static netdev_tx_t tg3_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
* vlan encapsulated.
*/
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021Q) ||
- skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021AD))
- return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
+ skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021AD)) {
+ if (tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(tnapi, skb))
+ return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
+ goto drop;
+ }
if (!skb_is_gso_v6(skb)) {
if (unlikely((ETH_HLEN + hdr_len) > 80) &&
- tg3_flag(tp, TSO_BUG))
- return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
-
+ tg3_flag(tp, TSO_BUG)) {
+ if (tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(tnapi, skb))
+ return tg3_tso_bug(tp, tnapi, txq, skb);
+ goto drop;
+ }
ip_csum = iph->check;
ip_tot_len = iph->tot_len;
iph->check = 0;
@@ -8075,7 +8088,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t tg3_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
if (would_hit_hwbug) {
tg3_tx_skb_unmap(tnapi, tnapi->tx_prod, i);
- if (mss) {
+ if (mss && tg3_tso_bug_gso_check(tnapi, skb)) {
/* If it's a TSO packet, do GSO instead of
* allocating and copying to a large linear SKB
*/
--
2.1.0
From 0090d03ed7a0851f00eade59eed8bbba4b0e164c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sandeep Pillai <sanpilla@cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 14:40:44 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 23/47] enic: increment devcmd2 result ring in case of timeout
[ Upstream commit ca7f41a4957b872577807169bd7464b36aae9b9c ]
Firmware posts the devcmd result in result ring. In case of timeout, driver
does not increment the current result pointer and firmware could post the
result after timeout has occurred. During next devcmd, driver would be
reading the result of previous devcmd.
Fix this by incrementing result even in case of timeout.
Fixes: 373fb0873d43 ("enic: add devcmd2")
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Pillai <sanpilla@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Govindarajulu Varadarajan <_govind@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic.h | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/vnic_dev.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic.h
index 1671fa3..7ba6d53 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#define DRV_NAME "enic"
#define DRV_DESCRIPTION "Cisco VIC Ethernet NIC Driver"
-#define DRV_VERSION "2.3.0.12"
+#define DRV_VERSION "2.3.0.20"
#define DRV_COPYRIGHT "Copyright 2008-2013 Cisco Systems, Inc"
#define ENIC_BARS_MAX 6
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/vnic_dev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/vnic_dev.c
index 1ffd105..1fdf5fe 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/vnic_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/vnic_dev.c
@@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ static int _vnic_dev_cmd2(struct vnic_dev *vdev, enum vnic_devcmd_cmd cmd,
int wait)
{
struct devcmd2_controller *dc2c = vdev->devcmd2;
- struct devcmd2_result *result = dc2c->result + dc2c->next_result;
+ struct devcmd2_result *result;
+ u8 color;
unsigned int i;
int delay, err;
u32 fetch_index, new_posted;
@@ -336,13 +337,17 @@ static int _vnic_dev_cmd2(struct vnic_dev *vdev, enum vnic_devcmd_cmd cmd,
if (dc2c->cmd_ring[posted].flags & DEVCMD2_FNORESULT)
return 0;
+ result = dc2c->result + dc2c->next_result;
+ color = dc2c->color;
+
+ dc2c->next_result++;
+ if (dc2c->next_result == dc2c->result_size) {
+ dc2c->next_result = 0;
+ dc2c->color = dc2c->color ? 0 : 1;
+ }
+
for (delay = 0; delay < wait; delay++) {
- if (result->color == dc2c->color) {
- dc2c->next_result++;
- if (dc2c->next_result == dc2c->result_size) {
- dc2c->next_result = 0;
- dc2c->color = dc2c->color ? 0 : 1;
- }
+ if (result->color == color) {
if (result->error) {
err = result->error;
if (err != ERR_ECMDUNKNOWN ||
--
2.1.0
From 055c0a822bdeca4b0ebdc7a34d91e9cef3ad1ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 23:33:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 24/47] sctp: translate network order to host order when users
get a hmacid
[ Upstream commit 7a84bd46647ff181eb2659fdc99590e6f16e501d ]
Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid") corrected the hmacid byte-order when setting a hmacid.
but the same issue also exists on getting a hmacid.
We fix it by changing hmacids to host order when users get them with
getsockopt.
Fixes: Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 06a9cfb..be1489f 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -5542,6 +5542,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
__u16 data_len = 0;
u32 num_idents;
+ int i;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
@@ -5559,8 +5560,12 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(num_idents, &p->shmac_num_idents))
return -EFAULT;
- if (copy_to_user(p->shmac_idents, hmacs->hmac_ids, data_len))
- return -EFAULT;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_idents; i++) {
+ __u16 hmacid = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(&p->shmac_idents[i], &hmacid, sizeof(__u16)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
return 0;
}
--
2.1.0
From 163cc5d252e42abbab2d8a7780f028483e49b720 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 06:14:43 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 25/47] net: Copy inner L3 and L4 headers as unaligned on GRE
TEB
[ Upstream commit 78565208d73ca9b654fb9a6b142214d52eeedfd1 ]
This patch corrects the unaligned accesses seen on GRE TEB tunnels when
generating hash keys. Specifically what this patch does is make it so that
we force the use of skb_copy_bits when the GRE inner headers will be
unaligned due to NET_IP_ALIGNED being a non-zero value.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Acked-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/flow_dissector.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/flow_dissector.c b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
index d79699c..b258f45 100644
--- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
@@ -396,6 +396,13 @@ ip_proto_again:
goto out_bad;
proto = eth->h_proto;
nhoff += sizeof(*eth);
+
+ /* Cap headers that we access via pointers at the
+ * end of the Ethernet header as our maximum alignment
+ * at that point is only 2 bytes.
+ */
+ if (NET_IP_ALIGN)
+ hlen = nhoff;
}
key_control->flags |= FLOW_DIS_ENCAPSULATION;
--
2.1.0
From 14850edd12f32fba006d23109fe5739e2483cc93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 02:49:54 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 26/47] flow_dissector: Fix unaligned access in
__skb_flow_dissector when used by eth_get_headlen
[ Upstream commit 461547f3158978c180d74484d58e82be9b8e7357 ]
This patch fixes an issue with unaligned accesses when using
eth_get_headlen on a page that was DMA aligned instead of being IP aligned.
The fact is when trying to check the length we don't need to be looking at
the flow label so we can reorder the checks to first check if we are
supposed to gather the flow label and then make the call to actually get
it.
v2: Updated path so that either STOP_AT_FLOW_LABEL or KEY_FLOW_LABEL can
cause us to check for the flow label.
Reported-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/flow_dissector.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/flow_dissector.c b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
index b258f45..12e7003 100644
--- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
@@ -208,7 +208,6 @@ ip:
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6): {
const struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct ipv6hdr _iph;
- __be32 flow_label;
ipv6:
iph = __skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_iph), data, hlen, &_iph);
@@ -230,8 +229,12 @@ ipv6:
key_control->addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS;
}
- flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(iph);
- if (flow_label) {
+ if ((dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
+ FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_FLOW_LABEL) ||
+ (flags & FLOW_DISSECTOR_F_STOP_AT_FLOW_LABEL)) &&
+ ip6_flowlabel(iph)) {
+ __be32 flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(iph);
+
if (dissector_uses_key(flow_dissector,
FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_FLOW_LABEL)) {
key_tags = skb_flow_dissector_target(flow_dissector,
--
2.1.0
From fd0a139b8c2f871c6baf9221aadaaab1f9e2b097 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 16:47:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 27/47] bpf: fix branch offset adjustment on backjumps after
patching ctx expansion
[ Upstream commit a1b14d27ed0965838350f1377ff97c93ee383492 ]
When ctx access is used, the kernel often needs to expand/rewrite
instructions, so after that patching, branch offsets have to be
adjusted for both forward and backward jumps in the new eBPF program,
but for backward jumps it fails to account the delta. Meaning, for
example, if the expansion happens exactly on the insn that sits at
the jump target, it doesn't fix up the back jump offset.
Analysis on what the check in adjust_branches() is currently doing:
/* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */
if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
insn->off += delta;
else if (i > pos && i + insn->off + 1 < pos)
insn->off -= delta;
First condition (forward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- i/insn insns[1] <--- i/insn
insns[2] <--- pos insns[P] <--- pos
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- target_X insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- target_X
insns[5]
First case is if we cross pos-boundary and the jump instruction was
before pos. This is handeled correctly. I.e. if i == pos, then this
would mean our jump that we currently check was the patchlet itself
that we just injected. Since such patchlets are self-contained and
have no awareness of any insns before or after the patched one, the
delta is correctly not adjusted. Also, for the second condition in
case of i + insn->off + 1 == pos, means we jump to that newly patched
instruction, so no offset adjustment are needed. That part is correct.
Second condition (backward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- target_X insns[1] <--- target_X
insns[2] <--- pos <-- target_Y insns[P] <--- pos <-- target_Y
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- i/insn insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- i/insn
insns[5]
Second interesting case is where we cross pos-boundary and the jump
instruction was after pos. Backward jump with i == pos would be
impossible and pose a bug somewhere in the patchlet, so the first
condition checking i > pos is okay only by itself. However, i +
insn->off + 1 < pos does not always work as intended to trigger the
adjustment. It works when jump targets would be far off where the
delta wouldn't matter. But, for example, where the fixed insn->off
before pointed to pos (target_Y), it now points to pos + delta, so
that additional room needs to be taken into account for the check.
This means that i) both tests here need to be adjusted into pos + delta,
and ii) for the second condition, the test needs to be <= as pos
itself can be a target in the backjump, too.
Fixes: 9bac3d6d548e ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d1d3e8f..2e7f7ab 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ static void adjust_branches(struct bpf_prog *prog, int pos, int delta)
/* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */
if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
insn->off += delta;
- else if (i > pos && i + insn->off + 1 < pos)
+ else if (i > pos + delta && i + insn->off + 1 <= pos + delta)
insn->off -= delta;
}
}
--
2.1.0
From 818792e44f5178cd8199768e0750e28201549d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 13:35:56 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 28/47] bonding: Fix ARP monitor validation
[ Upstream commit 21a75f0915dde8674708b39abfcda113911c49b1 ]
The current logic in bond_arp_rcv will accept an incoming ARP for
validation if (a) the receiving slave is either "active" (which includes
the currently active slave, or the current ARP slave) or, (b) there is a
currently active slave, and it has received an ARP since it became active.
For case (b), the receiving slave isn't the currently active slave, and is
receiving the original broadcast ARP request, not an ARP reply from the
target.
This logic can fail if there is no currently active slave. In
this situation, the ARP probe logic cycles through all slaves, assigning
each in turn as the "current_arp_slave" for one arp_interval, then setting
that one as "active," and sending an ARP probe from that slave. The
current logic expects the ARP reply to arrive on the sending
current_arp_slave, however, due to switch FDB updating delays, the reply
may be directed to another slave.
This can arise if the bonding slaves and switch are working, but
the ARP target is not responding. When the ARP target recovers, a
condition may result wherein the ARP target host replies faster than the
switch can update its forwarding table, causing each ARP reply to be sent
to the previous current_arp_slave. This will never pass the logic in
bond_arp_rcv, as neither of the above conditions (a) or (b) are met.
Some experimentation on a LAN shows ARP reply round trips in the
200 usec range, but my available switches never update their FDB in less
than 4000 usec.
This patch changes the logic in bond_arp_rcv to additionally
accept an ARP reply for validation on any slave if there is a current ARP
slave and it sent an ARP probe during the previous arp_interval.
Fixes: aeea64ac717a ("bonding: don't trust arp requests unless active slave really works")
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index f1692e4..28bbca0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -214,6 +214,8 @@ static void bond_uninit(struct net_device *bond_dev);
static struct rtnl_link_stats64 *bond_get_stats(struct net_device *bond_dev,
struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats);
static void bond_slave_arr_handler(struct work_struct *work);
+static bool bond_time_in_interval(struct bonding *bond, unsigned long last_act,
+ int mod);
/*---------------------------- General routines -----------------------------*/
@@ -2418,7 +2420,7 @@ int bond_arp_rcv(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond,
struct slave *slave)
{
struct arphdr *arp = (struct arphdr *)skb->data;
- struct slave *curr_active_slave;
+ struct slave *curr_active_slave, *curr_arp_slave;
unsigned char *arp_ptr;
__be32 sip, tip;
int alen, is_arp = skb->protocol == __cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_ARP);
@@ -2465,26 +2467,41 @@ int bond_arp_rcv(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond,
&sip, &tip);
curr_active_slave = rcu_dereference(bond->curr_active_slave);
+ curr_arp_slave = rcu_dereference(bond->current_arp_slave);
- /* Backup slaves won't see the ARP reply, but do come through
- * here for each ARP probe (so we swap the sip/tip to validate
- * the probe). In a "redundant switch, common router" type of
- * configuration, the ARP probe will (hopefully) travel from
- * the active, through one switch, the router, then the other
- * switch before reaching the backup.
+ /* We 'trust' the received ARP enough to validate it if:
+ *
+ * (a) the slave receiving the ARP is active (which includes the
+ * current ARP slave, if any), or
+ *
+ * (b) the receiving slave isn't active, but there is a currently
+ * active slave and it received valid arp reply(s) after it became
+ * the currently active slave, or
+ *
+ * (c) there is an ARP slave that sent an ARP during the prior ARP
+ * interval, and we receive an ARP reply on any slave. We accept
+ * these because switch FDB update delays may deliver the ARP
+ * reply to a slave other than the sender of the ARP request.
*
- * We 'trust' the arp requests if there is an active slave and
- * it received valid arp reply(s) after it became active. This
- * is done to avoid endless looping when we can't reach the
+ * Note: for (b), backup slaves are receiving the broadcast ARP
+ * request, not a reply. This request passes from the sending
+ * slave through the L2 switch(es) to the receiving slave. Since
+ * this is checking the request, sip/tip are swapped for
+ * validation.
+ *
+ * This is done to avoid endless looping when we can't reach the
* arp_ip_target and fool ourselves with our own arp requests.
*/
-
if (bond_is_active_slave(slave))
bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, sip, tip);
else if (curr_active_slave &&
time_after(slave_last_rx(bond, curr_active_slave),
curr_active_slave->last_link_up))
bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, tip, sip);
+ else if (curr_arp_slave && (arp->ar_op == htons(ARPOP_REPLY)) &&
+ bond_time_in_interval(bond,
+ dev_trans_start(curr_arp_slave->dev), 1))
+ bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, sip, tip);
out_unlock:
if (arp != (struct arphdr *)skb->data)
--
2.1.0
From 2a1f86f784469fedb786b863458330e8e910e852 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 06:23:28 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 29/47] ipv4: fix memory leaks in ip_cmsg_send() callers
[ Upstream commit 919483096bfe75dda338e98d56da91a263746a0a ]
Dmitry reported memory leaks of IP options allocated in
ip_cmsg_send() when/if this function returns an error.
Callers are responsible for the freeing.
Many thanks to Dmitry for the report and diagnostic.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 ++
net/ipv4/ping.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/raw.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/udp.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 5f73a7c..a501242 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ int ip_cmsg_send(struct net *net, struct msghdr *msg, struct ipcm_cookie *ipc,
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case IP_RETOPTS:
err = cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr));
+
+ /* Our caller is responsible for freeing ipc->opt */
err = ip_options_get(net, &ipc->opt, CMSG_DATA(cmsg),
err < 40 ? err : 40);
if (err)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index e89094a..aa67e0e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -746,8 +746,10 @@ static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc, false);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index bc35f18..7113bae 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -547,8 +547,10 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(net, msg, &ipc, false);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
goto out;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index c438908..7f8ab46 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -966,8 +966,10 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc,
sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
connected = 0;
--
2.1.0
From 1e6d3be5ae45d16befd733df388714902da15f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 18:47:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 30/47] af_unix: Don't set err in unix_stream_read_generic
unless there was an error
[ Upstream commit 1b92ee3d03af6643df395300ba7748f19ecdb0c5 ]
The present unix_stream_read_generic contains various code sequences of
the form
err = -EDISASTER;
if (<test>)
goto out;
This has the unfortunate side effect of possibly causing the error code
to bleed through to the final
out:
return copied ? : err;
and then to be wrongly returned if no data was copied because the caller
didn't supply a data buffer, as demonstrated by the program available at
http://pad.lv/1540731
Change it such that err is only set if an error condition was detected.
Fixes: 3822b5c2fc62 ("af_unix: Revert 'lock_interruptible' in stream receive code")
Reported-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 ++++++++++------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 6de41c3..265412c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -2270,13 +2270,15 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state)
size_t size = state->size;
unsigned int last_len;
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
+ }
- err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (flags & MSG_OOB)
+ if (unlikely(flags & MSG_OOB)) {
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
+ }
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock);
@@ -2322,9 +2324,11 @@ again:
goto unlock;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
- err = -EAGAIN;
- if (!timeo)
+ if (!timeo) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo, last,
--
2.1.0
From dcd51b905bfc941f1ffea3322e97bb8a20db8a5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 19:37:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 31/47] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in
unix_dgram_sendmsg
[ Upstream commit a5527dda344fff0514b7989ef7a755729769daa1 ]
The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either
established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an
unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the
specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or
because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of
the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In
both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which
might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock
the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk
check to guard against this.
Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")
Reported-By: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 265412c..898a53a 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1781,7 +1781,12 @@ restart_locked:
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ /* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock
+ */
+ if (other != sk &&
+ unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
if (timeo) {
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
--
2.1.0
From aba4bbb881ef85776da744260e8f1d24c75722d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jon Paul Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 16:14:57 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 32/47] tipc: fix premature addition of node to lookup table
[ Upstream commit d5c91fb72f1652ea3026925240a0998a42ddb16b ]
In commit 5266698661401a ("tipc: let broadcast packet reception
use new link receive function") we introduced a new per-node
broadcast reception link instance. This link is created at the
moment the node itself is created. Unfortunately, the allocation
is done after the node instance has already been added to the node
lookup hash table. This creates a potential race condition, where
arriving broadcast packets are able to find and access the node
before it has been fully initialized, and before the above mentioned
link has been created. The result is occasional crashes in the function
tipc_bcast_rcv(), which is trying to access the not-yet existing link.
We fix this by deferring the addition of the node instance until after
it has been fully initialized in the function tipc_node_create().
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/tipc/node.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c
index 20cddec..3926b56 100644
--- a/net/tipc/node.c
+++ b/net/tipc/node.c
@@ -168,12 +168,6 @@ struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr, u16 capabilities)
skb_queue_head_init(&n_ptr->bc_entry.inputq1);
__skb_queue_head_init(&n_ptr->bc_entry.arrvq);
skb_queue_head_init(&n_ptr->bc_entry.inputq2);
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&n_ptr->hash, &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
- if (n_ptr->addr < temp_node->addr)
- break;
- }
- list_add_tail_rcu(&n_ptr->list, &temp_node->list);
n_ptr->state = SELF_DOWN_PEER_LEAVING;
n_ptr->signature = INVALID_NODE_SIG;
n_ptr->active_links[0] = INVALID_BEARER_ID;
@@ -193,6 +187,12 @@ struct tipc_node *tipc_node_create(struct net *net, u32 addr, u16 capabilities)
tipc_node_get(n_ptr);
setup_timer(&n_ptr->timer, tipc_node_timeout, (unsigned long)n_ptr);
n_ptr->keepalive_intv = U32_MAX;
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&n_ptr->hash, &tn->node_htable[tipc_hashfn(addr)]);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(temp_node, &tn->node_list, list) {
+ if (n_ptr->addr < temp_node->addr)
+ break;
+ }
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&n_ptr->list, &temp_node->list);
exit:
spin_unlock_bh(&tn->node_list_lock);
return n_ptr;
--
2.1.0
From 9db218fa06f9917a7e852089e7d2b9513af31f2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 22:50:29 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 33/47] tcp: md5: release request socket instead of listener
[ Upstream commit 729235554d805c63e5e274fcc6a98e71015dd847 ]
If tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash() returns an error, we must release
the refcount on the request socket, not on the listener.
The bug was added for IPv4 only.
Fixes: 079096f103fac ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index f66696c..bfcddee 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1597,8 +1597,10 @@ process:
struct sock *nsk = NULL;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
- if (tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
- goto discard_and_relse;
+ if (unlikely(tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))) {
+ reqsk_put(req);
+ goto discard_it;
+ }
if (likely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
} else {
--
2.1.0
From f3eddbd11f221643b1f33beca572d06f6c883da0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <bjorn@mork.no>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 16:42:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 34/47] qmi_wwan: add "4G LTE usb-modem U901"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Upstream commit aac8d3c282e024c344c5b86dc1eab7af88bb9716 ]
Thomas reports:
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=05c6 ProdID=6001 Rev=00.00
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=1234567890ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 5fccc5a..982e0acd 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
/* 3. Combined interface devices matching on interface number */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0408, 0xea42, 4)}, /* Yota / Megafon M100-1 */
+ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x6001, 3)}, /* 4G LTE usb-modem U901 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7000, 0)},
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7001, 1)},
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7002, 1)},
--
2.1.0
From ae637d7ca4d9df02a5438870066f40de97746eea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amir Vadai <amir@vadai.me>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 17:24:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 35/47] net/mlx4_en: Count HW buffer overrun only once
[ Upstream commit 281e8b2fdf8e4ef366b899453cae50e09b577ada ]
RdropOvflw counts overrun of HW buffer, therefore should
be used for rx_fifo_errors only.
Currently RdropOvflw counter is mistakenly also set into
rx_missed_errors and rx_over_errors too, which makes the
device total dropped packets accounting to show wrong results.
Fix that. Use it for rx_fifo_errors only.
Fixes: c27a02cd94d6 ('mlx4_en: Add driver for Mellanox ConnectX 10GbE NIC')
Signed-off-by: Amir Vadai <amir@vadai.me>
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
index ee99e67..3904b5f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
@@ -238,11 +238,11 @@ int mlx4_en_DUMP_ETH_STATS(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev, u8 port, u8 reset)
stats->collisions = 0;
stats->rx_dropped = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RDROP);
stats->rx_length_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropLength);
- stats->rx_over_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
+ stats->rx_over_errors = 0;
stats->rx_crc_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RCRC);
stats->rx_frame_errors = 0;
stats->rx_fifo_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
- stats->rx_missed_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
+ stats->rx_missed_errors = 0;
stats->tx_aborted_errors = 0;
stats->tx_carrier_errors = 0;
stats->tx_fifo_errors = 0;
--
2.1.0
From b5fcfba41470bc264d1d750efd01f0ed104c37da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 17:24:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 36/47] net/mlx4_en: Choose time-stamping shift value according
to HW frequency
[ Upstream commit 31c128b66e5b28f468076e4f3ca3025c35342041 ]
Previously, the shift value used for time-stamping was constant and didn't
depend on the HW chip frequency. Change that to take the frequency into account
and calculate the maximal value in cycles per wraparound of ten seconds. This
time slot was chosen since it gives a good accuracy in time synchronization.
Algorithm for shift value calculation:
* Round up the maximal value in cycles to nearest power of two
* Calculate maximal multiplier by division of all 64 bits set
to above result
* Then, invert the function clocksource_khz2mult() to get the shift from
maximal mult value
Fixes: ec693d47010e ('net/mlx4_en: Add HW timestamping (TS) support')
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Matan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
index 038f9ce..1494997 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
@@ -236,6 +236,24 @@ static const struct ptp_clock_info mlx4_en_ptp_clock_info = {
.enable = mlx4_en_phc_enable,
};
+#define MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC 10ULL
+
+/* This function calculates the max shift that enables the user range
+ * of MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC values in the cycles register.
+ */
+static u32 freq_to_shift(u16 freq)
+{
+ u32 freq_khz = freq * 1000;
+ u64 max_val_cycles = freq_khz * 1000 * MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC;
+ u64 max_val_cycles_rounded = is_power_of_2(max_val_cycles + 1) ?
+ max_val_cycles : roundup_pow_of_two(max_val_cycles) - 1;
+ /* calculate max possible multiplier in order to fit in 64bit */
+ u64 max_mul = div_u64(0xffffffffffffffffULL, max_val_cycles_rounded);
+
+ /* This comes from the reverse of clocksource_khz2mult */
+ return ilog2(div_u64(max_mul * freq_khz, 1000000));
+}
+
void mlx4_en_init_timestamp(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev)
{
struct mlx4_dev *dev = mdev->dev;
@@ -254,12 +272,7 @@ void mlx4_en_init_timestamp(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev)
memset(&mdev->cycles, 0, sizeof(mdev->cycles));
mdev->cycles.read = mlx4_en_read_clock;
mdev->cycles.mask = CLOCKSOURCE_MASK(48);
- /* Using shift to make calculation more accurate. Since current HW
- * clock frequency is 427 MHz, and cycles are given using a 48 bits
- * register, the biggest shift when calculating using u64, is 14
- * (max_cycles * multiplier < 2^64)
- */
- mdev->cycles.shift = 14;
+ mdev->cycles.shift = freq_to_shift(dev->caps.hca_core_clock);
mdev->cycles.mult =
clocksource_khz2mult(1000 * dev->caps.hca_core_clock, mdev->cycles.shift);
mdev->nominal_c_mult = mdev->cycles.mult;
--
2.1.0
From 2681336d558086688fb81760a2294c5c298e60dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 17:24:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 37/47] net/mlx4_en: Avoid changing dev->features directly in
run-time
[ Upstream commit 925ab1aa9394bbaeac47ee5b65d3fdf0fb8135cf ]
It's forbidden to manually change dev->features in run-time. Currently, this is
done in the driver to make sure that GSO_UDP_TUNNEL is advertized only when
VXLAN tunnel is set. However, since the stack actually does features intersection
with hw_enc_features, we can safely revert to advertizing features early when
registering the netdevice.
Fixes: f4a1edd56120 ('net/mlx4_en: Advertize encapsulation offloads [...]')
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
index 7869f97..67e9633 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
@@ -2381,8 +2381,6 @@ out:
/* set offloads */
priv->dev->hw_enc_features |= NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
- priv->dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
- priv->dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
}
static void mlx4_en_del_vxlan_offloads(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -2393,8 +2391,6 @@ static void mlx4_en_del_vxlan_offloads(struct work_struct *work)
/* unset offloads */
priv->dev->hw_enc_features &= ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL);
- priv->dev->hw_features &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
- priv->dev->features &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
ret = mlx4_SET_PORT_VXLAN(priv->mdev->dev, priv->port,
VXLAN_STEER_BY_OUTER_MAC, 0);
@@ -3020,6 +3016,11 @@ int mlx4_en_init_netdev(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev, int port,
priv->rss_hash_fn = ETH_RSS_HASH_TOP;
}
+ if (mdev->dev->caps.tunnel_offload_mode == MLX4_TUNNEL_OFFLOAD_MODE_VXLAN) {
+ dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
+ dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
+ }
+
mdev->pndev[port] = dev;
mdev->upper[port] = NULL;
--
2.1.0
From 679b435ba7247a4ade026c9fadf0bd3444907fbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Tomlinson <mark.tomlinson@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 16:24:44 +1300
Subject: [PATCH 38/47] l2tp: Fix error creating L2TP tunnels
[ Upstream commit 853effc55b0f975abd6d318cca486a9c1b67e10f ]
A previous commit (33f72e6) added notification via netlink for tunnels
when created/modified/deleted. If the notification returned an error,
this error was returned from the tunnel function. If there were no
listeners, the error code ESRCH was returned, even though having no
listeners is not an error. Other calls to this and other similar
notification functions either ignore the error code, or filter ESRCH.
This patch checks for ESRCH and does not flag this as an error.
Reviewed-by: Hamish Martin <hamish.martin@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tomlinson <mark.tomlinson@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
index f93c5be..2caaa84 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
@@ -124,8 +124,13 @@ static int l2tp_tunnel_notify(struct genl_family *family,
ret = l2tp_nl_tunnel_send(msg, info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq,
NLM_F_ACK, tunnel, cmd);
- if (ret >= 0)
- return genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ ret = genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ /* We don't care if no one is listening */
+ if (ret == -ESRCH)
+ ret = 0;
+ return ret;
+ }
nlmsg_free(msg);
@@ -147,8 +152,13 @@ static int l2tp_session_notify(struct genl_family *family,
ret = l2tp_nl_session_send(msg, info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq,
NLM_F_ACK, session, cmd);
- if (ret >= 0)
- return genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ ret = genlmsg_multicast_allns(family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ /* We don't care if no one is listening */
+ if (ret == -ESRCH)
+ ret = 0;
+ return ret;
+ }
nlmsg_free(msg);
--
2.1.0
From af71da691d72f8d4dff2c6ee2f478635d8c1db0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 17:01:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 39/47] pppoe: fix reference counting in PPPoE proxy
[ Upstream commit 29e73269aa4d36f92b35610c25f8b01c789b0dc8 ]
Drop reference on the relay_po socket when __pppoe_xmit() succeeds.
This is already handled correctly in the error path.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
index 0a37f84..4e0068e7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ static int pppoe_rcv_core(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!__pppoe_xmit(sk_pppox(relay_po), skb))
goto abort_put;
+
+ sock_put(sk_pppox(relay_po));
} else {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
goto abort_kfree;
--
2.1.0
From 11253bc76ca428cf57d2ef3fcd198eff79359d24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 07:38:04 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 40/47] net_sched fix: reclassification needs to consider ether
protocol changes
[ Upstream commit 619fe32640b4b01f370574d50344ae0f62689816 ]
actions could change the etherproto in particular with ethernet
tunnelled data. Typically such actions, after peeling the outer header,
will ask for the packet to be reclassified. We then need to restart
the classification with the new proto header.
Example setup used to catch this:
sudo tc qdisc add dev $ETH ingress
sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: pref 1 protocol 802.1Q \
u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:1 \
action vlan pop reclassify
Fixes: 3b3ae880266d ("net: sched: consolidate tc_classify{,_compat}")
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sched/sch_api.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index b5c2cf2..af1acf0 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -1852,6 +1852,7 @@ reset:
}
tp = old_tp;
+ protocol = tc_skb_protocol(skb);
goto reclassify;
#endif
}
--
2.1.0
From 92e994dc73307d98080ee684259182eb300dc552 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 21:21:19 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 41/47] route: check and remove route cache when we get route
[ Upstream commit deed49df7390d5239024199e249190328f1651e7 ]
Since the gc of ipv4 route was removed, the route cached would has
no chance to be removed, and even it has been timeout, it still could
be used, cause no code to check it's expires.
Fix this issue by checking and removing route cache when we get route.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/ip_fib.h | 1 +
net/ipv4/route.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip_fib.h b/include/net/ip_fib.h
index 9f4df68..3f98233 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_fib.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_fib.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct fib_nh_exception {
struct rtable __rcu *fnhe_rth_input;
struct rtable __rcu *fnhe_rth_output;
unsigned long fnhe_stamp;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
};
struct fnhe_hash_bucket {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index 85f184e..02c6229 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ static int ip_rt_mtu_expires __read_mostly = 10 * 60 * HZ;
static int ip_rt_min_pmtu __read_mostly = 512 + 20 + 20;
static int ip_rt_min_advmss __read_mostly = 256;
+static int ip_rt_gc_timeout __read_mostly = RT_GC_TIMEOUT;
/*
* Interface to generic destination cache.
*/
@@ -755,7 +756,7 @@ static void __ip_do_redirect(struct rtable *rt, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flow
struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(res);
update_or_create_fnhe(nh, fl4->daddr, new_gw,
- 0, 0);
+ 0, jiffies + ip_rt_gc_timeout);
}
if (kill_route)
rt->dst.obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_KILL;
@@ -1556,6 +1557,36 @@ static void ip_handle_martian_source(struct net_device *dev,
#endif
}
+static void ip_del_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
+{
+ struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
+ struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, __rcu **fnhe_p;
+ u32 hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+
+ hash = rcu_dereference_protected(nh->nh_exceptions,
+ lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+ hash += hval;
+
+ fnhe_p = &hash->chain;
+ fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+ while (fnhe) {
+ if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(*fnhe_p, rcu_dereference_protected(
+ fnhe->fnhe_next, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)));
+ fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
+ kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu);
+ break;
+ }
+ fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next;
+ fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(fnhe->fnhe_next,
+ lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+}
+
/* called in rcu_read_lock() section */
static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct fib_result *res,
@@ -1609,11 +1640,20 @@ static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
fnhe = find_exception(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
if (do_cache) {
- if (fnhe)
+ if (fnhe) {
rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
- else
- rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
+ if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
+ time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
+ ip_del_fnhe(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
+ fnhe = NULL;
+ } else {
+ goto rt_cache;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
+rt_cache:
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
goto out;
@@ -2014,19 +2054,29 @@ static struct rtable *__mkroute_output(const struct fib_result *res,
struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(*res);
fnhe = find_exception(nh, fl4->daddr);
- if (fnhe)
+ if (fnhe) {
prth = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
- else {
- if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
- FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
- !(nh->nh_gw &&
- nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
- do_cache = false;
- goto add;
+ rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
+ if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
+ time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
+ ip_del_fnhe(nh, fl4->daddr);
+ fnhe = NULL;
+ } else {
+ goto rt_cache;
}
- prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
}
+
+ if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
+ FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
+ !(nh->nh_gw &&
+ nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
+ do_cache = false;
+ goto add;
+ }
+ prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
+
+rt_cache:
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
dst_hold(&rth->dst);
return rth;
@@ -2569,7 +2619,6 @@ void ip_rt_multicast_event(struct in_device *in_dev)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-static int ip_rt_gc_timeout __read_mostly = RT_GC_TIMEOUT;
static int ip_rt_gc_interval __read_mostly = 60 * HZ;
static int ip_rt_gc_min_interval __read_mostly = HZ / 2;
static int ip_rt_gc_elasticity __read_mostly = 8;
--
2.1.0
From e7b45041b74baa3aea88b9ef6e2db8c4ed9b7e24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 05:39:18 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 42/47] tcp/dccp: fix another race at listener dismantle
[ Upstream commit 7716682cc58e305e22207d5bb315f26af6b1e243 ]
Ilya reported following lockdep splat:
kernel: =========================
kernel: [ BUG: held lock freed! ]
kernel: 4.5.0-rc1-ceph-00026-g5e0a311 #1 Not tainted
kernel: -------------------------
kernel: swapper/5/0 is freeing memory
ffff880035c9d200-ffff880035c9dbff, with a lock still held there!
kernel: (&(&queue->rskq_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at:
[<ffffffff816f6a88>] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add+0x28/0xa0
kernel: 4 locks held by swapper/5/0:
kernel: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8169ef6b>]
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x4b/0x1f0
kernel: #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff816e977f>]
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3f/0x380
kernel: #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81685ffb>]
sk_clone_lock+0x19b/0x440
kernel: #3: (&(&queue->rskq_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at:
[<ffffffff816f6a88>] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add+0x28/0xa0
To properly fix this issue, inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() needs
to return to its callers if the child as been queued
into accept queue.
We also need to make sure listener is still there before
calling sk->sk_data_ready(), by holding a reference on it,
since the reference carried by the child can disappear as
soon as the child is put on accept queue.
Reported-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Fixes: ebb516af60e1 ("tcp/dccp: fix race at listener dismantle phase")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/inet_connection_sock.h | 5 +++--
net/dccp/ipv4.c | 14 +++++++-------
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 14 +++++++-------
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 14 +++++++-------
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 14 +++++++-------
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 14 +++++++-------
6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
index 481fe1c..49dcad4 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
@@ -270,8 +270,9 @@ struct dst_entry *inet_csk_route_child_sock(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req);
-void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
- struct sock *child);
+struct sock *inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(struct sock *sk,
+ struct request_sock *req,
+ struct sock *child);
void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
unsigned long timeout);
struct sock *inet_csk_complete_hashdance(struct sock *sk, struct sock *child,
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv4.c b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
index 5684e14..902d606 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
@@ -824,26 +824,26 @@ lookup:
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
- struct sock *nsk = NULL;
+ struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
- if (likely(sk->sk_state == DCCP_LISTEN)) {
- nsk = dccp_check_req(sk, skb, req);
- } else {
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != DCCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req);
goto lookup;
}
+ sock_hold(sk);
+ nsk = dccp_check_req(sk, skb, req);
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
- sock_hold(sk);
reqsk_put(req);
} else if (dccp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
dccp_v4_ctl_send_reset(sk, skb);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
} else {
+ sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
}
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 9c6d050..b8608b7 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -691,26 +691,26 @@ lookup:
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
- struct sock *nsk = NULL;
+ struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
- if (likely(sk->sk_state == DCCP_LISTEN)) {
- nsk = dccp_check_req(sk, skb, req);
- } else {
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != DCCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req);
goto lookup;
}
+ sock_hold(sk);
+ nsk = dccp_check_req(sk, skb, req);
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
- sock_hold(sk);
reqsk_put(req);
} else if (dccp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
dccp_v6_ctl_send_reset(sk, skb);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
} else {
+ sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
index 46b9c88..6414891 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
@@ -789,14 +789,16 @@ static void inet_child_forget(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
reqsk_put(req);
}
-void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
- struct sock *child)
+struct sock *inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(struct sock *sk,
+ struct request_sock *req,
+ struct sock *child)
{
struct request_sock_queue *queue = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue;
spin_lock(&queue->rskq_lock);
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_child_forget(sk, req, child);
+ child = NULL;
} else {
req->sk = child;
req->dl_next = NULL;
@@ -808,6 +810,7 @@ void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
sk_acceptq_added(sk);
}
spin_unlock(&queue->rskq_lock);
+ return child;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add);
@@ -817,11 +820,8 @@ struct sock *inet_csk_complete_hashdance(struct sock *sk, struct sock *child,
if (own_req) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req);
reqsk_queue_removed(&inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue, req);
- inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
- /* Warning: caller must not call reqsk_put(req);
- * child stole last reference on it.
- */
- return child;
+ if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child))
+ return child;
}
/* Too bad, another child took ownership of the request, undo. */
bh_unlock_sock(child);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index bfcddee..8c7e631 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1594,30 +1594,30 @@ process:
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
- struct sock *nsk = NULL;
+ struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
if (unlikely(tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))) {
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_it;
}
- if (likely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
- nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
- } else {
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req);
goto lookup;
}
+ sock_hold(sk);
+ nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
- sock_hold(sk);
reqsk_put(req);
} else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
} else {
+ sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index aea071e..b8d4056 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ process:
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
- struct sock *nsk = NULL;
+ struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
@@ -1396,24 +1396,24 @@ process:
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_it;
}
- if (likely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
- nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
- } else {
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req);
goto lookup;
}
+ sock_hold(sk);
+ nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
- sock_hold(sk);
reqsk_put(req);
tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
} else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
tcp_v6_send_reset(nsk, skb);
- goto discard_it;
+ goto discard_and_relse;
} else {
+ sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
}
--
2.1.0
From 21f96ea490128efda867db9e12de77a77981eb7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 15:37:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 43/47] IFF_NO_QUEUE: Fix for drivers not calling ether_setup()
[ Upstream commit a813104d923339144078939175faf4e66aca19b4 ]
My implementation around IFF_NO_QUEUE driver flag assumed that leaving
tx_queue_len untouched (specifically: not setting it to zero) by drivers
would make it possible to assign a regular qdisc to them without having
to worry about setting tx_queue_len to a useful value. This was only
partially true: I overlooked that some drivers don't call ether_setup()
and therefore not initialize tx_queue_len to the default value of 1000.
Consequently, removing the workarounds in place for that case in qdisc
implementations which cared about it (namely, pfifo, bfifo, gred, htb,
plug and sfb) leads to problems with these specific interface types and
qdiscs.
Luckily, there's already a sanitization point for drivers setting
tx_queue_len to zero, which can be reused to assign the fallback value
most qdisc implementations used, which is 1.
Fixes: 348e3435cbefa ("net: sched: drop all special handling of tx_queue_len == 0")
Tested-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/dev.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 7dc137f..9efbdb3 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -7128,8 +7128,10 @@ struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mqs(int sizeof_priv, const char *name,
dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE | IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE_PERM;
setup(dev);
- if (!dev->tx_queue_len)
+ if (!dev->tx_queue_len) {
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_NO_QUEUE;
+ dev->tx_queue_len = 1;
+ }
dev->num_tx_queues = txqs;
dev->real_num_tx_queues = txqs;
--
2.1.0
From 3405709a2458bd74386630981b23bbe4f152f7e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 21:43:16 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 44/47] rtnl: RTM_GETNETCONF: fix wrong return value
[ Upstream commit a97eb33ff225f34a8124774b3373fd244f0e83ce ]
An error response from a RTM_GETNETCONF request can return the positive
error value EINVAL in the struct nlmsgerr that can mislead userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/devinet.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index cebd9d3..f6303b1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static int inet_netconf_get_devconf(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = EINVAL;
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (!tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX])
goto errout;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index 828ab28..e8d3da0 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static int inet6_netconf_get_devconf(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = EINVAL;
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (!tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX])
goto errout;
--
2.1.0
From 7bb4e9fb668efb3ccac5308ad53e77e31be84a16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 11:47:35 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 45/47] tipc: unlock in error path
[ Upstream commit b53ce3e7d407aa4196877a48b8601181162ab158 ]
tipc_bcast_unlock need to be unlocked in error path.
Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/tipc/bcast.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.c b/net/tipc/bcast.c
index 9dc239d..92e367a 100644
--- a/net/tipc/bcast.c
+++ b/net/tipc/bcast.c
@@ -399,8 +399,10 @@ int tipc_nl_add_bc_link(struct net *net, struct tipc_nl_msg *msg)
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg->skb, msg->portid, msg->seq, &tipc_genl_family,
NLM_F_MULTI, TIPC_NL_LINK_GET);
- if (!hdr)
+ if (!hdr) {
+ tipc_bcast_unlock(net);
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ }
attrs = nla_nest_start(msg->skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK);
if (!attrs)
--
2.1.0
From 94405f52f00d5cea3e612251df468c39afa0a690 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 04:27:48 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 46/47] unix_diag: fix incorrect sign extension in
unix_lookup_by_ino
[ Upstream commit b5f0549231ffb025337be5a625b0ff9f52b016f0 ]
The value passed by unix_diag_get_exact to unix_lookup_by_ino has type
__u32, but unix_lookup_by_ino's argument ino has type int, which is not
a problem yet.
However, when ino is compared with sock_i_ino return value of type
unsigned long, ino is sign extended to signed long, and this results
to incorrect comparison on 64-bit architectures for inode numbers
greater than INT_MAX.
This bug was found by strace test suite.
Fixes: 5d3cae8bc39d ("unix_diag: Dumping exact socket core")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/unix/diag.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/diag.c b/net/unix/diag.c
index c512f64..4d96797 100644
--- a/net/unix/diag.c
+++ b/net/unix/diag.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ done:
return skb->len;
}
-static struct sock *unix_lookup_by_ino(int ino)
+static struct sock *unix_lookup_by_ino(unsigned int ino)
{
int i;
struct sock *sk;
--
2.1.0
From 7175e22c21a1a420ea72caca518146f43ec4e29e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 16:10:57 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 47/47] sctp: Fix port hash table size computation
[ Upstream commit d9749fb5942f51555dc9ce1ac0dbb1806960a975 ]
Dmitry Vyukov noted recently that the sctp_port_hashtable had an error in
its size computation, observing that the current method never guaranteed
that the hashsize (measured in number of entries) would be a power of two,
which the input hash function for that table requires. The root cause of
the problem is that two values need to be computed (one, the allocation
order of the storage requries, as passed to __get_free_pages, and two the
number of entries for the hash table). Both need to be ^2, but for
different reasons, and the existing code is simply computing one order
value, and using it as the basis for both, which is wrong (i.e. it assumes
that ((1<<order)*PAGE_SIZE)/sizeof(bucket) is still ^2 when its not).
To fix this, we change the logic slightly. We start by computing a goal
allocation order (which is limited by the maximum size hash table we want
to support. Then we attempt to allocate that size table, decreasing the
order until a successful allocation is made. Then, with the resultant
successful order we compute the number of buckets that hash table supports,
which we then round down to the nearest power of two, giving us the number
of entries the table actually supports.
I've tested this locally here, using non-debug and spinlock-debug kernels,
and the number of entries in the hashtable consistently work out to be
powers of two in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CC: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CC: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/protocol.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index 3d9ea9a..8b4ff31 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
+#define MAX_SCTP_PORT_HASH_ENTRIES (64 * 1024)
+
/* Global data structures. */
struct sctp_globals sctp_globals __read_mostly;
@@ -1352,6 +1354,8 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
unsigned long limit;
int max_share;
int order;
+ int num_entries;
+ int max_entry_order;
sock_skb_cb_check_size(sizeof(struct sctp_ulpevent));
@@ -1404,14 +1408,24 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
/* Size and allocate the association hash table.
* The methodology is similar to that of the tcp hash tables.
+ * Though not identical. Start by getting a goal size
*/
if (totalram_pages >= (128 * 1024))
goal = totalram_pages >> (22 - PAGE_SHIFT);
else
goal = totalram_pages >> (24 - PAGE_SHIFT);
- for (order = 0; (1UL << order) < goal; order++)
- ;
+ /* Then compute the page order for said goal */
+ order = get_order(goal);
+
+ /* Now compute the required page order for the maximum sized table we
+ * want to create
+ */
+ max_entry_order = get_order(MAX_SCTP_PORT_HASH_ENTRIES *
+ sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket));
+
+ /* Limit the page order by that maximum hash table size */
+ order = min(order, max_entry_order);
do {
sctp_assoc_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
@@ -1445,20 +1459,35 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain);
}
- /* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table. */
+ /* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table.
+ * Note that order is initalized to start at the max sized
+ * table we want to support. If we can't get that many pages
+ * reduce the order and try again
+ */
do {
- sctp_port_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
- sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
- if ((sctp_port_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0)
- continue;
sctp_port_hashtable = (struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order);
} while (!sctp_port_hashtable && --order > 0);
+
if (!sctp_port_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed bind hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_bhash_alloc;
}
+
+ /* Now compute the number of entries that will fit in the
+ * port hash space we allocated
+ */
+ num_entries = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
+ sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
+
+ /* And finish by rounding it down to the nearest power of two
+ * this wastes some memory of course, but its needed because
+ * the hash function operates based on the assumption that
+ * that the number of entries is a power of two
+ */
+ sctp_port_hashsize = rounddown_pow_of_two(num_entries);
+
for (i = 0; i < sctp_port_hashsize; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain);
--
2.1.0
next reply other threads:[~2016-02-29 21:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 308+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-02-29 21:56 David Miller [this message]
2016-02-29 22:45 ` [PATCHES] Networking Greg KH
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-09-24 21:40 David Miller
2020-09-25 8:38 ` Greg KH
2020-08-24 16:52 David Miller
2020-08-26 10:13 ` Greg KH
2020-08-15 1:36 David Miller
2020-08-17 9:37 ` Greg KH
2020-08-08 1:53 David Miller
2020-08-10 12:08 ` Greg KH
2020-07-29 3:12 David Miller
2020-07-29 11:42 ` Greg KH
2020-07-16 23:07 David Miller
2020-07-17 8:21 ` Greg KH
2020-06-28 0:55 David Miller
2020-06-28 14:15 ` Greg KH
2020-06-16 1:27 David Miller
2020-06-16 7:43 ` Greg KH
2020-06-17 16:16 ` Greg KH
2020-06-10 0:08 David Miller
2020-06-11 10:01 ` Greg KH
2020-06-07 2:55 David Miller
2020-06-07 13:01 ` Greg KH
2020-05-27 6:16 David Miller
2020-05-28 12:21 ` Greg KH
2020-05-16 0:44 David Miller
2020-05-16 16:14 ` Greg KH
2020-05-12 0:41 David Miller
2020-05-12 8:59 ` Greg KH
2020-04-27 1:10 David Miller
2020-04-27 11:40 ` Greg KH
2020-04-17 17:51 David Miller
2020-04-18 9:08 ` Greg KH
2020-04-08 22:05 David Miller
2020-04-09 11:17 ` Greg KH
2020-04-02 20:16 David Miller
2020-04-02 20:23 ` Greg KH
2020-03-27 23:51 David Miller
2020-03-28 8:49 ` Greg KH
2020-03-14 4:52 David Miller
2020-03-15 8:34 ` Greg KH
2020-03-01 5:11 David Miller
2020-03-01 9:27 ` Greg KH
2020-02-18 23:41 David Miller
2020-02-19 20:32 ` Greg KH
2020-02-09 21:21 David Miller
2020-02-09 21:54 ` Greg KH
2020-02-05 14:07 David Miller
2020-02-06 6:54 ` Greg KH
2020-01-30 10:12 David Miller
2020-01-30 10:22 ` Greg KH
2020-01-27 11:16 David Miller
2020-01-27 14:27 ` Greg KH
2020-01-20 19:44 David Miller
2020-01-21 15:29 ` Greg KH
2020-01-11 0:33 David Miller
2020-01-11 8:19 ` Greg KH
2020-01-01 20:13 David Miller
2020-01-01 21:37 ` Greg KH
2019-12-28 8:14 David Miller
2019-12-28 11:23 ` Greg KH
2019-12-16 22:10 David Miller
2019-12-17 7:43 ` Greg KH
2019-12-19 15:42 ` Greg KH
2019-12-03 3:21 David Miller
2019-12-03 6:46 ` Greg KH
2019-11-25 5:54 David Miller
2019-11-25 13:31 ` Greg KH
2019-11-18 8:08 David Miller
2019-11-18 8:16 ` Greg KH
2019-11-10 5:47 David Miller
2019-11-10 15:34 ` Greg KH
2019-10-24 21:30 David Miller
2019-10-25 1:38 ` Greg KH
2019-10-05 21:57 David Miller
2019-10-06 7:50 ` Greg KH
2019-09-29 22:39 David Miller
2019-10-01 13:38 ` Greg KH
2019-09-19 12:07 David Miller
2019-09-19 13:02 ` Greg KH
2019-09-15 19:37 David Miller
2019-09-16 11:05 ` Greg KH
2019-09-05 7:23 David Miller
2019-09-08 10:40 ` Greg KH
2019-08-28 0:42 David Miller
2019-09-02 16:30 ` Greg KH
2019-09-02 17:51 ` David Miller
2019-08-20 23:01 David Miller
2019-08-20 23:19 ` Greg KH
2019-08-07 23:27 David Miller
2019-08-08 6:57 ` Greg KH
2019-07-25 1:55 David Miller
2019-07-26 8:54 ` Greg KH
2019-07-02 1:52 David Miller
2019-07-02 4:40 ` Greg KH
2019-06-18 4:23 David Miller
2019-06-19 12:35 ` Greg KH
2019-06-08 23:27 David Miller
2019-06-09 7:26 ` Greg KH
2019-06-09 19:42 ` David Miller
2019-05-21 6:37 David Miller
2019-05-22 6:36 ` Greg KH
2019-05-14 19:58 David Miller
2019-05-15 6:02 ` Greg KH
2019-05-04 7:01 David Miller
2019-05-04 7:34 ` Greg KH
2019-04-30 2:06 David Miller
2019-04-30 7:53 ` Greg KH
2019-04-18 22:53 David Miller
2019-04-23 20:06 ` Greg KH
2019-04-10 3:55 David Miller
2019-04-10 15:35 ` Sasha Levin
2019-03-28 19:24 David Miller
2019-03-28 20:55 ` Greg KH
2019-03-28 21:51 ` Greg KH
2019-03-28 23:18 ` David Miller
2019-03-29 6:18 ` Greg KH
2019-03-15 1:47 David Miller
2019-03-15 6:30 ` Greg KH
2019-03-19 13:03 ` Greg KH
2019-03-07 22:47 David Miller
2019-03-08 6:38 ` Greg KH
2019-02-24 5:18 David Miller
2019-02-24 7:52 ` Greg KH
2019-02-20 20:42 David Miller
2019-02-21 3:08 ` Sasha Levin
2019-02-21 7:21 ` Greg KH
2019-02-09 23:21 David Miller
2019-02-10 12:21 ` Greg KH
2019-02-01 21:45 David Miller
2019-02-02 9:55 ` Greg KH
2019-01-26 0:18 David Miller
2019-01-26 9:29 ` Greg KH
2019-01-21 23:28 David Miller
2019-01-22 7:18 ` Greg KH
2019-01-23 7:33 ` Greg KH
2019-01-20 19:12 David Miller
2019-01-21 8:00 ` Greg KH
2019-01-04 18:17 David Miller
2019-01-04 18:48 ` Greg KH
2018-12-12 6:31 David Miller
2018-12-13 9:53 ` Greg KH
2018-12-03 7:01 David Miller
2018-12-03 9:13 ` Greg KH
2018-11-21 3:49 David Miller
2018-11-21 17:49 ` Greg KH
2018-11-02 3:55 David Miller
2018-11-02 5:27 ` Greg KH
2018-09-24 16:46 David Miller
2018-09-26 9:32 ` Greg KH
2018-09-18 16:14 David Miller
2018-09-20 5:25 ` Greg KH
2018-09-11 6:15 David Miller
2018-09-11 8:29 ` Greg KH
2018-08-17 19:32 David Miller
2018-08-18 9:43 ` Greg KH
2018-08-04 5:05 David Miller
2018-08-04 7:33 ` Greg KH
2018-08-01 5:32 David Miller
2018-08-01 6:20 ` Greg KH
2018-07-26 23:50 David Miller
2018-07-27 0:06 ` Eric Dumazet
2018-07-27 6:34 ` Greg KH
2018-07-23 3:51 David Miller
2018-07-23 6:21 ` Greg KH
2018-07-18 23:35 David Miller
2018-07-19 6:33 ` Greg KH
2018-06-20 12:37 David Miller
2018-06-21 21:10 ` Greg KH
2018-06-24 11:20 ` Greg KH
2018-06-08 2:18 David Miller
2018-06-08 4:52 ` Greg KH
2018-05-15 20:50 David Miller
2018-05-16 8:40 ` Greg KH
2018-04-26 18:38 David Miller
2018-04-26 18:50 ` Greg KH
2018-04-13 17:47 David Miller
2018-04-14 14:04 ` Greg KH
2018-04-10 19:39 David Miller
2018-04-10 21:26 ` Greg KH
2018-03-28 15:35 David Miller
2018-03-28 15:40 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-03-28 15:46 ` David Miller
2018-03-28 16:36 ` Greg KH
2018-03-28 16:49 ` Greg KH
2018-03-07 2:28 David Miller
2018-03-07 3:30 ` Greg KH
2018-02-06 20:19 David Miller
2018-02-07 19:39 ` Greg KH
2018-01-28 16:22 David Miller
2018-01-28 16:39 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 21:12 David Miller
2018-01-13 9:54 ` Greg KH
2017-12-31 4:15 David Miller
2017-12-31 10:14 ` Greg KH
2017-12-12 15:44 David Miller
2017-12-14 17:51 ` Greg KH
2017-11-20 11:47 David Miller
2017-11-21 14:04 ` Greg KH
2017-11-14 6:36 David Miller
2017-11-16 14:12 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 4:02 David Miller
2017-10-09 7:34 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 7:56 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 16:55 ` David Miller
2017-10-09 19:04 ` Greg KH
2017-10-09 22:54 ` David Miller
2017-10-10 14:10 ` Greg KH
2017-09-15 4:57 David Miller
2017-09-15 6:24 ` Greg KH
2018-06-07 7:00 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-06-07 9:21 ` Greg KH
2018-06-07 10:47 ` Ido Schimmel
2018-06-07 10:52 ` Greg KH
2018-07-05 16:15 ` Greg KH
2018-07-05 16:42 ` Ido Schimmel
2017-08-24 3:24 David Miller
2017-08-25 0:55 ` Greg KH
2017-08-11 5:25 David Miller
2017-08-11 16:22 ` Greg KH
2017-08-08 23:21 David Miller
2017-08-08 23:30 ` Greg KH
2017-07-17 16:44 David Miller
2017-07-17 19:23 ` Greg KH
2017-07-19 10:27 ` Greg KH
2017-06-29 16:19 David Miller
2017-06-29 17:34 ` Greg KH
2017-05-30 23:14 David Miller
2017-05-31 0:18 ` Greg KH
2017-05-11 2:41 David Miller
2017-05-11 13:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-22 10:16 ` Greg KH
2017-04-28 19:41 David Miller
2017-04-29 6:23 ` Greg KH
2017-03-25 7:53 David Miller
2017-03-25 9:26 ` Thomas Backlund
2017-03-25 17:38 ` David Miller
2017-03-26 18:47 ` Thomas Backlund
2017-03-27 16:19 ` Greg KH
2017-03-17 1:48 David Miller
2017-03-18 14:13 ` Greg KH
2017-02-23 19:54 David Miller
2017-02-23 20:19 ` Greg KH
2017-02-13 17:15 David Miller
2017-02-15 17:21 ` Greg KH
2017-01-31 21:50 [PATCHES] networking David Miller
2017-02-01 8:10 ` Greg KH
2017-01-12 18:55 [PATCHES] Networking David Miller
2017-01-12 20:40 ` Greg KH
2016-12-07 23:43 David Miller
2016-12-08 6:34 ` Greg KH
2016-11-18 2:59 David Miller
2016-11-18 10:36 ` Greg KH
2016-11-09 17:19 David Miller
2016-11-10 15:50 ` Greg KH
2016-09-21 5:07 David Miller
2016-09-21 9:23 ` Greg KH
2016-08-12 0:50 David Miller
2016-08-12 7:37 ` Greg KH
2016-07-13 21:43 David Miller
2016-07-13 22:38 ` Greg KH
2016-07-06 5:02 David Miller
2016-07-07 0:35 ` Greg KH
2016-06-17 7:03 David Miller
2016-06-18 1:01 ` Greg KH
2016-05-16 16:35 David Miller
2016-05-16 21:50 ` Greg KH
2016-04-15 4:45 David Miller
2016-04-16 17:49 ` Greg KH
2016-01-27 2:00 David Miller
2016-01-27 6:35 ` Greg KH
2015-12-22 21:51 David Miller
2016-01-19 5:20 ` Greg KH
2016-01-19 12:00 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-19 13:29 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-19 17:39 ` Greg KH
2016-01-19 17:41 ` Josh Boyer
2015-12-10 19:37 David Miller
2015-12-11 16:49 ` Greg KH
2015-11-13 21:38 David Miller
2015-11-14 15:59 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-11-15 17:55 ` David Miller
2015-12-06 5:25 ` Greg KH
2015-10-21 3:51 David Miller
2015-10-23 16:25 ` Greg KH
2015-09-29 4:54 David Miller
2015-09-30 3:33 ` Greg KH
2015-08-27 6:05 David Miller
2015-08-27 7:29 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-08-27 13:35 ` Luis Henriques
2015-08-27 16:34 ` David Miller
2015-09-28 14:04 ` Greg KH
2015-09-26 19:21 ` Greg KH
2015-07-03 22:31 David Miller
2015-07-04 3:04 ` Greg KH
2015-06-10 3:01 David Miller
2015-06-10 13:26 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-06-19 18:03 ` Greg KH
2015-05-05 17:34 [PATCHES] NETWORKING David Miller
2015-05-06 6:57 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-05-08 11:14 ` Greg KH
2015-05-08 14:42 ` Greg KH
2015-04-29 4:48 [PATCHES] Networking David Miller
2015-04-29 11:09 ` Greg KH
2015-04-29 16:03 ` David Miller
2015-04-30 12:25 ` Jiri Slaby
[not found] <20150421.143012.2106864724544609194.davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-27 9:23 ` Jiri Slaby
2015-05-04 19:53 ` Ben Hutchings
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20160229.165615.2232238957282850211.davem@davemloft.net \
--to=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).