[PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.7.1 release.
There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Aug 16 20:25:22 UTC 2016.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.7.1-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.7.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.7.1-rc1

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    ext4: fix reference counting bug on block allocation error

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    ext4: short-cut orphan cleanup on error

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
    ext4: validate s_reserved_gdt_blocks on mount

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    ext4: don't call ext4_should_journal_data() on the journal inode

Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
    ext4: fix deadlock during page writeback

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    ext4: check for extents that wrap around

Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
    serial: mvebu-uart: free the IRQ in ->shutdown()

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: scatterwalk - Fix test in scatterwalk_done

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: gcm - Filter out async ghash if necessary

Andreas Herrmann <aherrmann@suse.com>
    Revert "cpufreq: pcc-cpufreq: update default value of cpuinfo_transition_latency"

Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
    fs/dcache.c: avoid soft-lockup in dput()

Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
    Revert "mm, mempool: only set __GFP_NOMEMALLOC if there are free elements"

Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
    fuse: fix wrong assignment of ->flags in fuse_send_init()

Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
    fuse: fuse_flush must check mapping->flags for errors

Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@parallels.com>
    fuse: fsync() did not return IO errors

Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
    x86/power/64: Fix hibernation return address corruption

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    x86/microcode: Fix suspend to RAM with builtin microcode

Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
    radix-tree: account nodes to memcg only if explicitly requested

Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
    sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    block: fix use-after-free in seq file

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    x86/syscalls/64: Add compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace

Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
    mm: memcontrol: fix memcg id ref counter on swap charge move

Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
    mm: memcontrol: fix swap counter leak on swapout from offline cgroup

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
    random: strengthen input validation for RNDADDTOENTCNT

John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read

Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
    IB/hfi1: Disable by default

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    KEYS: 64-bit MIPS needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace

Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>
    arm: oabi compat: add missing access checks

Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
    tcp: consider recv buf for the initial window scale

Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
    macsec: ensure rx_sa is set when validation is disabled

Manish Chopra <manish.chopra@qlogic.com>
    qed: Fix setting/clearing bit in completion bitmap

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    net/sctp: terminate rhashtable walk correctly

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    net/irda: fix NULL pointer dereference on memory allocation failure

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
    sctp: fix BH handling on socket backlog

Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>
    net: ipv6: Always leave anycast and multicast groups on link down

Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
    bridge: Fix incorrect re-injection of LLDP packets

Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
    net/bonding: Enforce active-backup policy for IPoIB bonds

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    udp: use sk_filter_trim_cap for udp{,6}_queue_rcv_skb

Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
    vfs: fix deadlock in file_remove_privs() on overlayfs

Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
    vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
    ext4: verify extent header depth


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/cpu-freq/pcc-cpufreq.txt    |  4 +-
 Makefile                                  |  4 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c         |  8 +++-
 arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S            |  2 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S            |  2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h          |  2 -
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c      |  3 +-
 arch/x86/mm/init.c                        |  7 ----
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S         |  4 +-
 block/genhd.c                             |  1 +
 crypto/gcm.c                              |  4 +-
 crypto/scatterwalk.c                      |  3 +-
 drivers/char/random.c                     | 13 +++---
 drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c             |  2 -
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/Kconfig        |  1 -
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c           | 11 ++++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_spq.c |  7 ++--
 drivers/net/macsec.c                      |  3 +-
 drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c           |  2 +
 fs/dcache.c                               |  7 +++-
 fs/ext4/balloc.c                          |  3 ++
 fs/ext4/extents.c                         | 12 +++++-
 fs/ext4/inode.c                           | 35 +++++++++++++---
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c                         | 17 ++------
 fs/ext4/super.c                           | 17 ++++++++
 fs/fuse/file.c                            | 24 +++++++++++
 fs/fuse/inode.c                           |  2 +-
 fs/inode.c                                |  8 ++--
 fs/ioctl.c                                |  1 +
 ipc/msg.c                                 |  2 +-
 ipc/sem.c                                 | 12 +++---
 lib/radix-tree.c                          | 14 +++++--
 mm/memcontrol.c                           | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 mm/mempool.c                              | 18 ++------
 net/bridge/br_input.c                     |  8 ++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c                     |  3 +-
 net/ipv4/udp.c                            |  4 +-
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                       |  4 ++
 net/ipv6/udp.c                            |  4 +-
 net/irda/af_irda.c                        |  7 +++-
 net/sctp/input.c                          |  2 +
 net/sctp/inqueue.c                        |  2 -
 net/sctp/socket.c                         |  1 +
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c            |  1 +
 45 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.7 01/41] ext4: verify extent header depth

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit 7bc9491645118c9461bd21099c31755ff6783593 upstream.

Although the extent tree depth of 5 should enough be for the worst
case of 2*32 extents of length 1, the extent tree code does not
currently to merge nodes which are less than half-full with a sibling
node, or to shrink the tree depth if possible.  So it's possible, at
least in theory, for the tree depth to be greater than 5.  However,
even in the worst case, a tree depth of 32 is highly unlikely, and if
the file system is maliciously corrupted, an insanely large eh_depth
can cause memory allocation failures that will trigger kernel warnings
(here, eh_depth = 65280):

    JBD2: ext4.exe wants too many credits credits:195849 rsv_credits:0 max:256
    ------------[ cut here ]------------
    WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 50 at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:293 start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
    CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: ext4.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #508
    Stack:
     604a8947 625badd8 0002fd09 00000000
     60078643 00000000 62623910 601bf9bc
     62623970 6002fc84 626239b0 900000125
    Call Trace:
     [<6001c2dc>] show_stack+0xdc/0x1a0
     [<601bf9bc>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2e
     [<6002fc84>] __warn+0x114/0x140
     [<6002fdff>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1f/0x30
     [<60165829>] start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
     [<60165d4e>] jbd2__journal_start+0x11e/0x220
     [<60146690>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x60/0xa0
     [<60120a81>] ext4_truncate+0x131/0x3a0
     [<60123677>] ext4_setattr+0x757/0x840
     [<600d5d0f>] notify_change+0x16f/0x2a0
     [<600b2b16>] do_truncate+0x76/0xc0
     [<600c3e56>] path_openat+0x806/0x1300
     [<600c55c9>] do_filp_open+0x89/0xf0
     [<600b4074>] do_sys_open+0x134/0x1e0
     [<600b4140>] SyS_open+0x20/0x30
     [<6001ea68>] handle_syscall+0x88/0x90
     [<600295fd>] userspace+0x3fd/0x500
     [<6001ac55>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90

    ---[ end trace 08b0b88b6387a244 ]---

[ Commit message modified and the extent tree depath check changed
from 5 to 32 -- tytso ]

Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -474,6 +474,10 @@ static int __ext4_ext_check(const char *
 		error_msg = "invalid extent entries";
 		goto corrupted;
 	}
+	if (unlikely(depth > 32)) {
+		error_msg = "too large eh_depth";
+		goto corrupted;
+	}
 	/* Verify checksum on non-root extent tree nodes */
 	if (ext_depth(inode) != depth &&
 	    !ext4_extent_block_csum_verify(inode, eh)) {

[PATCH 4.7 02/41] vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>

commit 10eec60ce79187686e052092e5383c99b4420a20 upstream.

This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.

Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ioctl.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/fs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ioctl.c
@@ -590,6 +590,7 @@ static long ioctl_file_dedupe_range(stru
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	same->dest_count = count;
 	ret = vfs_dedupe_file_range(file, same);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;

[PATCH 4.7 03/41] vfs: fix deadlock in file_remove_privs() on overlayfs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

commit c1892c37769cf89c7e7ba57528ae2ccb5d153c9b upstream.

file_remove_privs() is called with inode lock on file_inode(), which
proceeds to calling notify_change() on file->f_path.dentry.  Which triggers
the WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode)) in addition to deadlocking later
when ovl_setattr tries to lock the underlying inode again.

Fix this mess by not mixing the layers, but doing everything on underlying
dentry/inode.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 07a2daab49c5 ("ovl: Copy up underlying inode's ->i_mode to overlay inode")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/inode.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1740,8 +1740,8 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct dentry
  */
 int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
 {
-	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	int kill;
 	int error = 0;
 
@@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
 	if (IS_NOSEC(inode))
 		return 0;
 
-	kill = file_needs_remove_privs(file);
+	kill = dentry_needs_remove_privs(dentry);
 	if (kill < 0)
 		return kill;
 	if (kill)

[PATCH 4.7 04/41] udp: use sk_filter_trim_cap for udp{,6}_queue_rcv_skb

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

[ Upstream commit ba66bbe5480a012108958a71cff88b23dce84956 ]

After a612769774a3 ("udp: prevent bugcheck if filter truncates packet
too much"), there followed various other fixes for similar cases such
as f4979fcea7fd ("rose: limit sk_filter trim to payload").

Latter introduced a new helper sk_filter_trim_cap(), where we can pass
the trim limit directly to the socket filter handling. Make use of it
here as well with sizeof(struct udphdr) as lower cap limit and drop the
extra skb->len test in UDP's input path.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/udp.c |    4 +---
 net/ipv6/udp.c |    4 +---
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -1581,9 +1581,7 @@ int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, s
 	    udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
 			goto csum_error;
 
-	if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
-		goto drop;
-	if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof(struct udphdr)))
+	if (sk_filter_trim_cap(sk, skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
 		goto drop;
 
 	udp_csum_pull_header(skb);
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -618,9 +618,7 @@ int udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
 	    udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
 		goto csum_error;
 
-	if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
-		goto drop;
-	if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof(struct udphdr)))
+	if (sk_filter_trim_cap(sk, skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
 		goto drop;
 
 	udp_csum_pull_header(skb);

[PATCH 4.7 05/41] net/bonding: Enforce active-backup policy for IPoIB bonds

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit 1533e77315220dc1d5ec3bd6d9fe32e2aa0a74c0 ]

When using an IPoIB bond currently only active-backup mode is a valid
use case and this commit strengthens it.

Since commit 2ab82852a270 ("net/bonding: Enable bonding to enslave
netdevices not supporting set_mac_address()") was introduced till
4.7-rc1, IPoIB didn't support the set_mac_address ndo, and hence the
fail over mac policy always applied to IPoIB bonds.

With the introduction of commit 492a7e67ff83 ("IB/IPoIB: Allow setting
the device address"), that doesn't hold and practically IPoIB bonds are
broken as of that. To fix it, lets go to fail over mac if the device
doesn't support the ndo OR this is IPoIB device.

As a by-product, this commit also prevents a stack corruption which
occurred when trying to copy 20 bytes (IPoIB) device address
to a sockaddr struct that has only 16 bytes of storage.

Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c |   11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -1422,7 +1422,16 @@ int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (slave_ops->ndo_set_mac_address == NULL) {
+	if (slave_dev->type == ARPHRD_INFINIBAND &&
+	    BOND_MODE(bond) != BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP) {
+		netdev_warn(bond_dev, "Type (%d) supports only active-backup mode\n",
+			    slave_dev->type);
+		res = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto err_undo_flags;
+	}
+
+	if (!slave_ops->ndo_set_mac_address ||
+	    slave_dev->type == ARPHRD_INFINIBAND) {
 		netdev_warn(bond_dev, "The slave device specified does not support setting the MAC address\n");
 		if (BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP &&
 		    bond->params.fail_over_mac != BOND_FOM_ACTIVE) {

[PATCH 4.7 06/41] bridge: Fix incorrect re-injection of LLDP packets

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit baedbe55884c003819f5c8c063ec3d2569414296 ]

Commit 8626c56c8279 ("bridge: fix potential use-after-free when hook
returns QUEUE or STOLEN verdict") caused LLDP packets arriving through a
bridge port to be re-injected to the Rx path with skb->dev set to the
bridge device, but this breaks the lldpad daemon.

The lldpad daemon opens a packet socket with protocol set to ETH_P_LLDP
for any valid device on the system, which doesn't not include soft
devices such as bridge and VLAN.

Since packet sockets (ptype_base) are processed in the Rx path after the
Rx handler, LLDP packets with skb->dev set to the bridge device never
reach the lldpad daemon.

Fix this by making the bridge's Rx handler re-inject LLDP packets with
RX_HANDLER_PASS, which effectively restores the behaviour prior to the
mentioned commit.

This means netfilter will never receive LLDP packets coming through a
bridge port, as I don't see a way in which we can have okfn() consume
the packet without breaking existing behaviour. I've already carried out
a similar fix for STP packets in commit 56fae404fb2c ("bridge: Fix
incorrect re-injection of STP packets").

Fixes: 8626c56c8279 ("bridge: fix potential use-after-free when hook returns QUEUE or STOLEN verdict")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bridge/br_input.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/net/bridge/br_input.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_input.c
@@ -288,6 +288,14 @@ rx_handler_result_t br_handle_frame(stru
 		case 0x01:	/* IEEE MAC (Pause) */
 			goto drop;
 
+		case 0x0E:	/* 802.1AB LLDP */
+			fwd_mask |= p->br->group_fwd_mask;
+			if (fwd_mask & (1u << dest[5]))
+				goto forward;
+			*pskb = skb;
+			__br_handle_local_finish(skb);
+			return RX_HANDLER_PASS;
+
 		default:
 			/* Allow selective forwarding for most other protocols */
 			fwd_mask |= p->br->group_fwd_mask;

[PATCH 4.7 07/41] net: ipv6: Always leave anycast and multicast groups on link down

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>

[ Upstream commit ea06f7176413e2538d13bb85b65387d0917943d9 ]

Default kernel behavior is to delete IPv6 addresses on link
down, which entails deletion of the multicast and the
subnet-router anycast addresses. These deletions do not
happen with sysctl setting to keep global IPv6 addresses on
link down, so every link down/up causes an increment of the
anycast and multicast refcounts. These bogus refcounts may
stop these addrs from being removed on subsequent calls to
delete them. The solution is to leave the groups for the
multicast and subnet anycast on link down for the callflow
when global IPv6 addresses are kept.

Fixes: f1705ec197e7 ("net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional")
Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -3562,6 +3562,10 @@ restart:
 		if (state != INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD) {
 			__ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_DELADDR, ifa);
 			inet6addr_notifier_call_chain(NETDEV_DOWN, ifa);
+		} else {
+			if (idev->cnf.forwarding)
+				addrconf_leave_anycast(ifa);
+			addrconf_leave_solict(ifa->idev, &ifa->addr);
 		}
 
 		write_lock_bh(&idev->lock);

[PATCH 4.7 08/41] sctp: fix BH handling on socket backlog

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit eefc1b1d105ee4d2ce907833ce675f1e9599b5e3 ]

Now that the backlog processing is called with BH enabled, we have to
disable BH before taking the socket lock via bh_lock_sock() otherwise
it may dead lock:

sctp_backlog_rcv()
                bh_lock_sock(sk);

                if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
                        if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
                                sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
                        else
                                backloged = 1;
                } else
                        sctp_inq_push(inqueue, chunk);

                bh_unlock_sock(sk);

while sctp_inq_push() was disabling/enabling BH, but enabling BH
triggers pending softirq, which then may try to re-lock the socket in
sctp_rcv().

[  219.187215]  <IRQ>
[  219.187217]  [<ffffffff817ca3e0>] _raw_spin_lock+0x20/0x30
[  219.187223]  [<ffffffffa041888c>] sctp_rcv+0x48c/0xba0 [sctp]
[  219.187225]  [<ffffffff816e7db2>] ? nf_iterate+0x62/0x80
[  219.187226]  [<ffffffff816f1b14>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x94/0x1e0
[  219.187228]  [<ffffffff816f1e1f>] ip_local_deliver+0x6f/0xf0
[  219.187229]  [<ffffffff816f1a80>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x3b0/0x3b0
[  219.187230]  [<ffffffff816f17a8>] ip_rcv_finish+0xd8/0x3b0
[  219.187232]  [<ffffffff816f2122>] ip_rcv+0x282/0x3a0
[  219.187233]  [<ffffffff810d8bb6>] ? update_curr+0x66/0x180
[  219.187235]  [<ffffffff816abac4>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x524/0xa90
[  219.187236]  [<ffffffff810d8e00>] ? update_cfs_shares+0x30/0xf0
[  219.187237]  [<ffffffff810d557c>] ? __enqueue_entity+0x6c/0x70
[  219.187239]  [<ffffffff810dc454>] ? enqueue_entity+0x204/0xdf0
[  219.187240]  [<ffffffff816ac048>] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
[  219.187242]  [<ffffffff816ad1ce>] process_backlog+0x9e/0x140
[  219.187243]  [<ffffffff816ac8ec>] net_rx_action+0x22c/0x370
[  219.187245]  [<ffffffff817cd352>] __do_softirq+0x112/0x2e7
[  219.187247]  [<ffffffff817cc3bc>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
[  219.187247]  <EOI>
[  219.187248]  [<ffffffff810aa1c8>] do_softirq.part.14+0x38/0x40
[  219.187249]  [<ffffffff810aa24d>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x7d/0x80
[  219.187254]  [<ffffffffa0408428>] sctp_inq_push+0x68/0x80 [sctp]
[  219.187258]  [<ffffffffa04190f1>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0x151/0x1c0 [sctp]
[  219.187260]  [<ffffffff81692b07>] __release_sock+0x87/0xf0
[  219.187261]  [<ffffffff81692ba0>] release_sock+0x30/0xa0
[  219.187265]  [<ffffffffa040e46d>] sctp_accept+0x17d/0x210 [sctp]
[  219.187266]  [<ffffffff810e7510>] ? prepare_to_wait_event+0xf0/0xf0
[  219.187268]  [<ffffffff8172d52c>] inet_accept+0x3c/0x130
[  219.187269]  [<ffffffff8168d7a3>] SYSC_accept4+0x103/0x210
[  219.187271]  [<ffffffff817ca2ba>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1a/0x20
[  219.187272]  [<ffffffff81692bfc>] ? release_sock+0x8c/0xa0
[  219.187276]  [<ffffffffa0413e22>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x62/0x1b0 [sctp]
[  219.187277]  [<ffffffff8168f2d0>] SyS_accept+0x10/0x20

Fixes: 860fbbc343bf ("sctp: prepare for socket backlog behavior change")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/input.c   |    2 ++
 net/sctp/inqueue.c |    2 --
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/input.c
+++ b/net/sctp/input.c
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ int sctp_backlog_rcv(struct sock *sk, st
 		 */
 
 		sk = rcvr->sk;
+		local_bh_disable();
 		bh_lock_sock(sk);
 
 		if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
@@ -339,6 +340,7 @@ int sctp_backlog_rcv(struct sock *sk, st
 			sctp_inq_push(inqueue, chunk);
 
 		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+		local_bh_enable();
 
 		/* If the chunk was backloged again, don't drop refs */
 		if (backloged)
--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -89,12 +89,10 @@ void sctp_inq_push(struct sctp_inq *q, s
 	 * Eventually, we should clean up inqueue to not rely
 	 * on the BH related data structures.
 	 */
-	local_bh_disable();
 	list_add_tail(&chunk->list, &q->in_chunk_list);
 	if (chunk->asoc)
 		chunk->asoc->stats.ipackets++;
 	q->immediate.func(&q->immediate);
-	local_bh_enable();
 }
 
 /* Peek at the next chunk on the inqeue. */

[PATCH 4.7 09/41] net/irda: fix NULL pointer dereference on memory allocation failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit d3e6952cfb7ba5f4bfa29d4803ba91f96ce1204d ]

I ran into this:

    kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
    kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ #19
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
    task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>]  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
    RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8  EFLAGS: 00010286
    RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358
    RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048
    RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Stack:
     0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220
     ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232
     ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190
     [<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0
     [<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10
     [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
     [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74
    RIP  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
     RSP <ffff880111747bb8>
    ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]---

The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL,
and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/irda/af_irda.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/irda/af_irda.c
+++ b/net/irda/af_irda.c
@@ -1024,8 +1024,11 @@ static int irda_connect(struct socket *s
 	}
 
 	/* Check if we have opened a local TSAP */
-	if (!self->tsap)
-		irda_open_tsap(self, LSAP_ANY, addr->sir_name);
+	if (!self->tsap) {
+		err = irda_open_tsap(self, LSAP_ANY, addr->sir_name);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Move to connecting socket, start sending Connect Requests */
 	sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;

[PATCH 4.7 10/41] net/sctp: terminate rhashtable walk correctly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 5fc382d87517707ad77ea4c9c12e2a3fde2c838a ]

I was seeing a lot of these:

    BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:388
    in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 14971, name: trinity-c2
    Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff819bcd46>] rhashtable_walk_start+0x46/0x150

     [<ffffffff81149abb>] preempt_count_add+0x1fb/0x280
     [<ffffffff83295722>] _raw_spin_lock+0x12/0x40
     [<ffffffff811aac87>] console_unlock+0x2f7/0x930
     [<ffffffff811ab5bb>] vprintk_emit+0x2fb/0x520
     [<ffffffff811aba6a>] vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20
     [<ffffffff812c171a>] printk+0x94/0xb0
     [<ffffffff811d6ed0>] print_stack_trace+0xe0/0x170
     [<ffffffff8115835e>] ___might_sleep+0x3be/0x460
     [<ffffffff81158490>] __might_sleep+0x90/0x1a0
     [<ffffffff8139b823>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x153/0x1e0
     [<ffffffff819bca1e>] rhashtable_walk_init+0xfe/0x2d0
     [<ffffffff82ec64de>] sctp_transport_walk_start+0x1e/0x60
     [<ffffffff82edd8ad>] sctp_transport_seq_start+0x4d/0x150
     [<ffffffff8143a82b>] seq_read+0x27b/0x1180
     [<ffffffff814f97fc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
     [<ffffffff813d471b>] __vfs_read+0xdb/0x610
     [<ffffffff813d4d3a>] vfs_read+0xea/0x2d0
     [<ffffffff813d615b>] SyS_pread64+0x11b/0x150
     [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
     [<ffffffff832960a5>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
     [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Apparently we always need to call rhashtable_walk_stop(), even when
rhashtable_walk_start() fails:

 * rhashtable_walk_start - Start a hash table walk
 * @iter:       Hash table iterator
 *
 * Start a hash table walk.  Note that we take the RCU lock in all
 * cases including when we return an error.  So you must always call
 * rhashtable_walk_stop to clean up.

otherwise we never call rcu_read_unlock() and we get the splat above.

Fixes: 53fa1036 ("sctp: fix some rhashtable functions using in sctp proc/diag")
See-also: 53fa1036 ("sctp: fix some rhashtable functions using in sctp proc/diag")
See-also: f2dba9c6 ("rhashtable: Introduce rhashtable_walk_*")
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/socket.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -4301,6 +4301,7 @@ int sctp_transport_walk_start(struct rha
 
 	err = rhashtable_walk_start(iter);
 	if (err && err != -EAGAIN) {
+		rhashtable_walk_stop(iter);
 		rhashtable_walk_exit(iter);
 		return err;
 	}

[PATCH 4.7 11/41] qed: Fix setting/clearing bit in completion bitmap

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manish Chopra <manish.chopra@qlogic.com>

[ Upstream commit 59d3f1ceb69b54569685d0c34dff16a1e0816b19 ]

Slowpath completion handling is incorrectly changing
SPQ_RING_SIZE bits instead of a single one.

Fixes: 76a9a3642a0b ("qed: fix handling of concurrent ramrods")
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manish.chopra@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuval Mintz <Yuval.Mintz@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_spq.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_spq.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_spq.c
@@ -809,13 +809,12 @@ int qed_spq_completion(struct qed_hwfn *
 			 * in a bitmap and increasing the chain consumer only
 			 * for the first successive completed entries.
 			 */
-			bitmap_set(p_spq->p_comp_bitmap, pos, SPQ_RING_SIZE);
+			__set_bit(pos, p_spq->p_comp_bitmap);
 
 			while (test_bit(p_spq->comp_bitmap_idx,
 					p_spq->p_comp_bitmap)) {
-				bitmap_clear(p_spq->p_comp_bitmap,
-					     p_spq->comp_bitmap_idx,
-					     SPQ_RING_SIZE);
+				__clear_bit(p_spq->comp_bitmap_idx,
+					    p_spq->p_comp_bitmap);
 				p_spq->comp_bitmap_idx++;
 				qed_chain_return_produced(&p_spq->chain);
 			}

[PATCH 4.7 12/41] macsec: ensure rx_sa is set when validation is disabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit e3a3b626010a14fe067f163c2c43409d5afcd2a9 ]

macsec_decrypt() is not called when validation is disabled and so
macsec_skb_cb(skb)->rx_sa is not set; but it is used later in
macsec_post_decrypt(), ensure that it's always initialized.

Fixes: c09440f7dcb3 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/macsec.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -942,7 +942,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(st
 	}
 
 	macsec_skb_cb(skb)->req = req;
-	macsec_skb_cb(skb)->rx_sa = rx_sa;
 	skb->dev = dev;
 	aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, macsec_decrypt_done, skb);
 
@@ -1169,6 +1168,8 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle
 		}
 	}
 
+	macsec_skb_cb(skb)->rx_sa = rx_sa;
+
 	/* Disabled && !changed text => skip validation */
 	if (hdr->tci_an & MACSEC_TCI_C ||
 	    secy->validate_frames != MACSEC_VALIDATE_DISABLED)

[PATCH 4.7 13/41] tcp: consider recv buf for the initial window scale

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>

[ Upstream commit f626300a3e776ccc9671b0dd94698fb3aa315966 ]

tcp_select_initial_window() intends to advertise a window
scaling for the maximum possible window size. To do so,
it considers the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and
net.core.rmem_max as the only possible upper-bounds.
However, users with CAP_NET_ADMIN can use SO_RCVBUFFORCE
to set the socket's receive buffer size to values
larger than net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2] and net.core.rmem_max.
Thus, SO_RCVBUFFORCE is effectively ignored by
tcp_select_initial_window().

To fix this, consider the maximum of net.ipv4.tcp_rmem[2],
net.core.rmem_max and socket's initial buffer space.

Fixes: b0573dea1fb3 ("[NET]: Introduce SO_{SND,RCV}BUFFORCE socket options")
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Suggested-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -236,7 +236,8 @@ void tcp_select_initial_window(int __spa
 		/* Set window scaling on max possible window
 		 * See RFC1323 for an explanation of the limit to 14
 		 */
-		space = max_t(u32, sysctl_tcp_rmem[2], sysctl_rmem_max);
+		space = max_t(u32, space, sysctl_tcp_rmem[2]);
+		space = max_t(u32, space, sysctl_rmem_max);
 		space = min_t(u32, space, *window_clamp);
 		while (space > 65535 && (*rcv_wscale) < 14) {
 			space >>= 1;

[PATCH 4.7 14/41] arm: oabi compat: add missing access checks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>

commit 7de249964f5578e67b99699c5f0b405738d820a2 upstream.

Add access checks to sys_oabi_epoll_wait() and sys_oabi_semtimedop().
This fixes CVE-2016-3857, a local privilege escalation under
CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT.

Reported-by: Chiachih Wu <wuchiachih@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
@@ -279,8 +279,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oabi_epoll_wait(int
 	mm_segment_t fs;
 	long ret, err, i;
 
-	if (maxevents <= 0 || maxevents > (INT_MAX/sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
+	if (maxevents <= 0 ||
+			maxevents > (INT_MAX/sizeof(*kbuf)) ||
+			maxevents > (INT_MAX/sizeof(*events)))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, events, sizeof(*events) * maxevents))
+		return -EFAULT;
 	kbuf = kmalloc(sizeof(*kbuf) * maxevents, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!kbuf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -317,6 +321,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int
 
 	if (nsops < 1 || nsops > SEMOPM)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, tsops, sizeof(*tsops) * nsops))
+		return -EFAULT;
 	sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops) * nsops, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sops)
 		return -ENOMEM;

[PATCH 4.7 15/41] KEYS: 64-bit MIPS needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit 20f06ed9f61a185c6dabd662c310bed6189470df upstream.

MIPS64 needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace rather than
calling sys_keyctl.  The latter will work in a lot of cases, thereby hiding
the issue.

Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/13832/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S |    2 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ EXPORT(sysn32_call_table)
 	PTR	sys_ni_syscall			/* available, was setaltroot */
 	PTR	sys_add_key
 	PTR	sys_request_key
-	PTR	sys_keyctl			/* 6245 */
+	PTR	compat_sys_keyctl		/* 6245 */
 	PTR	sys_set_thread_area
 	PTR	sys_inotify_init
 	PTR	sys_inotify_add_watch
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ EXPORT(sys32_call_table)
 	PTR	sys_ni_syscall			/* available, was setaltroot */
 	PTR	sys_add_key			/* 4280 */
 	PTR	sys_request_key
-	PTR	sys_keyctl
+	PTR	compat_sys_keyctl
 	PTR	sys_set_thread_area
 	PTR	sys_inotify_init
 	PTR	sys_inotify_add_watch		/* 4285 */

[PATCH 4.7 16/41] IB/hfi1: Disable by default

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>

commit a154a8cd080b437969ef194dee365bbb60a3b38a upstream.

There is a strict policy in the Linux kernel that new drivers must be
disabled by default. Hence leave out the "default m" line from Kconfig.

Fixes: f48ad614c100 ("IB/hfi1: Move driver out of staging")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Cc: Jubin John <jubin.john@intel.com>
Cc: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/Kconfig |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/Kconfig
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ config INFINIBAND_HFI1
 	depends on X86_64 && INFINIBAND_RDMAVT
 	select MMU_NOTIFIER
 	select CRC32
-	default m
 	---help---
 	This is a low-level driver for Intel OPA Gen1 adapter.
 config HFI1_DEBUG_SDMA_ORDER

[PATCH 4.7 17/41] apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

commit 0b938a2e2cf0b0a2c8bac9769111545aff0fee97 upstream.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct se
 			seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
 		seq_puts(seq, "\n");
 	}
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
 
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 4.7 18/41] random: strengthen input validation for RNDADDTOENTCNT

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 86a574de4590ffe6fd3f3ca34cdcf655a78e36ec upstream.

Don't allow RNDADDTOENTCNT or RNDADDENTROPY to accept a negative
entropy value.  It doesn't make any sense to subtract from the entropy
counter, and it can trigger a warning:

random: negative entropy/overflow: pool input count -40000
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 6828 at drivers/char/random.c:670[<      none
 >] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 6828 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.7.0-rc4+ #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 ffffffff880b58e0 ffff88005dd9fcb0 ffffffff82cc838f ffffffff87158b40
 fffffbfff1016b1c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff87158b40
 ffffffff83283dae 0000000000000009 ffff88005dd9fcf8 ffffffff8136d27f
Call Trace:
 [<     inline     >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [<ffffffff82cc838f>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x18f lib/dump_stack.c:51
 [<ffffffff8136d27f>] __warn+0x19f/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:516
 [<ffffffff8136d48c>] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:551
 [<ffffffff83283dae>] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
 [<     inline     >] credit_entropy_bits_safe drivers/char/random.c:734
 [<ffffffff8328785d>] random_ioctl+0x21d/0x250 drivers/char/random.c:1546
 [<     inline     >] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
 [<ffffffff8185316c>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0xff0 fs/ioctl.c:674
 [<     inline     >] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:689
 [<ffffffff8185405f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:680
 [<ffffffff86a995c0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:207
---[ end trace 5d4902b2ba842f1f ]---

This was triggered using the test program:

// autogenerated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)

int main() {
        int fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDWR);
        int val = -5000;
        ioctl(fd, RNDADDTOENTCNT, &val);
        return 0;
}

It's harmless in that (a) only root can trigger it, and (b) after
complaining the code never does let the entropy count go negative, but
it's better to simply not allow this userspace from passing in a
negative entropy value altogether.

Google-Bug-Id: #29575089
Reported-By: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/random.c |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -723,15 +723,18 @@ retry:
 	}
 }
 
-static void credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
 {
 	const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1));
 
+	if (nbits < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
 	nbits = min(nbits,  nbits_max);
-	nbits = max(nbits, -nbits_max);
 
 	credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -1543,8 +1546,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
-		return 0;
+		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
 	case RNDADDENTROPY:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -1558,8 +1560,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 				    size);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			return retval;
-		credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
-		return 0;
+		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
 		/*

[PATCH 4.7 19/41] mm: memcontrol: fix swap counter leak on swapout from offline cgroup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>

commit 1f47b61fb4077936465dcde872a4e5cc4fe708da upstream.

An offline memory cgroup might have anonymous memory or shmem left
charged to it and no swap.  Since only swap entries pin the id of an
offline cgroup, such a cgroup will have no id and so an attempt to
swapout its anon/shmem will not store memory cgroup info in the swap
cgroup map.  As a result, memcg->swap or memcg->memsw will never get
uncharged from it and any of its ascendants.

Fix this by always charging swapout to the first ancestor cgroup that
hasn't released its id yet.

[hannes@cmpxchg.org: add comment to mem_cgroup_swapout]
[vdavydov@virtuozzo.com: use WARN_ON_ONCE() in mem_cgroup_id_get_online()]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160803123445.GJ13263@esperanza
Fixes: 73f576c04b941 ("mm: memcontrol: fix cgroup creation failure after many small jobs")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5336daa5c9a32e776067773d9da655d2dc126491.1470219853.git.vdavydov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/memcontrol.c |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -4088,6 +4088,24 @@ static void mem_cgroup_id_get(struct mem
 	atomic_inc(&memcg->id.ref);
 }
 
+static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_id_get_online(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
+{
+	while (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&memcg->id.ref)) {
+		/*
+		 * The root cgroup cannot be destroyed, so it's refcount must
+		 * always be >= 1.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(memcg == root_mem_cgroup)) {
+			VM_BUG_ON(1);
+			break;
+		}
+		memcg = parent_mem_cgroup(memcg);
+		if (!memcg)
+			memcg = root_mem_cgroup;
+	}
+	return memcg;
+}
+
 static void mem_cgroup_id_put(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
 {
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&memcg->id.ref)) {
@@ -5805,7 +5823,7 @@ subsys_initcall(mem_cgroup_init);
  */
 void mem_cgroup_swapout(struct page *page, swp_entry_t entry)
 {
-	struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
+	struct mem_cgroup *memcg, *swap_memcg;
 	unsigned short oldid;
 
 	VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageLRU(page), page);
@@ -5820,16 +5838,27 @@ void mem_cgroup_swapout(struct page *pag
 	if (!memcg)
 		return;
 
-	mem_cgroup_id_get(memcg);
-	oldid = swap_cgroup_record(entry, mem_cgroup_id(memcg));
+	/*
+	 * In case the memcg owning these pages has been offlined and doesn't
+	 * have an ID allocated to it anymore, charge the closest online
+	 * ancestor for the swap instead and transfer the memory+swap charge.
+	 */
+	swap_memcg = mem_cgroup_id_get_online(memcg);
+	oldid = swap_cgroup_record(entry, mem_cgroup_id(swap_memcg));
 	VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(oldid, page);
-	mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(memcg, true);
+	mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(swap_memcg, true);
 
 	page->mem_cgroup = NULL;
 
 	if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg))
 		page_counter_uncharge(&memcg->memory, 1);
 
+	if (memcg != swap_memcg) {
+		if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(swap_memcg))
+			page_counter_charge(&swap_memcg->memsw, 1);
+		page_counter_uncharge(&memcg->memsw, 1);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Interrupts should be disabled here because the caller holds the
 	 * mapping->tree_lock lock which is taken with interrupts-off. It is
@@ -5868,11 +5897,14 @@ int mem_cgroup_try_charge_swap(struct pa
 	if (!memcg)
 		return 0;
 
+	memcg = mem_cgroup_id_get_online(memcg);
+
 	if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg) &&
-	    !page_counter_try_charge(&memcg->swap, 1, &counter))
+	    !page_counter_try_charge(&memcg->swap, 1, &counter)) {
+		mem_cgroup_id_put(memcg);
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
-	mem_cgroup_id_get(memcg);
 	oldid = swap_cgroup_record(entry, mem_cgroup_id(memcg));
 	VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(oldid, page);
 	mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(memcg, true);

[PATCH 4.7 20/41] mm: memcontrol: fix memcg id ref counter on swap charge move

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>

commit 615d66c37c755c49ce022c9e5ac0875d27d2603d upstream.

Since commit 73f576c04b94 ("mm: memcontrol: fix cgroup creation failure
after many small jobs") swap entries do not pin memcg->css.refcnt
directly.  Instead, they pin memcg->id.ref.  So we should adjust the
reference counters accordingly when moving swap charges between cgroups.

Fixes: 73f576c04b941 ("mm: memcontrol: fix cgroup creation failure after many small jobs")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9ce297c64954a42dc90b543bc76106c4a94f07e8.1470219853.git.vdavydov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/memcontrol.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -4083,9 +4083,9 @@ static struct cftype mem_cgroup_legacy_f
 
 static DEFINE_IDR(mem_cgroup_idr);
 
-static void mem_cgroup_id_get(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
+static void mem_cgroup_id_get_many(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, unsigned int n)
 {
-	atomic_inc(&memcg->id.ref);
+	atomic_add(n, &memcg->id.ref);
 }
 
 static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_id_get_online(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
@@ -4106,9 +4106,9 @@ static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_id_
 	return memcg;
 }
 
-static void mem_cgroup_id_put(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
+static void mem_cgroup_id_put_many(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, unsigned int n)
 {
-	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&memcg->id.ref)) {
+	if (atomic_sub_and_test(n, &memcg->id.ref)) {
 		idr_remove(&mem_cgroup_idr, memcg->id.id);
 		memcg->id.id = 0;
 
@@ -4117,6 +4117,16 @@ static void mem_cgroup_id_put(struct mem
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void mem_cgroup_id_get(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
+{
+	mem_cgroup_id_get_many(memcg, 1);
+}
+
+static inline void mem_cgroup_id_put(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
+{
+	mem_cgroup_id_put_many(memcg, 1);
+}
+
 /**
  * mem_cgroup_from_id - look up a memcg from a memcg id
  * @id: the memcg id to look up
@@ -4754,6 +4764,8 @@ static void __mem_cgroup_clear_mc(void)
 		if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(mc.from))
 			page_counter_uncharge(&mc.from->memsw, mc.moved_swap);
 
+		mem_cgroup_id_put_many(mc.from, mc.moved_swap);
+
 		/*
 		 * we charged both to->memory and to->memsw, so we
 		 * should uncharge to->memory.
@@ -4761,9 +4773,9 @@ static void __mem_cgroup_clear_mc(void)
 		if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(mc.to))
 			page_counter_uncharge(&mc.to->memory, mc.moved_swap);
 
-		css_put_many(&mc.from->css, mc.moved_swap);
+		mem_cgroup_id_get_many(mc.to, mc.moved_swap);
+		css_put_many(&mc.to->css, mc.moved_swap);
 
-		/* we've already done css_get(mc.to) */
 		mc.moved_swap = 0;
 	}
 	memcg_oom_recover(from);

[PATCH 4.7 21/41] x86/syscalls/64: Add compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit f7d665627e103e82d34306c7d3f6f46f387c0d8b upstream.

x86_64 needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace rather than
calling sys_keyctl(). The latter will work in a lot of cases, thereby
hiding the issue.

Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/146961615805.14395.5581949237156769439.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
 # 285 sys_setaltroot
 286	i386	add_key			sys_add_key
 287	i386	request_key		sys_request_key
-288	i386	keyctl			sys_keyctl
+288	i386	keyctl			sys_keyctl			compat_sys_keyctl
 289	i386	ioprio_set		sys_ioprio_set
 290	i386	ioprio_get		sys_ioprio_get
 291	i386	inotify_init		sys_inotify_init

[PATCH 4.7 22/41] block: fix use-after-free in seq file

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84 upstream.

I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:

    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
    Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
    =============================================================================
    BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
    INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
            ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
            __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
            kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
            disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
            traverse+0x176/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
            __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
            kfree+0x20a/0x220
            disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
            traverse+0x3b5/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a

    CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G    B           4.7.0+ #62
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
     ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
     [<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
     [<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
     [<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
     [<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
     [<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
     [<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
     [<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
     [<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
     [<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
     [<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
     [<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
     [<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
     [<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
     [<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10

This problem can occur in the following situation:

open()
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
       - seqf->private = iter
    - .seq_stop()
       - kfree(seqf->private)
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // fails
    - .seq_stop()
       - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer

As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.

An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 block/genhd.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/block/genhd.c
+++ b/block/genhd.c
@@ -856,6 +856,7 @@ static void disk_seqf_stop(struct seq_fi
 	if (iter) {
 		class_dev_iter_exit(iter);
 		kfree(iter);
+		seqf->private = NULL;
 	}
 }
 

[PATCH 4.7 23/41] sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>

commit 9b24fef9f0410fb5364245d6cc2bd044cc064007 upstream.

Commit 53dad6d3a8e5 ("ipc: fix race with LSMs") updated ipc_rcu_putref()
to receive rcu freeing function but used generic ipc_rcu_free() instead
of msg_rcu_free() which does security cleaning.

Running LTP msgsnd06 with kmemleak gives the following:

  cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak

  unreferenced object 0xffff88003c0a11f8 (size 8):
    comm "msgsnd06", pid 1645, jiffies 4294672526 (age 6.549s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      1b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00                          ........
    backtrace:
      kmemleak_alloc+0x23/0x40
      kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe1/0x180
      selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security+0x3f/0xd0
      security_msg_queue_alloc+0x2e/0x40
      newque+0x4e/0x150
      ipcget+0x159/0x1b0
      SyS_msgget+0x39/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f

Manfred Spraul suggested to fix sem.c as well and Davidlohr Bueso to
only use ipc_rcu_free in case of security allocation failure in newary()

Fixes: 53dad6d3a8e ("ipc: fix race with LSMs")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470083552-22966-1-git-send-email-fabf@skynet.be
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 ipc/msg.c |    2 +-
 ipc/sem.c |   12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ long do_msgsnd(int msqid, long mtype, vo
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		ipc_lock_object(&msq->q_perm);
 
-		ipc_rcu_putref(msq, ipc_rcu_free);
+		ipc_rcu_putref(msq, msg_rcu_free);
 		/* raced with RMID? */
 		if (!ipc_valid_object(&msq->q_perm)) {
 			err = -EIDRM;
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static inline struct sem_array *sem_obta
 static inline void sem_lock_and_putref(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	sem_lock(sma, NULL, -1);
-	ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+	ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 }
 
 static inline void sem_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct sem_array *s)
@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ static int semctl_main(struct ipc_namesp
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
 			if (sem_io == NULL) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 
@@ -1426,20 +1426,20 @@ static int semctl_main(struct ipc_namesp
 		if (nsems > SEMMSL_FAST) {
 			sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
 			if (sem_io == NULL) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (copy_from_user(sem_io, p, nsems*sizeof(ushort))) {
-			ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+			ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			goto out_free;
 		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++) {
 			if (sem_io[i] > SEMVMX) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				err = -ERANGE;
 				goto out_free;
 			}
@@ -1731,7 +1731,7 @@ static struct sem_undo *find_alloc_undo(
 	/* step 2: allocate new undo structure */
 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sem_undo) + sizeof(short)*nsems, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new) {
-		ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+		ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 

[PATCH 4.7 24/41] radix-tree: account nodes to memcg only if explicitly requested

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>

commit 05eb6e7263185a6bb0de9501ccf2addc52429414 upstream.

Radix trees may be used not only for storing page cache pages, so
unconditionally accounting radix tree nodes to the current memory cgroup
is bad: if a radix tree node is used for storing data shared among
different cgroups we risk pinning dead memory cgroups forever.

So let's only account radix tree nodes if it was explicitly requested by
passing __GFP_ACCOUNT to INIT_RADIX_TREE.  Currently, we only want to
account page cache entries, so mark mapping->page_tree so.

Fixes: 58e698af4c63 ("radix-tree: account radix_tree_node to memory cgroup")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470057188-7864-1-git-send-email-vdavydov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/inode.c       |    2 +-
 lib/radix-tree.c |   14 ++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inc_nlink);
 void address_space_init_once(struct address_space *mapping)
 {
 	memset(mapping, 0, sizeof(*mapping));
-	INIT_RADIX_TREE(&mapping->page_tree, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	INIT_RADIX_TREE(&mapping->page_tree, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_ACCOUNT);
 	spin_lock_init(&mapping->tree_lock);
 	init_rwsem(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mapping->private_list);
--- a/lib/radix-tree.c
+++ b/lib/radix-tree.c
@@ -274,10 +274,11 @@ radix_tree_node_alloc(struct radix_tree_
 
 		/*
 		 * Even if the caller has preloaded, try to allocate from the
-		 * cache first for the new node to get accounted.
+		 * cache first for the new node to get accounted to the memory
+		 * cgroup.
 		 */
 		ret = kmem_cache_alloc(radix_tree_node_cachep,
-				       gfp_mask | __GFP_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
+				       gfp_mask | __GFP_NOWARN);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -300,8 +301,7 @@ radix_tree_node_alloc(struct radix_tree_
 		kmemleak_update_trace(ret);
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = kmem_cache_alloc(radix_tree_node_cachep,
-			       gfp_mask | __GFP_ACCOUNT);
+	ret = kmem_cache_alloc(radix_tree_node_cachep, gfp_mask);
 out:
 	BUG_ON(radix_tree_is_internal_node(ret));
 	return ret;
@@ -348,6 +348,12 @@ static int __radix_tree_preload(gfp_t gf
 	struct radix_tree_node *node;
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
 
+	/*
+	 * Nodes preloaded by one cgroup can be be used by another cgroup, so
+	 * they should never be accounted to any particular memory cgroup.
+	 */
+	gfp_mask &= ~__GFP_ACCOUNT;
+
 	preempt_disable();
 	rtp = this_cpu_ptr(&radix_tree_preloads);
 	while (rtp->nr < RADIX_TREE_PRELOAD_SIZE) {

[PATCH 4.7 25/41] x86/microcode: Fix suspend to RAM with builtin microcode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit 4b703305d98bf7350d4b2953ee39a3aa2eeb1778 upstream.

Usually, after we have found the proper microcode blob for the current
machine, we stash it away for later use with save_microcode_in_initrd().

However, with builtin microcode which doesn't come from the initrd, we
don't call that function because CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=n and even if
set, we don't have a valid initrd.

In order to fix this, let's make save_microcode_in_initrd() an
fs_initcall which runs before rootfs_initcall() as this was the time it
was called previously through:

 rootfs_initcall(populate_rootfs)
 |-> free_initrd()
     |-> free_initrd_mem()
         |-> save_microcode_in_initrd()

Also, we make it run independently from initrd functionality being
present or not.

And since it is called in the microcode loader only now, we can also
make it static.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jim Bos <jim876@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465225850-7352-3-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h     |    2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c |    3 ++-
 arch/x86/mm/init.c                   |    7 -------
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h
@@ -133,13 +133,11 @@ static inline unsigned int x86_cpuid_fam
 #ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE
 extern void __init load_ucode_bsp(void);
 extern void load_ucode_ap(void);
-extern int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void);
 void reload_early_microcode(void);
 extern bool get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name);
 #else
 static inline void __init load_ucode_bsp(void)			{ }
 static inline void load_ucode_ap(void)				{ }
-static inline int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)		{ return 0; }
 static inline void reload_early_microcode(void)			{ }
 static inline bool
 get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name)	{ return false; }
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ void load_ucode_ap(void)
 	}
 }
 
-int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
+static int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
 {
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
 
@@ -691,4 +691,5 @@ int __init microcode_init(void)
 	return error;
 
 }
+fs_initcall(save_microcode_in_initrd);
 late_initcall(microcode_init);
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -696,13 +696,6 @@ void free_initmem(void)
 void __init free_initrd_mem(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Remember, initrd memory may contain microcode or other useful things.
-	 * Before we lose initrd mem, we need to find a place to hold them
-	 * now that normal virtual memory is enabled.
-	 */
-	save_microcode_in_initrd();
-
-	/*
 	 * end could be not aligned, and We can not align that,
 	 * decompresser could be confused by aligned initrd_end
 	 * We already reserve the end partial page before in

[PATCH 4.7 26/41] x86/power/64: Fix hibernation return address corruption

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit 4ce827b4cc58bec7952591b96cce2b28553e4d5b upstream.

In kernel bug 150021, a kernel panic was reported when restoring a
hibernate image.  Only a picture of the oops was reported, so I can't
paste the whole thing here.  But here are the most interesting parts:

  kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8804615cfd78
  ...
  RIP: ffff8804615cfd78
  RSP: ffff8804615f0000
  RBP: ffff8804615cfdc0
  ...
  Call Trace:
   do_signal+0x23
   exit_to_usermode_loop+0x64
   ...

The RIP is on the same page as RBP, so it apparently started executing
on the stack.

The bug was bisected to commit ef0f3ed5a4ac (x86/asm/power: Create
stack frames in hibernate_asm_64.S), which in retrospect seems quite
dangerous, since that code saves and restores the stack pointer from a
global variable ('saved_context').

There are a lot of moving parts in the hibernate save and restore paths,
so I don't know exactly what caused the panic.  Presumably, a FRAME_END
was executed without the corresponding FRAME_BEGIN, or vice versa.  That
would corrupt the return address on the stack and would be consistent
with the details of the above panic.

[ rjw: One major problem is that by the time the FRAME_BEGIN in
  restore_registers() is executed, the stack pointer value may not
  be valid any more.  Namely, the stack area pointed to by it
  previously may have been overwritten by some image memory contents
  and that page frame may now be used for whatever different purpose
  it had been allocated for before hibernation.  In that case, the
  FRAME_BEGIN will corrupt that memory. ]

Instead of doing the frame pointer save/restore around the bounds of the
affected functions, just do it around the call to swsusp_save().

That has the same effect of ensuring that if swsusp_save() sleeps, the
frame pointers will be correct.  It's also a much more obviously safe
way to do it than the original patch.  And objtool still doesn't report
any warnings.

Fixes: ef0f3ed5a4ac (x86/asm/power: Create stack frames in hibernate_asm_64.S)
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=150021
Reported-by: Andre Reinke <andre.reinke@mailbox.org>
Tested-by: Andre Reinke <andre.reinke@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <asm/frame.h>
 
 ENTRY(swsusp_arch_suspend)
-	FRAME_BEGIN
 	movq	$saved_context, %rax
 	movq	%rsp, pt_regs_sp(%rax)
 	movq	%rbp, pt_regs_bp(%rax)
@@ -48,6 +47,7 @@ ENTRY(swsusp_arch_suspend)
 	movq	%cr3, %rax
 	movq	%rax, restore_cr3(%rip)
 
+	FRAME_BEGIN
 	call swsusp_save
 	FRAME_END
 	ret
@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ ENTRY(core_restore_code)
 	 /* code below belongs to the image kernel */
 	.align PAGE_SIZE
 ENTRY(restore_registers)
-	FRAME_BEGIN
 	/* go back to the original page tables */
 	movq    %r9, %cr3
 
@@ -145,6 +144,5 @@ ENTRY(restore_registers)
 	/* tell the hibernation core that we've just restored the memory */
 	movq	%rax, in_suspend(%rip)
 
-	FRAME_END
 	ret
 ENDPROC(restore_registers)

[PATCH 4.7 27/41] fuse: fsync() did not return IO errors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@parallels.com>

commit ac7f052b9e1534c8248f814b6f0068ad8d4a06d2 upstream.

Due to implementation of fuse writeback filemap_write_and_wait_range() does
not catch errors. We have to do this directly after fuse_sync_writes()

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4d99ff8f12eb ("fuse: Turn writeback cache on")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/fuse/file.c |   15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -462,6 +462,21 @@ int fuse_fsync_common(struct file *file,
 		goto out;
 
 	fuse_sync_writes(inode);
+
+	/*
+	 * Due to implementation of fuse writeback
+	 * filemap_write_and_wait_range() does not catch errors.
+	 * We have to do this directly after fuse_sync_writes()
+	 */
+	if (test_bit(AS_ENOSPC, &file->f_mapping->flags) &&
+	    test_and_clear_bit(AS_ENOSPC, &file->f_mapping->flags))
+		err = -ENOSPC;
+	if (test_bit(AS_EIO, &file->f_mapping->flags) &&
+	    test_and_clear_bit(AS_EIO, &file->f_mapping->flags))
+		err = -EIO;
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
 	err = sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;

[PATCH 4.7 28/41] fuse: fuse_flush must check mapping->flags for errors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>

commit 9ebce595f63a407c5cec98f98f9da8459b73740a upstream.

fuse_flush() calls write_inode_now() that triggers writeback, but actual
writeback will happen later, on fuse_sync_writes(). If an error happens,
fuse_writepage_end() will set error bit in mapping->flags. So, we have to
check mapping->flags after fuse_sync_writes().

Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4d99ff8f12eb ("fuse: Turn writeback cache on")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/fuse/file.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -417,6 +417,15 @@ static int fuse_flush(struct file *file,
 	fuse_sync_writes(inode);
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 
+	if (test_bit(AS_ENOSPC, &file->f_mapping->flags) &&
+	    test_and_clear_bit(AS_ENOSPC, &file->f_mapping->flags))
+		err = -ENOSPC;
+	if (test_bit(AS_EIO, &file->f_mapping->flags) &&
+	    test_and_clear_bit(AS_EIO, &file->f_mapping->flags))
+		err = -EIO;
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	req = fuse_get_req_nofail_nopages(fc, file);
 	memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg));
 	inarg.fh = ff->fh;

[PATCH 4.7 29/41] fuse: fix wrong assignment of ->flags in fuse_send_init()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>

commit 9446385f05c9af25fed53dbed3cc75763730be52 upstream.

FUSE_HAS_IOCTL_DIR should be assigned to ->flags, it may be a typo.

Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 69fe05c90ed5 ("fuse: add missing INIT flags")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/fuse/inode.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ static void fuse_send_init(struct fuse_c
 	arg->flags |= FUSE_ASYNC_READ | FUSE_POSIX_LOCKS | FUSE_ATOMIC_O_TRUNC |
 		FUSE_EXPORT_SUPPORT | FUSE_BIG_WRITES | FUSE_DONT_MASK |
 		FUSE_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_SPLICE_MOVE | FUSE_SPLICE_READ |
-		FUSE_FLOCK_LOCKS | FUSE_IOCTL_DIR | FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA |
+		FUSE_FLOCK_LOCKS | FUSE_HAS_IOCTL_DIR | FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA |
 		FUSE_DO_READDIRPLUS | FUSE_READDIRPLUS_AUTO | FUSE_ASYNC_DIO |
 		FUSE_WRITEBACK_CACHE | FUSE_NO_OPEN_SUPPORT |
 		FUSE_PARALLEL_DIROPS;

[PATCH 4.7 30/41] Revert "mm, mempool: only set __GFP_NOMEMALLOC if there are free elements"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>

commit 4e390b2b2f34b8daaabf2df1df0cf8f798b87ddb upstream.

This reverts commit f9054c70d28b ("mm, mempool: only set __GFP_NOMEMALLOC
if there are free elements").

There has been a report about OOM killer invoked when swapping out to a
dm-crypt device.  The primary reason seems to be that the swapout out IO
managed to completely deplete memory reserves.  Ondrej was able to
bisect and explained the issue by pointing to f9054c70d28b ("mm,
mempool: only set __GFP_NOMEMALLOC if there are free elements").

The reason is that the swapout path is not throttled properly because
the md-raid layer needs to allocate from the generic_make_request path
which means it allocates from the PF_MEMALLOC context.  dm layer uses
mempool_alloc in order to guarantee a forward progress which used to
inhibit access to memory reserves when using page allocator.  This has
changed by f9054c70d28b ("mm, mempool: only set __GFP_NOMEMALLOC if
there are free elements") which has dropped the __GFP_NOMEMALLOC
protection when the memory pool is depleted.

If we are running out of memory and the only way forward to free memory
is to perform swapout we just keep consuming memory reserves rather than
throttling the mempool allocations and allowing the pending IO to
complete up to a moment when the memory is depleted completely and there
is no way forward but invoking the OOM killer.  This is less than
optimal.

The original intention of f9054c70d28b was to help with the OOM
situations where the oom victim depends on mempool allocation to make a
forward progress.  David has mentioned the following backtrace:

  schedule
  schedule_timeout
  io_schedule_timeout
  mempool_alloc
  __split_and_process_bio
  dm_request
  generic_make_request
  submit_bio
  mpage_readpages
  ext4_readpages
  __do_page_cache_readahead
  ra_submit
  filemap_fault
  handle_mm_fault
  __do_page_fault
  do_page_fault
  page_fault

We do not know more about why the mempool is depleted without being
replenished in time, though.  In any case the dm layer shouldn't depend
on any allocations outside of the dedicated pools so a forward progress
should be guaranteed.  If this is not the case then the dm should be
fixed rather than papering over the problem and postponing it to later
by accessing more memory reserves.

mempools are a mechanism to maintain dedicated memory reserves to
guaratee forward progress.  Allowing them an unbounded access to the
page allocator memory reserves is going against the whole purpose of
this mechanism.

Bisected by Ondrej Kozina.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160721145309.GR26379@dhcp22.suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/mempool.c |   18 +++---------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/mempool.c
+++ b/mm/mempool.c
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(mempool_resize);
  * returns NULL. Note that due to preallocation, this function
  * *never* fails when called from process contexts. (it might
  * fail if called from an IRQ context.)
- * Note: neither __GFP_NOMEMALLOC nor __GFP_ZERO are supported.
+ * Note: using __GFP_ZERO is not supported.
  */
 void *mempool_alloc(mempool_t *pool, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
@@ -315,27 +315,16 @@ void *mempool_alloc(mempool_t *pool, gfp
 	wait_queue_t wait;
 	gfp_t gfp_temp;
 
-	/* If oom killed, memory reserves are essential to prevent livelock */
-	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(gfp_mask & __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
-	/* No element size to zero on allocation */
 	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(gfp_mask & __GFP_ZERO);
-
 	might_sleep_if(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM);
 
+	gfp_mask |= __GFP_NOMEMALLOC;	/* don't allocate emergency reserves */
 	gfp_mask |= __GFP_NORETRY;	/* don't loop in __alloc_pages */
 	gfp_mask |= __GFP_NOWARN;	/* failures are OK */
 
 	gfp_temp = gfp_mask & ~(__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM|__GFP_IO);
 
 repeat_alloc:
-	if (likely(pool->curr_nr)) {
-		/*
-		 * Don't allocate from emergency reserves if there are
-		 * elements available.  This check is racy, but it will
-		 * be rechecked each loop.
-		 */
-		gfp_temp |= __GFP_NOMEMALLOC;
-	}
 
 	element = pool->alloc(gfp_temp, pool->pool_data);
 	if (likely(element != NULL))
@@ -359,12 +348,11 @@ repeat_alloc:
 	 * We use gfp mask w/o direct reclaim or IO for the first round.  If
 	 * alloc failed with that and @pool was empty, retry immediately.
 	 */
-	if ((gfp_temp & ~__GFP_NOMEMALLOC) != gfp_mask) {
+	if (gfp_temp != gfp_mask) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags);
 		gfp_temp = gfp_mask;
 		goto repeat_alloc;
 	}
-	gfp_temp = gfp_mask;
 
 	/* We must not sleep if !__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM */
 	if (!(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM)) {

[PATCH 4.7 31/41] fs/dcache.c: avoid soft-lockup in dput()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>

commit 47be61845c775643f1aa4d2a54343549f943c94c upstream.

We triggered soft-lockup under stress test which
open/access/write/close one file concurrently on more than
five different CPUs:

WARN: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 11s! [who:30631]
...
[<ffffffc0003986f8>] dput+0x100/0x298
[<ffffffc00038c2dc>] terminate_walk+0x4c/0x60
[<ffffffc00038f56c>] path_lookupat+0x5cc/0x7a8
[<ffffffc00038f780>] filename_lookup+0x38/0xf0
[<ffffffc000391180>] user_path_at_empty+0x78/0xd0
[<ffffffc0003911f4>] user_path_at+0x1c/0x28
[<ffffffc00037d4fc>] SyS_faccessat+0xb4/0x230

->d_lock trylock may failed many times because of concurrently
operations, and dput() may execute a long time.

Fix this by replacing cpu_relax() with cond_resched().
dput() used to be sleepable, so make it sleepable again
should be safe.

Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/dcache.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -622,7 +622,6 @@ static struct dentry *dentry_kill(struct
 
 failed:
 	spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
-	cpu_relax();
 	return dentry; /* try again with same dentry */
 }
 
@@ -796,6 +795,8 @@ void dput(struct dentry *dentry)
 		return;
 
 repeat:
+	might_sleep();
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (likely(fast_dput(dentry))) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -829,8 +830,10 @@ repeat:
 
 kill_it:
 	dentry = dentry_kill(dentry);
-	if (dentry)
+	if (dentry) {
+		cond_resched();
 		goto repeat;
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dput);
 

[PATCH 4.7 32/41] Revert "cpufreq: pcc-cpufreq: update default value of cpuinfo_transition_latency"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andreas Herrmann <aherrmann@suse.com>

commit da7d3abe1c9e5ebac2cf86f97e9e89888a5e2094 upstream.

This reverts commit 790d849bf811a8ab5d4cd2cce0f6fda92f6aebf2.

Using a v4.7-rc7 kernel on a HP ProLiant triggered following messages

 pcc-cpufreq: (v1.10.00) driver loaded with frequency limits: 1200 MHz, 2800 MHz
 cpufreq: ondemand governor failed, too long transition latency of HW, fallback to performance governor

The last line was shown for each CPU in the system.
Testing v4.5 (where commit 790d849b was integrated) triggered
similar messages. Same behaviour on a 2nd HP Proliant system.

So commit 790d849bf (cpufreq: pcc-cpufreq: update default value of
cpuinfo_transition_latency) causes the system to use performance
governor which, I guess, was not the intention of the patch.

Enabling debug output in pcc-cpufreq provides following verbose output:

 pcc-cpufreq: (v1.10.00) driver loaded with frequency limits: 1200 MHz, 2800 MHz
 pcc_get_offset: for CPU 0: pcc_cpu_data input_offset: 0x44, pcc_cpu_data output_offset: 0x48
 init: policy->max is 2800000, policy->min is 1200000
 get: get_freq for CPU 0
 get: SUCCESS: (virtual) output_offset for cpu 0 is 0xffffc9000d7c0048, contains a value of: 0xff06. Speed is: 168000 MHz
 cpufreq: ondemand governor failed, too long transition latency of HW, fallback to performance governor
 target: CPU 0 should go to target freq: 2800000 (virtual) input_offset is 0xffffc9000d7c0044
 target: was SUCCESSFUL for cpu 0

I am asking to revert 790d849bf to re-enable usage of ondemand
governor with pcc-cpufreq.

Fixes: 790d849bf (cpufreq: pcc-cpufreq: update default value of cpuinfo_transition_latency)
Signed-off-by: Andreas Herrmann <aherrmann@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 Documentation/cpu-freq/pcc-cpufreq.txt |    4 ++--
 drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c          |    2 --
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/cpu-freq/pcc-cpufreq.txt
+++ b/Documentation/cpu-freq/pcc-cpufreq.txt
@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ to be strictly associated with a P-state
 
 2.2 cpuinfo_transition_latency:
 -------------------------------
-The cpuinfo_transition_latency field is CPUFREQ_ETERNAL. The PCC specification
-does not include a field to expose this value currently.
+The cpuinfo_transition_latency field is 0. The PCC specification does
+not include a field to expose this value currently.
 
 2.3 cpuinfo_cur_freq:
 ---------------------
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c
@@ -555,8 +555,6 @@ static int pcc_cpufreq_cpu_init(struct c
 	policy->min = policy->cpuinfo.min_freq =
 		ioread32(&pcch_hdr->minimum_frequency) * 1000;
 
-	policy->cpuinfo.transition_latency = CPUFREQ_ETERNAL;
-
 	pr_debug("init: policy->max is %d, policy->min is %d\n",
 		policy->max, policy->min);
 out:

[PATCH 4.7 33/41] crypto: gcm - Filter out async ghash if necessary

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit b30bdfa86431afbafe15284a3ad5ac19b49b88e3 upstream.

As it is if you ask for a sync gcm you may actually end up with
an async one because it does not filter out async implementations
of ghash.

This patch fixes this by adding the necessary filter when looking
for ghash.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/gcm.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -639,7 +639,9 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create_common(stru
 
 	ghash_alg = crypto_find_alg(ghash_name, &crypto_ahash_type,
 				    CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_HASH,
-				    CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK);
+				    CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK |
+				    crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							 algt->mask));
 	if (IS_ERR(ghash_alg))
 		return PTR_ERR(ghash_alg);
 

[PATCH 4.7 34/41] crypto: scatterwalk - Fix test in scatterwalk_done

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit 5f070e81bee35f1b7bd1477bb223a873ff657803 upstream.

When there is more data to be processed, the current test in
scatterwalk_done may prevent us from calling pagedone even when
we should.

In particular, if we're on an SG entry spanning multiple pages
where the last page is not a full page, we will incorrectly skip
calling pagedone on the second last page.

This patch fixes this by adding a separate test for whether we've
reached the end of a page.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/scatterwalk.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/crypto/scatterwalk.c
+++ b/crypto/scatterwalk.c
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ static void scatterwalk_pagedone(struct
 
 void scatterwalk_done(struct scatter_walk *walk, int out, int more)
 {
-	if (!(scatterwalk_pagelen(walk) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) || !more)
+	if (!more || walk->offset >= walk->sg->offset + walk->sg->length ||
+	    !(walk->offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
 		scatterwalk_pagedone(walk, out, more);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(scatterwalk_done);

[PATCH 4.7 35/41] serial: mvebu-uart: free the IRQ in ->shutdown()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>

commit c2c1659b4f8f9e19fe82a4fd06cca4b3d59090ce upstream.

As suggested by the serial port infrastructure documentation, the IRQ is
requested in ->startup(). However, it is never freed in the ->shutdown()
hook.

With simple systems that open the serial port once for all and always
have at least one process that keep the serial port opened, there was no
problem. But with a more complicated system (*cough* systemd *cough*),
the serial port is opened/closed many times, which at some point no
processes having the serial port open at all. Due to this ->startup()
gets called again, tries to request_irq() again, which fails.

Fixes: 30530791a7a0 ("serial: mvebu-uart: initial support for Armada-3700 serial port")
Cc: Ofer Heifetz <oferh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/mvebu-uart.c
@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ static int mvebu_uart_startup(struct uar
 static void mvebu_uart_shutdown(struct uart_port *port)
 {
 	writel(0, port->membase + UART_CTRL);
+
+	free_irq(port->irq, port);
 }
 
 static void mvebu_uart_set_termios(struct uart_port *port,

[PATCH 4.7 36/41] ext4: check for extents that wrap around

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit f70749ca42943faa4d4dcce46dfdcaadb1d0c4b6 upstream.

An extent with lblock = 4294967295 and len = 1 will pass the
ext4_valid_extent() test:

	ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;

	if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
		return 0;

since last = 4294967295 + 1 - 1 = 4294967295. This would later trigger
the BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk) in ext4_es_end().

We can simplify it by removing the - 1 altogether and changing the test
to use lblock + len <= lblock, since now if len = 0, then lblock + 0 ==
lblock and it fails, and if len > 0 then lblock + len > lblock in order
to pass (i.e. it doesn't overflow).

Fixes: 5946d0893 ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Fixes: 2f974865f ("ext4: check for zero length extent explicitly")
Cc: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -381,9 +381,13 @@ static int ext4_valid_extent(struct inod
 	ext4_fsblk_t block = ext4_ext_pblock(ext);
 	int len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ext);
 	ext4_lblk_t lblock = le32_to_cpu(ext->ee_block);
-	ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;
 
-	if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
+	/*
+	 * We allow neither:
+	 *  - zero length
+	 *  - overflow/wrap-around
+	 */
+	if (lblock + len <= lblock)
 		return 0;
 	return ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), block, len);
 }

[PATCH 4.7 37/41] ext4: fix deadlock during page writeback

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

commit 646caa9c8e196880b41cd3e3d33a2ebc752bdb85 upstream.

Commit 06bd3c36a733 (ext4: fix data exposure after a crash) uncovered a
deadlock in ext4_writepages() which was previously much harder to hit.
After this commit xfstest generic/130 reproduces the deadlock on small
filesystems.

The problem happens when ext4_do_update_inode() sets LARGE_FILE feature
and marks current inode handle as synchronous. That subsequently results
in ext4_journal_stop() called from ext4_writepages() to block waiting for
transaction commit while still holding page locks, reference to io_end,
and some prepared bio in mpd structure each of which can possibly block
transaction commit from completing and thus results in deadlock.

Fix the problem by releasing page locks, io_end reference, and
submitting prepared bio before calling ext4_journal_stop().

[ Changed to defer the call to ext4_journal_stop() only if the handle
  is synchronous.  --tytso ]

Reported-and-tested-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -2748,13 +2748,36 @@ retry:
 				done = true;
 			}
 		}
-		ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+		/*
+		 * Caution: If the handle is synchronous,
+		 * ext4_journal_stop() can wait for transaction commit
+		 * to finish which may depend on writeback of pages to
+		 * complete or on page lock to be released.  In that
+		 * case, we have to wait until after after we have
+		 * submitted all the IO, released page locks we hold,
+		 * and dropped io_end reference (for extent conversion
+		 * to be able to complete) before stopping the handle.
+		 */
+		if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle) || handle->h_sync == 0) {
+			ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+			handle = NULL;
+		}
 		/* Submit prepared bio */
 		ext4_io_submit(&mpd.io_submit);
 		/* Unlock pages we didn't use */
 		mpage_release_unused_pages(&mpd, give_up_on_write);
-		/* Drop our io_end reference we got from init */
-		ext4_put_io_end(mpd.io_submit.io_end);
+		/*
+		 * Drop our io_end reference we got from init. We have
+		 * to be careful and use deferred io_end finishing if
+		 * we are still holding the transaction as we can
+		 * release the last reference to io_end which may end
+		 * up doing unwritten extent conversion.
+		 */
+		if (handle) {
+			ext4_put_io_end_defer(mpd.io_submit.io_end);
+			ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+		} else
+			ext4_put_io_end(mpd.io_submit.io_end);
 
 		if (ret == -ENOSPC && sbi->s_journal) {
 			/*

[PATCH 4.7 38/41] ext4: dont call ext4_should_journal_data() on the journal inode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit 6a7fd522a7c94cdef0a3b08acf8e6702056e635c upstream.

If ext4_fill_super() fails early, it's possible for ext4_evict_inode()
to call ext4_should_journal_data() before superblock options and flags
are fully set up.  In that case, the iput() on the journal inode can
end up causing a BUG().

Work around this problem by reordering the tests so we only call
ext4_should_journal_data() after we know it's not the journal inode.

Fixes: 2d859db3e4 ("ext4: fix data corruption in inodes with journalled data")
Fixes: 2b405bfa84 ("ext4: fix data=journal fast mount/umount hang")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ void ext4_evict_inode(struct inode *inod
 		 * Note that directories do not have this problem because they
 		 * don't use page cache.
 		 */
-		if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode) &&
-		    (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) &&
-		    inode->i_ino != EXT4_JOURNAL_INO) {
+		if (inode->i_ino != EXT4_JOURNAL_INO &&
+		    ext4_should_journal_data(inode) &&
+		    (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))) {
 			journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal;
 			tid_t commit_tid = EXT4_I(inode)->i_datasync_tid;
 

[PATCH 4.7 39/41] ext4: validate s_reserved_gdt_blocks on mount

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 5b9554dc5bf008ae7f68a52e3d7e76c0920938a2 upstream.

If s_reserved_gdt_blocks is extremely large, it's possible for
ext4_init_block_bitmap(), which is called when ext4 sets up an
uninitialized block bitmap, to corrupt random kernel memory.  Add the
same checks which e2fsck has --- it must never be larger than
blocksize / sizeof(__u32) --- and then add a backup check in
ext4_init_block_bitmap() in case the superblock gets modified after
the file system is mounted.

Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/balloc.c |    3 +++
 fs/ext4/super.c  |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
@@ -208,6 +208,9 @@ static int ext4_init_block_bitmap(struct
 	memset(bh->b_data, 0, sb->s_blocksize);
 
 	bit_max = ext4_num_base_meta_clusters(sb, block_group);
+	if ((bit_max >> 3) >= bh->b_size)
+		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
 	for (bit = 0; bit < bit_max; bit++)
 		ext4_set_bit(bit, bh->b_data);
 
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -3416,6 +3416,13 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_
 		goto failed_mount;
 	}
 
+	if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks) > (blocksize / 4)) {
+		ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
+			 "Number of reserved GDT blocks insanely large: %d",
+			 le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks));
+		goto failed_mount;
+	}
+
 	if (sbi->s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_DAX) {
 		err = bdev_dax_supported(sb, blocksize);
 		if (err)

[PATCH 4.7 40/41] ext4: short-cut orphan cleanup on error

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit c65d5c6c81a1f27dec5f627f67840726fcd146de upstream.

If we encounter a filesystem error during orphan cleanup, we should stop.
Otherwise, we may end up in an infinite loop where the same inode is
processed again and again.

    EXT4-fs (loop0): warning: checktime reached, running e2fsck is recommended
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:758: group 2, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 6117 vs 0 free clusters
    Aborting journal on device loop0-8.
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Remounting filesystem read-only
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_free_blocks:4895: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_remove_space:3068: IO failure
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_truncate:4667: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_orphan_del:2927: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (00000000618192a0): orphan list check failed!
    [...]
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819748): orphan list check failed!
    [...]
    EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819bf0): orphan list check failed!
    [...]

See-also: c9eb13a9105 ("ext4: fix hang when processing corrupted orphaned inode list")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/super.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -2278,6 +2278,16 @@ static void ext4_orphan_cleanup(struct s
 	while (es->s_last_orphan) {
 		struct inode *inode;
 
+		/*
+		 * We may have encountered an error during cleanup; if
+		 * so, skip the rest.
+		 */
+		if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_ERROR_FS) {
+			jbd_debug(1, "Skipping orphan recovery on fs with errors.\n");
+			es->s_last_orphan = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		inode = ext4_orphan_get(sb, le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_orphan));
 		if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
 			es->s_last_orphan = 0;

[PATCH 4.7 41/41] ext4: fix reference counting bug on block allocation error

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

commit 554a5ccc4e4a20c5f3ec859de0842db4b4b9c77e upstream.

If we hit this error when mounted with errors=continue or
errors=remount-ro:

    EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used:2940: comm ext4.exe: Allocating blocks 5090-6081 which overlap fs metadata

then ext4_mb_new_blocks() will call ext4_mb_release_context() and try to
continue. However, ext4_mb_release_context() is the wrong thing to call
here since we are still actually using the allocation context.

Instead, just error out. We could retry the allocation, but there is a
possibility of getting stuck in an infinite loop instead, so this seems
safer.

[ Fixed up so we don't return EAGAIN to userspace. --tytso ]

Fixes: 8556e8f3b6 ("ext4: Don't allow new groups to be added during block allocation")
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c |   17 +++--------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -2939,7 +2939,7 @@ ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_
 		ext4_error(sb, "Allocating blocks %llu-%llu which overlap "
 			   "fs metadata", block, block+len);
 		/* File system mounted not to panic on error
-		 * Fix the bitmap and repeat the block allocation
+		 * Fix the bitmap and return EFSCORRUPTED
 		 * We leak some of the blocks here.
 		 */
 		ext4_lock_group(sb, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_group);
@@ -2948,7 +2948,7 @@ ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_
 		ext4_unlock_group(sb, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_group);
 		err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, bitmap_bh);
 		if (!err)
-			err = -EAGAIN;
+			err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
@@ -4513,18 +4513,7 @@ repeat:
 	}
 	if (likely(ac->ac_status == AC_STATUS_FOUND)) {
 		*errp = ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(ac, handle, reserv_clstrs);
-		if (*errp == -EAGAIN) {
-			/*
-			 * drop the reference that we took
-			 * in ext4_mb_use_best_found
-			 */
-			ext4_mb_release_context(ac);
-			ac->ac_b_ex.fe_group = 0;
-			ac->ac_b_ex.fe_start = 0;
-			ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len = 0;
-			ac->ac_status = AC_STATUS_CONTINUE;
-			goto repeat;
-		} else if (*errp) {
+		if (*errp) {
 			ext4_discard_allocated_blocks(ac);
 			goto errout;
 		} else {

Re: [PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 06:44:02PM -0700, kernelci.org bot wrote:
> stable-rc boot: 468 boots: 1 failed, 432 passed with 33 offline, 2 conflicts (v4.7-41-g57464803070d)
> 
> Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/kernel/v4.7-41-g57464803070d/
> Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/kernel/v4.7-41-g57464803070d/
> 
> Tree: stable-rc
> Branch: local/linux-4.7.y
> Git Describe: v4.7-41-g57464803070d
> Git Commit: 57464803070db4979012aba1322f675d42a5c280
> Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
> Tested: 85 unique boards, 21 SoC families, 35 builds out of 143
> 
> Boot Failure Detected: https://kernelci.org/boot/?v4.7-41-g57464803070d&fail
> 
> arm:
> 
>     multi_v7_defconfig+CONFIG_LKDTM=y:
>         sun5i-r8-chip: 1 failed lab

Is this boot failure to be expected for the 4.7 tree?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[Kevin Hilman]

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> writes:

> On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 06:44:02PM -0700, kernelci.org bot wrote:
>> stable-rc boot: 468 boots: 1 failed, 432 passed with 33 offline, 2 conflicts (v4.7-41-g57464803070d)
>> 
>> Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/kernel/v4.7-41-g57464803070d/
>> Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/kernel/v4.7-41-g57464803070d/
>> 
>> Tree: stable-rc
>> Branch: local/linux-4.7.y
>> Git Describe: v4.7-41-g57464803070d
>> Git Commit: 57464803070db4979012aba1322f675d42a5c280
>> Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
>> Tested: 85 unique boards, 21 SoC families, 35 builds out of 143
>> 
>> Boot Failure Detected: https://kernelci.org/boot/?v4.7-41-g57464803070d&fail
>> 
>> arm:
>> 
>>     multi_v7_defconfig+CONFIG_LKDTM=y:
>>         sun5i-r8-chip: 1 failed lab
>
> Is this boot failure to be expected for the 4.7 tree?

Nope, but  I re-tried it and it seems to be working fine, so it can be
considered a PASS.  

Kevin

Re: [PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On 08/14/2016 01:38 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.7.1 release.
> There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue Aug 16 20:25:22 UTC 2016.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
	total: 148 pass: 146 fail: 2
Failed builds:
	unicore32:defconfig
	unicore32:allnoconfig

Qemu test results:
	total: 107 pass: 107 fail: 0

The fix for the unicore32 build error finally made it into mainline
(783011b13095, "unicore32: mm: Add missing parameter to
arch_vma_access_permitted").

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Thanks,
Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 06:03:39AM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On 08/14/2016 01:38 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.7.1 release.
> > There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Tue Aug 16 20:25:22 UTC 2016.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> 
> Build results:
> 	total: 148 pass: 146 fail: 2
> Failed builds:
> 	unicore32:defconfig
> 	unicore32:allnoconfig
> 
> Qemu test results:
> 	total: 107 pass: 107 fail: 0
> 
> The fix for the unicore32 build error finally made it into mainline
> (783011b13095, "unicore32: mm: Add missing parameter to
> arch_vma_access_permitted").

Great!  I'll queue that up for the next 4.7-stable release after this
on, no need to worry about it now.

And thanks for all of these test results, much appreciated.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[Shuah Khan]

On 08/14/2016 02:38 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.7.1 release.
> There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Tue Aug 16 20:25:22 UTC 2016.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.7.1-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.7.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah


-- 
Shuah Khan
Sr. Linux Kernel Developer
Open Source Innovation Group
Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley)
shuah.kh@samsung.com

Re: [PATCH 4.7 00/41] 4.7.1-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 10:03:10PM -0600, Shuah Khan wrote:
> On 08/14/2016 02:38 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.7.1 release.
> > There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Tue Aug 16 20:25:22 UTC 2016.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.7.1-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> >   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.7.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> > greg k-h
> > 
> 
> Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h