From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from wtarreau.pck.nerim.net ([62.212.114.60]:44393 "EHLO 1wt.eu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752329AbcHPVny (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Aug 2016 17:43:54 -0400 Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 23:43:45 +0200 From: Willy Tarreau To: "Charles (Chas) Williams" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet , Yuchung Cheng , Neal Cardwell , "David S. Miller" Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3.10.y] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable Message-ID: <20160816214345.GA16017@1wt.eu> References: <1471380611-22214-1-git-send-email-ciwillia@brocade.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1471380611-22214-1-git-send-email-ciwillia@brocade.com> Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 04:50:11PM -0400, Charles (Chas) Williams wrote: > From: Eric Dumazet > > [ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ] > > Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS > (RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker > to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic > paper. > > This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds > some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack > sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes. > > Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus. > > Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting > to remove the host limit in the future. > > v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period. > > Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2") > Reported-by: Yue Cao > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds > Cc: Yuchung Cheng > Cc: Neal Cardwell > Acked-by: Neal Cardwell > Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng > Signed-off-by: David S. Miller > [ ciwillia: backport to 3.10-stable ] > Signed-off-by: Chas Williams (...) Thank you guys, I'm queuing this v3 then. Willy